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ABSTRACf 
International Technology Transfer (the transfer of technology across national borders) is 
extensively believed to be necessary for the industrialisation of any c01mtry. The experiences 
of some successful countries in rapid economic and industrial development show that the 
acquisition of a significant amount of foreign technology has played a crucial role in 
promoting their managerial and technical expertise as well as increasing their productivity 
level In particular, the experiences of some successful East Asian Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs) during the past three decades indicate that they could achieve rapid 
industrialisation and technological development through the adoption of a set of appropriate 
policies and strategies. The experiences of these countries can have valuable lessons and 
policy implications for other countries which wish to follow the same path of rapid 
industrialisation and technological development. 
Although many Less Developed Countries (LDCs) have realised the great importance of 
technological transformation for their rapid economic and industrial development, they have 
not designed effective and efficient policies and strategies for the transfer of appropriate and 
high-level technologies. Therefore, it seems necessary for decision makers in these countries 
to formulate appropriate policies for effective and successful transfer of technology as wen as 
rapid industrialisation. Iran, as a developing country with large natural and human resources 
has also attempted to adopt the best approach of technology transfer to improve and promote 
its technological capability and achieve rapid industrialisation. However, like many other 
countries, the industrial base of Iran can be characterised as being heavily dependent on 
importing their required parts and components for manufacturing outputs, which in tum is 
due to the assembly nature of many of its industries. In other words, Iran as wen as many 
other developing COWltries has been meed with heavy technological dependency. 
The main pwpose of this study is to identifY and examine the critical success factors for the 
effective technology transfer and rapid industrialisation of the LDCs in general and Iran in 
Particular. Firstly, some of the most important and relevant theoretical frameworks as wen as 
conceptual issues of technology transfer and industrialisation of LDCs are analysed. The 
empirical and practical experiences of some selected colDltries in particular East Asian first 
and second tier Newly IndustriaHsed Countries (NICs) as well as Mexico and Turkey are also 
studied. The critical success mctors of these countries in rapid industrialisation and 
technological development are identified. Moreover, the past and present industrialisation 
policies as well as technology transfer status of Iran is investigated in detail to identify and 
determine the most important strengths and weaknesses which are needed for designing its 
future plan. Finally, a framework of an appropriate poHcy and strategy for international 
technology transfer to LDCs in general and Iran in particular is proposed. Some overall 
recoJDDlelldations and suggestions derived from the research findings and results for the 
effective and successfhl technology transfer and industriaIisati ofLDCs in general and Iran 
in particular is also included. 
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CHAFfERl 
INTRODUCTION: 
It is widely acknowledged that transfer of technology has played a key role in the economic 
and industrial development of any nation. It seems that Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
can increase their productivity and efficiency levels through the acquisition of technical 
knowledge and skills from the developed countries. The effective transfer of technology 
enables these countries to utilise their natural and human resources efficiently through 
transformation of inputs into outputs. Therefore, it is essential for LOCs to study and 
examine how to exploit and employ their natural and human resources efficiently in order 
to expand and develop their technological base. 
Technology transfer can be an important tool for this purpose, as it allows LOCs to utilise 
their natural and human resources efficiently. It also enables them to build up their 
technological capabilities by importing and adopting foreign technology. Technology 
transfer is also seen as an important strategic variable which must be integrated into national 
development planning of LOCs. As the experiences of some East Asian countries during 
the past three decades show, these countries could increase their output, upgrade the skills 
of their labour force and accelerate the process of industrialisation through the adoption, 
adaptation and absorption of imported technologies. 
Technological change has also played a key role in the overall economic and industrial 
growth of developed countries in the past. Many studies have indicated that over 50% of 
long-term economic growth in advanced countries resulted from technological change which 
improved productivity, and contnbuted to higher levels of efficiency and higher quality of 
their products. For example, it is estimated that technological progress contnbuted as much 
as 65% to Japanese economic growth. Moreover, about 29% of the growth in 
manufacturing industry in Japan during the period between 1955·1979 could be attnbuted 
to technological progress [1]. 
The fact that the current developed and advanced countries could increase their 
technological levels over the last two centuries indicate that LOCs can also catch up with 
technologically advanced countries. It can be said that LDCs in the current situation can 
1 
take the most advantage from the availability of existing technological resources and 
therefore do not need to reinvent the wheel. The transfer of technology from the 
industrialised countries has enabled most LDCs to benefit from some of the advances made 
in the field of technology. Technology transfer has also introduced high-productivity 
techniques and in many cases encouraged technical change in LDCs. The acquisition of 
foreign technology can also contn"buted to improving competitiveness in the local as well 
as the international markets for these countries. However, while the development of 
indigenous technology should be encouraged, technology transfer can be considered as a 
vital process of industrialisation for LDCs. In other words, industrialisation is a process of 
acquiring technological capabilities in the direction of consistent technological change [2]. 
Despite the great importance of technology transfer in the process of industrial and 
technology development ofLDCs, there have been some general problems in the process 
of an effective and successful technology transfer. These problems which include mainly the 
lack of absorptive capacity in the recipient country, and unwillingness of the transferor in 
transferring real technology and technical know-how, have led to unsuccessful technology 
transfers. Therefore, it is necessary for these countries to promote their local technological 
capability in order to adapt and absorb foreign technologies efficiently to their local needs 
and conditions. LDCs should also identify carefully their needs and objectives which they 
intend to achieve through the acquisition of foreign technology. It seems also essential for 
these countries to identify and improve those elements of technology in which they are 
weak, such as developing an appropriate industrial and technological infrastructure. The 
imported technologies should also be adapted and matched with the existing technologies 
which can lead to the rapid process of industrialisation. 
Having recognised the great importance of technology for their development and 
industrialisation, LDCs seem to be unable to exercise real choice in designing effective 
strategies for their technological transformation. Many developing countries do not appear 
to have established the necessary procedures and criteria to choose the effective technology 
transfer policy needed for a rapid industrialisation and technological development. In other 
words, many LDCs lack an appropriate plan and strategy for an effective transfer of 
technology. LDCs are nowadays paying more attention on estab)jshment and implementation 
of an appropriate strategy for technology transfer and development, as they find out more 
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about the significant effects of an effective acquisition of foreign technology on their overall 
economic and industrial progress. However, sufficient actions for the formulation of 
technology policies and plans have yet to emerge. 
It seems that problems associated with technology absotption and adaptation have so far 
generally received little attention. Problems of technology transfer can generally be 
discussed from different points of view. For example, the major problem for the macro-
economists point of view is to investigate the appropriate technology, how to adopt and 
adapt it effectively and use it for the development and industrialization ofLOCs. Another 
is the of manager's point of view in LOCs; how do these managers choose the technology 
they import and how do they decide the channels through which technology will be 
transferred ? Managers in LOCs also consider how to utilise their limited resources 
efficiently in order to promote their technological capability. Engineers and scientists are 
also more concerned about the technical and scientific aspects of the subject, the process of 
an effective indigenous technological development, industrial and technological research, 
and promotion of the skills and productivity of the labour force. 
Technology transfer without promotion of indigenous technological capability has been 
especially common as LOCs attempted to increase their production capacities in a minjmal 
amount of time. It seems that LOCs prefer to adopt and assimilate new technologies rather 
than trying to generate and create them, since it needs less traditional R & 0, but they still 
require a high level oftecbnical skiDs. Having explained the great importance of technology 
transfer in the industrial and technological development of any country, as indicated earlier, 
there have been little attempts to formulate and design the appropriate plan and strategies 
for an effective and successful technology transfer and development. Therefore, it is 
essential for the policy makers in LOCs to identify the overall goals and objectives which 
are needed in designing a suitable policy for their technology transfer and development. 
It can also be said that the specific strategy and policy for technology transfer in a country 
cannot be separated and isolated from the overall national plan for its economic, industrial 
and social development. Therefore, the major aims and goals of technology transfer policy 
should be concentrated on finding the most appropriate and efficient methods to use 
technology in order to achieve a rapid economic and industrial progress. It is also important 
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for a LDC, in the formulation of its overall industrial and technology development policy 
and strategy, to place more emphasis on such important areas as the interrelation between 
the acquisition offoreign technology and promotion of indigenous technological capability, 
and the need to reduce the technological dependency on developed countries. In designing 
appropriate policies and strategies for their technology transfer and development, LDCs can 
also draw valuable lessons from the successful experiences of some Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs) in East Asia and Latin America. 
1. 1 THE OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
This research is primarily aimed at examining and analysing the effects of technology 
transfer on the industrialisation of Less Developed Countries generally, and Iran in 
particular. The main emphasis of this research is placed on Iran, ahhough the overall 
problems of LDCs in successful technology transfer and rapid industrialisation are also 
investigated. This study also attempts to find answers to such important questions as: 
• What are the critical and the most important factors which can lead to a successful 
technology transfer and more broadly industrial and technology progress ofLDCs 
in general and Iran in particular 1; 
• What are the best strategies and policies of technology transfer and industrialisation 
that these countries can adopt, in order to promote their technological capability and 
industrialisation 1; 
• How can foreign technologies be used effectively in order to achieve rapid industrial 
and technological development in these countries 1; 
• What are the best methods and mechanisms for the efficient acquisition of foreign 
technologies in order to maximise the success and effectiveness of technology 
transfer 1; 
• How can the process and procedures of technology transfer be effectively monitored 
in order to attain the highest success in the rapid industrialisation and technological 
development of these countries 1. 
It is hoped that the answer to these overall questions as well as so many other sub-questions 
can assist the policy makers in LDCs in general and Iran in particular to design an 
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appropriate plan and strategy for a successful technology transfer and more broadly rapid 
industrial and technological development. 
1. 2 THE METHODOWGY OF RESEARCH 
As indicated earlier, the main objective of this research is to identitY the most important and 
vital factors which can lead to a successful technology transfer and rapid industrialisation 
of LDCs in general and Iran in particular. To this end, a comprehensive swvey of most 
current literature including the theoretical frameworks, conceptual issues of technology 
transfer and industrialisation, as well as empirical and practical experiences of some chosen 
co1Dltries in successful technology transfer and rapid industrialisation is undertaken. Based 
on the main objectives and questions of the research as well as an extensive review of 
literature, some important hypotheses can be formulated. For example, it is hypothesised 
that the process of rapid industrial and technological development in a country to a large 
degree depends on the successful acquisition and adaptation of foreign technologies as well 
as the development of its indigenous technological capability. 
It can also be hypothesised that an effective technology transfer strategy for LOCs is a 
simultaneous utilisation of foreign technologies and promotion of local technological 
capability. It also hypothesizes that the success in adapting foreign technology to a large 
degree depends on the recipient's technological capability and efforts. The other main 
hypothesis of the research, which can be derived from the objectives of the research, is that 
the success of LOCs including Iran relies mainly on the adoption of a set of appropriate 
policies including an effective technology transfer strategy, an efficient human resource 
development policy, and an outward-oriented export promotion policy. 
As indicated earlier, in order to answer the research questions, it is essential to conduct an 
extensive review and study of most current available information on the general area of the 
research which is concentrated more on International Technology Transfer and its role in 
the industrialisation ofLOCs. However, the main methodology of this research is an in-
depth case study analysis of some chosen countries in order to examine and identitY their 
key success mctors in effective teclmology transfer and rapid industrialisation. It can be said 
that among the a1temative methods \Wich are normally used for the social sciences, the case 
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study technique and historical analysis are the most appropriate methods for this research 
which enable an effective examination of the research hypotheses is to be made based on the 
past and current performances and experiences of the selected countries. 
According to Marshal and Rossman (1989), ''the historical survey is particularly useful in 
obtaining knowledge of previously unexamined areas and in re-examining questions for 
which answers are not as definite as desired" [3]. Therefore, countries are chosen on the 
basis of their successful past performances and experiences in the rapid industrial and 
technological development as wen as their similarity with Iran in terms of economic, social, 
cultural and industrial characteristics. Some of the East Asian first and second-tier NICs 
including S. Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are selected because of their 
significant performances in the successful technology transfer and rapid industrialisation. 
Some other countries including Mexico and Turkey are also included in the country surveys 
due to their similarity with Iran in terms of the economic and social characteristics. 
Each of these countries is studied in terms of its specific post Second World War 
industrialisation policy as wen as its experiences of technology transfer and FDI, and human 
resource development policies. The main source of data and information which is used for 
the analysis of these countries include the most current literature in books, journals, 
newspapers, various published and unpublished papers, governmental reports, different 
reports and papers published by international organisations, mainly UNCTAD (United 
Nations Centre for Trade and Development), UNIDO (United Nation Industrial 
Development Organisation), UNESCO (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation), ILO (International Labour Organisation), ADB (Asian Development Bank), 
ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development), EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit), and 
reports by several other international organisations. 
As indicated earlier, Iran is the main focus of this research as a LDC which has attempted 
to achieve rapid industrialisation through the adoption of effective technology transfer. The 
identification of the most vital factors contnDuting to the successful experiences of the 
countries of the survey in their rapid industrialisation and technological development can 
have useful implications for other LDCs including Iran. Therefore, the main objective is to 
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determine an appropriate policy framework for Iran for an effective and successful 
technology transfer and rapid industrialisation which can in tum be useful for the other 
LDCs. The proposition of an effective technology transfer as well as industrialisation 
policies for Iran can have some useful implications and lessons for not only its own future 
overall development planning but also for that of other LDCs as recipients of technology. 
Ahhough Iran's overall past and present industrial and technological development policies 
as well as its other relevant characteristics will be discussed later in detail, it is noteworthy 
to describe briefly the current status of the country's industrial and technological capability: 
1. Iran has large natural and physical resources along with significant numbers of 
scientists and engineers, plus a substantial body of skilled workers and technicians. 
However, it seems that there are not enough, in view of the expansion and 
diversification of industry, and the promotion of the indigenous industrial and 
technological capability. According to statistics presented by UNESCO (1993), Iran 
possessed total numbers of331,481 scientists and engineers and 218,532 technicians 
in 1990 [4]. However, these figures need to expand as Iran still faces shortages of 
the skilled labour, technicians, scientists and engineers required for its anticipated 
future technological development. During the Second Five-Year Plan, the number 
of technicians is projected to increase to 502,177. The Second Plan (1995-1999) 
also aims at the expansion of education at all levels, as well as increasing in the 
professional and vocational training of the labour force, and creating two million 
new employment opportunities by 1999. 
2. In terms of industrialisation policy, Iran has adopted a simuhaneous pattern of 
import substitution and export promotion policies during the First Five-Year Plan 
(1989-1993). Despite a relatively significant expansion ofIran's non-oil exports 
during the period of the FII'St Plan which reached USS 4.5 billion by 1994, this is still 
not enough if Iran wishes to reduce its heavy reHance on oil revenues. Non-oil 
exports are projected to increase to an average annual value ofUSS 5 billion during 
the Second Five-Year Plan (1995-1999). During the First Plan (1989-1993), high 
priority was given to reconstruction and development of the industrial infrastructure 
through the implementation and completion of a large number of industrial and 
development projects as well as expansion of technological-based industry and 
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important basic industries, which are both labour and capital intensive. The Second 
Plan is also aimed at continuing the same path with more emphasis on the expansion 
and diversification of Iran's non-oil exports. 
3. Most of Iran's industrial bases can be characterised as heavily dependent on 
importing their required parts and components for manufacturing outputs. This 
large reliance on the importation of foreign inputs is mainly due to the assembly 
nature of many of Iran's industries, and are also financed by oil incomes. Therefore 
the performance of the industrial sector in Iran is vu1nerable to the fluctuation of 
world oil markets and prices. The country's industrial sector sti1llacks the adequate 
efficiency and productivity level needed to compete in the international market. The 
Second Plan (1995-1999) has introduced a number of measures to promote the 
quantity and quality of the industrial products, improve and develop domestic 
technological capacity, and make maximum use of the country's existing industrial 
potential. These measures mainly include the reduction of tariff rates to increase the 
efficiency in domestic production, continuing the privatisation of non-strategic 
industries and increasing incentives for attracting more foreign investment, 
encouraging the transfer of appropriate and modern technologies, and promotion of 
regional industrial development. 
4. Industrial research institutes are being established and developed for the needs and 
skills of industry. Moreover, there has been an increasing trend in the research and 
development activities. The R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP during the 
period 1989-1993 has been 0.35%, which is projected to increase to over 1% by the 
end of the Second Plan. However, most R&D funds (over 80%) granted by 
government have been allocated to ministries, and the rest to universities and other 
research institutes. Although there are skills in Iran for the storage, transfer, 
recovery, planning and development of technical information, there seems to be no 
overall co-ordination and integration between various research and development 
institutes in this regard. 
5. The Second Five-Year Plan aimed at an average economic growth rate of 5.8% over 
the period 1995-1999. This figure is less than the projected target of First Plan 
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(8.1 %), but more emphasis in the current plan is placed on a steady and sustainable 
growth rate. While in the First Plan industrial sector was the main engine of the 
growth, in particular the petrochemical and steel industries, the agriculture sector 
is annOlDlced to be the main pivot of the growth over the next five years. However, 
over the period 1995-1999, the oil sector is projected to grow with an average rate 
of3.2%, and the industrial and construction sector with an average annual growth 
of 6.2%. The Second Plan also encourages the establishment and development of 
small, high-technology, industries linked to medium and large industries through a 
variety of subcontracting arrangements. Moreover, the Second Plan emphasises 
attracting as much FDI as possible as a major source of the country's technology, 
managerial expertise and foreign capital. It is expected that FDI will reach an 
average ofUSS2 billion per year over the period 1995-1999. This figure is expected 
to be achieved through the introduction of various incentive measures, and the 
formulation of new regulation and foreign investment laws. 
6. The major objectives of technology development in the current Five-Year Plan are: 
expanding the amount offoreign technology into the country in particular through 
the attraction more FDI; promoting the country's indigenous technological 
capability through increasing the R&D activities; decreasing the dependency on 
imported parts and materials required for the production of the industrial outputs 
through the development of the supporting intermediate industries; and increasing 
the HRD programmes, including training the local technicians and skilled workers 
for the effective adaptation and assimilation of imported technologies. 
It is hoped that the resuhs and findings of this research would assist the policy makers in the 
LOCs in general and Iran in particular, to design and formulate an effective policy 
framework which can lead to successful technology transfer and rapid industrialisation of 
these countries. 
1.3 THE STRUCfURE OF THESIS 
This research includes eight chapters which start with an introductory overview of the 
research topic explaining the general background to the area of the study; the importance 
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of the area of research; the overall objectives of the research which are explained through 
proposing a number of questions and sub-questions; the research methodology which is 
defined from the main hypotheses of the research; and finally the organisation of the study. 
Chapter two is devoted to an comprehensive review of the most current literature on 
technology transfer and industrialisation in LDCs. This includes the critical survey of the 
neoclassical approach towards technology transfer; the neoclassical views; the radical 
perspectives; the dependency school of thought; the product life-cycle theory; the 
technological gap theory and the big push theory of industrialisation. Some of the most 
important industrialisation policies including import substitution and export promotion 
policies are discussed. The main objective of this chapter is to find the most appropriate 
theory which can directly and explicitly be applied to the LDCs current conditions. It is 
concluded that despite the existence of various theories and schools of thought which have 
been examined in the chapter, there is still no specific theory of technology transfer which 
can be precisely applied to LDCs. 
It is recognised that some of these theories, in particular the dependency school of thought 
and the technological gap theory, can bring about useful implications for policy makers in 
LDCs. Theorists in the dependency school of thought strongly urge the LDCs to reduce 
their technological dependency through strengthening their domestic technological 
cal' abilities and increasing R&D activities. According to the technological gap theory, the 
technological gap between LDCs and developed countries can accelerate the process of 
catching up technologically between these two groups of countries through adoption of an 
effective technology transfer policy based on the acquisition and adaptation of foreign 
technology, as well as promotion the indigenous technological capability. 
In chapter three, the conceptual issues of technology transfer are extensively analysed 
through the definitions of technology and technology transfer; the classification of 
technology and technology transfer; the diagrammatic representation of technology transfer; 
explaining and examining the various mechanisms of technology transfer; technology 
transfer process and its formulation; the concept of appropriate technology; and the cost of 
technology transfer. This chapter is aimed at studying and evaluating the various relevant 
concepts of technology transfer which seems to be essential for better understanding, and 
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examining various aspects and features of technology transfer. A systematic model of the 
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technology transfer process is developed in order to analyse in depth the process of 
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successful technology transfer. This model has adopted a systemic approach to determine 
and evaluate the different stages of technology transfer process which can assist policy 
makers in LOCs to choose the most appropriate technology based on their goals. objectives, 
needs and capabilities. Moreover, technology transfer procedures are formulated through 
the introducing a Matrix which illustrates the best direction for the effective transfer of 
technology. An extensive analysis of various methods of technology transfer is also included 
in this chapter in order to identify the most appropriate channels of technology transfer. 
Chapter four discusses a series of a comprehensive case studies analysing the experiences 
of some selected countries in technology transfer and industrialisation. The main objective 
of this chapter is to determine the most important and crucial success factors which led to 
effective technology transfer and rapid industrialisation in these countries. The countries are 
chosen based on their significant overall performance in rapid industrial and technological 
development over the past three decades, as well as the similar characteristics which some 
of these countries have with Iran. These countries include S. Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. It can be said that the identification of the critical 
success factor of each COlDltry can have vahJable lessons for other LOCs in general and Iran 
in particular in the attempt to achieve an effective technology transfer and rapid 
industrialisation. 
In Chapter five, the key success factors of the East Asian first and second-tier NICs are 
specifically examined. The significant performance and successful experiences of these 
countries in an effective technology transfer and rapid industrialisation necessitate an in-
depth analysis of their success factors in order to apply them to other LOCs including Iran 
which try to follow their model Moreover, despite some slight differences in terms of 
technological capability levels, one can find a commonality in their success factors which 
could encourage other COlDltries to replicate their model in rapid industrial and technological 
development. Therefore, LDCs in general and Iran in particular may learn valuable lessons 
from the experiences of these countries in successful technology transfer and rapid 
industrialisation. 
11 
Chapter six examines in detail the industrialisation policies in Iran during the pre- and post -
revolutionary period, in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of these policies 
which give a useful insight for the future trend of the country. Moreover, an in-depth 
analysis of Iran's past and present industrial performances can be used as a primary basis for 
further discussion of technology transfer and FDI status in Iran in next chapter. 
In chapter seven, the past and current situation ofFDI and technology transfer, as well as 
human resource development and R&D activities in Iran, is investigated. This can give an 
overall view of the industrial and technological structure of the country which in tum is 
essential for the establishment and implementation of its future technology transfer and 
industrialisation policies. 
Finally, chapter eight concludes the research findings and results, derived from the 
discussion, analysis and conclusions in the previous chapters. The similarities in the success 
factors of the countries surveyed in the previous chapters are further discussed in order to 
design a common policy framework for an effective and successful technology transfer and 
industrialisation in other LDCs in general and Iran in particular. Some problems and 
obstacles of the selected countries surveyed are also identified, which can be useful for the 
other LDCs, including Iran, to avoid in their future path of technology transfer and 
industrialisation. A number of recommendations and policy implications for LDCs in general 
and Iran are also presented. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Historically, as far back as in the work of the classical economists, Adam Smith was one of 
the first to examine manufacturing technology systematically in 1776. He began the Wealth 
of Nations with an examination of the causes of technical change and productivity [1]. 
Later, Marx also found a central place assigned to technology. 
" Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of 
production by which he sustains life ... "[2] 
Karl Marx considered technical progress was responsible for the shift from one mode of 
production and from one economic system to another. However, Marx's work on 
technological change did not have a lasting impact on the concerns of economics. In the 
early 20th century, evidence in economic literature of the importance of technical progress 
is to be found in the work of Schumpeter [3]. In his analysis of capitalism, the waves of both 
short-run cycles and long-run development are, in great measure, attnDutable to technical 
progress. But this was treated as an exogenous process. He added that capitalism is 
characterized by periodic waves of innovation whereby older, inefficient firms and industries 
are replaced by new more efficient firms with newer technologies. 
Robert Solow has also contended that technology is the main source of economic growth. 
He said that technology alone was responsible for raising the real income of the developed 
countries nearly ten times over the last century [4]. According to Solow, technology is 
assumed to be a public good, i.e., something that is available to everyone everywhere free 
of charge. Gaski, by a process of elimination, has made technology the single cause of the 
industrial revolution [5]. More recently, experts from various schools of thought have 
recognized the place of technology in explaining growth, usually reflected in a downward 
shift of the supply cwve as new technologies are discovered and put to use in the production 
of commodities and services. The recent contributions also stress two new perspectives; one 
comes from the technological change school of economic theory, which holds that 
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technological knowledge has proven to be more the engine of economic growth than has 
capital. The other stems from the appropriate technology movement, which stresses the need 
for LDCs to adopt a mix of technologies; some high, but many that are low and of a labour-
intensive nature. Once it is accepted that technology is a significant contn'butor to growth 
as well as economic development and industrialization, then technology transfer is viewed 
as an essential bridge across the wide technological gap which exists between developing 
and developed countries. Recognition of the importance of technology has also led to the 
effort for technological follower countries to maintain, reduce, or even reverse the 
technological gap. The technological development in such follower countries can, in a broad 
sense, use a combination of internally available resources and the transfer of technology 
from external sources. 
It is necessary to have definitions of technology and technology transfer here. An extensive 
definition of technology and technology transfer will be considered in the concepts section 
of the discussion later, but it is essential to have a clear and accepted meaning in this 
occasion to avoid confusion. Many definitions for technology have been stated. Technology 
in its broadest sense can be defined as "knowledge, skills, methods, and procedure 
associated with production and utilization of goods and services in a given society" [6]. 
While this definition may be adequate for some pwposes, it should be noted that technology 
needs to be reviewed not only as the specific production prices or manufacturing 
technology, but also various other types of knowledge and expertise necessary for the 
planning, establishment, and operation of a manufacturing plant and associated enterprises. 
Technology transfer can be defined as "the acquisition, development, and utilization of 
technological knowledge by a country other than that in which this knowledge originated" 
[7]. Thus, technology transfer is not simply the reproduction of an identical enterprise in 
a second area, but is an adaptation of the original to fit the second region's peculiar, social, 
political, technological, climatological, economic, and educational environment. 
Rostow (1967) argues that Technology Transfer will lead to increased economic 
opportunities for developing countries [8]. Without technology transfer, the difficulties 
which confront Third World countries in attempting to create competitive local industries 
are enormous. However, technology transfer in itselfwill not lead to economic growth. The 
SUcce&§ of technology transfer depends more on the ability and wiDingness of the importing 
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society to accept and absorb the technology than on the support of the exporter. As Ito 
(1986) notes, a successful transfer can occur only if the recipient is sufficiently capable of 
maintaining an introduced production system [9]. Local or domestic technological capability 
is indispensable in order to alter, modify, and adapt transferred technology to local 
conditions. 
Gee (1981) suggests that managers must be both oriented towards innovation and sensitive 
to their environment in order to implement successfully new technology [10]. Wallander 
(1979) implies the need for managers in LDCs to develop managerial skills such as the 
ability to plan, organize and solve problems [11]. In essence, it is management skill which 
is needed to weld the various elements of knowledge into a viable productive effort [12]. 
2. 2 THEORETICAL ISSUES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
According to Beamount and Reithinger (1981), transfer of technology can be examined 
from three points of view [13]: 
1. The international political framework within which tendencies towards co-operation 
or confrontation between the developed and the developing world are largely 
determined. 
2. The commercial framework in which the interplay of corporate motives and 
negotiating strategies determines the outcome of individual projects. 
3. The operational framework in which the transferred technology may contribute, or 
may fail to contribute, to the recipient's economic and social development. 
The theoretical framework of technology transfer has been surveyed in this research through 
the analysis ofneo-classical theorists, structuralist, and the radical perspective. Moreover, 
the views of the dependency school of thought and the product life cycle theory of 
technology transfer have also been discussed in order to identify the most appropriate 
theory to be applied in LDCs. The Import-Substitution and Export Promotion 
Industrialisation policies have also been analysed. Generally, studies of the various aspects 
of technology transfer generally are based on case studies and concepts rather than theories. 
Case studies on the other hand, mostly fail to relate to an overall specific theoretical 
framework. 
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2.2.1 The Neoclassical Approach Towards Technology Transfer 
Technology is defined in context of neoclassical theory as the available methods by which 
resources or inputs can be converted to products or outputs. Technology transfer in the 
view of neoclassical theorists can also be defined as the process whereby technology is 
moved from one physical or geographic location to another in order to manufacture 
products [14]. This transfer should include both hardware or machinery and equipment, and 
software, or technical knowledge and managerial expertise. Most of the earlier neoclassical 
approach has been concentrated on the effects of technological change in one country's 
pattern of national production, and the levels of its national welfare. However, much recent 
literature ofneoclassica1 theorists has focused on the effects of technology transfer from one 
country to another or International Technology Transfer. 
Having surveyed the views of some writers influenced by neo-classical theories of 
international trade, MacCulloch and Yenen (1976) examined the effects of free 
dissemination of technology on the recipient national welfare and on the distnoution of 
national income between capital and labour [IS]. They found that the supplier of technology 
may lose welfilre due to the free flow of technology, and the receiver gains national welfilre. 
It seems that their conclusion considering the gains of a recipient country from the free 
transfer of production technology can be useful for the applicability to the IDCs. However, 
other authors such as Burgules and Jones (1977), through their primary assumption that 
technology is embodied in factors of production, suggested that maxbnization of national 
gains from new technology requires the imposition of tariffs on the foreign use of 
technology [16]. On the other hand, some other neoclassicalists analysed the effects of 
international technology transfer on the recipient country's national welfilre in the presence 
or absence of tariff protection and domestic distortions. They concluded that the recipient 
country's protectionist measures towards international technology transfer can reduce its 
level of national welfare [17]. Therefore, the recipient country can generally gain from 
technology transfer when there is no tariff 
The neoclassical theorists have also emphasised the role of the market in the more efficient 
anocation of resources and in the most appropriate teclmologychoice for a developing 
country. In their belief: it is market mechanism rather government intervention that can 
enable the LOCs to maximise the utilisation of their resources and therefore lead to their 
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industrial and technological development. The neoclassicalists believe that government 
intervention and the resultant price distortions would produce inefficiencies and therefore 
the direct role of government in economic decisions should be reduced [18]. Acquiring 
technological capability, in their view, has been determined by integration in the world 
economy, through importing appropriate technologies from foreign countries. Once the 
required technology has been transferred, it must be adapted and absorbed to the local 
condition and the know-how can gradually be acquired through some methods such as 
imitation and reverse engineering [19]. 
However, the neoclassical theorists have been criticised by the new institution theorists 
(North, 1995) [20] as well as others (Kiely, 1994) [21], who believe that the neo-classical 
theory neglects the role of the state in industrialisation of some Newly Industrialised 
Countries in South East Asia and Latin America. While some writers influenced by neo-
classical theory argued that the success of the East Asian NICs has been achieved despite 
state intervention, there is some evidence which indicates the very effective role of the state 
in the promotion of industrial and technological development in these countries. For 
example, in Taiwan, the state accounted for 57% of industrial production in 1952, and 
although there has been significant privatisation since then, the state's share of gross 
domestic investment still stood at 50% in 1980 [22]. 
As North (1995) stated, the state can never be treated as an exogenous factor in 
development policy, and getting the prices right only has the desired consequences when 
agents already have in place a set of property rights and enforcement that will then produce 
competitive market conditions [23]. Therefore, the new institutionalists believe that the 
neoclassica1ist neglected the role of institutions in the development process. According to 
North (1989), institutions are a set of rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms 
of behaviour that structure repeated human interactions [24]. 
2. 2. 2 The Structuralist Approach 
The structuralist school of thought which contn'buted mostly to development literature in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, believed that free trade would not necessarily be to the 
advantage of LDCs. Hence, these countries should switch from a reliance upon trade and 
primary exports towards inward-looking based industrialisation. They sought to show that 
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the price mechanism in LDCs did not work in accordance with the perfectly competitive 
mode~ and that neoclassical theory was therefore largely inapplicable in IDCs. They also 
believed that structural transformation required a shift from the production of primary and 
agricultural products towards manufacturing products which in tum need an increase in the 
level of investment in the economy. In their view, the manufacturing sector can be 
considered as an engine of growth for LDCs, which the expansion of manufacturing sector 
in these countries may lead to an increase in the productivity of their labour force and 
therefore technological progress [25]. Many structuralists refer to the specialisation of 
LDCs in primary production as a major factor contributing to their backwardness. On the 
other hand, they found a strong link between industry and development which can be proved 
through several empirical evidence [26]. 
The structuralists have also emphasised the effective role of technology in the 
industrialisation of IDes. In their view, technological capability can be acquired by building 
a local technological capacity through a process of technological learning. Furthermore, they 
argued that transferring inappropriate technologies will slow down or even hinder the 
process of technological development. They suggested that IDCs should build their own 
technological capability through the strategic government intervention in setting up adequate 
infrastructure needed for the expansion of indigenous technological capacity. Therefore, in 
the structuralist view, LDCs can also increase their ability to adapt and assimilate the 
imported technology more efficiently through more emphasis on the promotion of local 
technological capability. Structuralists have also been concerned with the problems of 
technological dependence which may arise as a result of excessive reliance on imported 
technology. However, the phenomenon oftecbnology dependency has been analysed in the 
views of the dependency school of thought which will be discussed later. 
Although structuralist perspectives may have very.useful points for application in LDCs, 
in particular their emphasis on the development of indigenous technological capability, their 
focus on inward-looking industrialisation can be criticised due to its inefficiency for solving 
the IDes' problems. As the experience of most successful East Asian and Latin American 
NICs countries indicated, despite the implementation of domestic-market based 
industrialisation in the early stages, it was their transition towards outward-oriented policies 
that can be credited as one of the major factor in the rapid industrialisation of these 
countries. 
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2. 2. 3 The Radical Perspectives 
Following the swvey by Griffin and Gulley (1985), radical analysis can be described as "that 
which is highly critical of capitalism, fitvours socialism, and often employs Marxian analysis" 
[27]. Moreover, many of the radical theorists have emphasised the limitations, problems 
and constraints which have impeded the industrialisation ofLDCs. Much of the literature 
related to the radical perspective has common features with the structuralist views but with 
a . relatively stronger stance. The major elements of industrialisation of LDCs under the 
radical points of view have been identified as : strong state intervention, adopting 
protectionist measures against foreign competition, controls over MNCs Foreign Direct 
Investment and pursing policies which emphasised more the promotion of domestic 
technological capabilities [28]. 
Several radical authors raised some important points on the limits to industrialisation in the 
LDCs, particularly on the role of transnational companies and their relations with the state 
and local capital, both logically and empirically. The notion of technological dependence 
of LDCs or "periphery" on the developed countries or " centre" has been put forward by 
radical theorists. They have argued that most multinational companies which are located in 
the developed countries have transferred inappropriate technologies to the developing 
countries. This is because much of the technologies created and developed in the advanced 
colDltries are highly capital intensive, or too large scale, so that LDCs are very hardly able 
to adapt these technologies to their local conditions. Most writers influenced by radical 
perspective argue that the trade of technology between "centre" and "periphery" not only 
do not increase the economic development of the periphery but it may also be considered 
as an obstacle in the industrial and technological progress of periphery. 
Therefore, in the radical perspective, one of the most critical steps towards a more 
independent industrial and technological development in LDCs can be by promoting their 
local technological capability. Furthermore, for some other radicals, a removal of 
dependence requires a radical transformation of the economic and political structures within 
developing countries themselves [29]. 
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2. 2. 4 The Dependency Theory 
The dependency school of thought can be identified as an important and distinct approach 
within the radical theorists who have considered the capitalist development in the advanced 
countries as main source of dependency in developing countries. Dependency theorists are 
mostly concerned with the cultural as well as economic features of dependent relationship 
between advanced countries and less developed countries. In other words, as Dos Santos 
( 1973) defines dependency as a " conditioning situation, in which the economies of one 
group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others" [30]. 
Furthermore, Cardoso and Faletto (1979), in what is generally recognized as one of the 
classics of the dependency literature, define a dependent economy as "one which cannot 
grow on the basis ofintemal forces-". '" A system is dependent when the accumulation and 
expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic component inside the system [31]. 
As Stewart (1981) argued, technology dependency occurs where a major source of a 
country's technology comes from abroad [32]. Moreover, technology dependency also arises 
from the lack of adequate indigenous technological capability in LDCs to assimilate and 
adapt imported technologies efficiently to their own needs. In the dependency perspective, 
LDCs are characterised with some &ctors which have made them technologically dependent 
on the developed countries. Some of the most important LDCs' characteristics are the 
absence of a coherent technology policy; the lack of sufficient R&D activities; the under-
utilisation of their natural and human resources; and the limited application of research 
results to their basic human needs [33]. 
The dependency theorists also argued that due to their lack of expertise, and weak 
indigenous technological capability, most LDCs are in a weak bargaining position and 
unable to adapt and absorb the foreign technologies. Jbey also added that most technologies 
which have created and originated in the developed countries may often be inappropriate for 
the condition in LOCs. This is mainly because these technologies are mostly too capital 
intensive and too larg&-scale, so that may create 1ittle employment opportunities along with 
a great deal of unused capacities. Therefore, . modem dependency theorist have strongly 
emphasised the importance of promoting local technological capability [34]. 
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Another argument made by the dependency theorists is that developing countries not only 
spend a smaller proportion on research, but that the volume of technology produced by their 
research sectors is far below that of developed countries. That seems to be a logical 
conclusion from the claim of most of the dependency theorists that, in developing countries, 
inputs into research activity are marginal. There is yet another factor which they consider 
to be responSIble for this low technology output namely, poor productivity of research. 
Advocates of the dependency school use patent data as one set of indicators to prove this 
point. Vaitos points out that the developing countries' share in the total number of patents 
granted in the world amounted to only 1 percent in the late 1960 [35]. It is also noted that 
in 1986-1987 only 4.3% of worldwide R&D expenditure was accounted for by developing 
counties [36]. 
The technological dependency, as is shown in the figure 2.1, indicates that Less Developed 
Countries are heavily dependent on the import of foreign technology from Developed 
Countries. As indicated earlier, most LDCs have been characterised with a low level of 
technological capability along with a weak industrial infrastructure which can partly be the 
result of a low level of research and development activities, and inefficient use of natural 
resources in these countries. Even though massive import of technology from developed 
countries may lead to the technological dependency for developing countries, there seems 
to be no other way for the LDCs to catch up with Developed Countries and close the gap 
existing between these countries. Moreover, the technological dependency at an early stage 
of industrialisation may not be viewed as a disadvantage for LOCs, as there is still not still 
an adequate indigenous industrial and technological capability for the creation and 
development of technologies in these countries. 
However, the dependency theorists argued that LDCs usually imported inappropriate 
technologies which were not compatible to the indigenous endowments and factor 
conditions in these countries. They believed that most technologies which have been 
transferred by MNCs to LOCs, were capital intensive and therefore could not create 
employment opportunities for LOCs and therefore ahemative sources of technology should 
be created by the LDCs themselves, preferably through intra-regional cooperation in 
research [37]. Some dependency theorists also argued that the majority of technologies 
developed in developed countries is aimed at meeting only those countries' economic and 
22 
cultural needs. They added that even if appropriate technologies are available, western 
multinationals express little interest in supplying them to developing countries' conditions 
and desires [38]. 
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Figure 2.1: A Vicious cycle of technological dependency in LOCs 
Source: Adapted from Technology Atlas Team (ESCAP), 1988. 
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The supporters of the dependency school of thought concluded that the flow of imported 
technologies may not essentially lead to the development of indigenous technological 
capability in LDCs. They even go one step further in saying that the transfer of west em 
technologies may even have negative implications for IDCs' internal technological 
capability. Mytelka (1979) refers to some negative effects offoreign technologies on the 
willingness of some IDCs' domestic firms to rely on their own new products, which is 
considered to be connected with a physiological environment of dependence [39]. 
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2. 2. 4. 1 The Criticism of Dependency Theory 
The dependency theorists' argument on the inappropriateness of MNCs' technology policy 
can not be easily justified since their analysis is not well structured. The negative view of 
the dependency theorists towards the effects of foreign technologies on the developing 
countries is opposed by the successful experiences of a number of countries in international 
technology transfer which have led to a significant industrial and technological development 
in these countries. Moreover, it seems that the dependency school of thought has not taken 
into account the major reasons for most LDCs' failure in international technology transfer, 
which are believed to be mainly because of the lack of adequate local absorptive capacities, 
and also the lack of an appropriate internal policy toward technology transfer in these 
countries. 
However, the experience of some countries, in particular, the Newly Industrialised Countries 
(NICs) prove that it is not technology transfer that leads to technological dependency, 
rather, it is the lack oflocal absorptive capacity to assimilate, adapt, and improve imported 
technologies, that leads to dependency on foreign suppliers. For example, the experience of 
some NICs such as Korea, Mexico, etc., shows that many of these countries have been able 
to move from almost total dependence on foreign technologies to independent production. 
Furthermore, unlike the dependency theorists belief in the negative impacts of imported 
technology on LDCs, some of these countries have not only successfu.lly transferred foreign 
technology but they could also export some of their manufacturing products and transfer a 
significant amount of technology to the other countries. 
The dependency school of thought has also been criticised by many authors of being vague 
in their division of countries as dependent and independent countries. As Seers (1979) 
[40], Lan (1975) [41], among others stated, nobody can claim that there is a country which 
is ful1y independent from other parts of the world. As Seers suggested, all countries either 
developed or underdeveloped are dependent, but with a different degree of dependency. 
Brewer (1980) also criticises Dos Santos' definition of dependence on the grounds that it 
wrongly asserts that the domestic countries enjoy independent (self-sustaining) development 
[42]. The dependency school of thought has also been criticised for not explaining the rapid 
growth performance and economic transformation of the NICs during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Soete (1981) has also argued that the notion of technological dependence is irrelevant in 
analysing the underdevelopment of LDCs, since most developed countries also rely on 
foreign technology. He concluded that there is no discussion on the presence or absence of 
dependency but in the degree of such dependence. As he states; " one may hardly find a 
country which was completely technologically independent, as many developed countries 
such as Japan and Germany have run large deficits in terms of technological payments and 
receipts". Therefore, he suggests that" one should really emphasise more the enormous 
benefits and advantages of a massive import of technology rather than focusing on the limits, 
costs and problems generally associated with international technology transfer" [43]. 
2. 2. 5 The Big Push Theory of Industrialisation 
According to this theory, industrialisation is defined as the way of achieving a more equal 
distribution of income between different areas of the world by raising incomes in depressed 
areas at a higher rate than in rich areas [44]. This theory indicates that simultaneous 
investment by various sectors of the economy using the available technology, can create 
income for each sector that becomes a source of demand for goods in other sectors, and so 
enlarge their markets and make industrialisation profitable. According to the big push 
theory, the development of a profitable industry would act as a leading sector in a LDC, 
creating productive jobs and generating an income multiplier process [45]. This theory 
generally supports the argument in favour of the role of larg~scale manufacturing and 
modem technology in the industrialisation of LDCs. Ahhough this theory has been 
experienced and applied by some European countries where it was initially formulated, it 
has generally &iled to replicate the European success story in the LDCs, due to its strongly 
pro-capitalist and interventionist assumptions. 
2. 2. 6 The Product Life Cycle Theory of Technology Transfer 
It seems essential to study initially some of the main assumptions and Hmitations of the 
product life cycle theory of technology transfer, since these assumptions differ significantly 
from those of traditional international trade theory. Among the most important traditional 
theories ofintemational trade, one can refer to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory which indicates 
that a country exports products which have comparative advantage and uses its abundant 
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factors of production, and reversely imports those products that require more ofits scarce 
factors [46]. While traditional trade theory is based on free availability of information and 
stable production functions, the product life cycle theory is based on assumptions that the 
flow of information and skills across regions or national borders is restricted. The product 
life cycle theory of international trade also assumes that products undergo predictable 
changes in production technology and marketing methods over time; and the production 
process is characterized by economies of scale, that it also changes over time; and that 
market characteristics (consumer tastes) also change over time [47]. 
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Figure 2.2 The Product Life Cycle 
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This theory also shows the sequences of a product's development and production during 
its life from introduction phase to decline. The first phase (introduction) mostly takes place 
in developed countries and is characterised by a large amount of resources allocated to 
Research and Development (R&D). The second stage of the life cycle of the product is 
usually characterised by diifusion of technology (product) and increases in foreign demand. 
In this stage, countries with less technical expertise begin to produce and market the 
products. The next stage or maturity phase is associated with the standardisation of the 
product; more emphasis on the innovative aspect of the product; and efforts for minimising 
the production costs. Then, the last phase of the life cycle of a product ends with ultimate 
decline and replacement by new products. The product life cycle remains a fundamental 
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theory in marketing, where it is used to generalize about circumstances across stages for a 
product class or product brand [48]. 
The product life cycle theory of technology transfer provides an invaluable tool for 
explaining the early post- second world war MNCs direct investment in other countries. As 
indicated earlier, because of restrictions in the flow of information across regions or national 
boundaries, innovation and development of new products is more likely to occur in 
developed countries. The developed countries have an advantage in producing and exporting 
new products and technologies, while Less Developed Countries have a comparative 
advantage in producing standardized or mature products and exporting them to the 
developed nations [49]. Despite innovation and creation of many new products and 
technologies in developed countries and their inflow to developing countries, according to 
the product life cycle theory, the flow of new products may be reversed from recipient 
countries to origin countries due to LDCs' cheap and skilled labour and low cost of 
production. 
2. 2. 6. 1 A Critique of Product Life Cycle Theory 
As is explained earlier, the product life cycle theory implies for analysing the role of MNCs 
investment in the industrial infrastructure of developing countries. Despite several examples 
of the application of the product life cycle theory, with the rapid growth of some Newly 
Industrialised Countries in 19708 and 19808 and their capability to innovate the products, 
the primary concept of Product Life Cycle theory that innovation of products firstly takes 
place in developed countries and would only reach a LDC in the later stage, was questioned. 
In addition to the above point, some NICs also involved in research-intensive investments 
in the developed countries in order to gain access to their higher level of technology which 
again could not be analysed effectively within the conceptual framework of the product life 
cycle theory. Giddy (1978) noted that the product cycle was no longer consistent with the 
developments in international trade and investment in the late 1970s. He added that the 
explanatory power of the product life cycle has itself undergone maturity and decline [SO]. 
Moreover, ahhough there were a number of examples in the support ofPLC theory in which 
MNCs in developed countries have transferred old technologies to developing countries, 
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there were also some examples in which MNCs were transferring their latest technology to 
their subsidiaries located in LDCs. 
2. 2. 7 Technology Gap Theory 
Technology transfer can generally take place when there is a gap in technological level of 
supplier and receiver of technology. Therefore, it seems that the transferor or supplier of 
technology is mostly in a higher position in terms of technological capability or more 
technologically advanced than the receiver. In other words, the technology gap which exists 
between the transferor and transferee accelerates the flow of technology. However, in order 
to be successful in technology transfer, it is essential for a recipient country to adapt, 
assimilate and absorb the imported technology which in turn relies on its technological level 
and capability. Therefore, the higher the level of absorptive capacity in the recipient country 
is, the higher the assimilation of foreign technology would be. 
TRANSFEROR 
F 
L 
o 
W 
TRANSFEREE 
, 
, 
, 
,..--__ .L.-_---, : 
Technological 
'-------i Level t-------i~ 
Technological 
~-~ 
Level 
G= Ix - Iy 
Figure 2.3 Technology gap as main factor for technology transfer 
The technology gap theory was firstly generated in an international trade model by Posner 
(1961) who believed that technological gap between developed and developing countries 
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can be considered as one of the most important causes of trade between these two groups 
of countries. As he stated " trade may be caused by technical changes and developments 
that influence some industries and not others; because particular technical change originates 
in one country, comparative cost di1ferences may induce trade in particular goods during the 
lapse of time taken for the rest of the world to imitate one country's innovation" [51]. 
Therefore, in Posner's view, technological differences among countries can be considered 
as the major cause of trade between these countries. In other words, according to this 
theory, the capability to innovate technologically is considered to be a necessary factor in 
a country's competitiveness. Moreover, the idea of imitation gap was also introduced by 
POSiler in order to measure the time difference between the generation of technology in the 
country of origin and its adoption by an imitating country. 
One can also say that the teclmologica1 gap between less developed and developed countries 
represents great promise for the technologically backward countries. Although it is 
difficuh for backward countries to fill this gap, it can accelerate the process of catching up 
between these two group of countries. As the experiences of some successful East Asian 
NICs in their rapid industrial and technological development indicat~ they could lessen 
their technological gap very rapidly with the adoption of a series of appropriate industrial 
and technology policies which will be discussed later. The experiences of these countries 
also shows that in order to catch up with the leading technologically countries, a developing 
country needs to enhance its efforts in technology transfer as wen as promoting its 
indigenous technological capability. It is argued that a less developed country may be able 
to close or even reverse the technological gap with more developed countries through 
devoting a substantial amount of investment on R&D activity. Moreover, the creation of an 
efficient absorptive capacity to adapt the imported technology may also enable a backward 
country to close or reverse the technological gap [S2]. 
It is also argued that the ability to catch up with the technological frontier countries 
depends on the growth rate of domestic demand for the specific products. Therefore, the 
higher is the growth rate of domestic demand, the faster the technological gap can be 
reduced. This is mostly because the rapid growth rate of domestic demand allows 
investment in new capital, specialisation, and acquisition of the experience to learn new 
tedmologies [S3]. Moreover, the ana1ysis of some example countries by Verspagen (1991) 
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shows that the pace of the catching up process in the countries characterised by a large 
technological gap and a low social and indigenous industrial and technological capability 
was slower in comparison with the countries with a relatively higher technological capability 
[54]. 
This is mostly because of the inadequate capacities of those countries with a relatively high 
degree of backwardness to acquire the know-how from the more advanced countries. In 
a similar analysis of the catching up process of some East Asian NICs, Verspagen (1993) 
found that the high rate of competitiveness, and the high degree of openness and investment 
intensity in these countries, were among the major factors which enable them in closing the 
technological gap with more advanced technologically countries. Therefore, he concluded 
that a pre-catching up phase is needed before the catching up process, in which the 
backward countries should build up an indigenous learning capability through extensive 
investment in education of the labour force, infrastructure and research and development 
activities [55]. 
The technological gap theory has gone through a period of significant development and 
expansion since Posner's initial view, and some other scholars such as Krugman (1979)[56] 
and (1985) [57], Jensen and Thursby (1987) [58], and Dollar (1989) [59] among many 
, 
others contributed further to this theory over the years. Having compared the technology 
gap models which have been studied by these authors, they generally indicate that the 
developed countries export technology-intensive goods to the LDCs, in return to importing 
imitated products from LDCs. According to technology gap models, the developed north 
gains relatively higher than developing south, due to their monopolistic power on 
innovation which resuhs in exporting high priced products to the developing south and 
importing low priced goods from them. However, according to Krugman (1990), technical 
progress in the most advanced countries always benefits less advanced countries, but a 
catch-up by a less advanced country may hurt the technological leader [60]. 
2.3 IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALISATION STRATEGY 
The Import Substitution Industrialisation (lSI) trade strategy, can be defined as the 
substitution of domestic production for imports of manufactured products [61]. This 
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strategy aimed at protection of domestic industries from foreign competition through a high 
wall of quotas, tariffs and overvalued exchange rates, and was very popular among less 
developed countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The widespread implementation of this strategy 
among so many LDCs is considered to be mostly because of the problems in their balance 
of payments, and economic depression resuhing from war and region conflicts. Despite an 
annual average growth rate of 6% in the industrial products of some Latin American 
countries which implemented lSI strategy extensively in the 1950s and 1960s, these 
countries faced serious problems in their balance of payments and high inflation [62]. 
Therefore, this strategy has been criticised by many neoclassical and even structuralist 
theorists who had been among the main advocates of lSI [63]. 
They believed that this strategy created an inefficient industrial sector, unable to compete 
in the international market. This is mainly due to the small size of the market in many of 
these countries which had been saturated by the domestic products. They also believed that 
this strategy leads to the inefficient utilisation of natural and human resources due to the 
lack of a competitive environment to maximise the utilisation of the domestic resources. 
Moreover, \Wile this strategy aims at substituting the imports of foreign products with the 
domestic goods, the overvalued exchange rate which is among the incentives for the 
implementation of lSI, causes an increase in imports which seemed to be cheaper than 
domestically produced goods. Moreover, the very process of indigenous production would 
create its own imports of raw materials and components [64]. 
As indicated earlier, although both neoclassicalists and structuralists have criticised the lSI 
strategy, the structuralist criticism of the lSI strategy differs from that of the neoclassical 
Neoclassicalists argued that lSI strategy and protectionist measures in most LOCs resulted 
in the creation of an inefficient industrial sector unable to compete in international markets 
and therefore gives little incentive for their tecbnical progress. The neoclassical critics ofISI 
also reteued to its fiWure regarding to the extreme interventionist role of government in the 
industriaHsation process. They also believed that lSI strategy has intensified such problems 
as imbalance of payments, inequalities in the distribution of income, unemployment and 
neglecting of the agriculture sector [65]. Thus, they recommend that LOCs should decrease 
the protectionist measures through the removal of trade barriers such as quotas and custom 
duties and encouraging the role of market forces. Structuralists, on the other hand, argued 
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that the failure of the lSI was mostly because of the productive structure and social class 
formation in LDCs. They believed that the adoption of the import substitution strategy in 
many LDCs not only led to the decrease in the these countries' imports but it also 
encouraged the importation of inappropriate technologies and therefore resulted to an 
outflow of capital in the form of royalty payments and transfer pricing [66]. 
Despite several criticisms of lSI strategy, as the experiences of most successful NICs 
shows, it seems that the adoption of lSI strategy has been essential for the establishment of 
an adequate industrial infrastructure needed for a transition to an outward-oriented strategy 
in these countries. The adoption of lSI strategy had initially encouraged the establishment 
and expansion of such industries as textiles and footwear manufactures in which these 
colDltries had a comparative advantage [67]. For example, the effective implementation of 
lSI in their early stages of industrialisation enabled S.Korea and Taiwan to develop their 
indigenous technological capacity, economies of scale, and infrastructure, which provided 
the basis for a successful transition to export-oriented strategy. 
It is also argued that the adoption of lSI strategy, followed by the protection of a specific 
industry for a limited period of time is essential for the domestic producer to gain 
confidence through lowering the cost of production and learning the technology from 
experience with its use (learning by doing). If protection is not provided, domestic 
producers may find themselves unable to compete in the international market. However, it 
is also argued that the success of the lSI strategy to a large degree depends on the size of 
the market. The larger the size of the domestic market, the more rapid the speed of 
achieving technical abilities for producing a particular type of manufacture products would 
be. Therefore, the large markets allow for intensive learning through experience from the 
production, initially, for the protected domestic market [68]. Therefore, one can say that the 
adoption of an effective lSI strategy seems to be a pre-requisite for a successful transition 
to the Export Promotion Industrialisation strategy, since it allows the build up of a strong 
domestic industrial base. 
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2. 4 THE EXPORT PROMOTION INDUSTRIALISATION POLICY 
The Export Promotion Industria1isation policy can be defined as a preference for production 
for the foreign relative to the domestic market [69]. As the experiences of some East Asian 
and Latin American NICs show, these countries have shifted to an outward-oriented export 
promotion industrialisation policy, as their market had become saturated with the 
domestically produced goods. The adoption of an EPI strategy in most of these countries 
have associated with a significant increase in the GDP growth rate in these countries. One 
can therefore say that EPI policy may indeed be superior to lSI strategy. This is largely due 
to the several advantages of the EPI policy in comparison with the lSI policy. 
Firstly, it is widely believed that the EPI strategy improves the efficient allocation of 
resources through the creation of a competitive environment, allowing greater capacity 
utilisation, overcoming the limitation of the domestic market, concentrating in producing the 
products with most comparative advantage, permitting the exploitation of economies of 
scale, and increasing the productivity of the human resources. Secondly, the export 
promotion policy accelerates the efforts for better acquisition and assimilation of foreign 
technologies. This is mainly because in order to be more competitive in the world market, 
more modem technologies are needed. Therefore, an strong EPI strategy encourages the 
national innovation system to keep up with innovations worldwide, and also provides 
incentives in terms of technology transfer and technical assistance from buyers [70]. Thirdly, 
the adoption ofEPI strategy leads to the use of labour-intensive technologies, consistent 
with the LDCs' mctor endowments and comparative advantage which in turn creates more 
employment opportunities and improvements in income distribution [71]. 
The adoption of EPI policy usually associated with introducing some export incentive 
measures such as a reduction in tax and custom duties, export credits and loans for the 
domestic exporters, and exchange rate devaluation. However, the implementation ofEPI 
strategy does not mean that lSI policy cannot be continued. As the experiences of some 
LDCs show, these countries have continued the second stage of lSI strategy while they 
implemented an outward-oriented EPI policy. Although the adoption ofEPI policy can lead 
to a significant growth rate, this strategy has also been criticised for causing a dependency 
on import of foreign inputs and materials needed to produce manufilcturing products for 
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exports. It should also be noted that the success of the EPI strategy relies heavily on the 
continued growth of the world economy and therefore this strategy is vulnerable to the 
effects of policies in advanced countries [72]. 
2. 5 TECHNOWGY CHANGE AND GROWTH MODELS 
As indicated earlier, technological change refers to improvements in transformation of inputs 
into outputs, including improvements in the quality of output. However, while in developed 
countries technical change involves mostly such activities as the reduction in cost of 
production as well as the creation of new products and technologies, in less developed 
countries technical change constitutes mostly the adaptation of imported technologies to 
their local conditions. Most of the previous studies about the role of international 
technology transfer on the economic growth of IDes generally assumed that new 
technology is exogenous. Yet technological progress is considered to be an indigenous 
economic process responsive to supply and demand conditions, costs and returns [73]. 
One can refer to some studies conducted by Kozumi and Kopeky (1977) [74], and Findly 
(1978)[75], within the growth models and theories which assumed that the superior 
technology to be transferred internationally is exogenous to the economic system modelled. 
Most of these growth theories have attempted to concentrate on the relation of capital 
inflow to technology transfer. According to these theories, the recipient country is assumed 
to benefit from the effects of the technology transfer process. However, more recently, 
attempts have been made to endogenise the process of technological change. In most of 
these studies, innovation has been considered as an endogenous process that requires the 
allocation of a large amount of R&D activities to create product and process for commercial 
use. R&D may include all activities that lead to new discoveries, as well as imitation 
activities that lead to the adoption of products or techniques known elsewhere. 
For example, the work by Rodrigez (1978) shows that the devotion of substantial R&D may 
enable a backward LDC to close the technological gap between its level of technology and 
that of an advanced country [76]. He therefore shows that a backward country may be able 
to close or reverse the gap. The main findings of more recent research on R&D spillovers 
shows that more technologies are transferred from developed countries to LDCs through 
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trade. Therefore, LDCs imitate more the technology of their trading partners than the 
technology of other countries, even though those other countries might have superior 
technology to that of their trading partners [77]. 
One can also refer to the other studies which have recently discussed the growth models 
concerning endogenous technological change, such as Lucus (1988)[78] who concentrates 
on human capital models; and the study of Grossman and Helpman (1990) [79], who 
focuses on the introduction of new goods with leaming by doing. However, most of these 
models are generally ignored to explain the important linkage between International 
Technology Transfer and the growth. However, a very recent study by Zhang and Zou 
(1995) develops a model which build a direct linkage between foreign technological imports 
and productivity increase in LDCs by assuming that the rate of technological growth is a 
positive function of foreign capital imports. According to their model, it is the quality gap 
between the developing country's home technology and imported technology from 
developed country that encourages the former to catch up with the latter. Therefore, a 
developing country can reduce the technological gap and eventually become a NIC, through 
effective leaming by doing [80]. 
2. 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It becomes clear from earlier discussion of theoretical framework of technology transfer that 
we still lack a rigorous theory of technology transfer which can be applicable to the less 
developed countries. However, it appears that some theories are much more useful than 
other theories in the terms of their applicability to LDCs. Most theoretical discussions of 
technology transfer treated new technology as exogenous in their models. Other theorists, 
however viewed technological progress as endogenous. Thus, different treatment of 
technology result in different theories and conc~ons. 
As discussed earlier in detail, it appears that neoclassical discussions of technology transfer 
lay great stress on the production fictor analysis of the role of technology. According to the 
neoclassical school of thought, technological change is considered to be a factor of 
production expanding by the residual in the production function. Moreover, neo-classical 
theorists focus more on market as a means of allocating resources which has been criticized 
3S 
by others who believe that neo-classicalists neglect the role of the state in the 
industrialization of some newly industrialized countries in south-east Asia and Latin 
America. As already analysed, early structuralists sought to show why free trade is not 
necessarily to the advantage ofLDCs, by criticizing the neoclassical analysis of trade. They 
believed that the price mechanism in LDCs did not work in accordance with the perfectly 
competitive model Modem structuralists, however, emphasize the importance of developing 
local technological capability. Furthermore, the structuralist approach also concentrated 
more on the role of the state in promoting national development and technological capability 
in LDCs. 
The product life cycle theory of technology transfer can be an important theory base for 
LDCs. According to this theory both developed and less developed countries can gain from 
technology trade. As this theory indicated, new products mostly originate in developed 
countries. For a period of time, the flow of new products may be reversed from recipient 
countries to origin countries, if developing countries have lower costs and wages and 
become relatively efficient in the production of new goods. This theory may also be applied 
to a wide range of technologies in LDCs. As indicated earlier, technological gap theory 
stresses the role of catching up process in closing the technological gap existed between 
LDCs and DCs. However, it fails to some extent explain and elaborate clearly the reasons 
for the importance of technological gap in the technological progress of the backward 
countries. 
The dependency theory is also a very important theory which can be applicable to LDCs. 
This theory implies that imported technologies have mostly resulted to a technological 
dependency for LDCs. Therefore, the dependency theorist strongly recommend the LDCs 
to increase their research and development efforts in order to promote their indigenous 
technological capability. Although dependency theory can bring about some useful aspects 
for LDCs, most of its studies has been criticized for its failure to distinguish between so 
called dependent countries. Substantial differences exist between dependent countries 
regarding their structural situation and development problems. The dependency school of 
thought tails to explain properly the reasons behind the successful experiences of some NICs 
such as Korea, Mexico, ... , which have been able to move from almost total dependence on 
foreign technologies to a certain level of indigenous technological capability and 
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technological independence. In conclusion, having surveyed the theoretical framework of 
technology transfer, one can mention the notion of the product life cycle theory and 
dependency school of thought are as the most empirical validation to apply in LDCs. 
However, these theories have yet to be integrated into an overall framework that can offer 
some guidance to planner involved in technology transfer. Moreover, most theories which 
are discussed earlier, neglected to examine the dynamic interaction between indigenous 
technological capability and imported foreign technology. Consequently, most of these 
theories are vu1nerable to the attack of being rather limited in scope. 
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CHAYfER 3: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
3.1 TECHNOWGY AND ITS DEFINITIONS 
Technology is a word in widespread use, especially in conjunction with other words such 
as development and industrialization. Technology means different things to different 
obseIVers. Its definitions vary from simple dictionary explanations to complex elaboration. 
Many definitions and descriptions of technology are very broad and sometimes almost all 
encompassing. A selection of definitions will be considered to cover the various dimensions 
of technology. 
Technology as a combined word originating from Greek words of "transferring" (art, craft) 
and "logos" (word, speech) refers to all the ways in which people satisfy their needs and 
desires through the systematic study of techniques and use of the inventions and discoveries. 
Many scholars define technology as knowledge of particular techniques, for example; the 
art of industrial production. Definitions of this type are of limited value, however, because 
the meaning and use of the word technology has changed over time, it is used differently by 
different schools of thought and between different languages; its common use is haphazard, 
and the definition does not convey nmch of the complexity of meaning attnbuted to the term 
in the literature. A number of different approaches to defining technology should therefore 
be examined. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, in a similar manner to other dictionaries, 
defines technology as the science of practical or industrial arts [1]. This definition does not 
include other areas, because industrial art is not by any means the only area in which 
technology plays a role. According to Webster Dictionary, technology is the science of the 
application of the knowledge to practical purposes in particular field [2]. This definition 
makes it clear that there can be many technologies as many as there are particular fields. 
Some definitions explicitly point to the soft and hard side of technology. According to 
Jantsch (1967), technology denotes the broad area of purposeful application of the contents 
of the physical, life, and behavioural sciences. It comprises the entire notion of techniques 
as wen as the medical, agricultural, management, and other fields with their total hardware 
and software contents [3]. Schon (1967) defined technology as " any tool or technique, any 
product or process, any physical equipment or method of doing or making, by which human 
capability is extended" [4]. 
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According to Thompson (1967), technology is " a design for instrumental action that 
reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationships involved in achieving a desired 
outcome [5]. Galbraith (1967) defines technology as "the systematic application of scientific 
or other organised knowledge to practical tasks" [6]. Merrill (1968) sees technology as 
bodies of knowledge, skiDs, and procedures, for making, using, and doing useful things [7]. 
According to Root (1968), technology is "the body of knowledge that is applicable to the 
production of goods and the creation of new goods" [8]. Peno and Wallender (1977) define 
technology as "knowledge embodied in products, processes formulas, and techniques 
needed for managing operations" [9]. According to Barquin (1981), a technology is the set 
of disciplines, methods, techniques and supporting instruments which make up the process 
by which a tangible or intangible product is elaborated [10]. In another definition used by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), technology means 
systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a process or 
for the rendering of a service, including any integrally associated managerial and marketing 
techniques [11]. Dahlman and Westphal (1981) define technology as a collection of physical 
processes which transforms inputs into outputs [12]. This definition is also similar to that 
of Technology Atlas Team (1988) which consider technology as a black box where inputs 
in the form of natural resources go into the box and outputs in the form of produced 
resources come out from the other side. Thus, one can say that technology performs as a 
transformer of inputs into outputs [13]. 
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Figure 3.1: The Schematic Representation of Technology 
Source: APCTT (Asian and Pacific Centre for Technology Transfer, U.N. " Technology 
Atlas", 1988. 
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According to Mansfield (1982), technology consists of society's pool of knowledge 
concerning physical and social phenomena, knowledge regarding the application of basic 
principles to practical work, and knowledge regarding the day-to-day operations of 
production (such as the rules of thumb of practitioners and craftsmen) [14]. In its broadest 
definitions, Evans (1984) defined technology as the means by which man undertakes to 
change or influence his environment [15]. Dosi (1984) sees technology as a set of segments 
of knowledge, containing directly practical and theoretical know-how, procedures, 
experiences of successes, and points out that technologies consist not only of hardware 
(machines and mechanical equipment) but also comprise the technical knowledge and skills 
of participants of an organisation [16]. Fransman ( 1984), believes that technology is defined 
broadly so as to encompass everything pertaining to the transforming of inputs to outputs 
[17]. This definition is widely used by economists, describing the relationship between inputs 
or factors of production, and output. According to Meissner (1988), technology is a process 
by which knowledge and experience are applied to achieving more efficient, effective, and 
timely use of available resources in a community that aims to increase its cultural and 
material welfare, according to the comnnmity's own values and means [18]. Dunning (1993) 
defines technology as the output of technological and organisational capacity, which 
determines the way (or ways) in which tangible and intangible resources may be physically 
converted into intermediate and finished goods and services [19]. 
It becomes obvious from these extensive technology definitions that technology is seen by 
many as the most significant factor in improving productivity, quality, and competitiveness. 
The main feature of most definitions is that they indicate to one or more specific aspects of 
technology such as its type, method and subject. Moreover, the various definitions for 
technology emphasise to its muhi-dimensional characteristics such as flexibility, institutional, 
organisational, and cumulative nature. 
3.2 TECHNOWGY CLASSIFICATIONS AND COMPONENTS 
Technology can be classified according to many variables, e.g. the cost of its supporting 
hardware, the type of end-product obtained, or the complexity of its methods and 
techniques. Hall and Johnson (1970) distinguished three kinds of technology: 
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I. General technology includes technical information common to companies operating 
in the same activity, 
2. System specific technology corresponds to the knowledge and know-how firms 
develop for solving particular industrial problems. In other words, system-specific 
technology refers to the information possessed by a firm or an individual in a firm, 
which might have been acquired through engaging in certain tasks or projects. Such 
information comprises procedures related to a particular system, solutions to unique 
problems, or requirements which differentiate them from procedures encountered 
in other systems. A system-specific technology is acquired by a firm in one industry, 
and usually not by other firms in the industry manufacturing the same item or 
engaged in the same activity. It gives the firm a competitive edge or differentiation. 
3. Company-specific technology covers the corporate skills and capabilities deriving 
from the general activity and experience of each individual firm. In other words, it 
refers to knowledge which a firm acquires beyond the general knowledge possessed 
by the industry as a whole. Such knowledge is not attn'buted to any specific item the 
firm produces or system it uses, but it resuhs from the firm's overall or collective 
activities [20]. 
There are some other classifications of technology which have been stated by other authors. 
Mansfield (1975) used "embodied", (Physical goods and sldlled labour) versus 
"disembodied", (soft goods such as, industrial property, know-how, technical data, technical 
services and technical assistance, ... ) technology [21]. Madeuf(1984) has elaborated this 
classification as capital embodied, human embodied and disembodied technology [22]. He 
has also drawn a distinction between technology alienated by property rights (patterns) or 
secrecy and know-how which could not be transferred without an effective participation of 
the firm holding it. 
According to another classification, technology is divided to production and consumption 
technology. Production technology considers the methods, processes etc, for production of 
goods and services, whereas consumption technology considers methods, processes and 
techniques by which a particular need or demand may be satisfied, for example, the need for 
inland transport, satisfied by using the horse and buggy, the automobile, trains, bicycles or 
a subway system [23]. According to Simon (1991) technology falls into multiple categories. 
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First, those technologies that are explicitly related to purely civilian commodities or the 
haIVesting and production of these commodities such as textiles and agricultural products. 
Second, those technologies that are directly links to military items such as weapon systems. 
The third type of technology is not really technology at all, but is best labeled scientific or 
basic research. The last type of technology, and perhaps the most controversial is what is 
called dual use technology. Dual-use technologies are those whose development and 
application are intended for civilian purposes, but could have potential application in the 
defense sector. Much of what is called high technology items, such as super computers, 
would fall in this category [24]. 
Bhalla and James (1991) determined four levels of technology; traditional, intermediate, 
conventional, and newly emerging [25]. Traditional technologies are " the evolutionary 
product of a long process of natural selection of innovations often stretching over several 
centuries." Ordinarily, traditional technologies exhibit little change and fit comfortably with 
local socio-economic conditions and value systems. They tend to be very old and are rooted 
in local tradition and culture. Intermediate technologies commonly result from incremental 
conventional technical improvements that upgrade traditional technologies. E.F.Schumacher 
( 1973) characterised intermediate technology as technology that: 
1. Is able to create a new workplace with low investment outlays; 
2. Makes only modest demands on skills, and 
3. Uses locally available inputs [26]. 
Conventional technologies comprise the technological core for production in developed 
countries and modern sectors of third world nations. 
Emerging technologies can be distinguished by four characteristics: 
1. They are the product of recent scientific research and development; 
2. They are being developed and applied at rates that exceed those of most past and 
contemporary technologies; 
3. They show no clear signs oflosing their dynamism in the near future, and 
4. They appear to have the potential for widespread application that will bring about 
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significant social and economic change. 
According to another classification, technology is classified into visible and invisible 
messages. While the former include drawings, specifications, manuals, documentation, 
computer programs, database, or patents, the latter represents know-how, skills or software 
that are not easily transferable in a descriptive form [27]. 
Technology Atlas Team (1987) identify four components of technology: 
1. Object-embodied technology which can be called Techno-ware, and consists of 
tools, equipment, machines, vehicles, physical facilities, etc. 
2. Person-embodied technology which can be called Human-ware, and refers to 
experiences, skills, knowledge, wisdom, creativity, etc. 
3. Document-embodied technology which can be called Info-ware and includes all 
kinds of documentation pertaining to process specifications, procedures, theories, 
observations, etc. 
4. Institution-embodied technology which can be called Orga-ware and consists of 
management practices, linkages, etc [28]. 
Zeleny also defines technology's four components: 
1. Hardware, which refers not only to a particular physical structure of components, 
but to their logical layout as well. 
2. Software, which refers to the know-how of carrying out tasks to achieve goals and 
objectives. 
3. Brain-ware, which refers to the application and the justification of hardware/ 
software deployment, the know-what and know-why of technology; that is, what to 
employ, how, when, and why; and 
4. Support net, which refers to the complex network of physical, informational, and 
socio-economic transformations that support the proper use and functioning of a 
given technology the unity of hardware, software, and brain-ware toward stated 
goals and objectives [29]. 
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One may find three common features in the classification of technology components. These 
are hardware or techno-ware, brain-ware or human-ware, and info-ware or software. In any 
technology transfer process, all components of technology are required for transformation 
of inputs into the outputs. In other words, both hardware (machinery and equipment) and 
software (the know-how for using those machinery and equipment) are needed in order to 
have an effective technology transfer. Moreover, the skillful labour force (human-ware) and 
managerial and organisational expertise (orga-ware) can also promote the level of recipient 
adaptation and absorption of imported technologies. 
3.3 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ITS DEFINITIONS 
The literature offers several definitions in respect of technology transfer which indicate to 
its importance. Technology transfer has been defined initially the process whereby 
technology is moved from one physical or geographic location to another for the purpose 
of application toward an end product [30]. This transfer can take place either domestically, 
from one sector or firm to another, or it can take place across national boundaries, from one 
country to another, which is generally accepted as international technology transfer. 
According to Get (1981), technology transfer is the process by which technology developed 
for one purpose is employed either in a different application or by a new user [31]. Kayak 
(1985) has defined technology transfer as the transition of know-how to suit local 
conditions, with effective absorption and diifusion both within a country and from one 
country to another [32]. 
According to another definition, technology transfer is the "utilisation of an existing 
technique in an instance where it has not previously been used" [33]. Chesnais (1986) 
defined technology transfer as the transition of the capability to manufacture a product or 
process from firms in one country to firms in another. He argued that this transfer includes 
not only the technical knowledge needed to produce the products, but also of the capacity 
to master, develop, and later produce autonomously the technology underlying these 
products [34]. Larsen et al. (1986) define technology transfer as the process by which 
technological innovations are exchanged between individuals and organisations who are 
involved in R&D on one hand, and in putting technological innovations into use on the 
other hand [35]. According to Meissner (1988), transfer of technology is the act of sharing 
50 
know-how by such devices as constancy, joint ventures, gifts, licenses, franchises, and 
patents [36]. Aggrawal (1991) on the other hand, view technology transfer as the 
comrmmication, adaptation and use of technology from one place or economic region into 
a second region. He also adds that this technology has to be adapted to local conditions by 
the receiver to fit to its social, political, cultural" economic, and educational environment 
[37]. 
There are several fundamental characteristics concerning technology transfer deriving from 
these definitions: 
First, as it discussed earlier, technology has many components and dimensions, and almost 
always involves more than one element of technology. Various elements of technology 
involved in a particular case interact with each other as if they constituted a system In 
addition, the technology package must be periodically re-evaluated as conditions change, 
and as the project cycle advances, and as new information becomes available. Thus 
technology transfer is a dynamic process. Second, industrial technology is different from 
scientific knowledge. Industrial technology consists of product design, production 
techniques, and managerial systems to organise and carry out production plans. Although 
scientific progress in a country may contn'bute to innovation and facilitate the application 
of science to production, scientific progress by itself is not adequate for technological 
progress. The scientific progress must be converted into industrial applications which are, 
in tum, made commercially viable through managerial know-how. Technology may be 
embodied in products, or disembodied, and recorded or held in minds of persons. It may 
have its applications in new products, new services, or old services and products with lower 
resource costs. The international transfer of technology thus means that people, products, 
or materials (data, manuals, blueprints) must be transferred across national boundaries. To 
be successfully transferred, the technology must be absorbed into the production process of 
the host nation, which will depend on cultural and social factors. 
Third, the effective transfer of technology requires an adequate infrastructure, which may 
include scientific institutions; research and development facilities; vocational, technical and 
management training institutes; and skilled personnel of different specialisation, within the 
recipient country. It also requires a suitable cultural environment. Both the infrastructure 
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and the cultural environment are basic determinants of the effectiveness of technology 
transfer. Fourth, technology developed in a specific context can hardly ever be introduced 
into a new environment without at least some degree of modification. Modification and 
further development of technology are thus very often an integrated part of transfer. This 
often involves changing the scale of a production process and the adaptation of products to 
local market characteristics. 
Tyre (1991) points out that new process introductions often involve considerable problem 
solving and even innovation at the plant level. The degree of changes in the technology is 
affected by the attnoutes and business environments of the units involved in the transfer 
[38]. 
3. 4 TECHNOWGY TRANSFER CLASSIFICATION 
It is important to distinguish among several types of technology transfer. The International 
Technology Transfer has been classified according to different criteria. Useful classification 
was provided by Mansfield (1982), who distinguished between material transfer, design 
transfer, and capacity transfer. 
Material transfer consists of the transfer of materials, final products, components, 
equipment, and even turnkey plants. In brief: this is the transfer of the technological artefact 
itself, it is not so much a transfer of knowledge as it is the transfer of the results of 
knowledge. The receiving country is merely a passive consumer of the knowledge produced 
by others, and it cannot reproduce that knowledge. The main objective is either to supply 
the physical capacity to produce or the desired products themselves. Design transfer, which 
basically involves the movement of designs, blueprints, and the know-how to manufacture 
previously designed products or equipment. The major objective here is to provide the basic 
information, data, and guidelines needed to create a desired capability. In other words, 
foreign items are imported in order to copy their designs, and the recipient nation begins to 
produce domestically the artefact formerly imported in the material type of transfer. 
Nevertheless, it still remains dependent upon technological knowledge produced elsewhere. 
Capacity transfer includes provision of the know-how and soft-ware not simply to 
manufacture existing products but, more importantly, to innovate and adapt existing 
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technologies and products, and ultimately design new products [39]. 
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Figure 3.2: The different classification of technology 
Another classification distinguished between two basic types of technology transfer; vertical 
transfer and horizontal transfer. Vertical transfer refers to the transfer of technical 
information within the various stages of a particular innovative process, i. e. from basic 
research to applied research, from applied research to development, and from development 
to production. In other words it is the transition from the principle to practice, or from pure 
science to its practical application. Since vertical technology transfer entails technological 
progression from science to a completed product, there seems to be tend toward organising 
R&D by vertical integration. Horizontal transfer occurs when technology is used in one 
place, organisation, or context is transferred and used in another [40]. 
3.5 DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
As noted earlier, technology transfer can be classified to different types. One can generally 
demonstrate four kinds of technology transfer as following: 
3. 5. 1 The Partial Transfer 
In this method, foreign technology T supplied in the year 1 is adapted by R&D centres to 
local conditions, before going to production and then to market. This method needs a long 
period of time to take technology to the exploitation stage. 
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Figure 3.3: The Partial Transfer 
3. 5. 2 The Incomplete Transfer 
In this case, the technology T is being imported in the year I and simuhaneously used in 
production, and then is being adapted by local R&D centres in the year Nt before going to 
market. Therefore, production has first priority. 
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Figure 3.4: The Incomplete Transfer 
3. 5. 3 The Complete Transfer 
This method is the combination of the previous methods. Firstly, the technology is taken to 
R&D centres and then used for production and finally after a period in the production 
process, the R&D centres develop an improved version of the technology. There is a 
significant role for R&D both in adapting the technology and customising it for the 
receiving COlDltry, and also in assimilating the "know-how" embodied in technology. There 
is a significant role for R&D centres in this method. 
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Figure 3.5 The Complete Transfer 
3. 5. 4 The Barter Transfer 
In this method, technology is used directly in production, and after a period of time, it 
should be reimported again, because it becomes obsolete. The R&D centres have no role 
in this method. 
Years T 
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Figure 3.6 The Barter Transfer 
3. 6 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MECHANISM 
Technology transfer among nations (International Technology Transfer) can take place 
through a number of different channels and mechanisms that may in some cases exist 
independently of other channels. Cooper and Sercovich (1971) [41] and Stewart (1979) 
[42] distinguish between direct and indirect mechanisms of transfer. Direct mechanisms are 
those used when the recipient is in direct contact with the supplier of technology. Direct 
forms of transfer include direct contracting of individual experts and consuhant companies, 
engaging engineering design and plant construction enterprises, training nationals for 
specific production projects, technical information activities and transfer of the process 
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technology embodied in capital goods by importation of equipment purchased directly from 
machine manufactures. Indirect mechanism of transfer occurs when for example a company 
in an advanced country plays an intermediary role packaging the technology for the 
developed country. Generally, indirect mechanisms tend to be adopted where a country 
lacks the capacity to undertake direct purchase, where proprietary technology is involved 
which will not be released, or where (for marketing or other reasons) the recipient wishes 
to acquire trade marks. 
Buckley (1985) divides the modes ofITT into two main categories; internal and external. 
specifying 10 forms of technology transfer: 
1. Wholly owned foreign subsidiaries; 
2. Joint ventures; 
3. Foreign minority holdings; 
4. "Fading-out" agreements; 
5. Licensing; 
6. Franchising; 
7. Management contracts; 
8. Turnkey contracts; 
9. Contractual joint ventures; and 
10. International subcontracting. 
The first: type, wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, is the conventional form of foreign direct 
investment for technology transfer. The mode of transfer for the first: three forms is internal; 
that for forms 5,6,7,8, and 10 is external. For the fourth form, the fading-out agreement, 
the mode of transfer is internal at the beginning but becomes external when the period of 
agreements ends. The mode of transfer is mixed for the ninth form, contractual joint 
ventures [43]. 
Erdilek and Rapoport (1985) refer to formal and informal mechanisms of technology 
transfer. The formal channels of International Technology Transfer (lIT) are licensing 
agreements, direct foreign investment, sale oftumkey plants, joint ventures, co-operative 
research arrangements, and co-production agreements. The informal channels are those 
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-which do not involve an actual agreement between supplier and receiver of technology such 
as export of high-technology products and capital goals, reverse engineering, exchange of 
scientific and technical personnel, science and technology conferences, trade shows and 
exhibits, education and training of foreigners, commercial visits, open literature (journals, 
magazines, technical books, and articles), industrial espionage, end-user or third country 
diversions, and government assistance programs. International technology transfer through 
most of these channels is very difficult to detect and monitor. Formal channels usually 
involve the market mechanism and assign an explicit value to ITT. It is not known whether 
the bu1k of ITT occurs through the formal channels or through the informal ones that much 
more difficult to detect and monitor [44]. 
A study by United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) (1987) 
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial channels of international technology 
transfer. The commercial transfer involves payment of a direct and indirect price for 
technology and thus generates more complicated issues in the international arena than non-
commercial transfer. For instmce, fiiction between the supplier and recipient of technology 
often arises in regard to price for, and range of technology supplied, teaching and learning 
attitudes, etc. Moreover, interaction between the supplier and recipient through technology 
transfer is a long process, unlike the transaction of a physical commodity. Therefore, the 
nature, method, and means of interaction can take various forms, appropriate or 
inappropriate. The commercial channels include: 
1. Foreign direct investment, 
2. Joint ventures, 
3. Licensing, 
4. Franchising, 
5. Marketing contracts, 
6. Technical service contracts, 
7. Tum-key contracts, 
8. International subcontracting. 
The non-commercial modes of ITT include the review of technical joumals and the training 
of foreign students, exchange of scientists and engineers, co-operative research and 
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participation in international conferences [45]. 
Karake (1990) specifies channels by which technology is transferred in two major 
categories. The first category can be termed "packaged transfer" channels, such as direct 
foreign investment and joint ventures, whereby technology is tied to other inputs of 
production such as capital and management. Generally, the higher the degree of packaging, 
the more control the donors can maintain, and thus the less beneficial the effects for the 
recipients. Developing countries wish to import technology separated from the packaging 
as much as possible for this reason, and donors wish the opposite. The second category, 
"un-packed transfer" channels, includes a wide range of activities that can be acquired 
independently of control and ownership of the resources of suppliers. This category 
includes, among other channels, machinery and equipment exports, contracts awarded, 
personnel training, and technical programs [46]. 
Olukoshi (1990) discusses the international technology transfer mechanisms regarding 
elements of embodied and disembodied technology. He summarised the ITT channels as: 
flows of books, journals and other published materials; movement of people between 
countries including immigration, return emigrants, study visits and foreign courses; import 
of machinery and equipment for production; ie. production technology; licensing, patents, 
trad~marks and know-how agreements; technical co-operation at bilateral and multinational 
levels; and import of consumer goods, i.e. consumption technology. He explained that each 
of these forms contains elements of embodied and disembodied technology or a complex 
combination of both. For example, the flow of books and journals is one means of 
transferring disembodied technology while the sale by foreign corporations of patents, 
trademarks and licenses are an embodied form of technology transfer. Similarly, the 
provision by multinational companies (MNCs) of constancy, management and financial 
services falls into the category of disembodied technology. However, the supply of 
machinery and equipment for production is a classic example of transfer of embodied 
technology, where the supply of machinery and equipment goes in hand with the provision 
of training and technical services for example, then the transfer process can be said to 
involve both embodied and dis-embodied forms of technology. In many cases, technology 
transferred by MNCs to developing countries usually entails a complex combination of 
embodied and disembodied technology [47]. 
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Simon (1991) placed the most important channels of ITT in to five generic categories [48]: 
1. The international technology market, which is made up of independent buyers and 
suppliers. 
2. Intrafirm transfer, whereby resort to the market is avoided and the transfer takes 
place through either a joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary. 
3. Government-directed agreements or exchanges, where the counterparts can be either 
public or private actors. 
4. Education, training, and conferences, where the dissemination of information is 
made public for common consumption by either a general or specialised audience. 
5. Pirating or reverse-engineering, whereby access to the technology is obtained while 
resort to the market is avoided but at the expense of the proprietary rights of the 
owner(s) of technology. 
He emphasised the first and second channels as the most critical ones, but this is not to deny 
the relative importance of three other channels noted, especially the role of education and 
training. 
Kim (1991) analyses the international technology transfer mechanisms by classifying them 
to market and non-market mediated [49]. In market mediated, he refers to those mechanisms 
which may be determined by the market. The transferor and transferee may negotiate the 
cost of technology transfer, either embodied in or disembodied from the physical equipment. 
In the non-mediated mechanisms, technology transfer usually takes place without formal 
agreements and payments. He demonstrates the mediated and non-mediated mechanisms 
of technology transfer in a useful four-cells matrix to identify and evaluate different 
mechanisms ofintemational technology transfer. As is shown in the following figure, those 
mechanisms in the cell 1 are among the most important technology transfer modes which 
the supplier of technology has exercised an active role in directing the technology transfer 
process including control over the quality and quantity of know-how being transferred, and 
the pOSSIble restriction imposed on the use of know-how. The channels of IT which are 
shown in cell 2, indicate those market-mediated modes which the suppliers of technology 
play a relatively passive role, with less control over the way in which technology and know-
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how are transferred to the recipient country. Finally, those methods which are shown in the 
cells 3 and 4 refer to the non-market mediated mechanisms and suppliers playa relatively 
passive and active role in transferring technological know-how respectively. 
Market Direct foreign investment, Standard (serial) machinery 
mediated foreign licensing, tum-key purchase 
plant, technical consultancy, (Cell 2) 
made-to-order machinery 
Non-market Technical assistance by Imitation (reverse engineering) 
mediated foreign buyers, technical observation, trade journals, 
assistance by foreign technical information service (Cell 
vendors (Cell 4) Active (role 3) Passive (role of supplier) 
Table 3.1 The Mode of Foreign Technology Transfer 
Source: Kim, L. , Pros and Cons of International Technology Transfer: A Developing 
Country View, 1991. 
Lall (1993) has also analysed the modes of technology transfer by distinguishing between 
two broad categories: internalised and externalised forms of technology transfer [50]. By 
internalised he refers to those modes which transferor has a significant and continuing 
financial share in the success of the affiliate, allows it to use its brand names and to have 
access to its global technology and marketing networks, exercise control over the affiliate's 
investment, technology and sales decisions. However, externalised forms lack one or all of 
these characteristics and include such mechanisms as licensing, international subcontracting, 
andjoint ventures with local control-which may be referred to as non-FDI forms ofTT. He 
also argued that the choice ofinternalisation of technology transfer mode is determined by 
some factors such as the nature of technology (its degree of complexity); the strategy of the 
supplier; the capability of receiver to absorb imported technology; and host government 
policy. Therefore, he believes that the internalised technology flows can be a very efficient 
means of transferring a package of capital, skills, technology, brand names and market 
access to LDCs. On the other hand, he also argues that the more standardised and diffused 
the technology and the more capable the receiver, the more economical will the externalised 
modes be. 
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Tho (1993) has classified the channels of international technology transfer into two broad 
categories, public and private [51]. In the first category, technologies can be considered as 
public goods, and the transfer is conducted by public organisation, such as governments of 
advanced countries and international agencies. The transfer of such technologies is 
conducted as a part of the technical assistance or economic co-operation provided to LDCs. 
The private channels of transfer relate to technologies that are developed by private firms 
and transferred on a commercial basis. The MNCs are usually the suppliers of such 
technologies which usually transfer their technologies through such channels as FDI, 
licensing agreements, plant export, original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and others. 
He also argues that the importance of each channel depends on some factors such as 
strategy ofMNCs supplying the technologies, the characteristics of the technologies, and 
the policies, absorptive capacity, and managerial resource endowments of the recipient 
countries. He adds that MNCs prefer FDI with whole or majority ownership when the newly 
developed technologies are transferred. On the other hand, recipient countries usually use 
licensing agreements, when the environment is considered risky. Moreover, the choice of 
OEM as channel of technology transfer depends on the technological level of recipient 
country. 
It appears that diffenm mechanisms will involve different agents of transfer and will affect 
the actual amount and composition of the technology transferred, the level of control for the 
exporting and importing country, and the return (costs and benefits) on technology for the 
parties involved. For example, if the mechanism is the export of product-embodied 
technology, the amount of actual knowledge and skill transferred is slight (assuming that the 
recipient can not reverse eugineer the underlying design and thus appropriate the necessary 
know-how to manufacture the product on his own) [52]. Moreover, the choice of transfer 
mechanism will also determine the costs and benefits·for both supplier and recipient of 
technology. In other words, the determination of the mechanism of transfer in a particular 
case is the outcome of the willingness of the supplier oftecbnology to supply the technology 
in a particular form and the desire and ability of the recipient to acquire in a particular form. 
The effectiveness of each channel depends on the nature of the technology that is being 
acquired, the type of the organisation, and the absorptive capacities of the recipient. Thus, 
the various methods of transfer can be determined by fonowing factors: 
61 
1) Motivation, purpose, criteria, and benefits agreed upon between recipient and donor 
on technology transfer, 
2) Technology-vending strategy of donor, 
3) Technology level and managerial capacities of recipients, 
4) Available information sources and bargaining power of the recipient, and 
5) Technology and trade policy of the recipient's nation [53]. 
So, the recipient of technology should keep in mind that effectiveness of technology 
importation is significantly affected by the forms and mechanisms of technology transfer. 
The various mechanisms and channels of international technology transfer have been 
examined from different points of view so far. Now, it is essential to describe and explain 
each of these methods, in order to examine their applications according to different 
situations and circumstances. 
3. 6. 1 Foreign Direct Investment 
It is believed that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of the most important channels of 
technology transfer [54]. The transfer of technology through FDI usually occurs when a 
Muhinational company involves in the flow of capital, technical, managerial and marketing 
skills through its affiliates in a foreign country of which MNC can have the whole, majority 
or minority of ownership. In other words, direct investment represents the horizontal and 
vertical extension of business enterprise across national boundaries, motivated by purely 
commercial considerations [55]. Since MNCs can be considered as one of the major sources 
of most modem technologies, their direct investment plays an important role in transferring 
technology to developing countries [56]. However, MNCs have sometimes been criticised 
for not transferring the appropriate technology and the know-how needed for adapting the 
foreign technology to IDCs' local conditions. This is mainly due to the low values of 
research and development expenditures of MNCs in host LDCs which is because of the 
small size of local markets in many LDCs and also the lack of adequate industrial and 
technological infrastructure and the shortage of skilled labour force in these host countries 
[57]. 
According to Vickery (1986), the flow ofFDI can either take place where a foreign owner 
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establishes business in the host country, or the inflows from established overseas affiliates 
to their parents [58]. However, it should be noted that the term affiliate is commonly used 
for joint venture, which is a specific form ofFDI and will be discussed later. The foreign 
branch of a MNC is usually called a subsidiary when there is effective control by the parent 
firm. While there is a common agreement on the significant role of FDI in transfer of 
technology and managerial expertise to LDCs, one can not easily explain the preference of 
FDI for a particular channel of transfer compared with other channels. However, it is 
generally argued that FDI has flowed more to the countries which have some characteristics 
such as a relatively cheap and skilled labour and abundant natural resources and preferably, 
although not necessarily, to areas in close geographical proximity [59]. 
There is considerable general literature on the advantages and disadvantages of foreign 
direct investment for developing countries. One of the main advantages of FDI is that it 
brings in new knowledge, technical know-how, marketing and entrepreneurial skills. 
Therefore, this complete package of knowledge and skills can certainly have a major impact 
on the recipient country. The importance of FDI as one of the major mechanism for 
technology transfer can be seen in the preference of this method over the other channels by 
both receiver and supplier of technology. It is argued that through the 1960s, the 
establishment of a wholly owned foreign subsidiary or a majority-owned foreign affiliate was 
the predominant method of MNCs' direct investment and a prime source of technology 
transfer to LOCs [60]. However, many LOCs proposed rather more restrictive policies 
towards MNCs in particular their whole ownership, as most of these countries wished to 
strengthen their indigenous industrial and technological capability which enabled them to 
adapt and assimilate foreign technologies more efficiently. 
The choice between exports and foreign direct investmeut as channels of technology transfer 
is more complex. One might expect that export would be 'the preferred choice as suggested 
by product cycle theory. However, it can be seen that in many respects, firms in LOCs 
prerer direct investment for technology transfer [61]. According to Dunning (1988), what 
makes a firm (MNC) enter a foreign investment activity instead of exporting of its products 
is the exploration of the location specific advantage and the ownership specific advantage 
[62]. In other words, the main reasons for a finn to involve in foreign investment are to 
control enterprises in other countries and also to use the firm's competitive advantage 
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abroad. 
The importance ofFDI as a mechanism of technology transfer has been important for 
many developing countries and in particular for the East Asian NICs, except for S. Korea 
where FDI has been an important source of technology in specific industries such as 
chemicals, electronics and petroleum refining [63]. According to a recent World Bank 
Publication, FDI is the dominant source of resource flowing to developing countries and the 
primary source of private capital flows for low-income countries. The UNCTC using 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, has estimated that during the five years 1985-89, 
world FDI flows totalled over $ 630 billion on a balance-of-payments basis. FDlon a 
balance-of-payments basis is a measure of changes in owners equity in business 
organisations or real assets that these owners control. The $ 630 billion figure cited above 
thus is :tar short of the total value of assets that came under foreign control as a result ofFDI 
[64]. 
The aggregate flow ofFDI to all developing countries exceeded $ 38 billion in 1992, and 
$ 80 billion in 1993, an increase of 50% over the previous two years and a 400% increase 
since the mid-1980. As a source of external capital for developing countries, FDI makes up 
more than 75% of the total. While global FDI flow has declined slightly in the last couple 
of years, the flow to developing countries has increased in absolute amounts and in the share 
from less than 12% of the total in 1987 to over 22% by the end of 1991[65]. Within the 
developing countries, the bulk ofFDI flow goes to Asia, which attracts over 60% of the 
total. However, this still constitutes less than 10% of the world's FDI flow. In contrast, 
developing countries in Latin America attract no more than 5% of the world's FDI flow. In 
addition, over the past few years there has been a slight shift of FDI flow from Latin 
America to Asia) [66]. There are several reasons for this, including the international debt 
crisis, the increased attractiveness of Asian economies to FDI, and the better 
macroeconomic prospects of Asian economies. Table 4 gives a picture of the changing 
pattern of the top 10 FDI recipients in the developing countries over the past two decades. 
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Recipients 1970-1980 Recipients 1980-1990 Recipients 1988-1992 
Total FDI 20.6 Total FDI 18.7 TotalFDI 164.5 
flow to flow to flow to ( estimated) 
LDCs LDCs LDCs 
Brazil 11.3 Sin~a'Pore 2.3 China 25.6 
Mexico 0.6 Mexico 1.9 Sinaa'Pore 21.7 
EJM)t 0.3 Brazil 1.8 Mexico 18.4 
Malaysia 0.3 China 1.7 Malaysia 13.2 
Ni~eria 0.3 Malaysia 1.1 Araentina 10. 
Sin~a'Pore 0.3 Hon~Kon~ 1.1 Thailand 9.5 
Indonesia 0.2 EJM)t 0.9 HonaKona 7.9 
Hon~Kona 0.1 Ar~entina 0.5 Indonesia 5.6 
Iran 0.1 Thailand 0.7 Taiwan 6.0 
Urusruav 0.1 Taiwan 0.5 Indonesia 5.6 
Share of 66 Share of 68 Share of 75 
flow to top flow to top flow to top 
10(%) 10(%) 10 (%) 
Table 3.2 Top 10 Annual Flow ofFDI to Less Developed Countries.( $ billions) 
Source: Columns (1-4) UN, World Investment Report, 1992; Columns (5-6), The 
Economist, Oct., 1994, P:29 
As is shown in table 3.2, during the 1970s, Asia had five recipients in the top 10 but this 
increased to six and seven during the 1980s and early 1990s respectively. The top slot 
switched from Brazil in 1970s to Singapore in 1980s, and has recently shifted to China in 
early 1990s. One can also see that the average share of Asia in the top 10 increased from 
only 5% to 58%. It should be understood that FDI flow is fairly uneven, and as more 
countries have become receptive to FDI the pattern of flow has ahered considerably. Less 
than one quarter of all FDI flow goes to developing countries and over two-thirds of this 
goes to only 10 countries. 
While the composition of these 10 has changed over the years the aggregate flow ofFDI to 
developing countries has increased about twice as fast as the rate of growth of their GDP 
during the latter half of 1980s and early 1990s. In 1989, Japan emerged for the first time 
as the world's largest investor. The slow-down of the global FDI outflow after 1990 was 
largely caused by a drop in Japanese FDI outflow from $48 billion in 1990 to $31 billion in 
1991. Japan's share in global FDI outflow increased from 10% for the period 1980-1985 
to 20% between 1986-1990, surpassing the UK (17%) and the USA (14%). MNCs from 
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Japan became the world's most important moves of international capital and the world's 
most important source of technology transfer. Japanese MNCs have tended to concentrate 
their investment in North America and the EC, which together accounted for more than half 
of Japan's total investment outflow in manufacturing during the period 1950-1990. Although 
Asia's share in absorbing Japan's total investment outflow was a mere 15.3%, its share in 
manufacturing outflow was much larger (22.9%) [67]. 
3. 6. 2 Joint Ventures 
A Joint Venture (JV) is a business association between two or more parties who agree to 
share the provision of equity capital, the investment risk, the control and decision making 
authority, and the profits or other benefits of the operation [68]. In other words, joint 
ventures can be defined as a collaboration or new investment involving shared ownership 
between local firms in host country and its foreign partner [69]. As indicated earlier, with 
many developing countries adopting some restrictive policies toward the MNCs foreign 
investment in particular in the form of the whole ownership, a new form of foreign 
investment has been shaped. The local and foreign partners were interested more in entering 
a new formal agreement for transfer of technology and managerial expertise which both 
parties share in the decision making, control and benefits of the operation. Therefore, the 
elements oftechnology provided by MNCs under joint venture agreement can include any 
or all of those provided under foreign direct investment. However, the parties involved in 
a IV contract, agree to share the provision of equity capital, the investment risk, the control 
and decision making authority, and the profits and the other benefits of the operation. 
In other respects, the only way in which the behaviour of the joint venture is likely to be 
distinguishable from the behaviour of a wholly owned subsidiary is in its ability to secure 
favourable treatment from the host government. Frequently, however, a joint venture 
combines the different skills and resources of the foreign and the local partner and divides 
the responsibilities of the management between them [70]. It seems that many developing 
countries have adopted a policy of requiring foreign investors to form joint ventures with 
local private or government entities. Since the interests oflocal partners are to be more in 
line with the overall interests of the host country than those of foreign firms, participation 
oflocal investors in the joint venture's decision-making process is expected to enhance the 
66 
net benefits to the host country. Moreover, active involvement of nationals in day-to-day 
operations of a joint venture is believed to lead to a speedier transfer of know-how than 
would be the case with a wholly owned subsidiary. 
Joint Venture agreements have been classified to different types. Killing (1983) distinguishes 
between two ways in which a local firm in the recipient country can use a joint venture to 
acquire technical and managerial expertise from a potential technology supplier. One is to 
form a dominant parent joint venture in which the dominant parent and the technology 
supplier is the passive parent; the other is to enter a shared management venture with the 
technology supplier. He states that while there is a possibility of very good technology 
tranSfer in a shared management venture for both local and foreign partners, however, the 
probability of f8i1ure is nmch higher in a shared joint venture than a dominant parent venture 
[71]. White (1983) [72] and UNCTAD (1988) [73] and many others, have made a 
distinction between two types of joint ventures: The equity joint venture in which assets, 
rights and liabilities are shared through joint ownership of an incorporated enterprise; and 
non equity joint venture where the co-operation between partners is established on a 
contractual basis. Non-equity joint ventures include all types of collaboration contracts and 
production sharing agreements. 
The share of equity in the hands of local partner can have an important impact on the 
technology transfer process. Therefore, it is vital to consider the important terms and 
conditions of transfer of technology through equity joint ventures: Firstly, the use of 
equity joint venture as a mechanism of technology transfer relies on the organisational 
arrangements made for ensuring an effective adaptation, assimilation, and absorption of the 
technological knowledge by the recipient enterprise. These organisational arrangements may 
include the co-ordination of the different financial and other interests of the parties, the 
degree of association and participation in areas such as research and development, quality 
control and marketing. Secondly, in the case that the local partner is a public entity, foreign 
enterprises often manage to capitalise their technological contribution, putting up little or 
no cash for their equity share in the joint venture. Although this practice has been impeded 
by the regulations of some developing countries, however, state enterprises in many cases 
accepted the capitalization of foreign know-how in joint ventures with MNCs. Thirdly, 
joint ventures may play the role of distributing to the foreign partner, through royalty fees, 
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for certain technological contn'butions in addition to the profits deriving from the share of 
the equity. For example, some countries have adopted specific criteria for the payment of 
royahies by joint venture, such as the experience of Brazilian government in the reduction 
of the royahy fee in proportion to the share of the foreign licensor in the joint venture [74]. 
Whatever the ownership structure of a venture, local production is likely to start with the 
assembly of components imported mainly from sources affiliated with the foreign partner. 
The host government, however, generally seeks to induce the joint venture to expand its 
level of operations to include locally produced raw materials and components. The level of 
the foreign equity participation in a joint venture depends on the amount of technical 
assistance that may be required from the foreign supplier in production, management, and 
marketing including exports [75]. The interests of the foreign and local partners, however, 
are by no means identical. Whereas the local partner can be expected to strive for maximal 
returns from the joint venture, the foreign partner generally seeks to limit the extent of local 
manufacture and indigenous management and attempts to charge the joint venture 
maximum possible prices for the know-how and technical services supplied. However, 
foreign partner involvement can be important in promoting and maintaining the efficiency 
and competitiveness of the venture. One can also say that because of different objectives 
between local and foreign partner, the foreign partner will resist pressure to increase 
domestic content longer and more vigorously than will the local partner [76]. 
There are two other types of joint ventures: production sharing ventures and joint research 
ventures. In the production sharing ventures, the foreign partner performs as general 
contractor and conducts the operational responsibility over the project. Production-sharing 
ventures can generally create a better opportunity for the development oflocal technological 
capabilities, based on the level of technical expertise of the local partner. However, joint 
research ventures between local and foreign partners can also be an efficient method of 
transferring technological knowledge and promoting technological activities in the country. 
Particular advantages of such ventures are the exchange and diffusion of technological 
information; practical training in laboratories, resuhs of evaluation testing, etc.; and 
participation in attaining fixed objectives in the project. This type of venture may require 
distribution of risks and costs among partners [77]. As Had1ik (1985) [78] states that some 
factors such as scale of the marketing of the host country, the technical competence of the 
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partner, and technological resources of the host country, are important for a foreign partner 
to enter into joint research venture with a local partner. 
Having swveyed some studies which have analysed the choice of joint ventures against other 
a1temative methods, Stopford and Wells (1972) [79] in their analysis of the foreign entry 
decision for 155 muhinational enterprises, found that the use of joint ventures relative to 
wholly owned subsidiaries declined with the importance of technology and, in particular, 
marketing and product standardisation increased. They also found that joint ventures were 
more likely when the entry included a product diversification, for the reasons of acquiring 
local expertise in new areas. Another point in their findings indicates that equity share is 
influenced by the strategic importance of the R&D or marketing expenditures and product 
diversity. Caves and Mehra (1986) [80] through the analysis of entry decisions of 138 
foreign firms into U. S. manufacturing industries found that the choice to enter to a joint 
venture is influenced by the size of the targeted firm relative to that of the foreign firm, by 
the characteristics of the industry, and by the cultural characteristics of the foreign and home 
countries. 
There are generally some advantages and disadvantages for joint ventures: Joint ventures 
represent a significant change in industry structures and in competitive behaviour. Joint 
ventures permit firms to create new strengths. They permit firms to share in the use of 
technologies they could never afford to explore alone. A joint venture may also create 
lower operating costs and become more efficient than a wholly owned subsidiary, because 
of complementary skills, economies of scale and scope, and the local partner's knowledge 
of the local environment. The importance of joint ventures in comparison with other 
channels of technology transfer has recently increased because product lives are shorter, cost 
advantages are becoming more pronounced, and greater numbers of firms which operated 
formerly only in domestic markets are becoming global competitors. Joint ventures can also 
be increasingly important in the development of new industries, the revitalisation of mature 
industries, and the enhancement offirms' competitive advantages [81]. Furthermore, as 
Kogut (1988) [82] states, joint ventures are more efficient mechanism for transferring tacit 
know-how and for minimising transaction costs. 
However, it may have some disadvantages. For example, different goals of the parties in 
69 
a joint venture can cause problems. When a product designer enters into venture with a 
manufacturer, the two may have different goals. The designer may be interested primarily 
in the further development of the product and may view the joint venture as a means to that 
end. The manufacturer, by contrast, may be motivated principally by a desire to establish a 
high volume of production and sales of the existing products [83]. Therefore, one can 
conclude that the success of joint venture agreements will increase when the supplier and 
recipient's goal and objective are in the same direction. 
3.6.3 Licensing Agreements 
Licensing is the sale of manufacturing technology by a multinational enterprise (licensor) to 
a non-controlled entity located outside the home country of the multinational enterprise 
(licensee) [84]. In other words, a licensing agreement is a legal contract under which the 
licensor confers certain rights upon the licensee for a specified duration in return for certain 
payments (usually royahies) [85]. The rights may consist of permission to use industrial 
property rights, such as patents, trade marks, brand names and copyrights, and it can include 
secret un-patented know-how, such as methods of production, scheduling and quality 
controL which are usually combined with the provision of technical services. Licensing is 
believed to be the most versatile mechanism for transferring technology, as it offers 
flexibility in the choice and opportunity for the recipient country to require its needs through 
the negotiation [86]. 
The major difference between licence agreements and joint ventures is that, in the former, 
there is no sharing of equity by the firms involved. The licensor agrees to provide the 
required technology through the complete capital investment by the licensee. One can also 
refer to two different types of license agreement. The current technology agreement, by 
which the licensee can only access the available technology at the time of signing the 
agreement; and the current and future technology agreement, in which licensee and licensor 
agree that the available technology will be developed in a specific product area before 
transferring it to the licensee. Although the current and future agreement can provide the 
opportunity for an effective technology transfer, however, they are usually offered only for 
older products [87]. 
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Frankel (1990) recognises some incentives for both licensee and licensor in entering into a 
licensing agreement [88]. The major impetus of licensee is to obtain. more advanced 
technology and with lower costs and shorter time rather than involving in its own 
development of similar technology. In other words, from the licensee's point of view, 
licensing resuhs in faster commercial development and market entry or enhanced market 
share than costly internal R&D would permit [89]. The main objective of the licensor, 
however, can be attnbuted to its willingness in getting help for financing the development 
of technology and in sharing the risk of technology development and its application with 
others in particular licensee. As Frankel states, licensing is a strategic decision for both 
licensee and licensor which needs effective market, technology, and cost valuation and 
forecasting. Therefore, it is vital for the licensee to develop an effective strategy of choice, 
timing, method of application and benefit objectives [90]. It is also necessary for the 
licensor to make an efficient strategy of timing and pricing of technology licensing. It is also 
believed that the main reasons for the licensor to license the technology are: to eam 
revenues not otherwise possible; to extend the technology's life (declining in commercial use 
in the licensor's market); and to establish or test the market for future FDI [91]. 
It is believed the main advantage for both licensee and licensor is that the·license agreement 
allows transfer of technology to take place without risks associated with financial 
involvement [92]. Moreover, licensing affects the development of new technology and may 
encourage or discourage new research and development. The advantages of licensed 
technology depend heavily on how current the technology is, and whether the licensee is 
permitted to retain. the rights to any improvements made. It is also believed that there is 
more tendency towards large firms which spend more on R&D activity to consider licensing 
as part of their strategic planning. Large and leading firms consider license agreements as 
a means for gaining benefits from their investment in teclmology and the follower firms view 
licenses as a way to have access to that technology without spending a large amount of 
expenditure to imitate and develop it [93]. Moreover, some of the important factors which 
determine the propensity to license are sim oflocal market (licensee), the stage of industrial 
development in recipient country, the availability of skilful and capable labour force in the 
host country, and a level of political risk and knowledge of the new market [94]. 
Although licensing is considered to offer a quick and handy way of transferring technology 
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to foreign countries with a relatively low risk and control, however, as Holstius (1993) has 
argued, there is often a possibility for the licensee to become a competitor for the licensor 
by using the expertise gained through the licence [95]. Moreover, when industrial 
technology is transferred through a licensing agreement, the success of the licensee in a 
license agreement to a large degree depends on how it can efficiently handle production in 
accordance with the agreement. In other words, the licensee requires a rather large 
package of technology including production know-how, and product design, the 
specification of inputs and machinery, and market studies. As indicated earlier, the licensee 
can use licensed and patented or non-patented technology in exchange for a fee which is 
often calculated on the basis of gross sales of the product. The price which a technology 
licensor can charge depends on its competitiveness and its stage of development [96]. Most 
licences are granted to subsidiaries and affiliates and to other multinational firms. The 
smallest share of licences goes to local firms in developing countries. Thus, the benefit from 
licensing may be largely within the set of already rather prosperous firms, which have the 
information networks about who has what and who needs it [97]. 
Having compared the use of licensing with other channels of technology transfer, one can 
say that the firm licensing the technology can exercise a greater degree of control over how 
it is used, adapted, and developed than if it were simply a minority partner or even equal 
partner in an equity joint venture. Moreover, the licensee can investigate to negotiate, as 
part of the transfer agreement, attractive arrangements for the training of its personnel as 
well as search of the best combination of price, and other technical characteristics while the 
local firm may locked in through a joint venture to a single technology source with a 
possibility of imposing monopolistic pricing from the foreign partner [98]. However, the 
bargaining strength of the licensee depends on its local capacities to assimilate and absorb 
the licensed technology. The more the licensee's absorptive capacity is, the higher the degree 
of its success in the effective assimilation of licensed technology would be. 
In Prasad's (1981) view, licensing may act as an attractive ahernative to FDI. This is mainly 
because licensing is generally a cheaper source of technology and also stimulates 
technological se1f:.reliance in the recipient country relatively more than FDI [99]. Moreover, 
licensing may be an attractive alternative to direct foreign investment, if the licensee is 
capable: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
to choose the technology required; 
to survey and select a suitable licensor and negotiate knowledgeably; 
¢ • 
to organise the complementary infrastructure needed for the technology; 
to monitor future technological developments. 
However, licensing is considered to be more complementary to FDI rather than a substitute. 
While one cannot deny the great importance of FDI in transferring technology and 
managerial skiDs, as the LOCs' level of industrial and technological capability have increased 
during the past years, the share of acquisition of technology licensing has also significantly 
risen. Therefore, one can see that although all IDCs are not equal in their technological 
absorption capacity, those LOCs that have this capacity can move away from foreign 
investment toward more reliance on licensing. 
The main reason for the increasing proportion of licensing as a vehicle for the sale and 
transfer of technology to IDCs is their unwillingness to permit unrestricted or unnecessary 
FDI. There has recently been a greater tendency among more advanced countries such as 
Japan and European countries to use technology licensing rather than foreign equity 
participation, because of the increased competition among suppliers of technology and the 
resulting need to sell existing technology to be able to finance future research and 
development [100]. It is also believed that these countries are able to make full use of 
licensed technology with little technical assistance from the transferor [101]. 
licensing is but one of the fields in the technological battle between MNCs. There are two 
broad reasons for the use of licensing agreements by MNCs, as licensors. Firstly, to 
substitute for controlled foreign direct investment when licensing proves to be more 
profitable, and secondly, to gain access to technology of other firms through complementary 
grants of licenses. In the first case, licensing to a non-controlled entity provides an 
alternative to entering foreign production with a controlled investment; in the second, access 
to other firms' technologies provides an ahernative to R&D. 
As indicated earlier, the ability of a licensee to absorb and improve upon licensed 
technology depends greatly on its capability to lDlderstand and control embedded technology 
as well as embodied technology. In other words, the licensee or the user of licensed 
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technology needs technical expertise nearly equal to that of licensor or supplier of 
technology in order to absorb the technology more effectively. This knowledge includes 
contract administration and patent management, which are generally considered to be 
managerial, rather than technical, skills [102]. Furthermore, in many licensing agreements, 
licensees prefer to include further improvement of licensed technology for additional fees 
by licensor to ensure technology upgrading. This can also be achieved through the 
agreement obliging the licensor to assist licensee in the research and development activity. 
However, because of the risk that such an agreement may cause for the licensor that (the 
licensee become its major competitor in the future), these agreements are often limited 
through some restrictive measures to reduce such a risk for the licensor [103]. 
International payments for patents, licenses and technical know-how were worth $11 billion 
in 1982, $ 12 billion in 1983. In constant terms the volume of payments increased by 2 per 
cent per year between 1975 and 1983; (payments measured in 1980 prices and exchange 
rates). Countries with a vigorous and broadly based domestic technological effort are 
reducing the extent of their direct reliance on foreign technology. Japan has been a major 
importer of foreign technology licences and has very successfully adapted and used this 
technology to develop manufacturing industry and export [104]. In the 1960s the Japanese 
government vigorously controlled direct investment by United States companies but 
welcomed licensing arrangements that involved wanted technology and know-how, and 
maintained an active screening control over licensing agreements. These licensing 
agreements were supplemented by the importation of modern plant machinery and 
equipment, the provision of basic training by licensors for the acquisition of embodied 
technology and the foreign visits of Japanese businessmen and students for the purpose of 
acquiring new, non-proprietary knowledge [105]. A large part of the industrial success of 
the NICs such as India, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong is attributable to local firms 
licensing or copying foreign technologies rather than to the modality of foreign direct 
investment. 
3. 6. 4 Patents and Patents Agreements 
Patents are considered as one of the main types of licences. As defined by Prasad (1981), 
"a patent is a temporary monopoly granted by a state to an inventor, justified on the grounds 
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that such monopolies provide essential incentives for innovation and risk-taking" [106]. In 
other words, a patent is government protection given to an inventor providing the exclusive 
right of manufacturing, exploiting, using, and selling the invention for a specified period of 
time [107]. The patents are widely used by developed countries as one of the most 
important forms of industrial property which give them the right to prohibit the unauthorised 
use. This right, however, can be easily passed on to the licensee to use it as a major source 
of marketing strength. As Saghafi Nejad (1991) states," patents playa key role in providing 
the legal barriers to competitive imitation, thus shielding the innovator long enough to gain 
from dynamic efficiency" [108]. 
However, the tendency towards the methods for protecting intellectual property vary 
among different countries and among different industries. For example, Japanese enterprises 
tend to rely more heavily on patenting than their American and European counterpart. The 
role of patents in LDCs, on the other hand, is relatively different with that of developed 
countries. In developing countries, the licensee's main need through a patent licence 
agreement, is usua1ly more focused on access to technology (know-how), technical 
assistance and markets rather than patent rights. It is also argued that patents in many 
LDCs, tend to prevent competition and local innovation rather than encourage it. This is 
because the vast majority of the patents issued to foreigners by LDCs are not exploited 
[109]. In developed countries, however, patents are considered as legal means for 
protection of industrial technology. It should be noted that ahhough patents have generally 
provided effective protection for technological innovation, some IDCs have limited the use 
of patents in some particular fields, such as drugs and food processing industries [110]. 
3. 6. 5 Know-how and the Know-how Agreement 
Know-how is a body of industrially useful, secret, novel and valuable information, and 
associated technical and other information and skills [111]. It can be said that know-how 
agreement is among the most important methods of technology acquisition for LDCs which 
may cover various processes, formulas, and industrial techniques. It is argued that know-
how agreements with MNCs enable LDCs entetprises potential access to developments in 
products and processes. This is mainly because know-how agreement usua1ly provide LDCs' 
firms with a package of technical information needed for efficient adaptation and 
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assimilation of imported technologies. 
Having compared the know-how and patents agreements, while know-how is in part 
considered secret information, some of its components and elements may be published 
information or information known to specialists. Also, some part of know-how may be 
obtainable from other industrial sources. Moreover, while the patents have defined 
expiration dates and an agreement based only on a patent cannot be extended beyond that 
period, there is no expiration date in the know-how, and the duration of an agreement is 
mutually agreed upon by the two parties [112]. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, patents 
have little relevance in LDCs and are mostly used by developed countries' firms and MNCs 
who possess secret industrial information and try to protect their patent rights. 
3. 6. 6 Trade Mark and Trade Mark Agreement 
Trademark is a sign or a special name which serves to distinguish a manufacture's goods 
from others, in other words, "trademarks are distinctive visual and sometimes aural devices, 
words or emblems (symbols), or a combination of them, that a firm applies to the goods it 
trades in, or to the services it performs, to indicate to the public that they are the firm's 
goods and services" [113]. Trade marks can assist the consumers to distinguish between 
products of different manufactures and also assure them about the quality of the products 
and therefore play an important role in market-place. Most trademarks in LDCs are 
registered by developed countries which are more prevalent in consumer goods and oflesser 
significance for capital and intermediate goods [114]. Since trade marks are usually used 
by firms in order to represent the quality of their products, some countries take the view 
that transfer of the right-of-use of the trade mark to another party is not possible without 
the concurrent transfer of the goodwill of the firm. It is also believed that unlike the patents, 
trade marks may not be licensable property in all countries [lIS]. 
3.6.7 Technical Assistance Contracts 
Technical assistance agreements, which may be considered as the most un-packed form of 
technology transfer, normally include the manufacturing drawings, maintenance and repair 
of machinery, obtaining specifications, assistance in setting up production facilities, advice 
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on process know-how, engineering services such as procurement of materials and 
equipment, information as to the sourcing components, personnel training, consultation with 
manufitcturing, quality control procedures, and testing of final products. Hence, technical 
assistance is usually required by a firm in a developing country which has less experience in 
operation and setting up of any productive activity [116]. The advantage of this method of 
technology acquisition is that it may enable the recipient country to access the foreign 
technology easily and quickly, with the technical assistance of the supplier of technology. 
Although it may cause to some extent technological dependency on the supplier, however, 
because of the time-1imitation in most technical assistance agreements, the recipient country 
attempts to decrease its technological dependency on the supplier and even become self:. 
reliant after the duration of the agreement. 
The services may also be provided on a consistent and long-term basis, such as in the case 
of new firms in LDCs which require a continuous flow of technical assistance enabling the 
local personnel to absorb the supplierls expertise. There are usually no restrictive constraints 
from the supplier unless the technical assistance required by the clients includes substantial 
engineering innovations such as a naphtha cracker in the petrochemical industry. Therefore, 
technical assistance agreements can be an appropriate method for transferring technology 
and know-how to LDCs because these agreements provide not only embodied technology 
in the form of drawings, specifications and services but, more importantly, confidential 
know-how accumulated through educating and training of the recipient's labour force and 
learning by doing [117]. 
3. 6. 8 Turnkey Contract 
A tum-key contract is one in which the contractor finn undertakes the responsibility for 
carrying out an of technical and managerial operations and activities needed for the planning, 
constIUction, and installation of a teclmical project before handing it over to local ownership 
in exchange for a fee [118]. Therefore, the contractor of turn-key is responsible for the 
completion of the whole project and delivery of a fully operational production system [119]. 
In other words, turnkey agreements provide for the complete physical package of 
technology, from one party to another. Less developed countries usually use turnkey plant 
in the early stages of their industriaHzation. The turn-key contracts are also widely used in 
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the transferring technology in heavy industries including chemical and petrochemical 
industries, metallurgy and iron and steel, and construction materials such as cement and 
glass. However, as the technological capability in many developing countries increases, there 
is gradual tendency towards replacing turn-key contracts with technology licence 
agreements for manufacturing technology and know-how [120]. 
Although this method may accelerate the process of transferring machinery and hardware 
to the recipient country, but as the experiences of some LDCs has indicated, in most cases 
when the whole package together with its design and operation is installed through a turn-
key plant, the recipient country failed to acquire the know-how and software for that 
machinery and hardware. Moreover, this method is considered to be more costly for the 
recipient country due to its high charge. It is also argued that there is more degree of 
dependency on the supplier of technology in tum-key agreements because of recipient's need 
for the technical and managerial expertise of the supplier. Furthermore, the supplier in turn-
key agreements usually imposes some restrictive regulation on the recipient such as 
enforcing the recipient to purchase the components and materials from them. 
3. 6. 9 Management Contracts 
According to a definition by UNCTC (1987);" management contract is an arrangement 
under which operational control of an enterprise, (or over one phase of its activities, which 
would normally be exercised by the board of directors or the managers elected or appointed 
by its owners), is vested by contract in a separate enterprise which performed the necessary 
managerial functions (such as production management, personnel management, procurement 
of goods and services, marketing, and financial management) in return for a fee" [121]. 
Management contracts are often part of other agreements including joint ventures, turnkey 
plants or to accompany a technical assistance or license agreements. They are widely used 
in such industrial sectors as transportation, mining and oil projects, heavy engineering, basic 
industry and other manufacturing ventures. The management contracts are also employed 
in service activities such as tourism, telecommunications, port management and others 
[122]. 
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The advantage of management contracts as means of technology transfer is that a substantial , 
amount of organisational skills can be transmitted to the recipient country through specific 
personnel training programs or by working together with the supplier. These contracts also 
provide the pOSSIbilities for the recipient to have access to high expertise of the supplier 
personnel, R&D activities, and other technology sources of supplier. However, these 
agreements have also some disadvantages which may affect an effective transfer of 
technology to the recipient country. These include the diverging objectives of the parties 
regarding the operation and duration of the project, and the intense control by the 
management contractors which may not differ from a turn-key contract or a wholly owned 
joint venture [123]. Therefore, it is necessary for the recipient country to formulate some 
regulation to protect and control management contracts, in the context of overall technology 
transfer regulation. 
3.6.10 International Subcontracting 
Sub-contracting is a business practice whereby the party offering the sub-contract (patent 
firm or company) requests another independent enterprise (sub-contractor) to undertake the 
\Wole or part of an order it has received instead of doing the work itself: while assuming full 
responsibility for the work vis-a-vis the customer [124]. The subcontracting usually takes 
place \Wen a multinational company in a developed country wants to relocate some of its 
manufacturing products in a developing country in order to take advantage of raw materials 
and cheap labour. Therefore, the MNC provides production know-how and technology of 
producing assembly products in the LDC using some cheap natural and human resources of 
the host country for its own production or marketing needs. No explicit payments for 
technology are involved, since it is the MNCs that pays the subcontracted firm for the 
amount of the work performed for them. For this reason, it might be argued that this 
relationship does not belong to the category of tranSfer of technology arrangements. 
Subcontracting in developing countries is mostly concentrated on clothing, electronic 
equipment and components, and semiconductor assembly. International sub-contracting is 
particularly well suited to labour-intensive, export-oriented industries such as textiles, 
clothing and electronics [125]. 
According to a study, by Watanabe, on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
79 
(ASEAN), established in 1967, industrial subcontracting, "i.e. supply of parts and 
components from subcontractors to an assembler" has developed considerably within 
ASEAN, largely as a result of the local government's regulations which require certain 
minimum domestic content with respect to locally assembled products. All the countries in 
the region except Singapore have been following such a strategy [126]. Berthomieu and 
Hanaut (1980) in a study of the conditions in international subcontracting relationships 
between developed and developing countries, identified three main types of international 
subcontracting [127]: 
I. cross-border international commercial subcontracting, 
2. cross-border international industrial subcontracting, and 
3. within-border international industrial subcontracting. 
International commercial subcontracting, typically in the area of consumer goods, generally 
develops spontaneously, on the initiative of the participating parties. Industrial 
subcontracting almost always requires active encouragement on the part of public 
authorities. Industrial subcontracting can also have industrialising effects under a durable 
government sponsorship. Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore are characterised by the 
extensive practice of cross-border commercial and, to a smaller extent, industrial 
subcontracting. These countries are rich in efficient labour, and their trade and industrial 
policies are liberal and export-oriented, taking advantage of their geographical conditions 
which are convenient for international trade. In contrast, within-border industrial sub-
contracting is dominant in India, where the government's import substitution policy has been 
obliging major firms, and especially foreign subsidiaries to increase local content of their 
products and sub-contract part of their work to smaller local firms [128]. 
3.6.11 The Franchising Agreement 
A franchise is a particular form of licensing agreement indicating an agreement between the 
franchisor and franchisee in which the franchisor provides rights, usually including the use 
of a trade mark or brand name, plus the services of technical assistance, training, 
merchandising and management, in return for certain payments. In other words, franchising 
is " a system of distnouting goods or services that is often associated with high-reputation 
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trade and service marks in which the franchiser supports, trains and to some extent controls 
the franchisee in selling the good~ or in rendering the services" [129]. In developed 
countries, franchising is today one of the most rapidly growing forms of licensing. One of 
the most recent examples of franchising in developing countries is the hotel chain franchise. 
One can see that there are similar features between a franchise agreement and trade-mark 
and management contracts. However, IDes' governments prefer the management contract 
mode when the franchisor is a foreign firm. This is mostly because the institutional structures 
in some IDes are not adequate enough to protect franchising. 
3. 6. 12 The Imports of Capital Goods and Machinery 
The import of capital goods and machinery is among the major modes of technology 
transfer for building industrial infrastructure and strengthening the recipient country's 
technological capability. This channel of technology transfer which is used by many IDes 
particularly the East Asian NICs assisted these countries to access to the advanced 
technologies embodied in the machinery and equipment. However, the success of this 
method of technology transfer in the development of recipient country's local technological 
capability relies on the level of industrial development together with the degree of technical 
and managerial expertise and its absorptive capacity [130]. It is argued that the 
bnplementation of strong export promotion policies in East Asian countries enable them to 
finance capital goods and machinery imports due to higher export revenues. For example, 
S. Korea is among the major East Asian NICs which was used capital good imports 
extensively as a method of transfer of technology and in 1987 had capital goods imports 
equal to 31% of its GDP [131]. 
3. 6. 13 Buy-Back Agreement 
In the buy-back contracts, the supplier of technology agrees to set up production facilities 
for the buyer, and will subsequently purchase from the buyer products produced in those 
production facilities [132]. A buy-back transaction usually includes not only the sale 
machinery and equipment, but also a grant of licence to use the supplier's patent rights or 
know-how and technical assistance for manufacturing of the products. The major incentive 
. for the supplier of technology to enter into a buy-back agreement is to take most advantage 
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from the natural and human resources in the recipient country. For the receiver, the main 
incentive is the transfer of industrial technology and utilisation of its natural and human 
resources. In other words, the buy back is an incentive contract, a buyer of capital 
equipment is interested to offer so as to satisfY his desire for state-of-the-art technology. The 
buy-back agreement can also be considered as a way to finance technology transfer. 
Therefore, it is a popular method of technology transfer for LDCs which are in shortage of 
foreign exchange [133]. 
It is argued that buy-back agreements may be considered as a way to deal with institutional 
or regulatory obstacles such as the prohibition offoreign ownership [134]. The buy-back 
contracts enable new mctories to take advantage of economies of scale earlier than the size 
of their domestic markets would otherwise permit [135]. Despite some common features 
with the subcontracting contracts, however, unlike a subcontracting contract where the 
recipient already has the production equipment in place, in a buy-back agreement, the 
receiver needs capital equipment or know-how to perform the contract which the supplier 
provides. 
3. 6. 14 Reverse Engineering and Imitation of Foreign Products 
Technology transfer can also take place either through reverse engineering or through 
imitation and copying of imported products, particularly those with less sophisticated 
technology and know-how. Reverse engineering is usually achieved by purchasing of 
samples of machinery and their dismantling and copying. In other words, reverse engineering 
involves the acquisition of detailed knowledge of how the product was designed as well 
as understanding of why it was designed in that particular way. However, this method may 
not be applicable on such industries as chemicals and pharmaceutical 
Reverse engineering and copying are usually performed legally through the granting of 
licence rights by a foreign country (licensor) to allow firm in a developing country to make 
a similar product to specification provided by the licensor. However, in most cases the 
leading MNCs are reluctant to license their up-to-date and advanced technology to the 
LDCs. Therefore, the only ahernative way for the firms in LDCs to access these 
technologies may be to reverse engineer the products. In this case, the domestic firm in a 
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LDC tries to build another product similar to the design of original product. In other words, 
the major pmpose of the local firm in a WC is to invent around the patents and copyrights 
surrounding the product [136]. 
Reverse engineering is relatively common in some industries with easily and readily available 
components such as computers, and some parts of the informatics sectors such as 
semiconductors. It enables a competitor to get the same advantage as could be obtained 
through manufilcturing that product. However, in the case of complex systems technologies 
like sophisticated integrated circuit (IC) designs, and telecommunication systems, the 
reverse engineering becomes increasingly difficult without a high investment in research and 
development activity by the domestic firm in a we [137]. Some NICs in East Asia and 
Latin America such as S.Korea, Taiwan and Brazil have successfully practiced reverse 
engineering as a channel of technology transfer in particular in machine tools and 
components. Many firms in these countries have passed the stage of reverse engineering and 
reached the stage of significantly modifYing or generating technology. However, it seems 
more difficult for countries with less technological capability to rely on reverse engineering 
in their infant stage. 
3.6.15 Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) 
The original equipment manufilcturing refers to contractual arrangements by which a foreign 
firm orders in volume products which the OEM supplier agrees to make according to its 
precise specifications [138]. The firm in a LDC which decides to use this method of 
technology transfer can take benefits from the technical information in the form of detailed 
specifications ( blueprints, manuals, data, tapes, etc) provided by the customer. Moreover, 
the large volume of many OEM orders enables the domestic firm in a we to acquire 
economies of scale, as well as technical expertise. Furthermore, due to customer 
responsibility for marketing and distribution of the finished product, the local firm in a LDC 
em save noticeable investments in its own marketing effort and distribution network. This 
method is widely used in the electronics and electrical appliance industry. 
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3. 6. 16 Industrial Espionage 
Industrial espionage refers to the illegal exportation of data and information, materials, 
parts, or equipment. Industrial espionage seems not to be restricted to any geographical 
setting, although the Silicon Valley of North em California and Geneva, Switzerland have 
relatively experienced more industrial espionage than any other places [139]. However, 
industrial espionage may be considered as an ineffective form of technology transfer. In the 
real world, there is no clear distinction between industrial espionage and other informal 
methods of comtmmication. When industrial espionage is perceived as a totally distinct and 
completely undesirable activity, and when actions are taken to deter it, damage can easily 
be done to much more important forms of technology transfer. Information exchange 
through personal and informal networks may be impaired and innovation which should 
emerge from such exchange may be impeded [140]. 
3.7 ANALYSES OF THE CHANNELS 
It appears from the previous discussion of technology transfer mechanisms that no single 
method is appropriate for all situations, and methods vary depending on the nature of the 
technology and the specific circumstances prevailing in each case. The effectiveness of the 
different approaches differs in terms of the ability of the technology recipient to learn and 
to acquire increased technological know-how. It is generally the combination of the desire 
of the transferor to supply technology and know-how in a particular form, and the ability 
of the receiver to acquire it in that form, which determines the mechanism of transfer in a 
particular case [141]. It is also argued that the technological content of the operations in 
the industry, the extent of barriers to entry, the degree of competition, and the bargaining 
power and policies of host countries can also be considered among major determinants of 
the methods of technology transfer [142]. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the recipient'S 
absotptive capacity to utilise the imported technology effectively may also affect the choice 
of appropriate channel for the acquisition of technology. The importance of the choice of 
technology transfer mechanisms has made many developing countries examine various 
methods oftechnology acquisition in order to select the most suitable one which will enable 
these countries to reduce the cost of technology and to absorb and assimilate the imported 
technology more efficiently to their local condition. 
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As explained earlier, one can generally identifY FDI, joint ventures and licensing 
agreements as the most important channels of technology transfer to LDCs. As already 
been discussed, a number of factors are likely to affect the effectiveness of ahemative 
channels. It is believed that the nature of existing technological capabilities in the recipient 
countries is among the first and the most important factors. In the case of relatively weak 
technological capability, a technology package in the form ofFDI may be most appropriate. 
Licensing, however, can be a viable mode when the recipient country is able to complement 
imported technology with its own technological resources. Joint venture can also be an 
efficient technology transfer channel mainly because the foreign supplier who shares the 
risks and profits of the project, is directly interested in its success. Capital goods imports, 
on the other hand, are believed to be necessary as an important channel of technology 
transfer when LDCs want to establish new industries [143]. 
Therefore, it can generally be said that LOCs should make most of their attempts to find the 
appropriate conditions for effective transfer of technology whether such a transfer occurs 
in the form ofFDI or technology licensing. However, as the survey by many studies about 
the technology transfer channels indicates, generally those methods that involve significant 
human contact together with some measure of education and training can be considered as 
the more effective approaches. In other words, much technology can successfully be 
transferred through the person-to-person contacts and through the transfer of skilled 
personnel and know-how associated with that technology. For example, a survey of the 
transfer of textile technology from Japan to Thailand stresses that transfer can really take 
place only through human contacts. This indicates the importance of the transfer not only 
of production technology but also of managerial skills in the rooting of new technologies in 
the local society [144]. 
A number of studies have shown interaction in terms of interpersonal connnunications and 
mobility to be of great importance in technology transfers. Utterback (1975) looked at the 
role of applied research institutes in transfer of technology to Latin America. Studying 
twenty completed projects of four institutes, he found, among other things, that personal 
contacts and direct links between the supplier and recipient of technology was the most 
effective clumnel of flow of technology, and working abroad was critical in establishing the 
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necessary communications links [145]. Bass (1974) has also identified close face-to-face 
interaction as an important characteristic that increases chances of successful transfer of 
technology [146]. Adeboye (1977) also found that the use of interpersonal transfer 
mechanisms was more frequent in the more innovative business he studied [147]. In a study 
of the effectiveness of aerospace and defence technology transfer to ninety-three electronic 
firms, Hayes (1968) found direct interpersonal communication to be the most important 
transfer mechanism [148]. However, it seems that the importance of personal interaction will 
be greater in the higher and more dynamic technologies, which are more person-embodied, 
and less in more simple and stable technologies \Were the technology can be embodied more 
easily in blueprints and intermediate and capital goods. 
The experiences of such successful countries as Japan and S. Korea in the early stage of 
their industrialisation indicates that they have systematically tried to adopt the mechanism 
for acquiring technology through the flow of human beings, together with the purchase of 
machinery and equipment. For example, the great emphasis in the Japan's early stage of 
development in the nineteenth century was placed more on employing foreigners. Even in 
more recently, many Japanese enterprises are actively involved in sending organised teams 
of their personnel abroad with the task of absorbing a particular element of technology 
through the visiting the industrial plants and then putting all piece of information together 
in order to take most advantage of the technology of the foreign firms involving in a similar 
activity [149]. 
Teece (1981) has identified four linkage mechanisms with which LDCs can gain access to 
the world stock of technical, managerial and organisational knowledge, namely multinational 
companies (MNCs), equipment vendors, foreign aid agencies and an indigenous science 
community [150]. It is obvious that multinational companies are among the major source 
of technology transfer for LDCs. The most important reasons for MNCs entering into 
technology transfer agreements with LDCs' firms are believed to be export potential, 
market protection, market penetration, increased production to reduce units costs, and to 
obtain financial resources for further R&D activities [151]. However, as indicated earlier 
in the theoretical framework, the MNCs have generally been criticised for charging LDCs 
high prices; subordinating host country interests to those of their own interests; failure to 
provide local personnel with crucial skills and know-how; and transferring inappropriate 
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technology to LDCs which found it to be either too advanced or obsolete [152]. Despite 
these criticisms which are made primarily by dependency theorists, their key role in 
transferring advanced technology to LDCs can not be denied. Since technology is highly 
concentrated within muhinational corporations, their licensing, direct investment and other 
activities are the major modalities of technology transfer in LDCs [153]. 
According to Baranson (1970), MNCs prefer direct investment to licensing if they have the 
required resources, and if control over market development, know-how, product policy 
system, integrity, product standards, or trade name is important, or if the transfer requires 
a sustained relationship between the supplier and recipient [154]. Elsewhere, Baranson 
(1971) concludes from case studies in the automotive industry that MNCs desire maximum 
control to maintain: managerial control over manufacturing; control over reinvestment of 
profits for future growth, and wider latitude in intercompany pricing [155]. 
According to UNCTAD (1972), the desire and ability of the multinationals to secure more 
control will be higher for more sophisticated technologies, recently developed and novel 
technologies, larger technology suppliers, more important trademarks and brand names, and 
higher income consumers [156]. Through the 1960s, the establishment of wholly-owned 
foreign subsidiary or a majority-owned foreign affiliate was the predominant method of 
foreign expansion by MNCs and a prime source of technology transfer [157]. However, as 
the level of industrial infrastructure and local technological capability in many LDCs 
increased, they imposed rather more restrictive regulations and policies towards MNCs in 
particular the wholly-owned subsidiary during the 1970s and 1980s [IS8]. For example, 
some countries such S.Korea and Mexico adopted a restrictive policy on majority ownership 
by foreign firms in all but export and high-technology activities [IS9]. Therefore, with the 
increased regulation of foreign investments in several countries, joint ventures have become 
a far more important form of operation for the MNC [160]. 
Vernon (1972) sees MNCs placing more capital in wholly owned subsidiaries than joint 
ventures, providing better access to their world-wide distnDution system, and to their pool 
of technical and managerial skiDs. He mentions, however, that the reinvestment rate is higher 
in joint ventures. Overall, he concludes that wholly owned subsidiaries are slightly more 
attractive than joint ventures from the developing country's point of view due to the greater 
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permissiveness of the technology supplier and its greater interest in the recipient's success 
[ 161]. According to Stop ford and Wells (1972), joint ventures, relative to wholly owned 
subsidiaries, are less likely to be chosen when the firm has more experience in the foreign 
market [162]. 
Pavitt (1971)[163] claims that licensing and joint ventures are inferior choices in comparison 
with foreign investment, because they may give other firms legal rights and technology 
which can later be used in competition against the licensor. He argues that the returns from 
foreign direct investment are often found to be greater than from licensing. On the other 
hand, he also shows that during the period between 1955 and 1964 in the DECD area, 
international technology transfer through licensing agreements between independent firms, 
or between parent firms and their foreign subsidiaries, grew rapidly. His data also indicate 
that the choice of technology transfer mechanism depends on the type of industry. For 
example, while the main transfer mode in the plastic industry was licensing agreements and 
joint ventures, in the pharmaceutical industry foreign direct investment was important when 
technology was transferred internationally. There was no FDI in aircraft industry, because 
of factors related to military security. However, he argued that these differences among 
industries depend on some factors such as the extent of competition in the industry and the 
extent of specialisation of firms in different product areas. Thus, it can be concluded from 
Pavitt's survey that the nature of the transfer mechanism adopted varies with the industry. 
The more technologically sophisticated, the more difficult it is for countries to rely on direct 
transfer. The extent and nature of property rights over technology vary with the industry, 
and does the significance of trademarks. 
Contractor (1985) argued that the choice of technology licensing versus direct investment 
by U. S. MNCs is influenced by both countIy and industry characteristics. He found through 
the cross-sectional analysis that the ratio of licensing to investment increases with technical 
capability in a country. He also found weaker support for the idea that the proportion of 
licensing increases, with government control and regulation of direct investment and 
decreases, on the other hand, as more incentives are offered on direct investment [164]. 
The UNCTC (1987) [165] also reported that the use of new forms of technology transfer 
varied widely from industry to industry: production-sharing contracts in primary production 
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and turnkey, franchising and management contracts in the service sector. In food and 
beverage processing industries FDI and joint ventures remain the important form of 
technology transfer. However, FDI has been of considerably less importance in the textile 
industry due to its relatively low rate of innovation and the insignificance of research and 
development expenditure. In the pharmaceutical industry, FDI has been a major mode of 
technology transfer, followed by licensing of patents and trade marks with a lesser degree 
of the importance. In the fertiliser industry, joint ventures and licensing agreements have 
been the major channel of technology transfer. The main mechanisms by which technology 
have been transferred in the automobile industry have been both FDI and licensing 
agreements. The main means of technology transfer in the electrical power equipment 
industry, have been FDI and licensing agreements. In the semiconductor industry, FDI and 
licensing have been the principal vehicle for technology transfer. 
Contractor (1984) analysed the data for 1977-1980 from the last Commerce Department 
Benchmark Survey to determine whether the relative use of arms-Iength licensing versus 
foreign direct investment can be statistically explained on the basis of foreign country and 
industry specific variables. He concluded that licensing is shown to be positively linked to 
the number of patents filed in a country. However, the absolute level of licensing in a 
country appears to be negative to the level of direct investment. He also indicated that the 
relative propensity to use licensing increase with the technological capability and decreases 
with level of economic development of recipient country [166]. 
Davidson & McFetridge (1985) [167] also examined the impact of recipient country, firm, 
and technology characteristics on the choice between licensing and direct investment as a 
vehicle for international technology transfer. Using data on 1226 inter-firm and market 
technology transactions carried out by 32 US-based MNCs during the period 1945-1978, 
strong statistical support is received for a number of variables hypothesised to affect the 
transfer mode. The probability of using wholly owned subsidiaries instead of licensing was 
greater: 
1. for newer technologies, 
2. for technologies with fewer previous transfers, 
3. for technologies closely related to the transferor's principal line ofbusiness, 
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4. the more R&D intensive the transferor was, 
5. if the transferor had an affiliate in the receiving country prior to the transfer, and 
6. for transferor with more prior technology transfers. 
In their swvey, market size and sophistication are not shown to be important factors in the 
choice between licensing and direct investment. However, public policy variables seem to 
be a more significant factor in this choice. According to Raymond Vernon (1986), recipient 
(LDCs) countries prefer "arms-Iength" technology licensing agreements or joint ventures 
to exports or foreign direct investment as a way of maximising overall return. and control 
over the technology and its uses in their territory [168]. 
Stewart and Nihei (1987) believe that the mechanisms for ITT depend either upon the type 
of technology (proprietary, non-proprietary, highly sophisticated, un-sophisticated, etc) or 
the agent undertaking technology transfer (firm, government agency, non-profit agency, 
etc). In concentrating on technology transfer via human resource development by Japanese 
and US organisations, an implicit decision has been made to concentrate on specific agents 
of technology transfer that are believed to be of greatest importance to the recipient 
countries studied (Thailand and Indonesia). It seems that the principal agents are business 
firms, and the principal mechanism is direct investment. They have pointed out that the 
mechanism ofITI also depends on the technological capability of the recipient country. As 
LDCs improve their absorptive capacity, more technology transfer is via licensing, and more 
licensing is to independent firms rather than to affiliated firms [169]. Kogut and Singh 
(1988) [170] in their study of choosing technology transfer mode found that the choice of 
technology transfer mechanisms can be influenced by cultural factors. They found that the 
greater the cultural distance between the country of the investing firm and the country of 
entry, the more likely it was that the firm would choose a joint venture to reduce its 
uncertainty in those markets. They distinguish between transaction costs that are 
independent of a firms country of origin and those that are determined by cultural factors. 
They suggest further investigation of the cultural factors involved in managerial decision 
making. 
Aharoni (1991) argues that the choice of an appropriate channel of technology transfer is 
a joint function of the goals of the technology donor and the absorption capacity of the 
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recipient. Therefore, if the level of absotptive capacity in the recipient country is low, a turn-
key project may be more appropriate than licensing. Aharoni adds that: "technology may 
also be transferred without being received or received without being transferred". An 
example of the first case is a turnkey project where the donor builds an entire factory but 
no one in the recipient country knows how to replicate it. An illustration of the second is 
when engineers in recipient country create a new product through reverse engineering" 
[171]. According to Aggrawal (1991) the nature and extent of technology transfer channel 
can be influenced by internal government policies as well as by national political and 
economic strategies. Unlike the view of some authors who emphasise the role of personal 
contacts and networks in technology transfer, Aggrawal refers to the international extension 
of the life cycle of new products by business firms as the major mechanism for IT. He 
argues that new products and technology are usually generated through an extensive 
investment in research and development, which it can recover by progressively developing 
and supplying markets for that product in as many countries as possible [172]. 
A survey by Yu and Tang (1992) shows that wholly owned subsidiaries generate a higher 
level of profits than joint ventures and licensing. Wholly owned subsidiaries enable MNCs 
to control their operations fu1ly in host countries. Due to their potential for generating the 
highest level of profits, wholly owned subsidiaries are usually the preferred strategy of 
MNCs when there are no environmental constraints. However a joint venture is preferred 
to a wholly owned subsidiary if significant cost reductions can be achieved through 
combining the strengths of a multinational cotporation and a local firm. Furthermore, a joint 
venture is the dominant entry strategy when there is a formidable local competitor and the 
risks of operation are high. On the other hand, licensing is usually preferred by host 
governments, because it is a low .. risk strategy. MNCs treat licensing as a fallback strategy 
when other strategies are not feasible [173]. 
Holstius (1993) [174] believes that the best technology transfer mode is the one that 
matches the recipient's resources and objectives, and its need for technology. Holstius 
(1993), and Mason (1981) [17S] have classified various modes of technology transfer with 
respect to the level of their risks and control As it can be seen in the following figure, it 
seems that exporting has the smallest degree of the risk and control compared to the other 
channels of technology transfer. It also appears that there is high level of risk when the 
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technology is transferred through joint ventures and foreign direct investment in particular 
in the form of the wholly owned subsidiary. This is especially true in the case when large-
scale projects are completed over a long period of time, and the recipient is actively involved 
in the technology transfer process during the implementation stage. Foreign direct 
investment implies the highest level of control and it has also the largest potential for profit. 
The financial risks, such as profit repatriation, and political risks, are also higher than in 
direct investment and other modes of technology transfer. 
Cost of control 
and risk 
Wholly Owned Subsidialy 
~ority owred Subsidialy 
Joint Ventures 
Licensing Agreements 
Management agreements 
Capital goods imports 
Technical Assistance 
Turn-key P1ant 
Exports 
Degree of control 
and risk 
Figure 3.7. The Degree of Control and Risks For Mechanisms of Technology Transfer 
Source: Mason, H. ''Comments on Alternative Channels and Modes of International 
Resource Transmission", in T. Saghafi-Nejad et.al. (Eds), 1981, P:31. 
Another useful analysis, is the relationship between technological complexity and 
organisational modes of international technology transfer. In other words, a strong 
correlation has been found between the technological complexity and the level of equity 
ownership. For example, in a study by Davidson and McFetridge (1985) which was 
discussed earlier, they argued that newer technologies and technologies developed by a 
more R&D intensive transfer agent are more likely to be transmitted through direct 
investment as opposed to licensing [176]. To sum up, it seems that some mechanisms are 
more active or effective in transferring technology and others more passive or ineffective. 
Generally, the main determinants of the form of technology transfer are the technological 
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content of the operations in the industry, the extent of barriers to entry, the degree of 
competition, and the bargaining power and policies of host countries. However, most 
studies of ITT mechanisms have reinforced the conviction that LOCs must improve their 
ability to negotiate with sellers of technology, both by understanding feasible ahernatives 
and by developing mechanisms to evaluate the social costs and benefit of each channel. 
3.8 TECHNOWGY TRANSFER PROCESS 
One can identify three overall stages in the process of international technology transfer: 
acquisition; adaptation; and improvement of technology [177]. However, it would be better 
to consider a more elaborate sequence of activities that constitute the process of technology 
transfer, using a systematic approach. A systematic approach to the technology transfer 
process is shown in figure 3.8. It is believed that developing a systematic framework for a 
technology transfer process can assist policy makers and planners in Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) to a successful acquisition of imported technology. This approach has 
broken down the process of technology transfer into a sequence of interrelated stages in 
order to analyse both transferor and transferee's goals and objectives through technology 
transfer. 
In the first stage, policy makers in the LDCs make their decisions for selecting technology 
by identifying the needs and objectives that are required through technology transfer. The 
country's weaknesses and capabilities are also recognised at this stage. This may include 
accessing the country's natural and human resources as a potential strength, or lack of 
adequate infrastructure which may limit a country's ability to absorb foreign technology. 
Once the country's needs and objectives are identified, in the next stage various technology 
alternatives are studied in order to choose the appropriate technology based on the country's 
standards and constraints. The appropriate technology can be selected by ranking priorities 
for different technologies based on the decision-maker's judgement. The establishment of 
the input-output relationships between different technologies can be a useful method for 
efficient allocation of resources in terms of identified priorities [178]. For example, an 
output from the oil industry can be used as an input for the petrochemical industry, or an 
output from the steel industry can be used as an input for the automobile industry. 
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Figure 3.8 A systematic approach for the technology transfer process 
Source: Salami, R. and Reavill, L. ''The Critical Success Factors for rrr to LOCs", in W. 
Grimberg et.a!' (Eds). Technology Transfer Models for Growth & Revitalization", 1996. 
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In the third stage, the decision makers in the country make their final decision for selecting 
the most appropriate technology. They also determine an appropriate transferor, considering 
different criteria such as quality of technology, cost of technology, and trade relationships. 
They also evaluate the financial support needed for importing technology through their final 
cost and benefit analysis. In the implementation and maintenance stage, some important 
criteria needed for better adaptation and assimilation of imported technology are identified 
through the common acts of transferor and transferee. These criteria differ for each country 
and depend mainly on the socio-economic and cuhural factors in the recipient country. For 
example, the existence of a relatively skilled labour force may increase the rate of 
assimilation and absotption offoreign technology in the recipient country. Therefore, it may 
be necessary for both transferor and transferee to make their efforts in designing some 
specific training programs for the human labour in the recipient country to enable them to 
adapt the imported technology for local use. 
Finally in the evaluation and modification stage, some of the most important success and 
failure factors affecting the whole process of technology transfer will be assessed and 
evaluated. The evaluation of the whole process can be done through analysing the 
performance of the country's goals and objectives in order to ensure that all of them are 
being satisfied. h may be realised that some innovative research and development programs 
are needed for further improvement and updating the existing technologies. 
3. 9 FORMULATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS 
The following assumptions are needed for the formulation of technology transfer process: 
We assume the domestic know-how which exists within country (AI)' and foreign know-
how which must be imported (~). We suppose machiD.ery and equipment required for 
production of goods exists in the country (Bl) and if there is not enough, the required 
machinery and equipment nmst be imported from a foreign country (B2)' Assuming the local 
expertise needed for using machinery (C1), ifthete is not enough local expertise, foreign 
expertise will be needed for using the machinery (C2). The technology transfer process can 
be formulated by 8 formulas as shown in the following matrix: 
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Stage (2) 
AlB2C2 
A2Bl C2 
~B2Cl 
Stage (3) 
AlBl C2 
AlB2C} 
~BlC} 
Figure 3.9 The appropriate direction for the effective technology transfer 
Source: Salami, R. And Reavill, L.R.P. ''The Appropriate Policies for a Successful 
International Technology Transfer to LDCs", in : Proceeding of the Conference on Global 
Change, Manchester. 1996. 
The first formula shows that the recipient country is fully dependent on foreign technology, 
because all the technology, machinery, technicians and expertise are imported from a foreign 
country. In the second formula, the R&D institutes in the recipient country have attempted 
to prepare know-how for the imported technology. In formula three, the recipient country 
has attempted to do research and development for copying the machinery but it must employ 
foreign expertise. While the first stage has a large degree of cost and dependency, there is 
less dependency and costs in the fourth stage. Thus, the cost and dependency are decreased 
from first to fourth stage. Each recipient COWltry can be located in one of these four stages. 
In every stage, there is an effort to change one of the previous factors which were imported 
from abroad, such as foreign know-how and technicians, to indigenous know-how and 
technicians. In the fourth stage, C2 changes to C; , thus we can show a step by step 
progression by the following forms: 
A2 B2 C2 
Al B2 C2 
Al Bl C2 
AlBIC} 
This set of formulas seem to provide the most appropriate direction in which to co-ordinate 
the industrial and economic policies of the recipient country. Although there is a possibility 
to go directly from the first formula to the eighth formula, this will depend on the local 
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technological capabilities of the recipient country. 
3.11 THE CONCEPT OF THE APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY 
Rosenblatt (1979) has defined appropriate technology as "the set of techniques which makes 
optimum use of available resources in a given environment" [179]. According to Watanabe 
(1980), appropriate technology is defined as "a set of production techniques which can 
improve the standard of living through creation of employment and economic growth than 
any available alternatives" [180]. According to Detz (1984), appropriate technology can 
be defined "as providing technical solutions that are appropriate to the economic structure 
of those influenced: to their ability to finance the activity, to their ability to operate and 
maintain the facility, to the environmental conditions involved, and to the management 
capabilities of the population" [181]. 
In other words, a technology may be considered as appropriate which is able to utilise the 
national and human resources efficiently and can also be easily assimilated to the local 
conditions of the recipient country. However, it is argued that many definitions of the 
appropriate technology are funited in their static nature, in particular from the view of policy 
analysis [182]. Therefore, the choice ofan appropriate technology for a LDC needs to be 
evaluated within the context of its development strategy [183]. Furthermore, as Sharif 
(1986) noted, the notion of the appropriateness is a rather complex one, requiring the 
identification of several criteria and factors and also involving with the goals and objectives 
of the recipient country. He believed that technological appropriateness is also a very 
dynamic concept and relies more on the purpose of transferring technology [184]. For 
example, if the purpose of the recipient country is to achieve competitive advantage in 
international market, then a labour-intensive and less advanced technology would not seem 
to be an appropriate choice. 
An appropriate technology can be recognised by its various characteristics. For instance, 
in terms of material aspects of appropriate tedmology production, appropriateness indicates 
to the use of renewable sources of energy and materials, minimum damaging impact on the 
environment, and maximum utilisation of local resources. In terms of the mode of the 
production, an appropriate technology is more labour intensive (capital saving), soft and 
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intermediate ( harmonious with the local environment) and located near the points of 
consumption to meet better the local demands. In other words, it involves with production 
techniques that are more compatible with LDCs' resource endowments in order to tackle 
such problems as unemployment, and income distnoution [185]. In terms of the application, 
appropriate technology should be easily adapted to the local socia~ environmental and 
cuhural conditions of the recipient country. It should also be fleXlole to any changes in local 
conditions [186]. The appropriate technology should also be capable of developing and 
producing new products; capable of improving quality performance of products; capable 
of expanding product export and increase earnings of foreign currencies; capable of 
developing managerial expertise in the recipient country and contributing to the 
advancement of scientific and technical standards. 
There are some other criteria relating to an appropriate technology. These include the 
capability to increase product output and economic growth rate; to reduce unemployment 
and balance of payments deficit; to provide better income distribution; and to make the 
recipient sel£:.sufficient from the import of raw material and components [187]. Moreover, 
the adaptability of technology to the indigenous conditions of the recipient country can be 
considered the most important criteria for its appropriateness. In a survey analysing the 
various factors which affect the appropriateness of technology, Teitel (1993) identifies some 
important criteria for a technology to be inappropriate. The technology is believed to be 
inappropriate; when the domestic needs and preferences of the local market are not taken 
into account adequately; when the technology depends on importing raw material; when the 
technology is not fitted to the size of the local market; when there is not adequate local 
skills for effective adaptation and assimilation of that technology; and when the technology 
can only be transferred at a high cost. Furthermore, damaging the environment and using 
scarce energy inputs are among other criteria for an inappropriate technology with a lesser 
degree of importance [188]. 
Schumacher (1973) in his book "small is beautiful" has used the term " intermediate 
technology" to be more suitable for the LDCs [189]. He argues that the large scale and 
capital intensive technologies are usually too costly and complex to be assimilated by the 
LDCs. However, he prefers to use the term intermediate technology instead of appropriate 
technology, because of the broad and relatively vague concepts of the latter. 
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As Schumacher indicates, an intermediate technology has some characteristics such as small 
scale, cheap, labour intensive, self-sufficient from the import of raw material. and profitable 
for the recipient COWltry. This indicates that a small scale technology can be easily absorbed 
by the local labour force in the recipient country. A labour intensive technology seems also 
to be more suitable for the IDCs, as it creates more employment opportunities for the 
masses of people. It also mostly relies on the local natural resources and inputs so that the 
recipient country is less dependent on import of foreign parts and materials which result to 
saving a substantial amount of its foreign exchange. Enos (1989) argues that the most 
appropriate technology for the LOCs might not be available, therefore, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that these countries should seek a less advanced technology which would be 
more easily and cheaply accessible to them [190]. 
There is another idea which believes that the big is wonderful and emphasises the adoption 
of more modern and large scale technologies as an appropriate choice for IDCs. The 
supporters of this idea argue that developed countries could achieve a high level of industrial 
and technological development through the acquisition and development of more large scale 
as wen as modem and advanced technologies. Therefore, those IDCs which want to follow 
the same pattern of industrial and technological development should transfer more 
advanced technologies. They also argued that the modem technologies generally are more 
efficient and productive for the LOCs' local conditions. These technologies assist a LDC 
to modernise its industrial sector and promote the managerial skills and productivity of its 
human labour in order to be able to compete in the international market. This idea is also 
largely criticised by many authors who argue that most advanced and large scale 
technologies which have been developed in industrialised countries are for their own needs 
and conditions, and therefore are inappropriate for the local conditions ofLOCs. 
However, others such as Haustein (1983) believe both approaches of small is beautiful and 
big is wonderful are not appropriate [191]. It is argued that LOCs require software and 
hardware, small scale and large scale, and simple as well as modern technologies in order 
to increase their industrial and technological capability and competitiveness. Moreover, as 
the experiences of some LOCs indicate, some countries such as S. Korea and Taiwan 
adopted labour-intensive and small-scale technologies in the early stage of their 
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industrialization which were suitable for their local conditions. However, as the level of 
industrial and technological capability in these countries developed, they switched to transfer 
of more capital-intensive, modern and large-scale technologies. 
As Pack (1981) also noted, the gradual shift from employing labour-intensive technologies 
towards more capital and modern technologies in these countries can be considered as a 
reward for good performance in the early industrialization period [192]. Therefore, the 
appropriateness of technology for a specific country depends to a large degree on the 
particular circumstances and the level of industrial and technological capability in that 
country in a certain period of time. While a labour-intensive technology can be considered 
suitable for a local condition of a country in its early stage of industrial and technological 
development, this may not be an appropriate choice of technology for that country in the 
later stage, when it needs to transfer more advanced and capital-intensive technology to be 
able to compete in the international market. In other words, it can be said that the 
technologies which believed to be appropriate in the specific period of time may not be 
considered as appropriate choice in an other phase. So it is clear that the independent 
choice of large scale advanced technologies, or small scale or intermediate technologies, 
cannot lead to technological development in LDCs. Therefore, a combination of these 
technologies can be regarded as an appropriate choice for LDCs and especially for Iran. 
According to the various characteristics of an appropriate technology that have been 
discussed earlier, there are three main sectors which are necessary for choosing an 
appropriate technology : 
1. Leading factor, that is necessary for obtaining foreign exchanges in the future. 
2. Driving factor, that reduces the technology gap in the future. 
3. Evolving factor, that tries to meet the agricuhural requirements and basic needs in the 
short term 
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Sector Objectives The most The needs of 
important operating process 
criteria of 
appropriateness 
Leading To compete in the world Maximum To predict the 
world technology market in profits from the condition of 
order to take most international technology in the 
advantages from market future, and to 
exporting technology evaluate the R&D 
activities and 
marketing aspects 
Driving To make technology More gains and To transfer, evaluate 
sector more modern in order to less losses and adapt technology 
use it in the selected 
fields for promoting their 
produ~ 
Evolving To achieve the gain from Less damaging To provide 
sector using technology in to the local information about 
selected fields, in order to tradition, and assimilation, 
meet the needs of the cu1tureand absorption, 
people in rural areas by environment adaptation and 
using local technologies innovation of 
technology 
Table 3.3 A three sector model for choosing appropriate technologies 
Source: adapted from Sham: M.N. "Management of Technology Trasfer", APCTT,1986. 
Thus each developing country needs a combination of strategies to be able to choose its 
appropriate technologies considering these three sectors. It is necessary for IDes to make 
their best effort to choose those technologies which seem more appropriate to their local 
socio-cultural, as well as technical, conditions. In order to be successfully in transferring 
appropriate technologies, they need to improve their endogenous absorptive capacity 
through designing some regular training programs for promoting the skill level of their 
labour force, and also spending more investment on the research and development activities. 
Moreover, it seems also vital to formulate effective mechanism for making the appropriate 
choice of technology within their overall national policies for technology transfer. 
3.11 THE COST OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
As discussed earlier, in the conceptual issues of technology transfer, in a technology 
transfer, both the recipient and the supplier of technology adopt strategies to maximise their 
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benefits from the technology transfer. The main objectives of the supplier of technology are 
to get the highest price for a specific technology; to minimise the quality of the technology 
without any impact on its price; to get access into another market and keep its market share; 
to get benefits from the cheap natural and human resources of the recipient country and 
therefore obtain access to a possibly diversified and lower cost source offunds [193]. On 
the other hand, the strategy of the recipient is based on such factors as paying the least 
amount for the price of a packaged technology; minimising its cost of technology transfer 
and maximising its benefits from the transferred technology and obtaining the high quality 
and standard technology from the supplier without paying any additional price. The recipient 
country can also get some benefits from TT including encouraging the expansion oflocal 
industries, creating local employment opportunities, and promoting its economic growth 
considering the efficient adaptation and assimilation of imported technologies and its effect 
on the recipient's export potentials. 
There are some direct and indirect costs for the recipient of technology. The direct cost of 
transfer includes royalities (as a percentage of net sales), the outflow of dividends, 
maintenance imports from the use of particular foreign technology, the payment for 
managerial and technical expertise, cost of training technical information, licensee fees and 
lump-sum payments which usually involved payments for less sophisticated technology or 
production techniques that are transferred on a one-time basis. Moreover, the payment for 
technical services depends on the extent and the nature and quality of services be provided, 
such as the length of a visit by technical personnel of the licensor and the extent of the 
training of the local workers [194]. However, indirect costs can be incurred when the 
recipient is heavily dependent on the import of material and components; or costs resulting 
from restrictive measures imposed by the supplier; or costs involved in transfer of 
inappropriate technologies which are not compatible with recipient's local conditions; the 
costs resuhing from the recipient's inability to train its labour force; and the costs due to low 
levels of absorptive capacities in the recipient countries. 
3.12 FACTORS AFFECfING THE SUCCESS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
There are some key factors which can assist the recipient country to adopt and adapt foreign 
technologies more effectively and efficiently. The overall success factors of successful 
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international technology transfer and rapid industrialization, based on the experiences of 
some East Asian first and second-tier NICs will be discussed later in detail. Here, it seems 
necessary to identify some specific factors which affect the efficient acquisition and 
assimilation of foreign technologies which could certainly be very useful for the policy 
makers in the LDCs. Some of the most important factors are as following: 
3.12.1 Effective Management 
It is essential for decision makers in the recipient country to be familiar with the most recent 
and up-to-date managerial expertise which can assist them in better absorption and 
assimilation of imported technology. The existence of efficient managerial expertise in a 
LDC can also lead to an effective utilisation of its natural and human resources which in turn 
will result in the promotion of its productivity level The professional managers can also 
identifY the most appropriate technology based on the recipient countries' needs, capabilities 
and objectives. The experiences of some successful countries in an effective technology 
transfer and rapid industrial and technological development show that the existence of a 
large numbers of well-trained and qualified managers in these countries have played a very 
important role in their success in the efficient adaptation and assimilation of foreign 
technologies. Therefore, it is essential for decision makers in LDCs to improve their 
managerial expertise and skiDs in particular the ability to plan, organise and solve problems. 
3.12.2 Research and Development 
The research and development activity is among the most important factors which not only 
assist the recipient country to modify and adapt the imported technologies to its local 
conditions but it may also lead to creation and generation of new technology and products. 
The allocation of a substantial research and development expenditure as a percentage of 
GNP is obviously necessary if a country wishes to promote its indigenous technological 
capability. For example, some successful countries such as S. Korea have increased the 
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP from 1% in 1984 to more than 2 % in early 1990s 
which has led this country to reach the level of technological maturity. More significantly 
is the contnoution of its private sector to such expenditure which rose from 32% in 1980 
to 82% in 1986 [195]. It seems that other LDCs are also paying more attention to increase 
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their R&D expenditure as a percentage of their GNP in order to promote their absorptive 
capacity level which can assist them in an effective transfer of technology. 
3. 12.3 Market Size 
A country with a relatively adequate size of market would have better learning and 
absorptive capability for the successful adaptation and effective transfer of technology to its 
local environment. The large size of the market in the recipient country can also encourage 
the flow ofFDI in to that country which in turn bring about technological know-how and 
managerial expertise as well as marketing skills. 
3. 12. 4 The Absorptive Capacity of Recipient 
The recipient country's absorptive capacity level can also play an instrumental role in the 
success of technology transfer. The absorptive capacity of a recipient country can increase 
through the development of its technological capability. The higher is the level of local 
technological capability in a country, the more this country would be able to absorb and 
assimilate imported technologies to its local conditions. The absorptive capacity of a 
recipient country can also increase through massive investment in the country's industrial 
infrastructure as well as promotion of the managerial skills and education and training of its 
labour force. As indicated earlier, the increase in the research and development activity can 
also lead to the promotion of the absorptive capacity level in a recipient country. Therefore, 
it is vital for the IDes to enhance their absorptive capacity level through enhancing, 
improving and developing their infrastructure including an effective cOlD1D]mication system, 
transportation networks, power stations, etc. 
3. 12. 5 The Government Regulations and Policies 
The supportive role of government in the recipient country, through adoption of appropriate 
regulation particularly for attracting FDI and implementation of an effective policy 
framework, can also contnDute to its success in technology transfer. The government can 
provide financial assistance, loans and credits for those private and public industrial firms 
which are involved in the acquisition offoreign technology. The government in the recipient 
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country can also create a stable macro-economic and policy environment which is necessary 
for an effective and successful technology transfer. Therefore, it is crucial for the 
government in an LDCs to introduce effective regulations for technology transfer which 
allow the free flow of appropriate technology to their countries. 
3.12.6 The Social and Cultural Values 
The other important factor which can affect the success of technology transfer is the 
recipient country's cultural and social value system. The social and cultural values of a 
country can include traditions, religious and ideological believes, historical habits, attitudes 
of people towards the new devices, etc. The awareness and understanding ofLDCs' social 
and cultural value systems in technology transfer decision making will enhance the 
successful transfer of appropriate technology. Therefore, the policy makers in a recipient 
country should pay their adequate attention when they design and formulate the overall plan 
for transferring foreign technologies to their countries. It can be said that the higher is the 
cultural and social gap between the supplier and recipient societies, the bigger is the need 
to consider the social and cultural aspects in the overall plan for the technology transfer. 
Therefore, it is believed that the success of an international technology transfer also depends 
on the compatibility of the cu1tural values of countries involved in such transactions [196]. 
3.12.7 The Willingneis of Transferor and Transferee 
In any technology transfer to occur, there must be a recipient and supplier of technology 
which the former is usua11y lagging behind the latter in terms of technology level Moreover, 
both the transferor (supplier of technology) and transferee (the receiver of technology) 
should have some goals and objectives which they intend to achieve through technology 
transfer. Therefore, the compatibility and willingness of both parties are necessary for a 
successful technology transfer. While the recipient of technology may import foreign 
technology mostly because of its needs and demands, the supplier of technology may 
transfer its technologies for such a reasons as the incentive of larger profits, wider markets, 
and new or additional sources of raw material supply. 
lOS 
However, both supplier and receiver of technology may impose some restrictions on 
technology transfer. For example, the unwillingness of recipient country may be due to 
transfer of inappropriate technologies which have resulted in heavy dependency on imports 
of foreign parts and components from the supplier. Moreover, some capital-intensive 
technologies cannot create employment opportunities for a country with large human 
resources. The supplier of technology on the other hand may not be willing to transfer its 
up-to-date technologies to the LDCs for the fear that such technology might be used in the 
long term as competitors and rivals in the international market .. 
3. 12. 8 The Export Promotion Policy 
The adoption of an export promotion policy in the LDCs is among the most important 
factors for a successful acquisition offoreign technology and promotion of its technological 
capability. This will be analysed extensively in the case study survey later. However, it can 
be briefly pointed out here that the implementation of EPP can accelerate the efficient 
utilisation of the LDCs' natural and human. resources in order to compete in the international 
market. It can also be said that the faster exports grow in a LDC, the more rapidly new 
technology can be transferred into that country. This close relationship between the 
expansion of growth and the acquisition of foreign technologies is mainly because of the 
current very competitive international markets which necessitate a country to transfer high 
level and modem technologies in order to shift its comparative advantage from labour-
intensive to more skill and technology intensive industries to become more capable of 
competing in the international market. As will be discussed later in the country studies, the 
experiences of some East Asian first and second-tier NICs in successful technology transfer 
and rapid industrialization have provided a strong support for the role of the expansion of 
exports in their rapid productivity growth and technological upgrading. 
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Export Promotion Policy 
Human Resource Development 
Policy 
Figure 3.10 The Key Success Factors For International Technology Transfer 
Source: Salami, R. and Reavill, L.R.P. " International Technology Transfer- The Key 
Success Factor for the Industrialization of Less Developed Countries", in Proceeding of the 
Technology Transfer and Innovation Conference, London: 1996, pp: 158-163. 
3.12.9 The Human Resource Development Policies 
The adoption of efficient Human Resource Development programmes can also be among 
the most crucial factors for a successful international technology transfer. Although the role 
ofHRD policies will be discussed in detail later in the country studies analysis, however, due 
to its great importance it seems also necessary to explain it briefly here. The existence of the 
wen-educated and high skilled labour force seems to be essential for a country to assimilate 
and absorb the foreign technologies and technical know-how more effectively. As the 
experiences of some East Asian first and second-tier NICs in particular S. Korea and Taiwan 
shows, it was massive investment in education and training and development of their human 
resources that enabled them to strengthen their technological capability and closed the gap 
with technologically advanced country very quickly. Therefore, LDCs should place more 
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emphasis on designing various HRD programmes including the expansion of education and 
training at all levels both quantitatively and qualitatively in particular in the bigher education 
in order to increase their university graduates especially in science and engineering. This 
would allow them to increase the numbers of technicians, engineers and scientists which are 
required for efficient adaptation of imported technologies to their local conditions as well 
as promotion of their indigenous technological capability. 
3. 13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As already discussed in the theoretical framework ofintemational technology transfer, there 
has not been a precise theory that can be applicable entirely to the conditions of LDCs. 
Similarly, having analysed the conceptual issues of technology transfer mechanisms, one may 
not find a direct answer to the question of which mode of ITT is more appropriate for the 
successful acquisition of foreign technology. However, as the experience of some LDCs 
shows, the major source of technical and managerial knowledge for these countries in their 
early stage of industrial development was the MNCs direct investment particularly in the 
form of the wholly and majority owned subsidiary. As the level of industrial and 
technological capability in many of these countries developed, they adopted some restrictive 
policy measures to control the dominant and monopolistic role ofMNCs. Since the 1960s 
and 1970s, IDCs employed some less packaged methods of lIT, including joint ventures 
(share ownership and control); licensing agreements (the ownership and management 
responsibility with the host country, but with the supervision of the licensor); franchise 
contracts ( sale of the use of the brand name and technical and managerial support); 
management contracts (supplying management personnel together with technical and 
managerial training for the local personnel); know-how and patents agreement ( supply of 
knowledge and skills of production and the rights for manufacturing certain products); 
turnkey contracts ( supply of a complete factory to the recipient with the whole 
responsibility of the supplier), and the subcontracting ( the provision of the technical 
assistance to the subcontractee). 
However, as noted earlier in detail, the choice of an appropriate method for ITI depends 
on some important factors such as the stage of development and the absorptive capacity of 
the recipient country, the national and trade policy of the host nation, the nature of 
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technology being transferred, and the motivation and strategy of the supplier of technology. 
Moreover, technology transfer mechanisms can be classified through different categories 
such as direct and indirect, commercial and non-commercial, formal and informal, internal 
and external, market mediated and non-market mediated, packaged and unpackaged. 
However, the major distinction of these classifications would be the degree of packaging and 
control employed by the foreign supplier of technology. Therefore, the most appropriate 
channel of technology transfer would be the one in which the recipient can effectively 
acquire the complete package of technology and the know-how and managerial and 
marketing skills needed for the assimilation of the technology to its local condition. In 
other words, it seems preferable for LDCs to choose a rather packaged form of technology 
transfer, while they develop their technological capability through education and training 
of their human resources, and significant R&D activities. Finally, it should be noted that 
the success of a technology transfer to a large degree relies on the appropriate choice of 
technology transfer mechanisms. Therefore, adequate attention should be paid by recipient 
countries to choose the method that enables them to take maximum advantage of the 
imported technology. This, as mentioned earlier, also depends on the indigenous industrial 
and technological capability of recipient country. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF INDUSTRIALISATION AND TECHNOWGY TRANSFER 
IN SOME SELECTED COUNTRIES 
4. 1 INTRODUCTION 
It is believed that the experience of industrial and technological development in some 
successful counties particularly most East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) may 
have many valuable lessons for other LDCs. The importance of the East Asian countries as 
a model for other developing countries can be attributed to their remarkable performance 
and their successful experience of industrial and technological development over the past 
three decades. These countries which include the first-tier NICs, known as tigers or dragons, 
namely Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, along with the second generation of 
NICs, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, have experienced an average annual growth rate 
of GNP per capita of near 7 per cent during the period between 1965-1990 and have also 
obtained 73.5 per cent of developing countries' manufacture exports in 1990 [1]. 
The diversity of these countries in some overall economic indicators such as per capita 
income, natural resources and the process of their industrialisation, can be helpful for other 
developing countries with similar characteristics to pursue their development strategies. 
Although there are some differences in the stage of development, size of economy, resource 
endowment etc, the industrial and technological development experience of these countries 
has been of interest to most Less Developed Countries (LDCs), in particular those which 
attempt to promote their technological capability through the same pattern of rapid 
industrialisation. The experiences of some other successful countries, such as Mexico and 
Turkey, will also be examined in order to identify and establish the vital success and 
possibly limiting factors of their industrial and technological development. The experiences 
of these specific countries can also be valuable for LDCs such as Iran who share a relatively 
common characteristics with them. 
In the fonowing, each country is separately studied within the context of its experience of 
industrial development and technology transfer. This case study needs to be undertaken to 
identify the critical success factors and also some of the limiting factors of these countries 
IZS 
which in turn can be useful for other LDCs with a relatively similar level of development. 
However, it should be noted that the analysis of Singapore and Hong Kong among the East 
Asian first-tier NICs are excluded in our survey mostly because of their small size as city 
states which distinguishes them from their counterparts. 
4.2 REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
It is common and rather necessary for every research investigating broadly the experiences 
of some successful countries to refer to S. Korea as a remarkable and outstanding example 
of rapid industrial and technological development during the past few decades. It is generally 
believed that the development experiences of some of the most successful East Asian 
economies may provide useful lessons for the other countries which are currently 
undergoing the transition process. Among the East Asian first-tier Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs), South Korea is usually chosen by other developing countries as the most 
favourable model This is mainly because of its very rapid transition from a low-income Less 
Developed Country (LDC) into a modem industrialised country in less than thirty years. 
Moreover, one may find several common features between the Korean post-World War two 
period and the current conditions of many LDCs who wish to pursue the same pattern of 
transition that it happened to Korea in the past. 
South Korea (Korea) is covered the area of about 98,913 square kilometres after a 
devastating war in 1950s which led to a division of Korea into two parts in the north and 
south. Most area in the south is consisted of mountains with only about 20% of farmland. 
However, S. Korea exercised a rapid postwar reconstruction period when significant 
progress was made in rebuilding its industrial infrastructure and moving towards economic 
and industrial growth. Much of the industrialisation policies during the 1950s and early 
1960s in S. Korea was concentrated on the protection of a strong domestic industrial base 
capable of producing goods as a ahernative for importing products. This import substitution 
policy was also associated with a substantial aid of about $ 3 billion from U.S. in 1950s, 
assisted the country to keep the relatively stable macroeconomic environment required for 
a successful transition to an outward-oriented economy in early 1960s. 
While S. Korea continued to develop some of the import substitution-industries such as 
fertiliser and cement manufacture in the 1960s, it also placed more emphasis on the 
expansion of some export-oriented and labour intensive industries. The 1960s can be 
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considered as the take-off stage of industrialisation in Korea, as many industries established 
ranging from chemicals and electronics to automobiles and electrical and electronics 
equip ment s. The Korean government formulated a series of Five-Year Economic 
Development Plans since 1962, aimed at obtaining rapid economic growth rate. As a result 
of the implementation of the first and second development plans during the period between 
1962-72, the average annual growth in per capita income in Korea was a remarkable rate 
of6.8% [2]. 
It is argued that the industrial sector was engine of the Korea's growth during the 1960s. 
While the share of the manufacturing sector as a proportion of GNP was less than 14%, this 
figure increased to more than 20% by 1970 [3]. Korea's first and second development plans 
emphasised more the expansion of manufacturing exports through the acquisition offoreign 
technologies. The share of manufactured products in total exports increased from 17.6 % 
in 1962 to 76.1 % in 1970 [4]. It can be said that the adoption of a strong export-
promotion policy in the early 1960s encouraged and facilitated the rapid acquisition of 
foreign industrial technologies, together with their adaptation and assimilation to suit 
Korea's local conditions. However, the number of foreign technology agreements was 
rather Hmited in the 1960s and there were about 320 agreements during 1962-72 valued $10 
mi1Iion. Furthermore, it is believed that Korea's outward-looking strategy contributed 
significantly to the overall economic and industrial performance of the country and its 
contribution rose from about 10 % in the 1960s, reaching to over 20% in the first half of 
1970s [5]. 
The Korean government established a number of supportive institutions for the development 
of science and technology, such as the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) 
for multidisciplinary research and development activity, Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) as a central government policy making and Korea A~anced Institute of Science 
(KAIS) in order to educate and train a large number of technicians and engineers needed 
for efficient absorption of foreign technologies. The government in Korea was also 
efficiently managed to expand the huge infrastructural projects including chemicals, 
petrochemicals, and iron and steel industries \Wich paved the way for a successful transition 
to more capital and high-technology intensive industries during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) enacted several laws and regulations for 
promotion of science and technology, such as the law for the promotion of technology 
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development of 1972, to provide financial support to private industry for technology 
development; the Engineering Services Promotion Law of 1973, to promote local 
engineering firms and the Assistance Law for Designated Research Organisation of 1973, 
to expand the fiscal and financial incentives for R&D centres [6]. 
Korea's economy entered a new phase of growth in the 1970s, when the third and fourth 
development plan were implemented. These plans placed more emphasis on building and 
strengthening the industrial and technological foundation and capability of the country 
through developing some selected industries including machinery, metals, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, shipbuilding, and electronics. Therefore, a large number of heavy and 
capital-intensive technologies were transferred to the country mainly through the imports 
of machinery and tum-key installations. The Korean government implemented a Heavy and 
Chemical Industries drive (HCI) in the mid-1970s, aiming at a shift towards manufacturing 
of heavy and capital-intensive industries from production of labour-intensive and light 
industries which could be more competitive in the international market. Furthermore, the 
national security issues regarding withdrawal of large numbers of U.S. troops from the 
region and also China's re-entry into the international community made the S. Korean 
decision makers put more emphasis on the development of defence-related industries which 
in tum required the establishment of the heavy and chemical industries [7]. 
As a result of various policy measures including tax exemption and financial credits in the 
context of Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive, the manufactured exports rose from 
24% in 1973 to 46% in 1979 and accounted for more than half of Korea's exports in 1984. 
On the other hand, the HCI imports fell from 39% in 1974 to 24% in 1980 [8]. Following 
the economic crisis of late 1970s, the Korean government adopted a series of stabilisation, 
Jiberalisation and privatisation policies in order to keep a stable macroeconomic environment 
needed for further industrial and technological development. A new general industrial 
promotion law replaced the previous individual industrial promotion laws in July 1986 [9]. 
This new law limited the government intetVention and removed some restrictions on foreign 
investment to manufacturing sector. Thus, the 1980s can be distinguished from the two 
previous decades in substantial declining in government intervention. Since 1980s, the 
government interventions were limited only on such activities as restructuring the distressed 
industries, fomwlating the national technology development policies, and the expansion of 
exports. Therefore, like its successful export promotion policy, Korea's h"beralisation policy 
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can be regarded as a model for a successful h1>eralisation [10]. 
Moreover , from the early 1980s, Korean technology development focused on new and 
more advanced technology-intensive industries including bio-technology, computers, 
semiconductors, and telecommunications. Therefore, it can be said that Korea achieved a 
certain level of self-sufficiency in manufacturing labour-intensive and light industries and a 
limited dependence on foreign technology in the heavy and chemical industries in 1980s 
[11]. The Korean exports increased by $ 30 billion during the period between 1980-1987, 
due to the implementation of further effective export incentive measures such as effective 
depreciation of its exchange rate in mid-1980s and a large trade surplus with the U.S. [12]. 
It should be noted that since the implementation of the trade liberalisation policy in the 
1980s, some export subsidies generously provided by the Korean government for exporters 
were reduced. However, the government continued to encourage exports of manufacturing 
products through tariff exemptions and removing the import restrictions for imports of raw 
materials used in export production, and also offering long-term credits to finance exports 
of ships, industrial plants and heavy machinery [13]. Moreover, the manufactured exports 
consisted of about 96% of total exports in 1984, which was the highest of any country in 
the world [14]. 
It is argued that during the process of the export expansion, Korea acquired substantial 
amounts of technology and know-how mainly through imports of goods embodying new 
technology. According to some statistics, the Korean government made about 3,073 
technology import agreements during the period between 1962-1984, including $ 1,043 
million in royalty payments [IS]. Thus, Korea is evaluated as having a most favourable 
environment to receive foreign advanced technology. Korea also transferred foreign 
technology through the other channels including licensing, foreign investment, and some 
informal methods such as technical assistance, foreign training oflocal personnel and reverse 
engineering. There were about 1,840 licensing and 1,249 foreign investment cases occurred 
between 1962-81, which mainly went into such industries as chemicals, machinery and 
electronics [16]. 
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Types of Industries 1985 % 1990 % 1994 
Food and direct consumption 1,259 4.2 2,290 3.5 2,570 
Crude materials and fuels 1,374 4.5 1,719 2.6 3,753 
Light industry products: 11,173 36.9 25,149 38.7 25,742 
Textiles 6,627 21.9 13,938 21.4 16,337 
Footwear 1,524 5.0 4,023 6.2 1,488 
Others 3,022 10.0 7,185 11.1 7,917 
Heavy industry products: 16,467 54.4 35,859 55.2 63,946 
Chemicals and chern. products 575 1.9 1,743 2.7 4,903 
Metal goods 3,328 11.0 5,662 8.7 7,782 
Machinery and equipment 1,377 4.5 6,056 9.3 10,325 
Electronic products 2,907 9.6 10,233 15.7 18,170 
Others 8,289 27.4 12,165 18.7 22,766 
Total 30,282 100. 65,014 100.0 96,011 
Table 4.1 Korea's Manufacturing exports by type of products in Million dollars 
Source: OEeD, 1996. 
% 
2.7 
3.9 
26.8 
17.0 
1.5 
8.2 
66.6 
5.1 
8.1 
10.8 
18.9 
23.7 
100.0 
Despite using various channels of technology acquisition in Korea, the importation of 
technology embodied in machinery and equipment remained as a major channel with about 
21 times that of other means of technology transfer in terms of value during the period 
between 1962-1986 [17]. As is shown in the table 4.2, there is close relation between 
technology imports (TI) and capital good s imports (KI). The sharp increase in TI in 1978 
was because of the implementation of HCI drive which led to importing massive 
technologies in order to promote heavy and chemical industries. For most major industries 
such as textiles, chemicals, shipbuilding, automobiles, electronics, heavy machinery, and iron 
and stee~ technology was transferred through purchase of equipment. This embodied form 
of technology transfer was supplemented by the acquisition of design, joint ventures, 
licensing and the hiring of foreign experts. No systematic approach to technological 
capability development is evident. Different enterprises have followed different strategies. 
For example, in shipbuilding, designs are supplied by clients who purchase them overseas~ 
in the electronics industry, licensing is widely practised. In the automobile industry, one 
enterprise (Daewoo) went into a joint venture with General Motors, while another 
(Hyundai) produced Fords under licence. More recently, Hyundai has gone back to a joint 
venture with Mitsubishi for body design technology [18]. However, there were some heavy 
restrictions in the use of technological licensing in some industries where local technological 
capability is consider to be advancing. It is also argued that the choice of production 
technology has depended more on market and export demand than long term technology 
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policies [19]. 
Period Technology imports FDI Ratios (TI:FDI) Capital goods imports 
Payment Cases Amount Cases [A]/C] [B]/[O] Amount [E]/total 
($ m)[A] [B] (m$) [C] [0] (%) (%) (mS) [E] imports 
1962-66 0.8 33 47.4 39 1.7 0.85 486.0 18.9 
1967-71 20.4 285 218.6 350 9.3 0.81 2,668 30.8 
1972-76 96.5 434 879.4 851 11.0 0.51 8,106 27.3 
1977-81 451.4 1,225 720.5 244 62.7 5.02 25,685.6 27.7 
1982-86 1,184.9 2,078 1,767.5 365 67.0 3.68 46,572.8 32.0 
1987-91 4,359.4 3,471 5,634.7 1,622 77.4 2.14 111,499.4 36.4 
1992-93 1,797.0 1,240 1.938.8 506 92.7 2.46 61,184.3 37.0 
Total 7,906.1 8,766 11,207.6 4,177 70.5 2.10 256,200.3 33.5 
Table 4.2 Technology Transfer to Korea, 1962-93 
Source: Bank of Korea, Korea Industrial Technology Association (KITA), 1996. 
The Korean government also planned some extensive programs for the education and 
training of human labour in order to promote their capability of absorbing and assimilating 
foreign technology. Human resource development policies have been a major and crucial 
element of the Five-Year Economic Development Plans which provided various programs 
for promoting education at a1llevel. For example, the most recent Seventh Five-Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996) aimed at extending the compulsory 
years of schooling from the primary school level to the middle school level by 1996. As of 
1993, the enrolment rate was 100% for primary schools, 96.3% for middle schools, 90% for 
high schools, and 44.8% for tertiaIy education [20]. Moreover, in a further attempt to raise 
the quality of education in Korea, in June 1995 the Korean government announced new 
regulation which aimed to increase competition among schools at a11levels in order to make 
educational system more responsive to changing demands for education by giving them 
more autonomy and diversity. In addition, the number of enrolments in colleges and 
universities has almost tripled since 1980. In order to meet the growing demands of the 
industrial work force, the number of public training institutes which introduced vocational 
training has increased to about 87 at the end of 1993 [21]. 
In order to promote the receptivity offoreign technology, the government in Korea adopted 
various policy measures including designing specific training for upgrading the skills of the 
labour force, training a large number of engineers and technicians, increasing the number of 
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research and development institutes to about 1200 in 1991, establishing science and 
technology parks, and through the financing of technology development programmes and 
institutes [22]. Moreover, the Korean government has recently formulated a challenging 
national R&D program, known as HAN project in order to promote the indigenous 
technological capability and industrial competitiveness with a total investment of about $ 4.6 
billion 56% of which make by public and 44% by private sector. 
In early 1990s, the Korean economy faced with slowing down in its high growth rate during 
the past decades mainly because of the stabilisation programs and growing protectionism 
against international technology transfer which led to lessening of Korea's competitiveness 
in the world market. The growth rate decreased from about 9% in 1991 to 4.7 % and 3.8% 
in 1992 and the first half of 1993 respectively [23]. As a recent report about Korea's 
economy indicates, "1990s have been a period in which S. Korean manufacturers of labour-
intensive goods have either moved up market (clothes manufacturers placing greater 
emphasis on quality and style) or shifted production to countries such as Thailand, or, most 
recently, Vietnam (in the case of many of the footwear companies), or gone out of business" 
[24]. Therefore, the declining rate of the growth and exports has made the Korean decision 
makers to emphasise on establishing a sound institutional framework, to insure the regain 
their previous competitiveness in the world market [25]. Since the election of President Kim 
in 1993, the new government in Korea has formulated new industrial policies aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of rising industries. Moreover, additional policy measures 
have also been undertaken to facilitate technological innovation in the private sector [26]. 
Having surveyed the success factors of Korea's industrial and technological development, 
one can generally refer to some factors such as the Confucian ethics (Song, 1990 [27], Nam 
1994 [28], US aid in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Edwards,1992 [29]; Haliday, 1987 
[30]), the effective and supportive role of state (Amsden,1989 [31]; Wade, 1992 [32]; 
Westphal 1990 [33]; Choi, 1994 [34], Smith 1995, [35]), the role of large industrial 
enterprises known as Chaebol (Singh 1995 [36], and a set of appropriate industrial and 
technological policies (Pilat,1994 [37]; Chang, 1993 [38]; Kumets, 1994 [39]; Koo 1995, 
[40]). This includes an early transition to export promotion policies from previous import 
substitution and also the policies which encouraged and facilitated the importation of 
modem technologies and strengthening its local technological capability. Moreover, Korea's 
human resource development policy has also played a significant role in providing the high-
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skilled labour force needed for the absorption and assimilation of foreign technologies. One 
can also add Korea's efficient macro economic policies which enabled this country to have 
the relatively stable economic situation required for successful development. 
However, it should be noted that the Korean success can not be only the result of a single 
factor, but a combination of inter-related factors and supportive government policies. It can 
be said that the successful experience of Korea in its rapid industrial and technological 
development can offer valuable lessons for other developing countries. Some of the Korea's 
success factors can be attnbuted to its own specific capabilities including high-skilled labour 
force and well-developed infrastructure and therefore may not be replicated by the other 
LDCs with different characteristics. As Robert Lucas (1993) also noted "simply advising a 
society to follow the Korean model is like an aspiring basketball player to follow the Michel 
Jordan model" [41]. The Korean experience may be unique in the sense that it was 
supported by a set of specific capabilities, but this does not mean that it is irrelevant for 
other countries with relatively different histories. 
Therefore, without doubt, Korea's industrial and technological policies in past decades 
which led to its very rapid growth can imply useful lessons for the decision makers in the 
other developing countries. As indicated earlier, the technological development strategy 
pursued by Korea in the process of its industrialisation has been the introduction of 
appropriate technology from developed countries for assimilation and improvement while 
simuhaneously promoting the development of a domestic technological capability. This can 
also be considered an effective technology transfer policy for the other developing countries 
that intend to follow the same pattern of industrialisation and technological development. 
Korea's experience in the past few decades shows that the effective absorption and 
assimilation of foreign technology is necessary for a successful expansion of exports. In 
other words, an adequate supply of appropriate technologies is an essential factor that 
enables industry to produce goods and services for the international markets. Korea's 
science and technology development policy also suggests the development of capacity for 
the proper selection, assimilation and adaptation of imported technologies [42]. This, as the 
Korea's experience shows, can be achieved through designing some regular programmes for 
training the labour force and upgrading their skills, increasing the research and development 
activities, selecting the most appropriate channel for transferring technology based on the 
national demands and capability, and establishing some institutions to formulate and support 
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national science and technology policies. 
The importance of strong outward-looking, market-oriented, and export promotion policies 
in the rapid economic and industrial development of Korea also suggests that the adoption 
of an export-oriented strategy is regarded as a crucial element for a developing country 
which intends to build up a modem industrial base through obtaining foreign exchange 
needed to finance transferring modem technologies. As Korea's experience in the adoption 
of strong export promotion policy indicates, this strategy encouraged the Korean local firms 
to invest heavily in technology transfer activities in order to get access to high and advanced 
technologies which enable them to compete in the international market. The adoption of an 
effective export-oriented policy also led to the acquisition of technological capability in 
existing simple and labour-intensive industries in Korea's early stage of industrialisation and 
also establishing of new modem and capital-intensive industries in the later stage. 
Furthermore, expansion of exports also accelerated the process of catching up 
technologically by allowing imports of goods embodying new technology. Therefore, 
pursuing an outward-oriented and export promotion policies can be generally viewed as an 
effective incentive that accelerates the accumulation of human capital and foreign 
technology [43]. 
Despite the significant effect of the export expansion in the rapid industrialisation of Korea, 
this strategy has been criticised by some authors who blamed it as a cause of technological 
dependency [44]. They believed that the emphasis on export-oriented production often led 
to the importation of a substantial amount of foreign inputs needed for producing 
intermediate goods. In 1990, 22.4 per cent of goods manufactured in Korea were based on 
foreign technology (foreign parts and inputs needed to produce manufactured goods), 
compared to 6.2 per cent in Japan, and l.6 per cent in U.S. Also of total Korea's total 
exports in 1990,55 % were based on foreign technology [45]. It should also be noted that 
despite the significant effect of the export promotion policy in the Korea's rapid industrial 
and technological development, however, in a very highly competitive international market 
environment and existence of many strong competitors, this strategy may not be easily 
implemented by some LOCs which lack the competitive advantage to compete in the world 
market. 
It is believed that industrial development in Korea has also been influenced to a great extent 
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by the guidelines of the Five-year Economic Plans since the early 1960s. The series of 
consistent five years development plans assisted Korean decision makers to formulate 
fleXlble and efficient short and long-term development policies in order to achieve the high 
rate of economic growth and industrial and technological development. A constant 
upgrading of the industrial and technological infrastructure through the introduction of a 
substantial amount of foreign technologies together with the promotion of local 
technological and managerial capabilities, were among the main strategies in the context of 
the science and technology policies in the Korea's five-years development plans. A 
significant point in the process of policy making is that on the one hand Korean policy 
makers usually adopt a top-down approach, which despite several groups including many 
experts and economists, and representatives of the private and labour sectors are consulted 
in the designing of the five-year development plans and annual budgets, decisions are made 
quicldy at the very top level. The top-down decision making seems to be necessary for 
Korea to catch up with the advanced technologies in a short period of time and with a lesser 
costs. On the other hand, Korean decision makers favour the "trial and error" approach 
which enable them to either admitting the policy if successful or withdrawing it in the case 
of achieving unsatisfactory results. 
Korea's experiences in h'beralisation and implementation of Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialisation drive may also have some useful implications for other LDCs. As the 
experience of S. Korea shows, the private sector should be encouraged to finance its own 
research and development activities. Moreover, high priority and more investment should 
be allocated to those R&D activities involved in the adaptation and assimilation of foreign 
technologies rather than on initially adopting and creating them. Although the state played 
a very effective role in leading Korea towards attaining a high growth rate in particular in 
its earlier stage of industrialisation, however, much of the Korea's success can be attnbuted 
to its efficient liberalisation program or the freeing of market from government control. 
Moreover, despite different point of views about whether Korea's experience of the Heavy 
and Chemical Industrialisation drive during the 1970s and 1980s was successful or not, it 
can be generally said that much of the significant export performance of the 1980s can be 
regarded to a large degree as a result of the implementation ofHCI drive in the previous 
decade. For example, the implementation ofHCI program enabled Korea to become the 
world's second largest shipbuilding power and world's third biggest producer of advanced 
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semiconductor memory chips and a major exporter of construction and engineering services, 
steel and automobiles by the late 1980s [46]. 
Korea's human resource development policy and heavy investment in the education and 
training of its labour force can also be considered as another important factor contributing 
its success. The fact that Korea had the highest number of the secondary students by the late 
1970s as a percentage of the total post-secondary age population; the highest number of 
scientists and engineers per million people; and the highest number of researchers among the 
other NICs, indicates to the large amount of investment which has been allocated to the 
development of its human resources by the Korean decision makers [47]. 
Country Degrees Total Science Engineering Engineering 
Science 
Korea Master's 6,874 2,381 4,493 1.89 
(1993) Ph.D 1,189 489 700 1.43 
Ph.DlMaster's 0.17 0.21 0.16 
United Master's 52,267 13,985 38,282 2.74 
States Ph.D 14,620 8,929 5,691 0.64 
(1989) Ph.DlMaster's 0.28 0.64 0.15 
Japan Master's 16,101 2,984 13,117 4.40 
(1990) Ph.D 2,804 835 1,969 2.36 
Ph.DlMaster's 0.17 0.28 0.15 
Table 4.3 The Master's and Ph.D degrees in science and engineering among Korea, U.S. 
and Japan 
Source: DECO, 1996. 
Total expenditures for education amounted to 13.3 per cent of GNP in 1984, including both 
private (6.9 per cent) and public (6.4 percent) spending. This is much larger than the 
Japanese figure of5.7 per cent in 1982, and the American figure of6.7 per cent in 1981. 
[48]. The percentage ofhigh school graduates advancing to colleges or universities in Korea 
has been the second highest in the world after United States in 1990 [49]. Moreover, as 
indicated in the table 2, having compared the number of master's and PhD degrees in science 
and engineering, one can find that the ratio of PhD to master's degrees is nearly equal to that 
of Japan and slightly lower than with the United States [50]. 
According to other statistics, Korea's adult literacy rate (93.7 per cent), was almost as high 
as Japan (99.7 per cent) for 1985 and more than twice as high as India (43.5 per cent), is 
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one of the most important elements in assimilating foreign technologies [51]. Moreover, the 
increasing number of Korean graduates studying abroad and returning home has also played 
an important role in transferring technical and managerial skills into the country. Therefore, 
the promotion of Korea's technological capability to a large extent has been achieved by its 
effective human resource development, as well as technology transfer policies and increasing 
research and development activities. The large stocks of scientists, engineers, technicians 
and skilled workers enabled Korea to assimilate and absorb imported technologies more 
efficiently. Furthermore, Korea's heavy investment in development ofits human resources 
accelerated the country's rapid growth rate of industrial and technological capability from 
the early stage of the industrialisation. Korea's significant expansion of education at all 
levels, has been accompanied by increasing public and private research and development 
expenditure as a percentage of the GNP which reached to 2.3 % in 1993 from 1.7% in 1988 
[52]. The share of private investment in R&D activities increased from 20% in 1975 to 80% 
by 1990. This rapid increase in the share of private R&D expenditure in Korea is mainly due 
to the necessity of the Korean firms to increase their R&D activities which enable them to 
absorb and assimilate modem and complex technologies more effectively. In addition, some 
Korean firms started to undertake their own technology innovation, such as in the 
development of some electronic components and products [53]. 
Despite relatively high R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP and the existence of a 
large number of scientists and engineers, Korea needs to allocate more investment on the 
R&D activities in order to catch up with the more advanced countries. Therefore, the 
Korean government has formulated a long-term plan known as "Science and Technology 
toward the 2000s", which aimed to increase R&D investment to 5% of its GNP by the year 
200 1. According to this plan, the number of scientists and engineers will reach 30 persons 
per 10,000 of population and about 150,000 scientists and engineers will be engaged in 
research and development by the beginning of the 21st century [54]. Therefore, it can be 
said that, in a country like Korea with its limited land and natural resources and high 
population density, it is skill and brainpower which will provide the base for national 
development [55]. 
As indicated earlier, the government played a very crucial role in the Korea's rapid industrial 
and technological development. The government in Korea adopts a set of appropriate policy 
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measures in order to accelerate the pace of transition to an industrialising country. The 
government intervened very efficiently in the creation of an adequate industrial infrastructure 
and a stable macroeconomic environment needed for promotion of indigenous technological 
capability and effective absorption of the imported technology. It is argued that the Korea's 
successful adaptation of foreign technology has been to a large degree as a result of the 
supportive role of the state through introduction of various policy measures including heavy 
investment in R&D activities, and formulation of effective regulations and law [56]. A 
significant characteristic of the Korean government is its adoption of market friendly policies 
which can be categorised in three aspects of promoting of exports; its supportive role of 
more efficient industries; and its relatively small degree of price distortions [57]. The other 
important aspect of Korean government, as mentioned earlier, has been the flexibility and 
adaptability of policy making. The Korean government has been very fleXIble in the case of 
changing the policies very quickly when they were found to be ineffective. This flexibility 
assisted Korea to overcome such crises as the two oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 which 
caused serious financial problems for the Korean government. The authoritarianism has also 
been another specific characteristic of the Korean government, in particular in its early stage 
of industrialisation when General Park Chung-Hee ruled the country during the period 
between 1963-1979 [58]. 
It is argued that Korea used the lessons of the Japanese experience very effectively in 
formulating its own policies in the past. The industrial and technological development 
approach in both Japan and Korea is similar in their process of catching up with the more 
advanced countries through promotion of technological capability and industrial 
infrastructure. Moreover, the government played a very important role in the process of 
industrialisation in both countries through effective mobilisation of capital, planning sector 
development, and controlling the corporate investment pattern [59]. Despite the replication 
of Japanese model in many aspects of Korea's industrial and technological development 
policies, there were some important differences. For instance, although both Korea and 
Japan followed the same pattern of industrialisation in their early stage of industrialisation, 
however, in the later stage, Japanese policy moved away from state intelVention earlier and 
quicker than it happened in Korea, focusing instead on information sharing and co-
ordination. and on indirect, functional support for new activities [60]. A survey by the 
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) regarding the level of 
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Korean technological capability shows that the average time lag in the development of 
technologies between Korea and Japan is four years. It also indicates that Korea is five years 
behind the world leaders in advanced technology in comparison with average time lag of 10-
15 years in late 1970s [61]. 
In sum, Korea's industrial and technological policies can offer useful implications for policy 
makers in other developing countries. Despite several general features in Korean experience 
that can be applied to the other LDCs, however, it seems difficult for some LDCs to 
replicate the Korean model This is mainly because the conditions that fuelled Korean rapid 
industrial and technological development may not exist in many LDCs. As indicated earlier, 
some of the Korea's success factors such as its institutional characteristics including high 
level of education and well-developed infrastructure, etc seem to be yet unique to Korea. 
4.3 TAIWAN 
The successful experience of industrial and technological development in Taiwan, as another 
first-tier East Asian NIC, has shared several common features with South Korea. Having 
looked to the successful experience of Taiwan in the last four decades, like S.Korea, 
Taiwan adopted an import substitution policy in its early stage of industrialisation which 
emphasised the promotion of an indigenous industrial infrastructure and self-sufficiency. 
However, Taiwan switched to the export promotion policy earlier than S.Korea in the late 
1950s aiming at the expansion of exports, in particular manufacturing exports to achieve 
industrial and technological development and increase its foreign reserves. The share of 
manufacturing products to total exports increased from 9.3 % between 1952-55 to 44.1% 
between 1961-65 [62]. 
Most of Taiwan's industrial exports in the 1960s consisted of textiles, garments, footwear 
products. In the 1970s, export promotion continued to be major drive of Taiwan's 
industrialisation policies which were followed by the Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation 
drive in mid-1970s. However, the implementation of the HCI drive is believed to be slightly 
different from that of S.Korea. While the HCI drive was considered as a method to promote 
the competitiveness of Korea's manufacturing exports, Taiwan used it more for 
strengthening its existing industries. Moreover, while S.Korea concentrated more on the 
development of its basic materials such as iron and steel and petrochemicals, in Taiwan it 
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was machinery industries that led to the shift of industrial activities toward the HCI drive 
of 1970s. It is also believed that heavy industry in Korea has been twice as capital intensive 
as heavy industry in Taiwan [63]. 
In 1980s, Taiwan entered the second stage of export promotion through continuing the 
implementation of various export incentive measures including tax rebates, low interest 
export loans, and further expansion of export processing zones [64]. As a result of these 
policy measures, Taiwan's trade surplus reached $ 15.6 billion in 1986 and its foreign 
exchange reserves exceeded $77 billion at the end of 1987 [65]. By early 1988, Taiwan also 
ranked sixth in the world in terms of product value, accounting for almost 4 % of total 
world production. Taiwan's major exports in 1986 included electronics products (15.7%), 
garments (13%), textile products (10.2%), metals (5.3%), and other manufactures (10.8 %) 
[66]. Like S.Korea, Taiwan also implemented liberalisation policies in the 1980s aiming at 
privatisation of infrastructure services. However, unlike the experience of Korea in 
privatising wide range of services, the process ofprivatisation in Taiwan was slow due to 
the lack of private sector participation in infrastructure services. In the early 1990s, the 
Taiwanese authorities formulated the six-year National Development Plan to provide the 
country with the modem industrial infrastructure needed to promote the indigenous 
technological capability and its overall productivity. The plan invested a total of$ 303 billion 
for 775 projects including a high-speed railway, highway expansion, petrochemical plants, 
infrastructure for heavy industries, and the development of science and technology. The plan 
also projected to increase GDP per capita from U.S. $ 8000 in 1990 to U.S. $ 14000 in 
1996 and the total exports of U.S. $ 122.8 billion in 1996 [67]. 
Having swveyed the overall success factors of the Taiwan's rapid industrialisation, one can 
refer to some general factors such as the U.S. and Japanese aid in the period between 1950-
1965 (Tsai, 1995 [68]), the Confucianism ethic [69]; Brick, 1992 [70]), the relatively well-
developed infrastructure established during the Japanese colonial period (Brick, 1992; 
Tsai,1995), the effective and supportive role of government (Pang, 1992 [71]; Tsai 1993 
[72], Chu 1994 [73], Yu (1995) [74]; the appropriate industrial policy including an early 
switch to export-promotionpolicy(Kuo, 1983 [75]; Chou, 1985 [76]; Lin, 1994 [77]), and 
the intensive human resource development policies (Lin 1994; Dollar and Sokoloff 1994). 
As mentioned earlier in the case of Korea, it is not only a specific factor which led to their 
success, but a combination of the above factors that resulted in their significant prosperity. 
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However, various authors have emphasised one particular factor as most effective and 
important for the rapid industrialisation of Taiwan. For example, in a survey of industrial 
policy, productivity growth, and structural change in manufacturing industries in both 
Taiwan and S.Korea, Dollar and Sokoloff (1994) believe that a rapid accumulation of 
physical capital, human capital, and technology has been the key element of their success 
[78]. Chu (1994) in his study of the role of state in the development of Taiwan's 
petrochemical industry argues that despite the significance impact of market mechanism on 
Taiwan's successful experience, the state played a leading role in fostering the rapid growth 
rate of the country. He concludes that the success of Taiwan and other NICs can mainly be 
attnbuted to the use of both market mechanism and state intervention [79]. Tsai (1995) also 
refers to the effective development and utilisation of human resources as the most significant 
factor of Taiwan's success [80]. Kuo (1983) on the other hand, refers to the adoption of 
export promotion policy as a major contribution to rapid development of Taiwan [81]. 
One can see that there is commonality in many success factors of Taiwan and S. Korea's 
rapid industrial and technological development. However, there have been slight differences 
in some aspects such as the methods of technology transfer, the role of the state, and the 
scale of their industrial entetprises. Like Korea, much of technology has been transferred 
to Taiwan through importing capital goods and machinery. However, while S. Korea 
pursued restrictive policies towards Foreign Direct Investment at an early stage of its 
industrialisation, Taiwan encouraged the flow ofIDI through the open door policies and 
introduction of various incentives for foreign investors including tax rebates, reduction of 
custom duties, profit repatriation and establishing EPZs [82]. Taiwan has also employed 
licensing agreements, imitation, technology cooperation agreements and international 
subcontracting as the other methods of acquisition offoreign technology [83]. 
Moreover, while the government intervention in both countries, has played a significant role 
in developing adequate infrastructure needed for strengthening their rapid industrial and 
technological development, it is argued that the government in Taiwan has been less 
interventionist, and more moderate compared with the Korean government. The government 
in Taiwan has also more actively encouraged the decentralisation of industrial activities, 
which enabled Taiwan to a maintain a more labour-intensive growth pattern than Korea, 
achieving higher employment rates and distribution of income [84]. The state inTaiwan also 
seemed to manage the processes of foreign technology acquisition in such a way as to 
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maximise the impact of this technology on the local economy [85]. Moreover, while in S. 
Korea the government has tended to enforce its policies on larger-sized enterprises, the 
Taiwanese state exercised less direct control over private firms and has intervened in key 
industrial sectors through a large number of small-scale firms. 
It is argued that the export promotion strategy has been instrumental in both Taiwanese and 
Korean successful experience of industrial and technological development. As indicated 
earlier, Taiwan changed its previous import substitution policy sooner than S.Korea. Since 
adopting an export-oriented policy in the late 1950s, the Gross National Product (GNP) and 
industrial manufacturing of Taiwan has grown by average annual rates of 8.9 per cent and 
13.4 per cent respectively. The share of manufactured products in total exports increased 
from 28 % in 1960 to 77 % in 1970 and reached to 95.9 % by 1993 [86]. It can be said 
that the existence of abundant and cheap labour force in both S. Korea and Taiwan has 
played a very important role in the expansion of exports in their eady stage of 
industrialisation. However, while S.Korea emphasised more on the use of abundant labour 
as the major input factor of export promotion policy, Taiwan attributed to higher degree of 
skill and capital intensity in its export products. This is mostly due to the appreciation of 
Taiwan national dollar against U.S. dollar in 1980s, which resulted in a higher wage 
increases in Taiwan in comparison with S. Korea. Moreover, as indicated earlier in the case 
of S.Korea, the significant export performance in both countries in their early stages 
benefited from the appropriate environment in the world economy during the 1960s and 70s. 
Therefore, with the very competitive international market in recent years, it seems difficult 
for some LDCs as a new comers to replicate and follow the successful experiences of Korea 
and Taiwan's export promotion policies. 
The Human Resource Development policy (HRD) has also played a vital role in Taiwan's 
success. The Taiwanese authorities paid great attention to design various programs for 
promotion of high-level education and skills and training scientists and engineers needed for 
successful assimilation and absorption of imported technologies. The heavy investment in 
education at all levels has been the core of Taiwanese policy makers with allocation of 
about 15% of central government budget to the education. In addition to increasing rate of 
public expenditure per student which amounted to NT $ 16,000 at the primary and NT $ 
26,600 at the secondary level in 1986, the vocational education and training has also been 
expanded considerably in order to meet the increasing demands of industry sector [87]. 
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The importance of vocational education within Taiwan's overall educational policy led to 
an increase in the number of students in vocational high schools which has been twice that 
of students in academic high schools in 1991-92 [88]. Moreover, Taiwan has one of highest 
number of graduates in science and technology, which the ratio of S&T graduates to total 
graduates increased from 43.3% in 1972 to 57.4% in 1992 [89]. Furthermore, the total 
expenditure on R&D activities has increased from 0.48 % of GNP in 1978, to 1.65% in 
1990, which grew at an average annual rate of 12.1 % [90]. Taiwan also set up the Hsinchu 
Science-based industrial park followed the development of high-tech industry at Silicon 
Valley in the U.S. in order to attract more foreign investment and high-technological and 
managerial skills [91]. 
Having compared the success factors of S.Korea and Taiwan, it can be seen that while for 
S.Korea, foreign capitals (heavy foreign borrowing), the big business conglomerates, and 
state inteIVentions have been among the main factors of its success, in Taiwan, foreign direct 
investment, small and medium enterprises and its appropriate development policies have 
played a key role in its success. As is mentioned earlier in the case of Korea, Taiwan's model 
of rapid industrial and economic development can also have valuable lessons for other 
developing countries. However, it seems difficuh for other less developed countries to 
duplicate Taiwan's development strategies, since every country has its own institutional and 
cuhural characteristics and a unique set offilctor endowments. Nevertheless, while Taiwan's 
experience is unique, being the result of a number of different factors, its development 
process presents features that may be applied to other LDCs trying to build up their 
economies. Thus, it can be said that many of Taiwan's success factors and experiences can 
be very useful for the other less developed countries. 
LDCs can learn from the development experience of Taiwan that the government of a 
country must: have long-range and fiex],ble plans which can serve as a blueprint for gradual 
and evolutionary development in order to make a direct effort to the rapid development and 
modernisation. The fact that Taiwan and S.Korea adopted and adapted successfully the 
Japanese model of industrialisation shows that the other developing countries can replicate 
this model for their own countries. Moreover, it should be noted that a number of countries 
in particular those of second-tier East Asian NICs have been able to follow successfully the 
Taiwanese and Korean model of technological and industrial development. This will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
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Some policies such as heavy investment on the development of the quality and quantity of 
its human resources, promotion of the export industries, the significant role of the state in 
choosing appropriate policies and strategies and strengthening its technological capability 
by transferring technology, are among the most important and vital policies which might be 
relevant to most, ifnot all, developing countries. Taiwan's experience also showed that, 
in order to strengthen technical capability, LDCs should invest heavily in the restructuring 
of the industrial and technological infrastructure; import massive foreign technologies 
together with allocation ofhigh expenditure as a percentage of GNP in R&D activities. Like 
S.Korea, the Taiwanese policy makers have emphasised on designing a technology 
development strategy which is based on the building up a self-sufficient industrial and 
technological infrastructure through heavy investment in industrial research and 
development activity and promoting the absorption level of imported technologies. 
Therefore, Taiwan's experience in formulating an overall national science and technology 
policy may suggest that in order to design an appropriate national technology strategy, 
LDCs' policy makers should pay special attention to such important aspects as the upgrading 
infra structural and overall R&D capabilities through introducing various financial incentives 
and supportive measures including establishment ofEPZs and industrial parks and adopting 
appropriate mechanisms for importing foreign technologies. 
Yu (1995) argues that LDCs may be able to draw useful implications from Taiwan's 
experience. In his view, the key elements of Taiwan's success which can have some 
important lessons for other developing countries are: the strong and efficient role of 
government (policy making is best done by a group of experts, advisors and administrators); 
reasonable economic strategy; effective use of foreign capital and technology; attracting 
foreign investment; adopting export-oriented strategy and effective human resource 
development policy [92]. Another lesson which can be learned from Taiwan's development 
experience, as Tsai (1993) has noted, is that in the absence of an already established 
democratic political system, an authoritarian regime, particularly a "soft" authoritarian 
regime like that of Taiwan, might assist a country in ensuring the stable political and social 
environment necessary for industrial and technological development. Such a regime should 
be prepared to use its authority to encourage economic growth. In other words, authority 
and power should only be the means to economic development and political modernisation, 
not an end in themselves [93]. However, it is argued that some differences in the 
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development strategies of Korea and Taiwan during the past decades can be attributed partly 
to a relatively difference in their political systems. While most industrialisation policies in 
the early stage (1962-1979) in Korea were directed by a strong military ruler with a 
relatively democratic nature, there has been a one party structure in Taiwan with a relatively 
soft authoritarian nature. 
The successful experience of Taiwan in its rapid industrial and technological development 
also shows that Less Developed Countries (LDCs) should not rely on policies which only 
aim at protecting selecting industries, but they should also choose a directed market 
approach which allows for development to take place in all sectors and leads to substantial 
productivity and growth rates, technical diffusion, increased employment, and thus to a 
balanced share of income and to a political and economic stability [94]. Taiwan's experience 
is thus most directly relevant to countries willing to accept the social and political 
consequences of growth and willing to allow an economy that, while mixed, is primarily 
market-oriented [95]. Taiwan's experience also suggests that, for establishing national 
programs of some strategic technologies aiming at commercial applications, an overall 
development framework to upgrade the infrastructure and general capabilities is needed. 
Finally, the Taiwan case shows that, under certain circumstances, it is possible for a less 
developed country to move up the technological ladder from the primary stage of 
technology importation to the advance stage of technology production and innovation. In 
conclusion, the successful development experience of Taiwan shows that a society with 
limited resources, and a dense population, would be able to achieve significant results in the 
industrialisation process through long-term planning and concerted effort. Having 
considered Taiwan's experience of very fast transition to a newly developed country and 
assuming that the very rapid growth rate of East Asian countries such as Taiwan continues 
in the future, as Brick (1992) predicted, there likely will be a shift of economic power away 
from Europe and North America to the western Pacific by the middle of the twenty-first 
century [96]. 
4. 4 MALAYSIA 
Malaysia can be ranked among the second-tier East Asian NICs with an abundant natural 
resources including rubber, palm oil, tin, petroleum and natural gas. However, having 
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considered some of its current economic and industrial indicators, such as an annual average 
growth rate of GNP (9 %) in the early 1990s, the share of manufacturing in GDP (31.5%), 
the share of export-oriented to total manufacturing (50%), and per capita income ($ 2,182), 
Malaysia can be categorised as a first tier Newly Industrialised Country (NIC) [97]. 
1970 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 
GDP ($ billion) 4 24.5 31.2 42.7 47.1 58 64.4 
GDP growth rate (%) 4.5 7.4 -1.1 9.7 8.7 7.8 8.5 
Total exports ($ billion) 1.7 12.9 15.4 29.5 34.4 40.7 47.1 
Manufacturing exports (% of total exports) 13.4 22.4 32.8 58.8 64.9 68.9 74.3 
Table 4.4 Some important macroeconomic indicators of Malaysia during period between 
1970-1993 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Quarterly Bulletin, Dec 1993, 
Like many other LDCs, Malaysia adopted an import-substitution strategy in its early stage 
of industrialisation, which involved assembly, packaging and producing of goods and 
products previously imported from abroad. Import substitution has also been conducted by 
introducing protectionist measures such as high rates of tariffs and quotas with the main 
objectives of supporting infant industries, replacing import of consumer goods with 
domestically produced materials, and creating employment opportunities for its labour force. 
However, it is argued that IS policies led to inefficient utilisation oflocal resources, and a 
saturated domestic market and therefore failed to create a manufacturing sector capable of 
competing in the international market [98]. Malaysia shifted to an export promotion policy 
with the introduction of the Investment Incentives Act in 1968, which was associated with 
the introduction of the government's New Economic Policy (NEP) in the early 1970s. This 
was followed by the Industrial Co-ordination Act (ICA) of 1975, aiming at such broad 
objectives as increasing income and employment of all Malaysians, accelerating the process 
of restructuring the Malaysian economy, and developing the labour-intensive manufacturing 
exports. 
Following the adoption of the export promotion policy, the Malaysian government 
implemented various policy measures mainly through establishing Free Trade Zones (FTZs) 
in order to raise manufacturing exports. Exporters have been exempted from custom duties 
in these zones for importing components and equipment needed for producing 
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manufacturing exports [99]. As a result of these policy measures, Malaysia experienced a 
period of favourable economic and industrial growth with manufacturing value added mainly 
in food-processing, electrical machinery and textiles grew with an annual average growth 
rate of 11 % during the period between 1971-1975, and the share of manufacturing in GDP 
increased from 12.2% in 1970 to 14.4 % in 1975 [100]. Moreover, the total exports grew 
with an average annual rate of 18.4% and the share of manufacturing exports in the total 
export value almost doubled in the 1970s [101]. While Malaysia relied mostly on the export 
of the processed natural resources such as tin, rubber, and palm oil in the early stage, after 
1970s, the food processing, textiles and electrical and electronic products accounted for the 
majority ofits export growth [102]. 
Due to a decline in Malaysia's economic performance in the early 19808 which was mainly 
as a result of world recession in that time and a sharp decrease in the price of Malaysia's 
major export products including rubber, tin, palm oil and petroleum, the new government 
in 1982 adopted some specific policies and plans for regaining export competitiveness in the 
international market. Therefore, privatisation and h'beralisation policies became important 
components of the new strategy since 1983, with the main objectives of increasing the role 
of the private sector through reducing the role of government in direct economic activity, 
increasing the quality, efficiency and productivity of the manufacturing products, and 
assisting the national goal ofredistn'buting wealth in the economy [103]. 
Moreover, with the implementation of the heavy industrialisation drive which replicated the 
Korean HCI drive of 19708, a large number of heavy and capital-intensive industries 
including integrated steel mills, petrochemical complexes and the automobile industry were 
established. However, despite several common features between the Malaysian heavy 
industrialisation drive with that of S.K.orea in 1970s, there have been some major differences 
in their objectives and implementation. For example, as indicated earlier in the case of 
Korea, the main objective of the Korean HCI drive was creating new bases for the 
diversification of manufacturing products in order to increase their competitiveness in world 
market, while Malaysia's heavy industry activity was focused on the domestic market in 
order to achieve two not very compatible objectives of accelerating the pace of 
industrialisation and redistributing national income to an Malaysians [104]. Moreover, while 
in Malaysia small-scale public enterprises mainly involved the implementation of heavy 
industries, in Korea, the drive was led by the large conglomerates known as Chaebl [105]. 
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It is also argued that Malaysia followed the Japanese and Korean model of industrial and 
technological development through the adoption ofits IIlook-east" policies in early 1980s. 
The main reason for the Malaysian look east policy is believed to be because of sharing 
several common features with these countries in particular in the cultural and traditional 
values which encouraged productivity, hard work, and financial discipline as prerequisite for 
their successful economic and industrial growth. [106]. Moreover, a sharp increase in the 
amount of tuition fees for overseas students in UK universities which had a large number 
of Malaysian students in the early 1980s, caused policy makers in Malaysia to retaliate by 
moving their trade activities towards Japan and East Asian NICs from UK and western 
countries. The highest share of Japan as a major supplier of technology in Malaysia can be 
also attnbuted to Malaysia's look east policy. The close cultural and economic linkage with 
the other East Asian countries like Japan and S.Korea assisted Malaysia to adapt, assimilate 
and absorb their technologies more easily and quicker than other foreign technologies. 
However, as Edwards (1992) argues, there were some differences within a socio-political 
and historical context of the S.Korea and Malaysia which may make it difficult for the 
Malaysian policy makers to replicate the Korean Model. For example, there was a relatively 
well-developed industrial infrastructure in the post colonial period in S.Korea in comparison 
with that of Malaysia after its independence in 1957. Moreover, the lSI in Korea was 
adopted earlier than Malaysia, and despite the nearly equal GDP in 1965, the share of 
industry sector was 18% in comparison with 9% in Malaysia. Furthermore, the geo-political 
condition of S.Korea varied remarkably from that of Malaysia. While Malaysian society 
consisted of different ethnics, Korea benefitted from homogeneous society. Therefore, 
Malaysian state has not had the same autonomy as that of S.Korea. In addition, while the 
main factor attributed to the successful export performance of Malaysian manufacturing 
exports was the establishment of Export Processing Zones (FTZs), exports from S.Korea 
were mainly build up from a base of producing for a protected domestic market [107]. 
Among the other industrial policies which have been implemented by the Malaysian 
government in 1980s, one can refer to the Industrial Master Plan (IMP) for the period 
between (1985-1995), with the new long-term objectives, such as increasing indigenous 
technological capability through the further utilisation of the country's comparative 
advantage and development of its resource based industries. It is argued that the 
148 
introduction of IMP enabled industries in Malaysia to identify their strength and weaknesses. 
Some of the major constraints in the process of Malaysia's industrial and technological 
development have been recognised, such as heavy dependency on the import of components 
and parts required for manufacturing the products, or technological dependency; lack of 
adequate indigenous technological capacity; shortage of engineers and technicians; and 
inadequate incentives for technological development. 
Following the introduction of the Promotion of Investment Act in 1986, various incentives 
and policy measures were implemented including investment tax reduction, allowing 100% 
foreign equity ownership, and incentives for research and development, aiming at promoting 
private and foreign investment activities [108]. These policy measures had some significant 
impacts on the Malaysia's overall economic and industrial growth performance in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, in particular remarkable increase in the manufacturing exports which 
reached to a total of $ 34 billion in 1993 and exceeded the IMP export target [109]. In 
1991, the National Development Policy (NDP) replaced the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
with the main objective of making Malaysia a fuI1y industrialised country by the year 2020. 
This objective known as "vision 2020" is supposed to be achieved by implementing a 
number of strategies including more investment in R&D activities (increasing R&D 
expenditure per GNP to 2 per cent by the year 2000), further support policies for human 
resource development, attracting more FDI, and continuing the promotion of indigenous 
technological capability through the difiUsion and assimilation of foreign technologies. The 
sixth Malaysian plan (1991-1995) was also formulated to focus on the promotion of the 
general level of national productivity specially through accelerated scientific and 
technological development [110]. Moreover, the current Malaysian plan (1996-2000) 
emphasises more the strategic and high-tech industries including automated manufacturing 
technology, advanced materials, bio-technology, electronics, and information technology. 
However, it can be said that a large amolDlt of effort needs to be taken in order to overcome 
some problems and constraints in achieving the vision 2020. As yet, there are some specific 
points which are prerequisite for Malaysia in reaching the level of industrialised nations. 
Special attention should be paid for promoting the level of absorptive capacity of foreign 
technologies which is far behind that of advanced countries and even NICs. This requires 
the allocation of a substantial amolDlt of investment in R&D activities which was only about 
0.8 % as a percentage of GNP in 1989 compared with 1.4% and 2.1% for Taiwan and 
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S.Korea respectively. Moreover, Malaysia lagged behind the other first-tier NICs in the 
number of technicians and engineers. Therefore, it needs to be a significant increase in the 
number of institutions for technical and vocational training in order to train adequate skilled 
engineers and technicians needed for closing the gap. Furthermore, in order to keep its 
manufacturing competitiveness in a very competitive international market, it seems essential 
for Malaysia to strengthen the introduction of strong export policy measures towards the 
manufacturing of those products which it has the most comparative advantage. This in turn 
depends on the efficient allocation of the Malaysia'S abundant natural resources. Malaysian 
comparative advantage in many technology-intensive products seems more developed than 
that of other East Asian second-tier NICs such as Thailand and Indonesia [111]. 
In sum, having surveyed the success factors of Malaysian economic and industrial 
development during the past three decades, one can refer to some general reasons such as 
its rich endowment and natural resources (in its early stage of industrialisation), adoption 
of export promotion industrialisation policy, the existence of adequate infrastructure and 
industrial facilities in particular its labour-intensive industries such as electronics and textiles, 
the high level ofFDI, and the role of government in directing the industrialisation process 
through a set of effective industrial and technology development strategies. The overall 
stability of socio-political and macroeconomic environment despite the existence of different 
ethnic, cultural and religious composition of its society has also played a vital role in the 
Malaysia's success and can be a model for inter-racial co-operation and harmony for other 
LDCs [112]. Moreover, as Dr Mahatir Mohammad the Malaysian Prime minister since 
1981 stated, the privatisation policies in 1980s and the close cooperation between 
government and industry through the "Malaysia Incorporated" concept are among other 
reasons behind the Malaysia's success story [113]. He also noted that Malaysia's future 
depends on the improved productivity and the ability to sell more and more goods in the 
world market [114]. Therefore, one can generally say that like the first-tier NICs such as 
Korea and Taiwan, Malaysia's experience of industrialisation may also have valuable lessons 
for other developing countries in particular for those with similar characteristics. 
The industrialisation of Malaysia was mainly conducted under the government guidance 
within the framework of the successive development plans and policies including NEP (New 
Economic Policy), IMP (Industrial Master Plan) and NDP (National Development Policy). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that despite the open nature of the Malaysian economy, the 
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state has played a critical role in creating the required infrastructure for industrial 
development, providing facilities for private firms, and utilising the country's vast natural 
resources. As in other Southeast Asia NICs such as Korea and Taiwan, the government has 
had an important role in the achievement of a strong and efficient manufacturing sector in 
Malaysia. Therefore, Malaysia's experience of industrialisation especially in 1960s and 1970s 
suggested to other LDCs the need for a direct and supportive role for government in the 
establishment of industrial projects and formulation of set of appropriate policies for 
achieving industrial development. 
As indicated earlier, the existence of extensive natural resources in Malaysia, in particular 
a significant amount of rubber, tin, palm oil and timber contributed to its success through 
its substantial revenue generation needed for financing development projects particularly in 
the early stage of industrialisation. However, it is argued that Malaysia did not utilise these 
resources more efficiently as most of these raw materials were exported to other countries 
such as S.Korea and Japan in order to be processed into higher value added products. It is 
also believed that the existence of abundant natural resources can be regarded as a constraint 
in the implementation of full-scale export-oriented industrialisation from the early 1960s; a 
strategy which was adopted so vigorously by such resource-scarce countries as S.Korea and 
Taiwan [115]. Furthermore, the Malaysian economy was seriously affected by a sharp 
decHne in the price of petroleum, palm oil and timber in 1985, when its growth rate fell to 
1% from over 7% in 1984. Moreover, more concentration on some specific and resources-
based, labour-intensive industries such as textiles and electrical appliances industries of the 
expense of neglecting the other industries led to a relatively imbalance structure of 
employment and manufactured exports. 
It can be said that the massive flow of foreign direct investment and technology, have 
accelerated the pace of industrial and technological development in Malaysia. Many 
technologies have been transferred into the Malaysia through foreign investment and imports 
of capital goods and machinery mostly from Japanese multinationals. Moreover, other 
methods of technology transfer including turn-key, technical assistance, know-how and 
joint venture agreements have also been used by the Malaysian firms. Despite some 
important effects of foreign technology and investment on the promotion of Malaysia's 
industrial structure, however, most industrial projects carried out by foreign multinationals 
involved more the assembly-based industries, contributing little in transferring high value-
lSI 
added technologies into the country. Moreover, multinational companies and some foreign 
firms which invested in the Malaysian FfZs, used relatively little local materials (about 5%) 
for manufacturing the products [116]. However, since the mid-19S0s, as Malaysia started 
to emphasise more the high level technologies in order to close the gap with technological 
frontiers, muhinational strategy has also shifted towards relocation of their industrial 
projects in Malaysia through subcontracting contracts to decrease their cost of production. 
Therefore, considerable training programs have taken place by MNCs for Malaysian labour 
force in order to improve their productivity and absorptive level needed for promoting the 
competitiveness of their products. 
As mentioned earlier in the case of Korea and Taiwan, due to its heavy dependence on the 
foreign parts and components, the technological dependency has been much higher in 
Malaysia than these two countries. This is mainly because of lack of a supportive, capital 
good industry to provide locally produced materials and components. For example, as the 
world's largest producer of tin, Malaysia has no refining industry to support inputs of its 
leading manufacturing industry. Moreover, the government regulations and legislations on 
technology transfer have not been utilised effectively to identify the more appropriate 
technologies for the local conditions of the country, partly because technology transfer has 
been processed by administrators lacking the necessary technology background [117]. It 
should be noted that, as a resuh of government efforts to reduce the dependency on imports 
of foreign inputs and components required for the manufacturing of the products, the 
technological dependency has recently decreased in some specific industries such as the 
manufacturing of Malaysian national car "Proton Saga" with about more than 60% of its 
parts are produced locally [for further information please refer to the appendix]. 
Among the other most important success factors of Malaysia's industrialisation is its overall 
soci-political and macroeconomic stability which accelerated the flow of foreign investment 
and technology in to the country [liS]. As indicated earlier, despite being a muhi-ethnic and 
cultural society, apart from racial riots in May 1969, Malaysia enjoyed a socio-political 
environment required for the successful implementation of industrial and economic 
development policies. As in the other East Asian NICs, Malaysia has also emphasised human 
resource development policies in order to promote the quantity and quality of education and 
training of its labour force. However, it should be noted that lDllike Korea and Taiwan which 
possess a large number of engineers and technicians, Malaysia still lagged behind them in 
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its level of engineers, technicians and skilled-labour. Despite a relatively large number of 
educated labour, this is not adequate enough considering its long-term objective to become 
an industrialised economy. It can be said that the shortage of qualified technicians and 
engineers in Malaysia has remained a major constraint for more effective assimilation and 
absorption of foreign technology. 
In an attempt to overcome Malaysia's shortcomings of high-level and skilful managers, 
technicians and engineers, the government increased significantly the investment in 
education and training, in particular in science and engineering and vocational training. For 
example, the overall expenditure on development of education and training represented a 
46 % increase in the sixth development plan (1991-1995) over the level in the previous plan 
[119]. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the Malaysian government is projected to increase 
research and development expenditure as a percentage of GNP to 2% by the year 2000 in 
order to promote the indigenous technological capability. A number of industrial and 
technology parks have also been established, aiming at enhancing the interaction and 
collaboration between R&D institutes, universities and private firms; encouraging the 
development of high-technology industries; and commercialisation of research resuhs [120]. 
As indicated earlier, like the successful experience of Korea and Taiwan, Malaysian 
experience of industrialisation can also have usefu.llessons for other LDCs. As Malaysia 
followed several industrial and technological development patterns of those of Korea and 
Taiwan under its look-east policy, it can be said that other LDCs can also follow some 
particular aspects of Malaysia's experience of industrialisation. Thus, Malaysia shares in 
several common success factors with those of Korea and Taiwan. These include the role 
of government in formulating and directing a set of appropriate policies, early shift to an 
export-oriented strategy from previous import substitution policy, human resource 
development policy and technology acquisition and development strategy. However, there 
are also some differences. For example, as indicated earlier, 'like Korea and Taiwan, the 
government in Malaysia has also played a key role in the process of its industrialisation. 
However, the degree of government intervention was less than that of Korea and Taiwan. 
While government in Malaysia has not been authoritarian as in that of Korea and Taiwan, 
it has also not been weak and uncertain, as in some less developed countries and thus 
directed successfully the industrialisation process of the country. 
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Malaysia also shifted from its previous import substitution policy to the export promotion 
policy later than that of Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, unlike Korea and Taiwan which are 
resource-scarce countries, Malaysia as a resource-rich country relying more on the export 
of its resource-based industries in the early stage of export promotion. Furthermore, there 
were some differences in the methods of technology transfer in these countries. While, in 
Korea, many technologies have been transferred through imports of capital goods and 
machinery, and licensing agreements, Malaysia acquired foreign technologies more through 
FDI, technical assistance and joint venture agreements. Unlike the Korean and Taiwanese 
successful experience of the Heavy and Chemical Industry drive in the 1970s, Malaysia's 
effort to establish and expand heavy industries was relatively unsuccessful, particularly in 
its first stage in the 1980s. This is mainly because of the world recession of the early 1980s 
which resulted to a sharp decline in Malaysia's foreign exchange earnings from exports of 
its resource-based industries such as tin, palm oil and petroleum. Therefore, Malaysia had 
to finance most of its heavy industries through external borrowing and foreign debt due to 
the capital-intensity nature of most heavy industries. Moreover, due to a relatively small size 
of market with about 14 million people in early 1980s, it has not been easy for many heavy 
industries to operate at a minimum efficient scale of operation [121]. 
Therefore, Malaysia's relatively unsuccessful experience shows that LDCs should develop 
a relatively modem small-scale industry base together with preparing an adequate source of 
skilled human labour required for efficient absorption of heavy and capital-intensive 
technologies. Moreover, LDCs may also learn from Malaysia's relatively unsuccessful 
experience in expansion of heavy industries that whenever government intervention is found 
to be ineffective in the implementation of heavy industries, private enterprises should also 
be involved in the process. 
4. 5 THAILAND 
Thailand is another fast growth economy in Southeast Asia with an average real growth rate 
of 7 per cent over the past three decades. Like its neighbour Malaysia, Thailand is also a 
resource-rich country with various agricuhural and mineral resources which put this country 
among the world's leading exporter of rice in 1970s, and the second and third largest 
producer of tungsten and tin. As in the case of Malaysia, Thailand has achieved most of the 
154 
criteria which are required to join the ranks of the first-tier NICs and becoming the fifth 
tiger, since about 1988. Some of these indicators include the period ofits double-digit GDP 
growth rate 11 % and 13 % in 1988 and 1989 respectively, its share of industrial sector per 
GDP 32%, and the share of manufactured exports in total exports of58% in 1988 [122]. 
However, some other elements, in particular its social indicators such as enrolment in 
education, per capita GNP and income distnbution were not adequate enough and needed 
to be improved. 
It can be said that Thailand pursued relatively similar industrial policies compared with those 
of Malaysia. For example, Thailand began the industrialisation program by choosing the 
usual pattern of import substitution aiming at creating an industrial sector producing for the 
domestic market. Following its capability to meet the local needs to some extent and the 
saturation of the domestic market with Thai- made products, the industrial policies in 
Thailand shifted to export promotion policies in the early 1970s. Various export incentives 
have been given to Thai producers such as tax exemptions and low interest loans and 
credits, in order to encourage them to export their products. These effective measures and 
incentives resuhed in a significant increase in Thailand exports and particularly manufactured 
exports. For example, exports of goods grew from 18% in 1965 to 27% ofGDP in 1985, 
and manufacturing exports grew eighty-six times during the period between 1965-1985 
[123]. The exports accounted for 25% of Thailand's GDP in early 1980s, which as a result 
of various export incentives including tax exemptions, reduction in customs duties, and low 
interest loans, this figure rose to nearly 40% during the latter half of 1980s [124]. The 
manufactured exports increased from 10 per cent of total exports in 1971 to 66 per cent of 
total exports in 1988 [125]. 
It is also believed that Thailand's filvourable policies, along with its adequate infrastructure 
and low cost of labour led to a massive relocation of export industries from Japan and the 
East Asian NICs, and also attracted a huge inflow offoreign investment. These among other 
major factors have affected its success in expanding exports [126]. Moreover, the adoption 
ofEPP accelerated the industrialisation of Thailand through some internal factors including 
implementation of the government's effective policy measures, stable macroeconomic and 
financial policies, maintenance of strong currency despite its devaluation, establishing Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) and also some external factors such as the US aid during the early 
stage, and the impact of Japan and the first-tier East Asian NICs in providing Thailand both 
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a source of foreign capital and investment and the effective models of an export-oriented 
strategy [127]. 
Unlike Malaysia, which implemented a heavy industrialisation drive in the 1980s, heavy 
industries have been relatively underdeveloped in Thailand. The latter half of the 1980s 
witnessed a remarkable economic and industrial growth performance in Thailand with an 
average two-digit GDP growth rate of 13% and 11% which were among the highest growth 
rates in the world in 1988 and 1989 respectively. This is mainly due to Thailand's significant 
export performance and particularly manufacturing exports which amounted to 58% of its 
total exports in 1988, comparable with 72% of that of Singapore at the same year [128]. 
Moreover, a large amount of foreign direct investment flowed into Thailand in the late 
1980s, making Thailand an appropriate base for the relocation of export-oriented industries 
by Japan and East Asian first-tier NICs. It is argued that the existence of a low-waged, 
educated, trainable, disciplined and hardworking labour force enhanced Thailand's 
attractiveness for FDI and also promoted its comparative advantage for exporting 
manufacturing products. 
As indicated earlier, the significant economic and industrial achievements in the late 1980s 
smoothed the way for Thailand to join the rank of East Asian first-tier NICs. However, 
some other elements in particular its low level of engineers and scientists, and imbalance 
income distribution and infrastructure facilities were among the major indicators which need 
to be developed. The Thai industrial sector in the 1980s had a higher proportion of light 
industries, particularly food processing, beverages, leather and rubber products and textile 
industries. Thailand also lagged behind other East Asian first and second-tier NICs in 
science and technology education. Several statistics and figures indicate the lack of qualified 
human resources at all educational levels in Thailand which is also considered to be as a 
major constrain on the development of technological capability. For example, despite a 
relatively high literacy rate of more than 86% in 1980, and the rate of school enrollment at 
primary level of97% in 1985, the rate of secondary school enrollment was only 30% in the 
same year [129]. 
This 30% was one of the lowest in East Asia compared with 94 % in S.Korea, 91 % in 
Taiwan, 53 % in Malaysia, 71 % in Singapore and 68 % in the Philippines [130]. According 
to another statistic, the number of scientists and technicians per 10,000 of the population 
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was only 14 for Thailand, in comparison with 524 for Korea, 256 for Singapore, 78 for 
Indonesia. It is estimated that by the year 2000, Thailand's shortfall of engineers will range 
between 10,000 and 30,000 [131]. Moreover, the inadequacy of R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of GNP which has never exceeded about 0.5%, in comparison with 1.4% in 
Taiwan and 2.1% in Korea and 0.8% in Malaysia in 1990, has also led to the low absorptive 
level to adapt the foreign technology to Thai local conditions. Moreover, most R&D 
activities are conducted by the public rather than private sector, mostly due to the lack of 
positive measures and incentives from the government to encourage them to invest in 
research and development. 
Therefore, it seems essential for Thai policy-makers to design special programs for 
upgrading the quantity and quality of the national educational standard, particularly at the 
secondary and higher education levels in order to meet one of the most important criteria 
needed to become a first-tier NIe. Thailand's significant economic performance of the late 
1980s is continuing in the early 1990s and GDP per capita reached $ 2,388 in 1994, 
indicating an average annual growth rate of7.4%. The significant export performance which 
was the engine of Thai economic growth particularly since the latter half of 1980s, 
amounted to $ 44.5 billion in 1994, contn"buting to more than 40% of GDP, and 
manufacturing exports consisted of over 81.1 % of total exports by value in the same year 
[132]. However, with a current situation of a very competitive international market, some 
specific science and technology development programs seems to be crucial if Thailand wants 
to sustain its high growth rate of GDP and manufacturing exports. These programs and 
policies should focus on areas such as promoting the skills of its labour force through 
increasing their education and training, expansion of numbers of scientists and engineers 
through an increase in the number of institutions for higher educations, and enhancing 
indigenous technological capability through continuing acquisition of technological know-
how, the development of local industrial infrastructure, and allocation of more R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GNP. 
It is argued that industrial and technological development policies in Thailand followed more 
the Taiwanese model of industrialisation. This is mainly due to the similar cultural 
background, the existence of a large Chinese community in Thailand and their close 
geographical location. Therefore, unlike Malaysia which adopted the Korean Model, and 
relatively neglected the development of an efficient local supply base of parts and 
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components and suffered from high dependency on foreign parts and components, Thailand 
has established a relatively strong industrial base which is less dependent on the importation 
of foreign parts and components. In 1988, Taiwan allocated the highest share of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and technology to Thailand with about 28.6 % of total foreign 
investment. Taiwanese investment in Thailand has been more concentrated in labour 
intensive industries such as footwear, electrical appliances, ceramics, food processing, textile 
and toys, due to Thailand's cheap labour, as well as the similar cultural background and the 
existence ofa large Chinese community [133] . It is argued that Thailand had become more 
or less a large export processing zone for assembling the components and parts imported 
mainly from Japan and Taiwan [134]. 
Japan Taiwan U.S.A Hong Kong Singapore S.Korea others 
Figure 4.1 Foreign Direct Investment in Thailand in 1988 
Source: UNIDO, United Nation Industrial Organisation (1992) 
Despite the significant role of foreign investment in the industrial development and 
transferring technology and managerial skills in the latter stage of Thailand's development, 
it is believed that most technology has generally been transferred through other channels 
such as technical assistance agreements, licensing, joint ventures, and purchase of machinery 
and equipment, in the earlier stage of its industrialisation [135]. For example, compared 
with Malaysia, FDI played a less important role in Thailand particularly in its early stage of 
industrialisation. For example, while FDI amounted to about $ 1350 million in Malaysia 
in 1974, this figure was $ 550 million for Thailand for the same year [136]. Moreover, much 
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ofFDI flow in the early stages has been concentrated in production for its local market and 
depended heavily on imports of machinery and equipments. 
Thailand has adopted open-door policies towards technology transfer, and Thai firms are 
free to enter into any kind of technology transfer agreement. The importance of technology 
transfer, in particular high-level and modem technologies, has increased in the 1990s as 
Thailand is faced with several new competitors such as Vietnam and China in many labour-
intensive and simple-technology industries. In 1993, the country spent 14,248.40 million 
bahts on direct purchase of technology of which 10,408.20 million bahts were for royahy 
and brand-name fees, and 3,840.2 million bahts were for technology fees [137]. In a recent 
SUIVey of Thai overall technological capability in the industry sector undertaken by Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TORI), the average capability levels were found to be 
highest in agriculture, bio-technology-based industries, and lowest in the field of electronics 
[138]. 
The successful experience of Thailand in rapid transition from an agriculture economy to a 
Newly Industrialised Country (NIC) can be attributed to some specific factors such as its 
strong export promotion policies, its rich natural resources, its effective state role in 
directing the industrial development process, its relatively stable political and 
macroeconomic conditions and the massive flow of FDI and technology. Moreover, 
Thailand's effective liberalisation and structural adjustment policies and government's open-
door policy towards technology transfer have also been among important elements of its 
industrialisation experience [139]. Therefore, it can be seen that Thai success factors are 
very similar with those of neighbouring Malaysia. Moreover, it can be generally said that 
Thailand's overall experience of industrialisation may also have useful implications for other 
LDCs, as one can find several common characteristics between Thailand and other LDCs. 
Having compared Thailand's industrialisation experience with that of Korea and Taiwan, it 
can be found that Thai's industrial and technological development has been accelerated with 
a much greater involvement of foreign investors and MNCs in particular in the later stage, 
compared with the case of Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, like the case of Malaysia, the 
degree ofgovemment intervention in Thailand has been much lower than those of first-tier 
NICs such as Korea and Taiwan. The successive governments in Thailand have been the 
least interventionist in comparison with other East Asian Countries [140]. The role of the 
1S9 
Thai state, like that of Malaysia, has been concentrated more in the provision of 
infrastructure, introducing some effective policy measures for promoting the flow ofFDI 
and formulating a set of national development plans. In other words, the government has 
played a more passive role in the industrialisation of Thailand than in Taiwan and Korea. 
The Thai state has legal control over natural resources and it uses its power to determine 
how natural resources are to be exploited. Thai government has also been effective mainly 
in creating favourable conditions for attracting foreign investment. Despite the relatively 
unstable politics in Thailand, the relationship between state and private sectors has been very 
stable [141]. Therefore, one can say that while the direct and substantial involvement of the 
state was critical in the success of Korea and Taiwan, in Thailand on the other hand, it was 
the limited government intervention which influenced its success. 
It is believed that a significant economic and industrial growth performance of Thailand 
since the second-half of 1980s, has presented a new model of development for other LDCs 
based on successful implementation of market-friendly and correct liberal economic policies 
[142]. As Warr (1995) has also noted," explanations for the Thai miracle will probably be 
found in Thailand's relatively open economic policies with respect to the rest of the world, 
its relatively free internal markets for goods and for factors of production, and in the relative 
steadiness and predictability ofgovemment macroeconomic policy" [143]. Furthermore, 
the gradual shift towards export promotion policies through various incentives for exports 
from the 1970s, and Thailand's stable macroeconomic conditions which enhanced the 
confidence oflocal and foreign investors, are among other factors which also contributed 
to the success experience of Thailand. Compared to the negative growth rate of some 
developing countries during the post second oil shock period, it is clear that the maintenance 
of macroeconomic stability was a crucial necessary factor that enabled the occurrence of the 
rapid growth experiences in the late 1980s. A constant and stable Thai baht against dollar 
and yen during the last 30 years as well as a low inflation rate have been the most important 
aspects of Thai macroeconomic stability. As pointed out earlier, Thailand's relatively 
political stability, its social openness and tolerance, its freedom of markets, and its good 
record in social development, may also be considered as other success factors. 
As Simon (1996) argued, the industrialisation experience of Thailand has benefitted from 
the successful experience of East Asian first-tier NICs in two ways. Firstly, as indicated 
earlier, the significant flow offoreign investment from Taiwan and S.Korea in the late 1980s 
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which relocated labour-intensive industries in Thailand to take most advantage of Thai cheap 
labour and a relatively suitable infra structural base and abundant natural resources, led to 
a substantial transfer of capital, and to a lesser extent know-how and managerial skills. 
Secondly, many Thai policy-makers have been influenced by the motivation made by several 
seminars and conferences about the success of East Asian first-tier NICs [144]. However, 
Thai authorities and economic planners have recently faced a major decision: whether to 
encourage a NIC's (Newly Industrialised Country) type of strategy based on manufacturing 
exports from the urbanised central region, which will probably require increasing 
dependence on foreign investment and technology especially from Japan and East Asian 
first-tier NICs, or follow a NAIC's (Newly Agro-Industrialised Country) type of strategy 
based on agro-industry exports, which will mean less overall rapid growth but an 
improvement in rural conditions as well as self-sufficiency and less dependency on the 
foreign inputs. It seems that selecting one of these strategies may not be an ideal choice for 
Thailand in the long-term, as each one has its own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, 
a combination of both strategies may be an appropriate choice for Thai authorities, as 
Thailand needs to challenge some of its weaknesses such as shortages of adequate engineers, 
technicians and skilled-workers; imbalance distnbution of income and facilities particularly 
in the rural areas. 
4.6 INDONESIA 
Indonesia is another Southeast Asian resource rich country which is also classified as a 
second-tier NICs with a total population of about 200 million living in more than 13,000 
islands. Although Indonesia is known as a latecomer in the process of industrialisation 
comparing with other East Asian first-tier and second-tier NICs, according to a recent 
prediction (Economist, October 1-7, 1994), it will be the fifth largest economy in the world 
by the year 2020, thanks to its large amount of natural and humin resources and a relatively 
high GD P growth rate. The industrialisation of Indonesia started much later than other 
Southeast Asian countries, because it took a longer time for the country to obtain a stable 
macroeconomic and political situation. Indonesia pursued an Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (lSI) policy during the period between 1965-1985 financed largely by oil 
incomes and foreign aid and loans and directed through protection of domestic industries. 
The first stage of lSI policy assisted the country to develop an indigenous small-scale 
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industry which was heavily protected by high tariffs, import quotas, and various subsidies 
[145]. 
Indonesia entered the second stage of an import substitution industrialisation process in the 
1970s, emphasising more the expansion of intermediate and capital goods. The import 
substitution industrialisation strategy of the 1960s and 1970s was also accompanied by 
importing a substantial amount of foreign technologies into Indonesia, much of which 
replaced older technologies. Uke the other oil-producing countries, the sharp increase in oil 
prices in October 1973, resulted in a substantial increase in its oil revenues, and enabled 
Indonesia to invest more in improving the infrastructure and general education needed for 
better acquisition of foreign technologies. The intensive transfer of technology also led to 
rapid modernisation of both labour and capital intensive industries in Indonesia during the 
1970s. As a resuh of the relatively successful implementation of an import substitution 
policy, Indonesia achieved an annual average GDP growth rate of7.9 % during the period 
between 1973-1981 [146]. According to another figure, the rate of growth in manufacturing 
during the period 1967-81 increased 14 fold, which was mainly concentrated in the 
construction, transport and communication industries [147]. 
However, it is argued that the second phase of import substitution policy in 1970s, which 
encouraged the expansion of heavy and capital-intensive industries, resuhed in creating a 
wide gap between the technological requirement and the absorptive capacity in Indonesia. 
As Kakazu (1992) noted, Indonesia's technological capability could be much stronger if the 
country had adopted technologies that would have utilised its relatively abundant human 
resources [148]. It should also be noted that due to continuing implementation of inward-
looking and protectionist measures, manufacturing exports during 1970s were almost 
negligible, and only constituted 3% of total merchandise exports [149]. 
Like the other East Asian countries, in particular its neighbouring Malaysia, Indonesia faced 
a decline in its average GOP growth rate to about 4.2 % in the early 1980s, mainly because 
of the general world recession in this period and also fluctuations in the oil prices. Despite 
this reduction in Indonesia's GDP growth rate, it can be said that Indonesia responded very 
quickly by adoption of a series of effective deregulation and liberalisation policies. This 
included an effective devaluation of Indonesian Rupiah in March 1983 which was 
accompanied by tight monetary and fiscal policies to avoid rising inflation, tax reforms, and 
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cancellation a large numbers of uneconomic investment projects [150]. The Indonesian 
government began to develop labour and resources-intensive industries during the period 
between 1982-86, through its direct intervention, which resulted in the export of a 
substantial amount of product from its resources-based and labour-intensive industries, such 
as plywood, timber and footwear products. For example, Indonesia has become the largest 
supplier of plywood in the world since 1984 [151]. 
The rapid decline of oil prices in the mid-1980s eventually forced Indonesia to shift from its 
previous import substitution policy to an export-oriented policy, emphasising more the 
promotion of non-oil exports, particularly manufactured products. Following the adoption 
of the export promotion policy, the Indonesian government introduced a series of policy 
measures including an effective currency devaluation, export incentives such as tax 
exemptions and tariff reductions, the h'beralised foreign investment code, privatisation, and 
deregulation policies. These have helped to secure an average annual increase of about 29% 
in non-oil exports during the late 1980s [152]. The share of manufacturing exports in total 
export increased to 28% in 1988 and reached to 48% in 1992. Due to its abundant natural 
and human resources, much of Indonesian manufacturing exports were labour-intensive 
industries (such as garments, textiles and footwear) and resource-based industries (such as 
plywood, cement, leather) which accounted to 62% and 26% of total manufacturing exports 
respectively in 1992 [153]. 
Despite the important role of the state in the implementation of a set of effective policy 
measures, it is argued that the private sector contnbuted more than 70% of total GDP 
growth during 1983-1991 [154]. It can be said that Indonesia as a latecomer into a very 
competitive international market, faced some major problems in promoting its manufactured 
exports. Some relatively high costs of industrial products due to continuing some of its 
protectionist measures such as import licensing arrangements, and a low level of labour 
productivity, were among the major constraints of expanding manufacturing exports [155]. 
Furthermore, the heavy dependency on the exports of its mineral resources including 
petroleum was considered as another main restraint in the process of expanding Indonesia's 
manufacturing exports. However, as mentioned earlier, Indonesia managed to reduce its 
heavy dependancy on oil-revenues through the implementation of effective policy measures 
aimed at expansion of non-oil exports and in particular manufactured exports. Non-oil 
exports increased with an average annual rate of290,4, during the period between 1986-1990, 
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from $ 6.7 billion in 1986 to about $ 14.3 billion in 1990. Much of this growth was because 
of a diversified base of manufacturing products which constituted more than half of total 
non-oil exports in 1991[156]. The increased importance of manufacturing exports which 
were valued at $ 14 billion in 1992 and accounted for 41.1 % of total exports resulted in 
overtaking the value of oil exports for the first time, with export revenues of $ 10.7 billion 
which accounted for 31.4% of total exports [157]. 
Indicator 1984 1992 
Oil outputlGDP (%) 21.5 13.0 
Non-oil manufacturinglGDP (%) 8.9 17.5 
Oil exports! total exports (%) 73.2 31.4 
Non-oil manufacturing exports/total exports (%) 18.2 51.7 
Oil revenue/domestic government revenue (%) 65.2 32.3 
Foreign Direct Investment approvals ($ billion) 1.3 10.3 
Table 4.5 A comparison between some major indicators of Indonesian Economy 
Source: Ramli, R ''Expansion of the Indonesian Export Sector: Past experience and 
current prospects", 1995. 
Indonesia has entered into a new phase of its export promotion policy in the early 1990s, 
as its manufacturing products should compete with those of other East Asian first and 
second-tier NICs along with some newcomers such as China, Vietnam and others. Despite 
the improvements in some technology-intensive industries such as aircraft manufacturing and 
shipbuilding industries, Indonesia sti1llacks a strong scientific, engineering and managerial 
base together with skilled workers on which to build high value-added industries. 
Therefore, Indonesia should expand its high-technology activities in order to be more 
competitive in the world market. This requires designing an appropriate technology 
development strategy as a part of the country's overall economic development plan, in order 
to formulate long-term science and technology programmes for development of its 
indigenous technological capability. The Indonesian Minister of State for Research and 
Technology, Prot Habibie, who is Indonesia's longest serving Cabinet member after the 
President, is believed to be the major person in designing and launching several S&T 
development programmes in Indonesia in the past decade. His plans for technological 
development of Indonesia include: acquiring modem technologies by assembling foreign 
designed aircraft under license; strengthening local technical skills through establishing more 
technical training institutes; and providing competence in basic science and technology at 
the same level with the advanced industrial nations [158]. 
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The Indonesian government has generally used two strategies to accelerate the development 
of technological capability. Firstly, to promote private market mechanisms for technology 
development through open-door policies towards technology transfer, providing incentives 
for private investment in technology research and development, and encouraging private 
investment for the expansion of research and development activities. The second strategy 
is to invest in technological development through selective strategic interventions, and 
establishing institutions for education and training the high-skilled workers and technicians 
required for the assimilation and absorption of advanced technologies [159]. Moreover, in 
order to promote the level of its competitiveness, the Indonesian government has recently 
introduced further policy measures to attract more FDI and technology, by allocating more 
financial resources to develop its industrial infrastructure and technical training. For 
example, there have been 227 new manufacturing projects with a total value of over $ 2.5 
billion by February 1993, including 18 chemical plants and 28 metal plants [160]. 
Despite significant expansion of industrial infrastructure and manufacturing exports, 
Indonesia's indicators of technological capability show that Indonesia needs to improve in 
many science and technology aspects in order to close the gap with the technological-
frontier countries. Although Indonesia is at the lower level of many educational indicators 
compared with other East Asian countries, due to its larger size, its scientific and industrial 
infrastructure is relatively larger than that of some smaller countries in the region. For 
example, Indonesia's literacy rate of about 81.6% is lower than that of Thailand with 93% 
in 1990 but is higher than that of Malaysia with 78.4% in the same year. Moreover, 
Indonesia allocated only 0.9% of its public expenditure as a percentage of GNP to 
education, which was very low compared with that of Malaysia with 19.6% and Thailand 
with 21.1% in 1992. In terms of the number of R&D personnel per million of the 
population, while this figure was 181 persons in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand had 327 
and 104 researchers per million of their population respectively [161]. 
The Indonesian government also encouraged the flow of foreign investment into the country 
in order to attract high technology and managerial expertise. Various measures have been 
introduced to encourage both domestic and foreign private investment. For example, one 
can refer to the recent privatisation programme announced by the Indonesian government 
during late 1993 and early 1994 in \\hich the shares of several state-owned companies were 
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sold on the domestic and foreign capital markets. In addition to being an attractive place for 
foreign investors, mainly because of rich natural resources, cheap labour and large market 
size, the government in Indonesia also introduced some other incentives such as tax 
exemptions and establishing export-processing zones (such as Golden Triangle in Batam-
Singapore-Johor) in order to attract more foreign investments. As a result of these effective 
policy measures, the flow ofFDI increased from $ 1.5 billion in 1987 to more than 10 and 
$ 8 billion in 1992 and 1993 respectively, mostly concentrated in export-oriented 
manufacturing industries [162]. 
Despite an important contribution of foreign investment in the flow of foreign technology 
and managerial expertise in to the Indonesian manufacturing sector, other methods of 
acquisition of foreign technology such as importing capital and intermediate goods, joint 
ventures, licensing and subcontracting agreements, have also been used. According to a 
survey of technology transfer through Multinational Companies (MNCs) in twelve 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia, the degree oflocal technological effort for achieving 
indigenous technological capability in Indonesia has been greater in the case of national 
companies which have purchased technology through licensing agreements than in the case 
of joint ventures between MNCs and Indonesian private or state-owned enterprises [163]. 
There have not been formal controls over, or monitoring of: technology transfer in 
Indonesia. However, The Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) 
is responsible for providing consulting services to government agencies as well as private 
firms about the compatibility offoreign technologies with the situation in the country. The 
current Five-year Development Plan [Repelita VI (1995-1999)], emphasises more the 
development of production technique including an increase in the high value-added 
manufacturing products capable of competing in the world market, promotion of technical 
and engineering skills, and enhancement of industrial infrastructure in particular national 
transport and telecommunication systems [164]. 
Having surveyed the success factors of Indonesia's experience in the process of 
industrialisation, one can see several common features in the industrial and technological 
development policies of Indonesia and other East Asian NICs. These policies include 
allowing unrestricted imports of technologies embodied in machinery and equipment, 
adopting an lSI in the early stage of industrialisation which enabled the country to expand 
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its infrastructure and considerable labour-intensive and resources-based industries, the 
acquisition of foreign technologies through appropriate selective channels and through 
limited well-considered government intervention and introducing various export incentive 
measures in order to expand the export of manufactured products. However, as indicated 
earlier, Indonesia adopted an export-oriented industrialisation policy later than other East 
Asian first and second-tier NICs. It should be also noted that like its East Asian 
counterparts, the government in Indonesia has also played an important role in the 
industrialisation process through introducing some effective policy measures such as, 
devaluation, privatisation, deregulation and export promotion policies, which resulted in a 
significant growth rate of its GDP and manufacturing exports. 
Having compared some overall economic and industrial indicators of Indonesia with those 
of East Asian first and second-tier NICs, it is believed that many Indonesian economic and 
industrial indicators in the early 1990s were comparable with those of S.Korea in the early 
1970s. However, Indonesia which is classified by the World Bank in the lower income group 
of countries, is lagging behind other East Asian first and second-tier NICs in terms of GNP 
per capita. For example, Indonesia's GNP per capita ofS610 in 1991 can be compared with 
the same level of Korea in 1957 and Malaysia in 1956 and Thailand in 1970. Assuming 
Indonesia's average annual growth in GNP to be 5.5% for next 25 years, Indonesia may 
catch up Korea's current level of GNP per capita in the year 2035 and with Malaysia in the 
year 2017 and Thailand in 2009. Thus, Indonesia appears to be at least two decades behind 
Korea, and somewhat less in the case of Malaysia and Thailand [165]. 
In terms of the size of industry sector, the Indonesian manufacturing sector is relatively 
smaller than that of S.Korea and Mexico, and little larger than that of Thailand. However, 
Indonesian experience of technological development has some common features with that 
1hailand. Both countries have a relatively weak science and technology education systems 
and a low level of R&D activities in particu1ar in the private sector. Both have adopted very 
open policies towards acquisition of foreign technologies and FDI. However, due to 
Thailand's earlier shift to the export promotion policy, it is more open to international 
market and therefore, access to the high-technologies. Moreover, despite a relatively similar 
level of educational indicators, Indonesia's technological capabi1ity and its absorptive 
capacity of foreign technologies is at a relatively lower level than that of Thailand. As a 
major oil-producing country, the Indonesian experience in reducing its dependency on the 
167 
oil-revenues may also have useful lessons for other oil exporters countries such as Iran. 
4.7 MEXICO 
The successful experiences of industrial and technological development of East Asian first 
and second-tier NICs have shown useful implications for other LDCs, and it can be said that 
the experience of Latin American NICs such as Mexico and Brazil can also have valuable 
lessons for the LDCs. Among Latin American NICs, the case of Mexico can be a good 
model as it share some common characteristics with Iran. Like many East Asian first and 
second-tier NICs, Mexico also adopted import-substitution industrialisation policy in its 
early stage of industrialisation. During the first phase of lSI policy in the 1960s a large 
number of labour-intensive and consumer-good industries were established which 
encouraged producing goods for domestic markets or substituted them for the previously 
imported products. As a result of lSI during the 1960s, the manufacturing sector grew at 
an average rate of9%, of which the growth rate in consumer, intermediate and capital goods 
industries were 6.3%,8.4% and 12.8% respectively [166]. During the second stage ofISI 
policy which began in the late 1960s, some problems such as shortages in the production of 
basic industrial inputs led to a sharp increase in the imports of raw materials, intermediate 
and capital goods, and therefore caused imbalance of payment and trade deficit. Moreover, 
the increase in protectionist measures as a result of IS policy also caused an inefficient 
manufacturing sector to develop. This was unable to compete in the international market and 
therefore was considered as a major obstacle to manufactured exports. The importance of 
import substitution as a development strategy began to decrease because of its inability to 
reduce Mexico's dependency on imports and create employment opportunities for Mexican 
workers. 
Like the other oil exporting countries, the sharp increase in oil prices during 1973 and 1979 
caused an expansion of Mexico's oil revenues and therefore led to the accelerated GDP 
growth rate of more than 8% during this period. However, non-oil manufacturing exports 
increased only slightly as a percentage of GDP from 1.1 % to 1.4% between 1975 and 1980 
[167]. Following the debt crisis in 1982, Mexico changed its previous inward-looking and 
IS policies to the outward-oriented and export promotion policies. As Whiting (1991) has 
noted, the transition towards a more open and liberalised economy after Mexico's 1982 
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crisis can be attributed to some important reasons such as reducing the heavy dependency 
of the Mexican economy on oil; increasing the efficiency and quality of manufacturing 
products capable of completion in the world market; promoting the country's indigenous 
technological capability; and reducing state-intelVention through implementing privatisation 
and liberalisation measures [168]. Sklair (1992) also refers to two general reasons for 
adopting an export-oriented industrialisation policy in Mexico. Firstly, opening up the 
country as much as possible towards attracting foreign investment and technologies. The 
second reason is to create as many as jobs as possible for the Mexico's large human 
resources [169]. 
Following the adoption ofEP policy which was also accompanied by the stabilisation and 
trade liberalisation policies, the Mexican government introduced some effective measures 
such as lowering trade barriers, relaxing of import restrictions, reducing import tariff 
schedules, and various incentives for the expansion of non-oil exports, including greater 
access of credits for exporters; easing the restrictions for importing the inputs required for 
the manufacturing the products for exports; and removing obstacles from attracting more 
foreign investment through the introduction of new guidelines for attracting FDI in 1984. 
For example, the proportion of tariff exemptions for imports was raised from 21 % in 1982 
to 42% in 1983 [170]. Since shifting toward more outward-looking and export-oriented 
policies, Mexico has also adopted a technology transfer strategy emphasising more on 
adaptation, absorption and diffusion of the foreign technologies, aiming at promoting its 
indigenous technological capacity and therefore increase its level of competitiveness in the 
world market. Moreover, the government decision to join the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in late 1985 is believed to be a very important step in linking the 
Mexican economy to better access to the MNCs stocks of investment and technologies. 
Furthermore, other important components of stabilisation and adjustment programmes in 
the 1980s included, real devaluation of the exchange rate, and'the reduction by more than 
40% of the number of public enterprises [171]. 
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Figure 4,2 The composition of Mexican exports during the period between (1982-1987) 
As a result of these effective policy measures, non-oil exports increased from $ 7 billion in 
1985 to $ 14 billion in 1988 and $ 16 billion in 1990 [172]. While non-oil exports were 
22% of total exports in 1982 and manufacturing exports constituted to 16% in 1982, these 
figures increased to 58% and 51% respectively. Therefore, non-oil exports grew more than 
two and a half times, while manufacturing exports tripled [173]. However, it should be 
noted that nmch of Mexico's success in exports of manufacturing products has been due to 
government promotion of labour-intensive firms known as Maquiladora which acted as 
Mexican export processing zones (EPZs), It is argued that Maquiladoras were mainly 
established by the US MNCs in order to relocate some of their labour-intensive assembly 
operation to take most advantage of the cheap labour costs in Mexico [174]. The 
government in Mexico supported the Maquiladoras through providing some infra structural 
facilities such as land, roads, and public utilities together with establishing special industrial 
parks for the Maquiladoras. Mexican capitalists and professionals have also played an 
important role in the maquiladora sector mainly by setting up industrial parks, providing 
services, and acting as subcontractors. The Mexican government also introduced various 
incentive measures such as allowing sale of up to 40% of their products in the local market 
to increase the number of these firms, in particular in the other areas in Mexico away from 
the American border. Therefore, with a rapid increase in the number of Maquiladoras 
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around Mexico, the importance of these firms as the second largest source of foreign 
currency after oil exports and the creation of about 160,000 jobs in the mid-1980s became 
more evident [175]. Moreover, the Maquiladoras have had an effective impact on the 
training and education of Mexican workers [176]. 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Imports 13.2 11.4 12.2 18.9 23.4 29.8 
Exports 21.7 16.0 20.7 20.6 22.8 26.8 
Petroleum 14.8 6.3 8.6 6.7 7.9 10.1 
Manufactured exports (A) 5.0 7.1 9.7 11.5 12.5 13.9 
Trade balance 8.5 4.6 8.5 1.7 -0.6 -3.0 
Tourism (net) 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Maquiladora exports 5.1 5.6 7.2 10.0 12.5 15.2 
Maquiladora exports (net) (B) 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.3 3.0 3.6 
[B]/[A]+[B] 20.6 15.5 14.2 16.7 19.4 20.6 
Table 4.6 The overall trade indicators of Mexico and the impacts of Maquiladoras on 
trade ($ billion) 
Source: Institute of Developing Economies, 1995. 
Despite several general advantages of Maquiladoras, these firms had some disadvantages 
such as dependency on the US market for both the imports of required inputs and also 
exporting their products; weak linkages with domestic producers and markets; and a lack 
of adequate infra structural facilities which caused some serious environmental pollution 
[177]. Moreover, due to the assembly nature of most of these firms, they operated as self-
contained units, and therefore made little contribution to the transfer of high-level 
technologies, and to the development of indigenous technological capability in Mexico. In 
addition to the above points, large quantities of parts and equipment required by these firms 
were imported from abroad. As for example, the share of local materials employed by 
maquiladoras varied around 1.5% during the period between 1975-80 [178]. However, 
more recently, in the early 1990s, the number of Maquiladoras increased very rapidly and 
reached about 2000 by 1992, employing almost 500,000 workers. These second wave of 
Maquiladoras involved more in production of sophisticated and high value-added products 
such as assembly of automobiles and advanced electronics. Therefore, it can be said that 
more high-level and advanced production technologies have recently been transferred into 
Mexico through the second wave of Maquiladoras involving highly standardised assembly-
line techniques. 
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The Mexican government launched a series of national modernisation programs for 
promoting science and technology, the educational system, and small and medium industries, 
for the period between 1990-1994, aiming at strengthening its industrial infrastructure, as 
it entered into an agreement with u.s. and Canada known as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 [179]. The main policy change included in these 
programmes in terms of technology modernisation was an entire deregulation of technology 
transfers which removed many government controls and interventions in technology transfer 
activities of industrial firms in Mexico. However, the government role was limited to 
providing some incentives for the promotion of local technological capability, such as a 
favourable tax regime to upgrade technology, long-term loans, establishing technology 
parks, and specific centres to enhance the stronger links between universities and 
manufacturing firms and the industries [180]. 
It is argued that the foundation ofNAFTA has had some important effects on Mexico's 
economy. Among the positives impacts ofNAFTA, one can refer to the relocation and 
transition of most US and Canadian factories to Mexico in order to utilise its low cost of 
labour which led to the acceleration of industrial restructuring in Mexico. The other 
important advantages ofNAFTA for Mexico can be the flow of American and Canadian 
direct investment together with technical and managerial expertise into the Mexico. 
Moreover, the prospect of a free trade agreement with Canada and U. S. has also provided 
a good opportunity for Mexico to show its capability as an appropriate base for attracting 
FDI. In other words, a free trade agreement with US and Canada would increase the foreign 
investors' confidence in Mexico. The short and medium-term impacts ofNAFTA would be 
an increase in Mexico's efficiency and productivity levels, due to removal of trade barriers, 
resulting from the anticipation of the benefits ofNAFTA [181]. 
For Mexican authorities, NAFTA can also be seen as a first step towards wider trading 
agreements including other Latin American countries [182]. However, some negative 
aspects of NAFTA can be noted such as; its damaging effects on Mexican agricultural 
products because of the high production costs and low productivity level of Mexican 
agriculture compared to those of the US; its harmful impacts on the Mexico's small-scale 
firms by importing low-price products; and its effect on rising wages of Mexican labour due 
to the increasing demand for them, which in turn would lower the level of competitiveness 
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of Mexico's manufacturing products against its rivals in East Asia [183]. 
Having looked at the most important success factors of the industrialisation experience in 
Mexico, one can refer to the effective role of the state in the utilisation of Mexico's abundant 
natural and human resources, in encouraging foreign investment and technologies, and in 
promoting industrial infrastructure in Mexico; the role of Mexico's FTZs known as 
Maquiladoras in fostering manufacturing exports and creating employment opportunities for 
Mexico's large labour force; the significant impacts of the export-oriented industrialisation 
policy which was accompanied with a series of policy measures including trade h"beralisation, 
stabilisation and privatisation programmes; and the overall effects ofNAFTA on Mexico's 
economy. However, some of these success factors can be attn"buted to Mexico's special 
geographical location. These include the significant impact ofNAFTA in the modernisation 
of the industrial infrastructure and overall economic performance of Mexico, and the 
contnlmtion of the Maquiladoras in the expansion of non-oil exports, and flow ofFDI into 
Mexico. 
Moreover, the massive flow ofFDI into Mexico has also played a very important role in the 
early stage of its industrialisation. Mexico has been among the developing countries that 
have received largest amount ofFDI in past years. While much FDI in the 1960s and 70s 
was import-substituting oriented aiming at investment in domestic industries such as 
automobiles, electronics, chemicals and processed foods, more recent flows ofFDI into 
Mexico contributed more to the growth of non-oil exports in the late 1980s. The 
government of Mexico has enacted several laws and regulation since 1970s including ''Law 
to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investments" in 1973, and 
''Regulations of the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment" 
in May 1989. Various effective policy measures have also been introduced to attract as 
much FD I as possible, such as allowing foreign investors to own .100% of enterprises valued 
up to $ 100 million, establishing FTZs, and providing adequate infrastructure facilities 
required by foreign investors. It can be said that one of the most important factors for high 
FDI in Mexico has been Mexico's comparative advantage in low cost of production and its 
proximity to U. S and Canada. In other words, Mexico has been a more attractive host for 
IDI more because of its position as a major source for supplying manufactured products to 
the US markets [184]. 
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FDI has also been a major channel for transfer of technology and managerial and technical 
expertise into Mexico and promoting the local industrial infrastructure in Mexico. Despite 
the importance ofFDI as a major source of acquiring foreign technology, there have been 
other methods of technology transfer into Mexico, including contractual agreements, 
payments for the use of patents, licenses and technical assistance agreements. The use of 
each channel relied more on the nature of ownership of the firms involved in the technology 
transfer (domestic or foreign) and the degree of its importance to a particular manufacturing 
sector in Mexico. According to a survey comparing the process of acquiring technology in 
some 102 firms in three countries (Ireland, Spain, Mexico), most Mexican firms involved 
in electrical and electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and the manufacturing of 
machinery acquired foreign technology through informal channels such as direct personal 
contacts and in the form of documentation of some sort, half of that being trade journals. 
It has also been found that research institutes in Mexico contributed very little as a source 
of new technology. Despite developing a relatively reasonable technological base in the 
universities and research institutes of the countries surveyed and in particular Mexico, there 
has not been a close cooperation between them and industry [185]. 
It can be said that developing and expanding the quantity and quality of its relatively large 
human resources has been an important part of Mexico's industrial and technological 
development strategy. Since 1960, the Mexican government has also made considerable 
efforts to expand its national educational system through heavy investment at all educational 
levels, and establishing various institutions for the on-the job and vocational training. 
Moreover, the government in Mexico proposed a project called" Programme Mexico", to 
allocate funds to academic institutions in order to train human resources and to carry out 
research in technical are as 56% of academic institutions participated in this programme in 
early 1988, recovering some $ 40 million, more than 80% of which was for electronics and 
information services [186]. 
Having compared the science and technology indicators of Mexico with its other Latin 
American counterparts, Mexico has had an intermediate position regarding some major 
indicators such as its R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP of about 0.6 in 1985 [187]. 
Moreover, due to its substantial investment in education, the educational level in Mexico has 
been higher than that of Brazil for the period between 1960-1980. As an example, one can 
refer to the literacy rate of 81 % in Mexico in 1977 which was among the highest in Latin 
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American countries [188]. Despite some significant improvements in the level of its 
educational indicators, however, it should be noted that Mexico still lags behind other major 
Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in terms of technological capability. Therefore, 
Mexican authority should increase their efforts in order to close the technological gap 
through intensive science and technology programs such as a higher allocation of R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GNP, establishing more science and technology parks, and 
increasing the number of institutions for higher education and technical training. 
Having compared the overall industrial and technological policies of the newly industrialised 
countries in Latin America such as Mexico and Brazil with those of Southeast Asia such as 
S. Korea and Taiwan, despite several common features in their experiences of rapid 
industrial and technological development, there have been some major differences such as 
their market size and the role of the government in directing industrial and technological 
development policies. The Latin American NICs, particularly Mexico, have considerably 
larger domestic markets than the first-tier Southeast Asian NICs. The large domestic market 
in the Latin American NICs including Mexico resulted from a relatively longer period of 
import-substitution policy in these countries in comparison with their East Asian 
counterparts. Moreover, the government role in the industrialisation and technological 
development of NICs in Southeast Asia (such as Korea and Taiwan) has been different in 
comparison with that of Latin American NICs (such as Brazil and Mexico). 
As discussed earlier in the case of Korea and Taiwan, the government in these countries has 
played a key role in the economic and industrial development of these countries. 
Government intelVention in these countries did not interfere with the market mechanism, but 
rather complemented it. While the state in East Asian NICs played an effective role in 
promoting their industrial competitiveness through adoption of some policy measures such 
as heavy investment in enhancing their technological infrastructure and R&D activities, in 
contrast, the Latin American state intervention has been far less effective in promoting the 
competitive level of their manufacturing exports. The government in Latin American 
countries in particular Mexico concentrate less than their East Asian rivals in investing on 
new and high-level technologies which in the current very competitive situation is 
considered to be a main element for success in the international market. The state in Latin 
American NICs including Mexico has also been highly interventionist in industrial and 
technology policy making. Moreover, state-owned enterprises in Mexico have been of major 
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importance of in the economy, especially in energy, transportation, communications, and 
fertilizers. However, the government's privatization program moved rapidly to transfer state 
enterprises to the private sector. 
Having compared the educational system in the NICs of Southeast Asia with that of Latin 
American countries, the Asian NICs have very highly educated populations and the 
secondary level education in the Latin American countries including Mexico has been on 
average one-third lower than that of East Asian counterparts. For example, the percentage 
of tertiary students in engineering in S. Korea has been at least double the figure for the 
Latin American NICs [189]. Comparing the method of technological acquisition, the Latin 
American NICs including Mexico have relied to a larger degree on foreign direct investment 
in particular in the earlier stage of industrialisation than East Asian first-tier NICs. The Asian 
NICs, on the other hand, have generally adopted fairly hberal policies regarding FDI. S. 
Korea has probably had the most restrictive FDI policy and has used other methods such as 
technology licensing and joint ventures as the major source of the foreign technology 
acquisition. However, some Latin American NICs, have faced tremendous problems in the 
transferring of technology through foreign direct investment because of the depressed state 
of their internal markets. Moreover, while the East Asian first and second tier NICs have 
used various methods of technology acquisition in particular technology licensing and capital 
goods imports, the Latin American NICs including Mexico made much less use of all 
channels of technology transfer except FDI. Therefore, it can be said that despite these 
different characteristics in some aspects of the industrialisation experience of the Latin 
American countries with that of East Asian first and second-tier NICs, however, as the 
comparative assessment of their experience shows, LDCs can learn useful lessons from 
several success factors of these countries. 
4.8 TURKEY 
Turkey which is located in one of the most strategic geographical areas of the world, with 
the area of779,452 km square, and has been a republic since 29 October 1923. Unlike some 
of the developing countries in East Asia such as Indonesia and Malaysia, Turkey is not a 
resource-rich country, with only about 246,000 km square land used in agricuhure, and 
some minerals such as coal, chromites and copper. During the post second-world war 
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period, and in particular since the early 1960s, Turkey has experienced a rapid GDP growth 
rate with an average annual growth rate of nearly 10% during 1962-1967. Industry sector 
has been the engine of this growth [190]. Like many other developing countries, the 
industrialisation in Turkey began with the similar pattern of import substitution aiming at 
creating a strong industrial base through adopting the protectionist policies including high 
tariffs and quantitative import restriction, to produce for the domestic market and replacing 
the previously imported products with the locally produced goods. During the first stage 
of import substitution in Turkey in 1960s, the imports of nondurable consumer goods were 
replaced by domestic production so that the share of consumer goods in total imports 
decreased to only 5% [191]. 
Tmkey entered into the second stage of import substitution aiming at replacing the imports 
of intermediate and capital-intensive products. However, because of the high cost that 
producing many capital-intensive products such as petrochemicals and steel had created, the 
implementation onSI in Turkey faced some difficuhies, such as increasing inefficiencies and 
imbalance of payments. Therefore, despite the initial success ofISI policy in the early stages, 
in the later stages it failed to produce the manufacturing products that can compete in the 
world market. Moreover, as a resuh of lSI policy, the Turkish manufacturing sector was 
heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and inputs. For example, one can refer to 
the Turkish automobile manufacturing sector, which alone needed $ 700 million in direct 
imports (or about 20 per cent of total Turkey's non-oil imports) for its assembly production 
in 1979, while total automotive exports did not exceed $ 7 million [192]. Therefore, by the 
late 1970s, Turkey encountered a serious financial crisis which led to the slowing down of 
the average annual growth rate of manufacturing products to 5.2% during the period 
between 1973-79 from that of 10.2% in 1960-73 [193]. Moreover, the GDP growth rate 
declined from 3% in 1977 to - 0.7% in 1979 [194]. 
Since 1980, the government in Turkey adopted a package of stabilisation, h'beralisation and 
export-oriented programmes in order to improve the balance of payments, and promote the 
country's international competitiveness. Some effective policy measures have been 
implemented including a real devaluation of the Turkish Lira by 33%, introducing various 
export incentives such as export tax rebates, removing the quotas from imports of inputs 
required for manufacturing for exporting products, transportation and energy subsidies, and 
low interest loans to exporters [195]. Moreover, different international organisations such 
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as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) supported these programs through 
granting substantial financial aid and loans [196]. As a result of these effective policy 
measures, the inflation rate decreased to 37% in 1981 from 107 % in the previous year, 
and the average growth rate of GNP which was negative in 1980 increased to more than 4% 
in 1981 [197]. 
The shift to the export-promotion from the previous import substitution policy in the early 
1980s also led to a significant export performance, in particular manufacturing exports. The 
total value of merchandise exports increased from $ 2.9 billion in 1980 to $ 10.3 billion in 
1987 with an annual average growth 22.3%. Moreover, the share of manufacturing products 
in total exports increased from 36.8% in 1980 to 79 % in 1987, with an average annual 
growth rate of38.2% during the same period [198]. As indicated earlier, some effective 
export incentive measures, in particular the real depreciation of Turkish Lira, export credits 
and tax rebates were among the major elements contributing to Turkey's significant export 
performance since the 1980s. The other important factor that led to Turkey's successful 
export performance in the early 1980s, was the creation of a huge excess capacity as a result 
of the crisis of the late 1970s which had depressed industrial outputs. This capacity 
utilisation particularly in private industry stood at 51% in 1980 [199]. The strategic location 
of Turkey and access to the European Community and Middle Eastern countries markets 
along with use of some high-tech methods of production such as Just-In-Time (nT) and 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) have been the other important elements of Turkey's success 
in the expansion of its exports [200]. Moreover, additional measures were taken to increase 
the attractiveness for foreign investors, including easing some previous restrictive 
regulations on flow of capital and investment as well as relaxation of capital and exchange 
market controls [201]. 
RealGDP Debt/exports Investment/GDP Export volume 
growth(%) ratio (%) ratio (%) increase (%) 
1981 3.6 280.2 2l.5 68.7 
1982 4.5 222.2 20.3 24.1 
1983 3.9 23l.3 19.6 13.9 
1984 6.0 217.6 19.6 23.1 
1985 5.1 223.4 20.5 9.9 
1986 8.1 288.4 23.2 -2.3 
1987 7.4 265.4 25.5 29.3 
Table 4.7 Some selected macroeconomic indicators for Turkey (1981-1987) 
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Source: World Development 1990. 
Despite the significant overall export performance in early 1980s, however Turkish exports 
faced a sharp decline in 1986 due to some external factors, mainly the sharp decline in oil 
prices in the mid-1980s which affected Turkey's exports to oil producing countries as well 
as some internal factors such as inadequate private investment in manufacturing and the 
decision made by the Turkish authorities to remove government subsidies on industrial 
exports [202]. Therefore, the government in Turkey adopted some further measures 
including reintroducing tax rebates and additional tariff cuts for imports of raw materials 
required for producing manufacturing goods for exports, and preferential credits for 
industrial enterprueners and exporters, in order to recover the sharp decrease of its industrial 
exports in 1986. Following the implementation of these measures the overall exports 
reached to $ 12,960 million in 1990 and the share of manufacturing exports in overall 
exports rose to 78.2% by the late 1980s. However, due to the appreciation of the exchange 
rate in 1989-90 and therefore an increase in imports in particular capital goods, Turkey 
faced a current account deficit in 1990 [203]. It is generally argued that to sustain ability 
for a rapid expansion of exports in Turkey in the future to a large degree depends on its 
capability to diversify the manufacturing exports as well as its macroeconomic and political 
stability, and also its ability to upgrade the level of competitiveness through introducing 
more high and modem technologies into the country. 
During the early 1990s and with the implementation of Turkey's Sixth Five-year Plan (1990. 
1994), Turkey continued the export promotion policies aiming at promotion of the private 
sector as well as further liberalisation of the economy through reducing protection on 
imported goods and attracting private and foreign investment. The main quantitative 
objectives of the sixth plan included an average annual growth rate of7o/ofor GDP, and 15% 
for exports which exceeded $ 22,000 million by the end of 1994 [204]. The strategy of the 
Seventh Plan published in Apri11993, also aimed at sustaining the increasing growth rate 
of exports, in particular industrial exports, through raising their competitiveness and 
productivity, with more emphasis on a free-market mechanism. It is argued that Turkey's 
overall economic and industrial performance in the early 1990s, considering its significant 
improvement in the industrial infrastructure and indigenous technological capability, can be 
compared with Spain and S. Korea a decade or two decades ago, which may have 
experienced a similar stage of rapid industrial and technological development, and joining 
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the ranks of newly industrialised nations [205]. However, due to the financial crisis in 1994 
which resuhed from macroeconomic imbalances and increasing rates of inflation, the Turkish 
government has recently introduced a comprehensive stabilisation programme in order to 
keep the stable macroeconomic environment needed for further industrial and technological 
progress. 
It can be said that the experience of Turkey's industrialisation has also had many common 
features with those of East Asian first and second-tier NICs as well as Latin American NICs. 
Like many of these countries, the Turkish state has played a very important role in directing 
a set of effective policy measures which led to its successful transition to an open-market 
export-oriented economy since 1980. As indicated earlier, following a serious financial crisis 
in late 1970s, the Turkish government adopted a series of programmes and policies 
including structural adjustment, stabilisation, trade liberalisation and export-oriented policies 
which supported by the conditional assistance from international organisations such as IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) and World Bank. However, in comparison with East Asian 
States, the Turkish state has been less supportive of private sector activity and also was less 
successful in attracting substantial private investment for industrial activity. As Onis (1995) 
indicates, ''The Turkish state is an overextended or an overloaded state in comparison with 
its East Asian counteIparts, which is identified as a key constraint on the continued success 
of export-oriented industrialisation strategy in Turkey" [206]. The state in Turkey has also 
been characterised to be a highly centralised, and a weak state in terms of its capability to 
generate tax revenues and impose fiscal discipline [207]. 
However, it is argued that the government in Turkey played a significantly larger role in the 
implementation of an import substitution strategy in its early stage of industrialisation in 
comparison with many other countries that followed the same pattern of industrialisation. 
The share of the state sector, in manufacturing industry and in total investments, was around 
40% and 50% respectively during the 1960s and 1970s [208]. Moreover, one of the most 
important factors which distinguished the Turkish and East Asian experience of lSI in the 
early stages of their industrialisation has been the lower degree of state autonomy and the 
insufficient degree of co-operation or collaboration between the state and private sector in 
Turkey which led to frustrating the development process and to the crisis of the late 1970s 
[209]. The relatively successful experience of Turkey in developing its import substituting 
industries shows that the expansion of a strong local industrial base is an important 
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prerequisite for a successful transition to an export-oriented economy. 
Like the East Asian first and second-tier NICs, the government in Turkey formulated some 
specific programmes for the developing its indigenous technological capability through the 
acquisition and assimilation of foreign technologies. The Turkish authorities adopted various 
incentive measures to attract foreign investment and technology including introducing open-
door policies towards foreign investment, the establishment of industrial FTZs in some 
industrial areas such as Anatalya and Mersin in 1986, 100% custom exemption for a period 
ofup to five years for the export-oriented investment, and tax rebates on imports of inputs 
needed for manufacturing exports. The government also attempted to attract foreign 
investment into infrastructural projects, such national telecommunication and transportation 
networks [210]. The Turkish government has also given more priority to joint venture 
projects between Turkish enterprises and their foreign trade partners, to strengthen the 
development of country's industry, technology and managerial skills. 
Fonowing the adoption of these effective measures, the flow ofFDI into Turkey increased 
significantly from $ 325.1 million in 1980, to $ 932 million in 1983, and reached to $ 2.9 
billion in 1990, which mostly concentrated on services such as banking, and the 
manufacturing sector such as chemicals, transport equipment and food processing industries 
[211]. As Onis (1994) argues, the most important factor behind the increasing rate ofFDI 
into Turkey during the 1980s has been the hoeralisation of trade and removing restrictive 
controls over flow of capital and foreign investment during this period [212]. However, it 
is also argued that Turkey's success in attracting further FDI mainly depends on the 
country's macroeconomic and political stability. Therefore, Turkish policy makers should 
place more efforts for attracting as much FDI and new and modern technologies as pOSSlole 
which is essential for attaining international competitiveness in key sectors of the economy 
in particular manufacturing sector. 
There have been other methods of technology transfer into Turkey in addition to FDI, such 
as licensing, technical assistance and joint venture agreements. Most of technology licensing 
agreements have taken place in the manuficturing sector with almost 88% during the period 
between 1980 and 1992. Furthermore, Turkey also acquired technology through the 
importation of capital goods and machinery imports which mostly concentrated on motor 
vehicle industry [213]. The government in 1'urlcey has also established about five technology 
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parks in different areas including Ankara, Istanbul, Marmara, Izmir and Anadolu in order 
to strengthen technology-related industries and fostering the development of industry in 
these areas. Despite these extensive efforts to promote the Turkey's indigenous 
technological capability through the adaptation and assimilation of foreign technology, it is 
argued that Turkey's overall industrial and technology infrastructure is still weak and 
therefore it is essential for Turkish policy- makers to design an appropriate technology 
development strategy to strengthen its indigenous S&T capability . 
One of the major areas of Turkey's weakness is its low level of R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of GNP which was about 0.3 % in 1980s which has been far below that of 
other countries. Moreover, most of industrial research and development activities has been 
carried out by a number of public institutes such as Turkish Scientific and Technical 
Research Council (TUBITAK) and Maramara Research Centre (MRC) which lacked the 
specialisation to adapt foreign technology to local conditions. Therefore, increasing public 
and private expenditure for more research and development activities and more coordination 
of R&D activities between universities and industries, as well as developing an effective 
system of industrial standards and quality control, are among the major government 
programmes to promote local technological capability. 
Another important element emphasised in the Turkish national development plans is the key 
role of human resource development policy in strengthening the country's industrial and 
technological capability. The rapid process of industrialisation since 1980 necessitated the 
need for skilled human labour with professional and technical knowledge. Hence, the 
government in Turkey increased the number of vocational and technical schools from 1,356 
in 1983-84 to 1,963 schools in 1990-91 [85]. According to the United Nations Human 
Development Index (IIDI) based on literacy rate, life expectancy and real per-capita GDP, 
Turkey was among the top ten countries in terms of improvement over the period 1960-92. 
However, by 1992, Turkey ranked 68th (71st in 1990) among 173 countries. This 
improvement in ranking was due to above-average economic performance, as Turkey lagged 
in education outcomes [214]. 
Despite the quantitative expansion of Turkish education system in the primary-level 
education, only 26% of the relevant age group were registered at secondary-level in 1988 
and the figure for tertiary-level was at the lower level of 12% in the same year which put 
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Turkey at the bottom of the table in comparison to DECD countries [215]. In order to solve 
these problems and generally improve the national education system, the Turkish 
government has adopted some specific programs through the national development plans, 
including necessary measures to raise the quality of national education, further increasing 
of the schooling rate at all educational levels, developing technological education at the 
primary and secondary level, emphasising an overall technical and vocational education and 
improving the quality of science and engineering in higher education. 
It can be said that other LDCs can also draw useful lessons from the experience of Turkey 
in a relatively successful industrialisation, as Turkey itself used several policy measures from 
the successful experiences of East Asian NICs. One may find an interesting parallel between 
the Turkish experience of post 1980 and that of S.Korea in the post 1964 period in terms 
of introducing several similar export incentives in order to expand the manufacturing 
exports. Despite the adoption of similar package of policy measures which were previously 
implemented in many East Asian NICs such as S.Korea about two decades earlier, however, 
Turkey's degree of success as a latecomer in the international market could not be matched 
with that of East Asian NICs during late 1960s and 1970s. This is mainly because of the 
world recession of the early 1980s which made a difficuh condition for a late-comer such 
as Turkey to compete in the international market. 
Moreover, a comparison of Turkey and some late industrialising countries in Latin America 
such as Mexico shows some major differences in the implementation of the policy measures 
as well as the degree of their success. For example, while the post 1982 stabilisation and 
economic reforms in Mexico were accompanied by an extreme import compression policy, 
Turkey experienced the reverse import liberalisation policy which was mostly because of its 
heavy dependence on imports of intermediate and capital inputs for its manufactured 
exports. In sum as suggested by Yeldan (1989), it seems that an appropriate development 
strategy for Turkey's future is to continue the current export promotion policy along with 
a primarily domestic demand-oriented industrialisation strategy. This strategy is based on 
the expansion of the domestic market through emphasising more the agriculture sector, and 
also production of basic intermediate and capital goods together with domestic production 
of associated technologies, and aimed at improvement of income distribution, employment 
and social welfare, particularly in rural areas [216]. 
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4. 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As the experiences of the selected countries in their rapid industrialisation shows, despite 
having different characteristics, there is commonality in the success factors of these 
cOlmtries. The government of most countries lIDder the survey, in particular East Asian first 
and second-tier NICs, have adopted a set of appropriate policies which mainly led to their 
rapid industrial and technological development. These policies include the adoption of a 
strong export-orientation industrialisation strategy, the massive investment in development 
of their human resources, education, technical training, and infrastructure, and the 
development of their indigenous technological capability through selective appropriate 
methods of technology transfer. Moreover, the state in these countries has also played a 
vital role in directing these policies through providing an effective and supportive policy 
environment for successful implementation of these policies. The government of many of 
these countries intervened very efficiently in developing an adequate industrial and 
technological infrastructure as well as creating a stable macroeconomic condition required 
for faster and easier assimilation and absorption of imported technologies. However, as 
explained earlier, the degree of intervention has been varied among these countries and has 
mainly relied on the nature of the political system as well as the type of development 
strategy in these countries. For example, the market-friendly approach of many East Asian 
first and second-tier NICs has helped them to accelerate the overall growth rate through the 
adoption of open-door policies towards acquiring more foreign investment, and technologies 
which strengthened their indigenous technological capability. 
Although the success of these countries can not only be a result of a single factor, it seems 
that the adoption of an export-promotion industrialisation policy along with the acquisition 
of foreign technologies have contributed most to their industrial and technological 
development. As explained earlier in detail, the very rapid growth rate of exports and 
particularly manufactured exports in these countries has accelerated their overall growth rate 
which supports the idea that the EPP has been among the major factors contnDuting to their 
success. On the other hand, these countries have to be very efficient in the acquisition and 
absorption offoreign technology in order to remain competitive in the international market, 
which in turn needs a massive investment in their technical human resources in all levels. In 
other words, the adoption of an appropriate technology transfer strategy which focused on 
the effective acquisition, assimilation, and absorption of foreign technology as well as 
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promoting the indigenous technological capability can be considered as a vital prerequisite 
for a COWltry to be successful in the international market. Therefore, it can be said that the 
faster export grows, the more rapidly new technology embodied in foreign machinery and 
equipment can be imported, and visa versa. 
The huge investment in human resource development also enabled these countries to acquire 
technological capability rapidly and increase the level of competitiveness and productivity 
in these countries by making effective use of their technological base. The main policy 
measures for development of the human resources in these countries included: designing 
some regular and effective programmes for training the labour force and upgrading their 
skills; increasing R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP; and establishing and expanding 
specific institutions for vocational and on-the-job training. The expansion of a relatively 
skilled labour force as well as high level scientists, engineers and technicians can also be 
considered as an important criteria for effective assimilation and absorption of foreign 
technologies. However, as explained earlier, each country has been at a different level in 
terms of the quantitative and qualitative improvements of its educational system It can be 
said that the higher the level of educational indicators, in particular in the secondary level 
in a country, the higher the level of technological capability of that country would be. For 
example, the existence oflarge numbers of scientists and engineers in S. Korea, mainly as 
a resuh of its heavy investment in all levels of the educational system, in particular in higher 
education, enabled this country to close its technological gap with the technological leaders 
easier and more quickly than its counterparts. 
As already recognised, almost all the selected countries have extensively transferred foreign 
technologies through various methods, in particular FDI, and importing capital goods and 
machinery. However, although FDI has played a major role in the transfer of foreign 
technologies and managerial expertise in almost all these cQuntries, other channels of 
technology acquisition such as licensing, joint venture and technical assistance agreements 
have also been employed by those countries with a relatively higher level of industrial and 
technological capability. In order to attract more the flow of foreign investment and 
technology to their countries, many of these countries have adopted effective incentives 
such as expansion of FTZs, removing restrictive measures, and introducing incentive 
measures for foreign investors such tax rebates and free custom duties. A few of these 
countries in particular those with a relatively higher level of industrial infrastructure, 
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formulated and designed a well-defined technology transfer and development strategy 
emphasising more the strengthening of their indigenous technological capability as well as 
transferring high-level technologies. 
As indicated earlier, other LDCs can draw valuable lessons from the successful experiences 
of these countries. Because several common factors contributed to the success of these 
countries, other LDCs can follow their pattern of rapid industrial and technological 
development. However, it should be noted that all or some specific conditions which 
accelerated the success of these countries may not exist in the present time. For example, 
the transition to an export-oriented industrialisation strategy from the previous import 
substitution policies in some first tier East Asian NICs took place at the time that many 
other countries still followed the inward-looking and protectionist policies. However, in a 
currently very competitive international market, it would be very difficult for a late-comer 
to achieve similar export performance that countries such as S.Korea and Taiwan attained 
in the early stage of their industrialisation. It should also be noted that due to unique and 
significant performance of East Asian countries, other developing countries usually tend to 
replicate their model in order to achieve the same rapid industrialisation path. Therefore, 
it seems necessary for the policy makers in other LDCs to study very carefully the 
experience of these countries in rapid industrial and technological development. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE KEY SUCCESS FACTORS OF EAST ASIAN FIRST AND SECOND TIER 
NICs 
5. 1 INTRODUCTION 
The process of industrial and technological development in some selected countries has been 
discussed in detail in the case study survey. As indicated in the previous chapter, the 
significantly successful performance of some Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) in East 
Asia can be distinguished from the experience of the other countries. As many other 
developing countries try to follow their model of rapid industrialisation, it seems necessary 
to analyse their success factors much more in detail. Moreover, the successful experience 
of East Asian countries in industrial and technological development can have valuable 
lessons for the other developing countries in the other parts of the world. 
The importance of the East Asian countries as a model for other developing countries has 
mostly been attnouted to reasons such as a very rapid growth rate in comparison with the 
other countries, successful experience of industrial and technological development, and their 
substantial share in the world's economy and population. During the period between 1970-
1990, East Asian exports grew 16.7% annually, reaching $699 billion, and its imports grew 
16.4% annually, reaching $ 654 billion in 1990. The East Asian share of exports also 
reached 21.0 % of the world total in 1990, up from 11.3% in 1970 [I]. East Asia accounted 
forjust over 17 per cent of world production in 1980.This is expected to increase to over 
28 per cent at the end of century. East Asia is also accounts for one-fifth of world trade, a 
larger share than North America, and this is expected to increase to one third of world trade 
by the year 2000 [2]. The four Asian tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong), 
with under 2 per cent of the total population of the developing world, have almost 7 per cent 
of its GDP, close to 20 per cent of its GDP, and nearly 60 per cent of its manufactured 
exports [3]. The second generation of NICs (Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) have also 
experienced a very rapid growth rate with tilvourable industrial policies, macroeconomic and 
political stability together with low labour costs, which led to a flow of massive foreign 
investment, and provided the transfer of technology into these countries that the first-tier 
NICs had to acquire through other methods [4]. 
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Figure 5.1 The Share of East Asia in World Trade and Output by the year 2000 
Source: Garnaut, R. et a1 (1995). 
The other point which one can consider, is the diversity of these countries in some overall 
economic indicators such as per capita income, natural resources and the process of their 
industrialisation, which can be helpful for other developing countries with different 
characteristics to pursue their development strategies. As Amsden (1994) noted, it is quite 
reasonable to advise LDCs to adopt a variant of the East Asian model. She also believes that 
the main reason behind this is that East Asia has had some of the highest growth rates of 
output and productivity in the world during the last decades and therefore may provide 
useful guidance for other developing countries [5]. The importance of the East Asian NICs 
can also be attrIbuted to their key role as currently the world centre of international market 
and trade. Although there are some differences in the stage of development, size of 
economy, resource endowment etc, the industrial and technological development experience 
of these countries has been of interest to most Less Developed Countries (LDCs), in 
particular those which attempt to promote their technological capability through the same 
pattern of rapid industrialisation. Moreover, the analysis of the industrialisation experience 
of East Asian NICs may assist the policy makers in other LDCs in an understanding of the 
development process. The success of the East Asian countries, as Krugman (1994) noted, 
shows that there is a major diffusion of world technology in progress, and western nations 
are losing their traditional advantage. He also believed that the significantly successful 
performance of East Asian NICs can also demonstrate that the world's economic centre of 
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gravity will inevitably shift to the Asian nations of the western Pacific [6] 
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5.2 THE MOST IMPORTANT SUCCESS FACTORS OF EAST ASIAN NICs 
Having SUlVeyed the success factors of these countries in rapid industrial and technological 
development, it is widely recognised that the core of development success in East Asia has 
been a set of appropriate policies mainly focused on macroeconomic stability, human 
resource investments, promoting industrial and technological capability and outward 
orientation, which to some extent were quite different from the experiences of most other 
developing countries. However, it is noteworthy to review different views about the success 
factors of these countries. 
Neo-c1assicalists believe that the rapid and successful development of the East Asian 
countries can be contributed to the following reasons [7]: 
1. Relying on an open economy with free trade in goods and services and a free flow of 
capital investment, technology. 
2. Adoption of aggressive export-orientation strategies has been a key factor contributing 
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to their success. 
3. The massive investments in development of their human resources, education, 
technical training, technology and infrastructure. 
4. Providing a stable political and macroeconomic environment which enabled the private 
and public sectors in these countries to succeed. 
5. The role of state intervention by supporting rather than supplanting the markets, in 
directing the economic and industrial development in these countries. 
As one can see, the Neo-classicals' view about the success of East Asian NICs again 
confirms the fact that it was a package of policy measures in these countries and mainly 
adopting market-friendly mechanism towards acquisition of foreign investment and 
technology as well as heavy investment on human capitals that contributing more in their 
success. However, the Neo-classicals are criticised for not considering many other East 
Asian success factors such as Confucian ethics. Hill ( 1993) has noted three factors affecting 
success of the East Asian countries. These three factors have been an effective role of the 
state with a stable and flexible policy environment, conservative macroeconomic 
management, and the outward orientation policies of these countries. However, the most 
important element of the East Asian countries, as he pointed out, has been their pragmatic, 
outward looking policies [8]. The very rapid growth rate of exports and particularly 
manufactured exports which resulted in the rapid pace of the overall growth performance 
in these countries can be considered as evidence for the significant role of export-promotion 
policies in their success. Henderson (1993) has also referred to six elements for the success 
of the East Asian countries [9]: 
1. The historical contexts and conjunctures out of which their transformative processes 
emerged. 
2. The role of foreign aid (both military and civil), and particularly from the United 
States. 
3. Direct investment by transnational corporations. 
4. The significance of a regionally unique economic culture based in Confucianism. 
5. Repressive labour systems that ensured supplies of cheap labour. 
6. The important role of free markets and state policies. 
Henderson's view about East Asian success concentrated more on some other factors such 
206 
as foreign aid in their earlier stage and the existence of a Confucian ethic which encouraged 
discipline and a hard working labour force. According to a survey of the World Bank 
(1993), there are some general features of East Asian countries' policies and strategies that 
can be applied for future development in other developing countries. Firstly, their very 
significant outward orientation and export promotion policies which have made them key 
players in the international market. Secondly, their massive and efficient investment in 
human resources which played a major role in the development of their industrial and 
technological capability. Thirdly, the vital role of state and government policies which 
directed these economies to a very rapid rate of growth through supporting the market [10]. 
Another World Bank survey (1993) refers to some key success factors for the rapid 
economic and industrial development of East Asian countries as follows [11]: Firstly, the 
macroeconomic stability in these countries such as a relatively low inflation rate which 
provided an appropriate environment for achieving high growth rate. Secondly, the creation 
of a broad base of human capital which has been an essential element in their rapid economic 
and industrial development. Thirdly, the efficient financial system which led to high saving 
and investment rates in these countries. Fourthly, policies which encouraged the absorption 
of foreign technologies in total factor productivity. Fifthly, their government policies as 
being "market mendly" such as a very successful export promotion policies which led them 
to compete in the world market. Finally, the successful creation in these countries of 
institutions which implemented the above policies is emphasised in both surveys of the 
World Bank. The most important reason behind the East Asian success story can be the 
adoption of effective policy measures including outward looking strategy, designing specific 
programs for developing indigenous technological capability, and expansion of a well-skilled 
and qualified workforce. A recent survey by Simone and Thompson (1995) has referred to 
a combination of four characteristics as the main success factor for Asian Pacific countries 
[12]: 
1. Market economy with free trade policy. 
2. Special circumstances ( such as well-developed infrastructure, well-educated human 
labour and US and Japanese aid) which are unlikely to be easily duplicated. 
3. A shared Confucian heritage emphasising hard work, frugality, hierarchy, and 
harmony,and 
4. It is the consequence of economic planning by a strong state in close collaboration 
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with a market-driven, export-oriented economy. 
Hobday (1995) also refers to some important aspects in success of East Asian NICs 
including their macroeconomic policy, industrial orientation and technological development 
strategies and programmes [13]. A continuous and sustainable macroeconomic stability, 
with low inflation rates and high saving rates assisted these countries to create an 
appropriate environment for long-term planning and development. Moreover, the adoption 
of an export expansion strategy has accelerated the acquisition and absorption of foreign 
technologies to increase the level of productivity and competitiveness in the world market. 
The massive investment on the development of an appropriate educational and technological 
infrastructure in each of these countries was also an essential element for their 
industrialisation. As was shown in the previous chapter, each country designed some specific 
programmes for enhancing the educational level as well as upgrading the skills of its labour 
force. The government in these countries established many institutes and polytechnics for 
vocational and technical training to promote their absorptive capacity for assimilating the 
new and modem technologies. Finally, the efficient role of government intervention as well 
as its flexibility in changing the policies whenever found to be ineffective assured a 
continuous and rapid industrialisation in these countries. 
A recent cross-country study by Easterly (1995) shows the significant effect of the four 
dragons' (S.Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) appropriate policies as a major 
success factor. Easterly's quantitative and statistic regressions in investment, education, and 
low budget deficits indicated that the four tigers were above average in these areas. He 
added that the good policies make success likely sooner or later. For example, private 
investment has been exceptionally high in all of the Four except Taiwan. The public 
expenditure on education has also been high in all of the four NICs except Hong Kong. He 
suggested that "policy makers should be convinced by looking at cross country evidence that 
it is a lot better to make miracles feasible through good policy than to make them impossible 
by bad policy" [14]. 
Therefore, the success of these countries can not be as a result of a single factor but 
combination of a set of strategies directed by the effective role of government in these 
countries. As explained in detail in the country study, despite some different characteristics 
in these countries such as the size of market, the level of industrial and technological 
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infrastructure, the level of technology absorption, the level of technicians and engineers, and 
the level of macroeconomic and political stability, they could manage to improve many of 
these economic and industrial indicators through the adoption of a common pattern of rapid 
industrialisation based on strong export promotion policy, accompanied by massive and 
efficient transfer of foreign technologies and supported by the supportive government 
programmes in supplying a large numbers of skillful labour force. As the most critical 
metors contributing to the success of these countries have already been identified, it seems 
essential to analyse the role of each metor in the rapid industrial and technological 
development of these countries. 
5.2.1 The Role of Government 
As indicated earlier, it is widely acknowledged that the government has played a very 
important role in leading these countries towards a rapid industrial and technological 
development. The government of most East Asian NICs accelerated the pace of 
industrialisation through the adoption of various policies, including an early transition to an 
export promotion policy from the previous import substitution, an appropriate technology 
transfer policy based on the massive acquisition of foreign technology and development of 
local technological capability, hberalisation and privatisation policies, and human resource 
development policy. The government in these countries also provided adequate 
infra structural mcilities, created an appropriate and stable macroeconomic environment, 
supported the private industrial firms in their export activities through giving them low 
interest loans and financial credits. 
As Wade (1994) noted, the governments in East Asian NICs aeted a supervisionary role in 
encouraging private firms to promote their level of productivity and competitiveness [15]. 
He also refers to the S.Korean and Taiwanese governments as leadership states due to their 
significant role in investing substantially in certain key industries , through specific incentives 
and administrative measures in order to promote their export performances in the 
international market. Ng and Pang (1993) argued that the quality of intervention was a 
critical faetor in S.Korea's success in industrial policy [16]. They also point out that the 
governments in some of the East Asian second-tier NICs have allocated extensive resources 
to developing particular industries. For example, the Indonesian government actively 
concenttated in the development of an aircraft manufacturing industry while Malaysia 
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invested in heavy industries and particularly the automobile industry. The government in 
these countries also concentrated on developing their resource-based industries especially 
in the early stage of their industrialisation with public enterprise participation, such as 
mining, petroleum and gas. Amsden (1993) on the other hand, refers to the market-friendly 
nature of East Asian governments as an important aspect of their success. She argues that 
the market-mendly approach of government in these countries enabled them to have a stable 
macroeconomic situation as well as a high share of international trade in GDP, and heavy 
investment for the expansion of their human resources [17]. 
The state in many East Asian NICs has also played a critical role in the successful transition 
from the import substitution to the export-oriented industrialisation policy. The state set the 
developmental targets; allocated and distnbuted the required resources; promoted and 
regulated foreign investment, and protected local firms against foreign competition during 
the import substituting industrialisation phase, and provided them with several export 
incentives such as tax and tariff rebates, and establishing FTZs, during the export-oriented 
industrialisation period [18]. Therefore, the East Asian experience shows that active and 
selective government intervention in the process of industrialisation can resuh in significant 
achievements. However, it should be noted that the conditions that made intervention 
successful in these countries may not be applicable in other developing countries, or other 
LDCs might not want to replicate the East Asian experience of government intervention 
[19]. 
The governments in most East Asian NICs, with the efficient cooperation and support of 
the private sectors, conducted effective macro industrial and technological policies through 
the massive investment in the accumulation and acquisition of foreign technologies, and 
upgrading the skill of their labour force. However, some resource-rich and second-tier East 
Asian NICs such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, adopted a relatively moderate policy 
of acquiring foreign technology due to the availability of resources in these countries. These 
countries accelerated the acquisition of foreign technologies more through attracting a 
massive flow offoreign investment with associated know-how and managerial skills. The 
government in second-tier NICs played a very active role in creating favourable conditions 
to encourage the flow of FDI and technology through introducing various incentive 
measures such as tax exemption and tariff reductions. However, the state in these countries 
played a relatively passive role in terms of developing an indigenous technological capability 
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through increasing the R&D activities. 
It is generally argued that the East Asian states have been stronger and more efficient than 
states in other developing countries. For example, in Latin America, the state was not strong 
enough in creating a stable macroeconomic environment needed for successful 
implementation of industrial and technological development policies. However, as indicated 
earlier, in East Asia, the strong state is seen as a key in achieving rapid industrialisation [20]. 
Another important characteristic of government in the East Asian countries is their 
authoritarian nature, to which can be attributed the strong state intervention in formulating 
and implementing the overall policies in the direction to foster rapid industrial and 
technological development. As Ho1heinz and Caldar (1982) argued, East Asian countries' 
success is based on political systems that seem better suited to economic competition. The 
authoritarian nature of East Asian political systems can be attn"buted to their stability, 
flexibility and a high degree of respect for hierarchy and discipline [21]. Another specific 
criteria of an authoritarian government is that it can facilitate the transition from a traditional 
economic and social order to a modem dynamic economy [22]. One can say that most East 
Asian countries have experienced some form of transition of power or social and economic 
restructuring [23]. Although government intervention has played a major role in the 
industrialisation of East Asian countries, the future direction of their policy orientation, is 
mainly towards private investment and open, competitive markets. 
5. 2. 2 The Role of Export Promotion Policy 
As indicated earlier, it is widely believed that the early transition to an export-oriented 
industrialisation policy has been among the key factors contnDuting to the success of these 
countries. The exports and in particular manufactming exports acted as an engine of growth 
in these countries. As is shown in the previous chapters, as each of these countries shifted 
to the export promotion policy from the previous import substitution strategy, there was a 
sharp increase in the growth rate of that country. Therefore, one may find a close 
relationship between the expansion of exports and overall growth performance in these 
countries [24]. As Lee and Naya (1988) argued, the adoption of an export promotion 
industrialisation policy created an appropriate atmosphere for achieving high growth rates 
in these countries [25]. Booth (1995) also believes that the rapid growth rate in the East 
Asian countries has mainly relied on their continued growth of exports, which in turn 
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depended on their capability to compete in the international market. She argues that, these 
countries efficiently moved out of export industries where they no longer have competitive 
advantage and into the sectors where they can rapidly compete in the international market 
[26]. 
The adoption of an outward-oriented and export expansion policy enabled these countries 
to allocate their resources efficiently in order to be able to compete in the international 
market. Hicks (1989) also believes that the success of East Asian NICs was owed to a large 
degree to the early shift from import substitution to export promotion policies [27]. The 
export performance of these countries shows that they initially relied on export of labour 
intensive products and then after an increase in real wages, these countries lost their 
comparative advantage in labour intensive manufacturing product. Therefore, they shift to 
export of more capital and technology-intensive products. Moreover, each country has 
developed its own areas of specialisation. For example, in the computer industry, S. Korea 
concentrated more on semi-conductors, Taiwan on monitors, Singapore on hard disk drives 
and Hong Kong on peripherals [28]. It is also argued that export promotion policies can 
bring higher growth rates than import-substitution policies. This is because an economy 
based on export expansion has a great opportunity to grow than one based solely on the 
expansion of limited domestic market. Moreover, export-oriented policies are generally 
associated with more efficient economies, and have higher rates of investment and increasing 
capital intensity [29]. The outward-looking policies can also overcome the limitations of the 
domestic market. Ahhough the Import Substitution Policies have been a base for a transition 
to successful export promotion policies in these countries, it is believed that lSI has 
discouraged the adoption and dissemination of industrial technologies appropriate for labour 
intensive economies such as Indonesia. The import substitution strategy gives little incentive 
for adapting foreign technology to local conditions and to achieve maximum efficiency. 
Therefore, one can say that the key to the export success of the East Asian NICs has been 
their early rejection of import substitution policies in favour of outward-looking policies 
through the removing the major barriers against exports [30]. 
The adoption of an outward-looking and export promotion policies enable a country to 
share technologies and ideas from around the world. Furthermore, an export-oriented policy 
encourages the expansion of industries with a comparative advantage by concentrating 
resources in a country's most productive industries. The export-promotion policies have also 
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accelerated the rapid acquisition of technological capability in these countries. This is mostly 
due to their competition in international markets which force them to invest more in 
technological effort. Exports acted as an effective device for encouraging investments in 
technology in these countries in order to promote the level of productivity and 
competitiveness. Technological innovation undertaken in response to foreign competition 
has also provided a continuous stimulus to growth for these countries [31]. Moreover, 
manufactured export growth provided a dynamic base for technological upgrading in these 
countries. As Smith (1995) argues, expansion of exports accelerated the process of catching 
up technologically and closing the technological gap with technological leaders through 
allowing imports of goods embodying new technology and by increasing overseas contacts 
and thus access to new ideas on production, technological and managerial skills [32]. As 
Grabowski (1994) has also noted, the faster exports grow, the more rapidly new technology 
embodied in foreign-produced capital can be imported [33]. 
Therefore, it can be said that the rapid growth of manufactured exports in the East Asian 
countries provided a strong mechanism for their rapid productivity growth and enhancing 
technological capability. According to a survey by La11 (1990), examining the experience of 
ten developing countries (the East Asian NICs, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil. Mexico and 
Kenya), found that export orientation has been important for building up their national 
technological capability but not without other ingredients such as human capital 
development, R&D tightly linked to the production process, a technology strategy, and even 
protection for technological learning [34]. 
As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, the rapid growth rate of manufacturing 
exports in the East Asian countries has been achieved through a number of effective policy 
measures. Firstly, the package of export incentives including effective depreciation of 
exchange rate, tax rebates, tariff and custom-duty exemptions ~r imported inputs needed 
for exports, low interest rate loans and financial credits for exporters, and establishment of 
FfZs or EPZs which provided an appropriate environment in promoting the exports in these 
countries. Secondly, the rapid increase in world demand for exports during the 1960s and 
early 1970s, and the increasing comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing 
outputs and later in technology and capital intensive products enabled these countries to 
raise their shares of manufacturing exports in total exports. Finally, as already indicated, the 
rapid transition to export promotion industrialisation policies in these countries favoured 
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new industries with export potential [35]. Moreover, the strong political commitments of 
East Asian NICs to an export promotion strategy has also been vital for effective and 
successful implementation of this policy. For example, a system of setting export targets and 
the practice of holding monthly trade promotions have been among the most important 
mechanisms which provided some very useful information needed to direct the Korean 
export drive [36]. 
Country Year Primary Semi- Manufacturing High- Industrial Other 
product manufacturing products Tech products products 
(1) Products (3) products (2}+(3) 100 - (1) 
(2) in total - (5) 
exports (6) 
(4) 
S. Korea 1989 3.3 5.8 90.6 24.4 96.4 0.3 
Indonesia 1989 52 29.8 18.2 0.8 48 0 
Malaysia 1988 35.3 23.5 40.6 25 64.1 0.6 
Thailand 1988 22.9 23.7 49.3 13 73 4.1 
Brazil 1987 23.8 30.7 44.5 6.2 75.2 1 
Mexico 1989 44.8 14.7 40 7.6 54.4 0.5 
Table 5.1 Export composition in Some East Asian and Latin American first and second-tier 
NICs (%). 
Source: Institute of Developing Economies, 1995. 
As a result of this series of export incentive measures which created an appropriate 
environment for the expansion of exports and in particular manufacturing exports, the 
average share of manufacturing exports to total exports in East Asian countries has 
increased from 13% in 1965 to 69% in 1993. For example, the manufacture exports 
consisted of90% of total exports in S. Korea, 54% in Thailand, 44% in Malaysia and 32% 
in Indonesia [37]. Table 5.1 shows a comparison of export composition between East Asian 
and Latin American countries, which has been classified in three main categories: primary 
products, semi-manufactured products, and manufactured products. For example, in 1989, 
the export share of industrial products (i.e. semi-manufactured products and manufactured 
products) were 96.4% for S. Korea and 54.7 % for Mexico respectively. As one can see the 
share of high-tech products in total exports in some second-tier East Asian countries such 
as Malaysia with 25% has been even more than that of first-tier East Asian NICs such as S. 
Korea with 24.4% [38]. 
Having compared the implementation of an export-oriented policy in the first and second-
tier NICs, it seems that the first type of East Asian NICs such as Korea and Taiwan 
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emphasised more an export expansion policy through providing credits and subsidies for 
some selected industries in particular capital and technology-intensive industries including 
heavy and chemical machinery and electrical and electronics manufacturing products. The 
second type NICs such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, however, relied more on 
exports ofprimaty and resource-processed products in the early stages of export-led policy. 
The processing of primary goods and the production of manufacturing using locally 
available materials and large labour forces has given a strong comparative advantage to 
these countries. Moreover, it is argued that in contrast to East Asian NICs, the rate of 
manufacturing protection up to 1980 has been higher in the Southeast Asian countries. For 
example, while the effective rate of protection for all manufacturing averaged 13 percent for 
Korea (1968), and 14 per cent for Taiwan (1969), the protection rate in manufacturing 
sector ranged from 34 percent for Thailand to 65 per cent for Indonesia. However, after a 
change to an export-oriented industrialisation policy in these countries, industries receiving 
protection were pushed to rapidly become internationally competitive [39]. 
As explained earlier, the transition from import substitution to export promotion policies in 
both Korea and Taiwan required a reform in exchange rate policy in addition to import 
liberalisation and export incentives. In Korea for example, one can refer to the major 
devaluation of 1961 and 1964 along with various measures for the hoeralisation of import 
restrictions and introduction of several export incentives after the devaluation of 1964, 
which had facilitated the rapid transition to export-led strategy. On the other hand, Taiwan 
had experienced this transition in the late 1950s and early 1960s when a series of measures 
switching to export orientation were undertaken. These measures mainly included reforms 
in exchange rate systems, import hoeralisation, and export incentives. Firstly, the multiple-
exchange rate system was gradually decreased into a single rate system through a real 
devaluation of its national currency. Secondly, there has been a gradualliberalisation of 
import controls and restrictions. Finally, the Taiwanese government introduced various 
export incentives including mainly the establishment of three export processing zones, cheap 
loans for exports, and further tax exemption for some export products [40]. 
Therefore, it can be said that most East Asian countries have achieved export promotion 
policies through the devaluation of their exchange rate as a main instrument of encouraging 
exports rather than other incentives such as tax credits or export subsides. As already 
indicated, both Korea and Taiwan adopted export promotion policies in the early stage of 
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their industrialisation through various export incentives, mainly a unified and realistic 
exchange rate. Moreover, almost all of the East Asian successful countries have 
implemented to some extent import and capital flow liberalisation policies [41]. Moreover, 
the establishment of some Export Processing Zones has also been one of the most important 
factors in the success of their export promotion policies. Some East Asian countries in 
particular Taiwan and Malaysia could expand their manufactured products through 
attracting large foreign investment and technology by these zones. Hence, one can say that 
foreign direct investment has played a more critical role in industrial development and 
technology transfer to Malaysia than in its neighbour Thailand. 
The adoption of export promotion in second-type newly industrialised countries, however, 
mainly started from the late 1960s and early 1970s. As an example, in Malaysia the 
transition to export-led policies began with adoption of some specific policies. These 
policies mainly included the investment incentive act of 1968 and some export incentives 
such as tax deductions and credits, and establishment of export processing zones. One can 
say that Malaysia relied more on export Processing Zones to enhance its manufactured 
exports, ahhough such zones were not relatively successful in Indonesia. Malaysia has been 
a successful exporter of manufactures since the late 1970s and there has been an explicit 
policy of export-led growth. However, unlike the first-tier NICs, Malaysia is still major 
exporters of primary goods [42]. 
As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, Thailand is another country in the Southeast 
Asia which has switched to the export promotion policy since the early 1970s through 
specific programs. some of these measures included the export promotion act of 1972, 
flexible exchange rate policy, and various export incentives such as tax rebates on imported 
inputs needed for manufacture exports and credits for exporters [43]. It can be said that the 
export pattern in Thailand was more similar to Korea and Taiwan than was that of Malaysia 
in the early 1960s. Moreover, it is argued that Thailand and Malaysia's recent export 
pattern can be closely compared with Taiwan's 1980 pattern [44]. The Thai state has also 
played a key role in providing the infrastructure such as highways, and power stations 
required for promoting the country's indigenous industrial and technological capability and 
promoting the quality of its manufacturing exports. However, there has been less direct 
intelVention in Thailand than S. Korea and Taiwan. 
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Indonesia's experience as a late-comer to export promotion in the mid-1980s may also 
provide valuable lessons for the other late-comer LDCs. As discussed in detail previously 
(Indonesia's case study), following the sharp decline in the oil prices in the mid-1980s, 
Indonesia switched to export-oriented policies from the previous import substitution and 
inward-looking policies. This has been done through major policy changes, such as 
exchange rate devaluation, import liberalisation, and reduced restrictions on foreign direct 
investment. The Indonesian government also took several measures enhance the flow of 
foreign direct investment, which could bring high technology and managerial expertise into 
the country. Although Indonesia is known as a late industrialiser due to its transition to 
export promotion policies in mid 1980s, its pattern. of industrial and technological 
development has had common features with its East Asian neighbours in its export 
promotion policy, with Mexico and other oil exporter countries as a petroleum economy, 
and with India in its large domestic market. 
Having faced competition from the cheaper products of some other countries in the region 
such as China and Viet:nam, most second-tier East Asian NICs had no choice but to improve 
the productivity and quality of their products, and increasing technological activities to 
diversify their manufacturing exports. For example, Thailand was more successful than 
Indonesia in doing this. Indonesia's experience points to the fact that reliance on cheap 
labour to fuel export growth is a risky strategy when other countries are able to supply even 
cheaper labour [45]. As discussed earlier, the East Asian countries adopted export 
promotion policies in a different period of time. The exports of labour-intensive 
manufactured products in the first tier NICs such as Korea and Taiwan expanded sharply 
from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, substantially contnDuting to labour employment and 
economic growth. However, the second tier NICs such as Thailand and Indonesia did not 
switch to export-oriented policies, after the easy import substitution in final consumer goods 
was exhausted [46]. 
Having compared the experience of East Asian countries in the adoption of export-
orientation policies with that of the Latin American NICs, one can see that the former has 
been more successful than the latter. As Sachs (1985) noted, the Latin American NICs failed 
to take an effective step towards export-orientation in the 19605 because of a historically 
urban-industrial society which sought protection [47] . 
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Moreover, it is argued that there is a greater incentive to rely on export-oriented 
industrialisation in resource-poor countries because such countries cannot rely on export 
income from primary commodities. This can also be a reason for continuing inward-looking 
strategy in resource-rich East Asian countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia until the 
collapse in oil prices, which forced them to move towards export promotion policies. It is 
also generally believed that the adoption of the successful export promotion policies in East 
Asian countries enabled them to attain higher investment and productivity rates and 
therefore led to a rapid growth rate. In contrast, the failure to achieve the expansion of 
exports confined several Latin American countries to severe balance of payment crises 
which caused the relatively slow growth rate. 
One can say that the successful implementation ofliberalisation and stabilisation policies in 
East Asian countries enabled them to achieve the macroeconomic stability needed for a 
successful export expansion. The reliance on external credit and continuing protectionist and 
inward-looking policies in the Latin American countries on the other hand, ended up with 
serious debt-service problems in these countries. The successful stabilisation and adjustment 
programs of East Asian countries can be another factors for their success in rapid economic 
and industrial development [48]. This, in long term perspective, may be very important for 
the Latin American policy makers to make their best efforts to formulate policy measures 
in order to promote resource allocation and establish a viable pattern of economic and 
industrial development. 
It is also argued that because of the larger size of domestic markets in Latin American NICs 
such as Brazil and Mexico, the experience of these countries with import substitution 
strategies has been significandy longer than those of East Asian NICs. Moreover, although 
the government in some Latin American NICs such as Mexico, played a major role in 
allocating resources for growth and in encouraging technical change through foreign 
investment, the state inteIVention has been far less effective in these countries in 
strengthening industrial competitiveness than it has been in East Asian NICs. Furthermore, 
the longer period of import substitution in Latin American NICs which is also believed to 
be as a resuh of their strong bias towards protectionist, resuhed in high capital investments 
and high technology costs and led to an increase in the cost of production in these countries. 
Although the export growth was comparable between the two regions (East Asia and Latin 
America), the share of manufacturing increased rapidly in East Asia but only slightly 
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increased in Latin America. This is believed to be an important difference, as there has been 
an increasing world demand for manufactured exports compared with primary exports [49]. 
It is also noteworthy that while most of East Asian countries were successful in avoiding 
excessive appreciation of their exchange rates, Latin American developing countries have 
mostly suffered from overvaluation and a high degree of exchange rate instability [50]. 
Latin America East Asia 
Low economic growth (1.6% p.a.) High economic growth (7.8% p.a.) 
Ingh inflation (192% p.a.) Moderate inflation (6% p.a.) 
Heavy debt burden (> $ 400 billion) Reduced debt «$ 200 billion) 
Slow-down of foreign investment Major wave of foreign investment 
Stagnation or decline in total research Rapid growth in total research and 
and development « 0.5 % ofGDP) development (1-2 % of GNP) 
Low share of industrial research and Growing share of industrial R&D (40-50 
development «30 % of total R&D) % of total R&D) 
Weak focus on exports/ competitiveness; Focus on exports/competitiveness; strong 
low electronics exports electronics exports 
Deteriorating higher education; number Expanding higher education; no. of 
of engineering graduates per 100,000 engineering graduates per 100,000 
population less than Japan population greater than Japan 
Very high income disparities Relatively low income disparities 
Table 5.2 A Comparison of some of the main macro-economic indicators between East 
Asian NICs and Latin American NICs 
Source: ACCEDE, " The Benefits of Free Trade: East Asia and Latin America", 1994, 
P:I00 
The other major difference between the East Asian and Latin American NICs is that the 
exports from the former have a1most focussed on manufacturing goods, while in Latin 
American NICs such as Mexico and Brazil, the manufactured products are included less than 
one- half of their total exports. For example, the annual average growth rate of 
manufactured exports during the period between 1966-73 increased by 22% and 21% in 
Taiwan and S. Korea, respectively, compared to 6.4% and 11.8% in Mexico and Brazil. 
The Latin American NICs, however, have exported a more diversified range of products, 
reflecting their more abundant supply of natural resources. The East Asian NICs have been 
shifting their manufactured exports from labour-intensive products to more technology and 
capital intensive goods [51]. 
It can be said that one of the most important reasons behind the significant export 
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performance of the East Asian countries which has also distinguished them from the 
experience of other countries in the implementation of export promotion policies is the close 
co-operation of the public and private sector in these countries. As discussed in detail in 
previous chapters, the government in many East Asian countries have introduced various 
incentive policy measures for their private firms in order to encourage them in the export 
activities. The private enterprises of these countries have pursued the priorities of the state 
more readily than other countries. Therefore, the experience of East Asian NICs in 
successful implementation of an export promotion policy indicates that it is not export 
expansion policy itself that led to their success, but rather how a specific country can 
manage and implement this policy successfully so that it can contn"bute to the significant 
export performance of these countries. 
Therefore, as has already been analysed, the adoption of outward-oriented, export 
promotion policies have played the key role in the overall successful performance of the East 
Asian first and second-tier NICs. Exports have been a leading, and sometimes even the 
primary, source of growth in these countries as the initial take off came after increasing of 
their exports, resulted from transition to export promotion policy in the early stage of their 
industrialisation. However, it is believed that the adoption of an outward looking 
industrialisation strategy which has brought a significant growth rate for East Asian 
countries, was not obtained without cost. One can see that most of these countries have 
depended largely on importing foreign material and inputs from developed countries in order 
to export their manufacturing products into the international market [52]. Moreover, there 
are some other critics who claim that the filst growth of exports in Southeast Asian countries 
(such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) was mostly because of the international 
relocation of labour-intensive and assembly-based industries from the NICs (such as Korea 
and Taiwan) and Japan in these countries which led to heavy dependency on imports of parts 
and components [53]. 
It is believed that only a few developing countries seem to be able to sustain the social and 
political bases required for long-term export-oriented industrial development strategy. One 
can also add to the above point that the model of national economic growth based on export 
of manufactured goods has been a partial approach toward the national development of 
these countries [54]. Furthermore, although the export promotion policy to a large extent 
has had a contn'butory effect on the industrial development of East Asian countries, it is 
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however argued that this strategy can not guarantee overall improvement in a country's 
income distribution. This depends on many other factors which have probably been 
favourable in the first- tier East Asian NICs, but much less so in the second-tier East Asian 
NICs, as many of the second-tier east Asian NICs, in particular Thailand and Indonesia, 
suffered from imbalance distn'bution of income and facilities. 
5. 2. 3 The Role of Technology Transfer 
The experience of the East Asian first and second tier NICs in the importation, adaptation 
and spread of new technology can also be invaluable for other developing countries. As 
many other countries tried to replicate their model of technology transfer and development, 
it seems essential to analyse more in depth their experience of technology transfer and 
development. The adoption, assimilation and absorption of imported technologies can play 
an important role in the industrial and technological development of any country. As 
mentioned earlier, the adoption of an appropriate mode of technology transfer from more 
advanced economies to developing countries has played a vital role in accelerating their pace 
of industrialisation. As discussed in the previous chapter, East Asian NICs have made 
extensive use of many ways of obtaining foreign technology. 
However, this does not mean that each of these countries has employed similar method of 
acquiring foreign technology. While those of second-tier NICs such as Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia, along with small city-state NICs such as Hong Kong and Singapore have 
relied on an forms of transferring foreign technologies and in particular FDI, the larger and 
the first-tier East Asian NICs such as Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan, have used less 
FDI in the earlier stage and more on licensing and importing capital goods and more recently 
on domestic R&D. There has also been a major effort in all of these countries to make 
maximnm use of foreign technology through different modes. One of the strongest 
similarities among most East Asian first and second tier NICs in the way they acquire 
foreign technology has been their very high dependence on imported capital goods. There 
has been a high rate of imports of capital goods in Korea and Taiwan, even though they 
have also developed very strong local capital goods industries. The second-tier East Asian 
countries have also transferred a substantial amount technologies embodied in machinery 
and capital goods. 
It seems that due to a relatively high financial resources and technical expertise needed to 
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enter a costly licensing agreement, it was mostly used by East Asian first-tier NICs including. 
S.Korea andTaiwan as a method for acquisition offoreign technology. Moreover, despite 
using some methods such as imitation and reverse engineering in some countries with 
stronger technological capability, as local firms in these countries seek to produce goods 
requiring more sophisticated technical know-how, copying becomes a more difficuh 
proposition. Thus, for such products licensing may be the most effective means of 
technology acquisition. Moreover, there has also been more tendency in S. Korea to use 
turnkey projects and machinery imports in the early stage of its industrial development. In 
Thailand and Malaysia, foreign direct investment was a major channel for acquisition of 
foreign technology. The Indonesian firms have mainly received technology through licensing 
and technical assistance agreements. Training the technical human labour by the foreign 
firms has also accounted a popular mode of technology transfer in Indonesia. However, 
Indonesia is considered to have the least level of technical capability among the East Asian 
first and second-tier NICs due to lack of adequate infrastructure and technical expertise to 
assimilate and absorb efficiently foreign technology to its local condition. 
It is also believed that the rapid growth in technological sophistication of first and second-
tier NICs' manufacturing products has been achieved more through the state-managed joint 
investment and licensing agreements than the whole-owned investment by multinational 
companies [55]. Therefore, their national technological capability has been strengthened 
through the absorption of knowledge and technical know-how. As discussed earlier, it is 
believed that the adaptation and diffusion of technologies and know-how can be achieved 
more through joint venture than by FDI under the complete control by foreign Multinational 
Company. This is mainly because under a joint venture agreement, the local partner can 
leam better the technical and managerial skills embodied in foreign technologies and even 
it was able to set up a national company, this could not have been done before entering the 
joint venture. For example, the Korean case of a close working relationship between 
government and industry in the establishment of technology institutes in the 1970s and 
1980s may provide useful implications to the pOSSIole replication of that experience 
elsewhere [56]. 
As indicated in the country study swvey, it seems that some second-tier East Asian NICs 
such as Malaysia and Indonesia have employed more regulation of technology imports than 
Thailand. Malaysia, on the other hand, seems to use a higher degree of regulation than 
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Indonesia through setting up a specific Technology Transfer Unit to examine technology 
contracts. It should be noted that most second-tier East Asian NICs have also been 
influenced by the Korean Model of encouraging domestic research, and heavy investment 
in its education activities to enhance technology transfer. However, fewer of these countries 
have noted that planning for technology transfer and development requires designing an 
appropriate specific plan and strategy for technology transfer within the country's overall 
national development framework as well as an understanding of the country's existing 
quantitative factor of endowments [57]. 
As discussed earlier in detail, most second-tier East Asian NICs (Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia) followed relatively open-door policies towards technology transfer and there were 
no special legal arrangements regarding technology transfer. For example, there were no 
restrictive policies and special legal frameworks in Indonesia and Thailand regarding 
transferring foreign technology. Despite some internal guidelines which were needed for 
firms wishing to obtain investment incentives by Thailand's Board of Investment, all firms 
were free to enter into any kind of technology agreement [58]. The Thai government has 
also taken specific measures to increase bargaining power in the acquisition of technology, 
through using various effective incentives for foreign investors to attract foreign investment 
projects, which also brought managerial and technical skills into that country. The open 
policies towards transfer of technology enabled the country to import a substantial amount 
offoreign technology in the past years. For example, in 1993, Thailand had spent about $ 
550 million on direct purchase of technology of which an estimated $ 400 million was for 
royalty and brand-name fees, and about $148 million was for technology fees [59]. 
There has recently been a considerable shift towards more government efforts in expanding 
research and development activities and technical training in the East Asian second-tier 
NICs. In Malaysia, for example, the Ministry of Trade and Industry is responsible for 
ensuring its local firms take most benefit from the inflow of technology. The Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) has also been established since 1992 to 
support private companies through various fiscal and financial incentives in order to 
commercialise their research resuhs. 
As indicated earlier, the Thai government has also tried to playa more effective role in the 
development of the science and technology of the country. Hence, it has set up an overall 
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plan for this purpose, emphasising key targets such as the promotion oflocal technology 
capability through increase in R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP and more 
investment in the development of its human resources. In order to achieve the objectives of 
the plan, several key measures have been taken, such as the establishment of a Technology 
Transfer Centre to collect, evaluate, and disseminate foreign technological information for 
local business and industry. In addition, a number of specialised research centres such as the 
Thai Institute of Scientific and Technological Research have been established in order to 
adapt foreign technology to local conditions [60]. 
As indicated in detail previously, East Asian first-tier NICs such as S. Korea and Taiwan 
placed more emphasis on strengthening their indigenous technological capability in contrast 
to second-tier East Asian NICs including Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. This is mainly 
because of the allocation of substantial investment in their national education at all levels, 
as well as high expenditure in R&D activities as a percentage of GNP. Moreover, S. Korea 
and Taiwan formulated a well-defined industry and technology development strategy which 
has been an important aspect of the catch up drive of these countries. This strategy 
concentrated more on an extensive plan to promote indigenous technological capability 
through development of research and development, infrastructure, and human resources. 
Therefore, the government in these countries introduced various measures to promote the 
numbers of scientists and engineers as well as technicians and skilled workers, to increase 
the level of absorptive capacity for more sophisticated technology. They also established 
a strong industrial infrastructure base and also enhanced the level of productivity and 
competitiveness of manufactured products in particular in some high and advanced 
technologies and industries [61]. 
As discussed in the COWltry study in detail, the second-tier East Asian NICs have transferred 
more technology from Japan and some first-tier NICs such S.Korea and Taiwan. This is 
mainly because of lower cost due to close proximity, and better appropriateness and 
adaptability of Japanese and Korean as wen as Taiwanese technology to the local conditions 
of these cOWltries. Moreover, Japan and East Asian first-tier NICs have also gained 
significant benefit from transferring technology to these countries, such as a substantial 
earnings as wen as development of technological capability through the recognition of their 
comparative advantage [62]. Choi et al (1989) classified some countries in the Asian and 
Pacific region to the different groups through focusing on some important industry and 
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technological characteristics [63]. 
Group Major Technological Countries Industry Characteristics 
I ( Characterised by - A dynamic S&T base. Japan Brain-intensive (in the 
Self-propagating by - Creation of new process of shifting 
Dynamism) technology based on towards a post-industrial 
advanced sciences society characterised by 
knowledge and 
information 
IT (Existence of some - A Growing/ S. Korea Technology-Intensive 
Dynamism with Diversified S&T base Taiwan (technological 
Potentials for Future - Improvement of Hong Kong competence in India 
Growth through imported technology Singapore arising from science and 
Integrated and some technology India technology development 
Approaches) generation China for domestic market, but 
in cases of other countries 
from export-oriented 
development and 
international competition) 
ill (Existence of -Existence of S & T Indonesia Skill-Intensive and 
Elements of base Iran resource rich; more relied 
Dynamism and need - Digestion and Malaysia on export of resource-
for Integrated adaptation of imported Pakistan based products; relatively 
Approaches). technology and some Philippines cheap labour force 
improvement of Thailand 
existing technology 
IV (Near Absence of - Weak S&Tbase Bangladesh Operation-Intensive (early 
Technological - Some utilisation of Nepal phase of and/or partial 
Dynamism) technology Sri Lanka industrialisation to meet 
Vietnam & domestic needs; 
Pacific predominance of 
Island agricuhure 
Countries 
Table 5.3 Major Technological Focus and Industry Characteristics in the Asian and Pacific 
Region 
Source: Choi, HS. and Subramanian, S.K and others" Hybrid of Man and Technology", 
Asian Productivity Organisation, Tokyo, 1989. 
As is shown in Table 5.3, Japan is distinguished from the other East Asian NICs, mainly due 
to its capability to create new technologies and products, characterised by their high 
knowledge and technology intensity. The East Asian first-tier NICs along with India can be 
classified in the second group, because of their capability in improving some existing 
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technologies and generating some new technologies and products. However, while India has 
relied more on an inward-looking pattern and self-sufficiency strategy for its industrial and 
technological development, the East Asian first-tier NICs have adopted the outward-looking 
and export-promotion industrialisation policy. It is also argued that India has also adopted 
restrictive policies toward foreign direct investment. The East Asian second-tier NICs, as 
well as Iran and Pakistan are classified in the third group, which is categorised through their 
capability in assimilation and adaptation of imported technologies and improvement of some 
existing technologies. 
Having compared the methods of technological acquisition, one can say that the Latin 
American NICs such as Brazil and Mexico have relied to a larger degree on foreign direct 
investment in the early stage of their industrialisation, than Southeast Asian NICs. such as 
S.Korea and Taiwan. For example, relative to its size, Mexico had the largest imports of 
technology and foreign direct investment of all the NICs. However, one can say that the 
access to foreign technology for Mexico did not lead to significant indigenous technological 
capability, as well as the East Asian first and second-tier NICs. The East Asian NICs have 
also used other methods of acquiring technology such as technology licensing and joint 
ventures and imports of capital and intermediate goods. One can also say that the East Asian 
human resource development policies have been more successful in comparison with that 
of Latin American NICs. For example, the secondary educational levels in Latin American 
NICs have been on average one-third lower than with that of East Asian NICs. 
5. 2. 4 The Role of Foreign Direct Investment 
As indicated earlier, almost all of the East Asian first and second-tier NICs (except S.Korea 
in the early stage of its industrialisation) have adopted open-door policies towards attracting 
foreign investment which has also been a major source of managerial and technological 
expertise in these countries. The main determinants that made these countries more 
attractive to foreign investors, have been due to their faster economic growth, the existence 
of efficient infrastructure facilities, stable macroeconomic and political stability, cheap and 
skilled labour force, and the openness of their market [64]. Moreover, the proximity to 
Japan and sharing several common features with the Japanese cultural condition have been 
other reasons to attract a substantial amount of Japanese investments [65]. It should be also 
noted that the early transition to an export promotion and outward-looking industrialisation 
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policies in these countries has also been a key role to encomage foreign investors to relocate 
many of their 1abour-intensive, assembly and export-oriented industries into these countries 
to take most advantage from their cheap 1abour and abundant natural resource [66]. 
East Asian countries have received 8 per cent of world FDI during the period between 
1972-1987, and also accounted for 49 per cent of FDI in developing countries by 1987. 
According to another figure, IDI inflows to developing East Asia increased from about $3 
billion in 1986 to $19 billion in 1992, which was from 33 percent of total external resource 
inflows to 38 percent [67]. Some East Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, Ma1aysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thai1and, received an annual average of$ 7.4 billion in FDI [68]. 
As explained earlier, the high rate ofIDI enabled most East Asian countries to develop their 
financial and macroeconomic stability as well as their technological, managerial and 
marketing skills. It is also argued that the significant amolDlt ofIDI provided these countries 
a strong linkage to connect with international markets [69]. The flow FDI also created 
several employment opportunities for these countries and also enabled these countries to 
utilise their human capital more efficiently by improving their managerial and technical skills 
[70]. 
As indicated earlier, among the East Asian first and second-tier NICs, IDI has played a 
relatively less important role in S. Korea in terms of technology transfer than its 
COlDlterpartS. According to a recent survey by Asian Development Bank (1995), the share 
of FDI to GDP between 1985 and 1987 has been 1.4% for the S. Korea comparing with 
3.3% for Taiwan, 8.7% for Thai1and and 25% for Singapore [71]. This is mainly because 
of S.Korea's restrictive policies and regulation as well as its use of other methods of 
technology acquisition such as licensing and imports of capital goods and machinery. 
However, S. Korea has adopted more open policies toward FDI since 1984. Moreover, it 
is argued that the experience ofS. Korea in terms of its low levelofFDI in the early stage 
of industrialisation shows that despite the key role which FDI can play in transferring 
technology and managerial expertise, it can not be considered as a necessary condition for 
improving a country's indigenous technological capability. This also requires increasing 
efforts in R&D activities as well as developing an adequate industrial infrastructure [72]. 
As discussed earlier in detail, the East Asian countries have adopted various policy measures 
in order to attract more foreign investment and technical know-how. These include several 
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incentives to foreign investors including tax exemption and free custom services, allowing 
up to 100% ownership, establishment of Export Processing Zones or Free Trade Zones and 
providing necessary and adequate physical facilities and raw materials to facilitate business 
operations of foreign investors by reducing the production costs. For example, Taiwan 
introduced up to 20% tax credits to enterprises and MNCs that invest in its automated 
production equipment [73]. It is also believed that the establishment of investment boards 
or centres in the Southeast Asian countries, such as the Indonesian Capital Investment 
Coordination Board (BKPM), the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), 
and the Board of Investment (BOI) in Thailand were very important to promote, coordinate 
and monitor FDI. However, some investment boards failed to perform as expected, lacking 
in expertise and needing changes in decision making processes [74]. Among the various 
measures introduced for promoting the FDI in East Asian countries, it is believed that a 
stable macroeconomic environment, an efficient tax system and open markets have 
contributed more in attracting foreign investment into these countries [75]. 
Moreover, as indicated earlier, the East Asian first-tier NICs gradually lost their comparative 
advantage as an attractive base for FDI in the 1980s, due to a sharp rise in real wages, a 
revaluation and appreciation of their currencies against the U. S. dollar which led to an 
increase in the cost of the production in these countries, and the emergence of new 
competitors mainly from the second-tier NICs in the region. Therefore, they decided to 
expand their investment in the second-tier East Asian countries in the late 1980s. Most FDI 
acquired by the first-tier NICs of the East Asia such as Korea and Taiwan, has been invested 
in the manufacturing sector of the second-tier East Asian NICs such as Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia. Therefore, the bulk ofFDI including a package of capital, technology and 
marketing skills has been attracted by the manufacturing sector in these countries which 
enjoyed comparative advantage. Moreover, the significant flow ofFDI to the manufacturing 
sector of East Asian countries led to an increase in production capacity in these country. For 
example, S.Korean firms tended to invest either in labour-intensive industries, such as 
foodstuffs, textiles, footwear and leather, and wood and furniture, or in resource-intensive 
products, such as chemicals, nonferrous products, and fabricated metals. The labour-
intensive industries accounted for about 54% of the investment in Thailand, 81 % in 
Indonesia, and 60% in the Phillippines. The share of the resource-based industries has been 
high in some East Asian resource-rich countries in particular Malaysia [76] 
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Country u.s. Europe Japan Asian NICs Others Total 
China 3121 1068 2173 47001 4761 58124 
Indonesia 385 756 798 2490 3290 7719 
Malaysia 213 75 257 248 119 912 
Thailand 16 35 66 42 74 233 
Philippines 88 125 112 93 114 529 
Table 5.4 Foreign Direct Investment in Selected Asian Countries, 1993 (Millions of dollars 
and Percentage increase over 1992): 
Source: ESCAP, (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 
"Outlook for Trading Opportunities in the ESCAP Region", Paper of workshop held in 
Jakarta, Indonesia, June 1994. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the flow ofFDI in these countries increased significantly 
particularly in export-oriented manufacturing. In 1991 Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and 
S. Korea were the third, fifth, seventh, and eighth largest recipients ofFDI respectively 
among developing countries, after China and Mexico. As indicated earlier, in addition to 
relocation of their assembly activity, labour and resource-intensive industries, the East Asian 
first-tier NICs have also transferred a substantial amount of technology to other developing 
countries in particular the second-tier East Asian NICs. Moreover, due to their high level 
of technological capability and industrial infrastructure, some industrial enterprises in the 
first tier East Asian NICs acted as intermediaries. This indicates that they have been used 
as a base to modify more advanced and sophisticated technologies for the use of other 
developing countries. Therefore, other developing countries with lower technological 
capability find it easier to adapt and cope with those technologies which have already 
modified in these countries [77]. 
It is believed that the large share of some Latin American NICs such as Brazil and Mexico 
in total FDI during the early stage of their industrialisation was mainly concentrated in 
capital-intensive industries which were heavily dependent on importing foreign inputs and 
therefore led to the heavy dependency to MNCs. However, much FDI in the East Asian 
first-tier NICs has been focused on labour-intensive industries and did not result in the same 
degree of dependency as their Latin American counterparts during the same period [78]. 
Therefore, it should be noted that although the level ofFDI as a share of total output was 
twice that of their East Asian counterparts in that period (1960s), the former was less 
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successful in comparison with the latter in developing a relatively self-sufficient 
technological base, due to some factors such as the long-term inward-looking policies as 
well as the larger domestic market which caused much of the FDI going to the Latin 
American NICs to be used for the domestic market rather than contnoute for exports [79]. 
Another important aspect of the East Asian countries is that the investment boom was 
sustained over a longer period of time in comparison with their Latin American 
counterparts. It is believed that the sustained investment boom and export orientation have 
created "a virtuous circular pattern of accumulative expansion" in the East Asian countries 
[80]. As Petri (1995) has also noted, there has been a 'Virtuous circle of investment, trade 
and growth" in these countries. This means that the outward-oriented, export promotion 
policies and investment policies have led to an expansion of trade and exports and attracted 
FDI, and this in tum has encouraged government in these countries to sustain policies that 
are in favour of international linkages [81]. This is mainly because export earnings led to 
higher investment in these countries, which in tum further resulted in higher exports. One 
can also say that at the centre of this process is the dynamic role of finance, technology, and 
know-how which comes with FDI, mostly through muhinational companies. 
5. 2. 5 The Role of Human Resource Development 
As in most studies undertaken about the successful experiences of East Asian NICs indicate, 
many of these countries in particular the East Asian first-tier NICs have invested heavily in 
development of their human resources which played a major role in their success. Lall 
( 1993) argues that the industrial success of the East Asian NICs is clearly linked to their 
capability development based on large investments in education and training [82]. As 
indicated earlier, one can find a strong linkage between the development of human resources 
in a country and its indigenous technological capability. In other words, human capital and 
technology complements rather than substitutes in modem industrial production. It is also 
argued that the availability of well-educated human resources is more important than the 
availability of natural resources in industrial and technological development of a country. 
Each country has to build up its human capital base in order to make effective use of its 
technological base and strengthen its technological capability. Therefore, one can say that 
it was East Asian NICs' massive investments in human resource development that enabled 
them to acquire technological capability rapidly and also led to their rapid industrialisation. 
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It is also believed that the high levels of investment in technical human capital in the East 
Asian countries have been an important factor for their effective assimilation of foreign 
technologies. 
It is also argued that East Asian countries managed to utilise their human resources very 
efficiently through designing specific plans and programs for upgrading their educational as 
well as skills levels. As discussed earlier, the rapid pace of industrialisation and technological 
development in these countries necessitate the development of quality as well as quantity 
of their labour force in order to adopt, assimilate and absorb modem and new technologies 
more effectively [83]. It is believed that for a country to assimilate modem labour intensive 
technologies, it is estimated that about 50% of population should have attained a secondary 
level of education. It is also considered that in order to be able to adopt and even export 
high technologies, a country needs about 30-40 per cent of college and university enrolment 
in the 20-24 years age group. However, despite the various attempts by several developing 
countries only S. Korea has reached such a level [84]. 
As explained in detail in the country study, almost all East Asian countries in particular the 
first-tier NICs such as S. Korea and Taiwan have paid attention to the importance of human 
capital and adopted various policy measures in promoting their educational systems both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Therefore, the government in each of these countries has 
fommlated a series of human resource development plans in order to meet the demands for 
their growing industrial bases. There have been a substantial number of educated and well-
trained workers among first-tier NICs since the early stage of their industrialisation in the 
mid-1960s. The education system in these countries has also developed very rapidly. For 
example, secondary school enrolments in the S. Korea and Taiwan were approximately at 
the same level of developed countries by the mid-1980s. These countries combined the high 
level of education with imported technology and the return of expatriates to produce rapid 
productivity growth [85]. 
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Figure 5.3 A Comparison Share of Public Expenditure on Basic and Higher education in 
Some of the Successful East Asian Countries 
Source: World Bank 1993, P: 199. 
There were also high educational levels among second-tier NICs, but far less than that of 
first-tier NICs. The number of scientists and engineers in proportion to total population are 
also lower than that first-tier NICs. Among the Southeast Asian second-tier NICs, Malaysia 
has been more successful in human resource development policy than Thailand and 
Indonesia, due to a large investment in education and the labour force. As discussed earlier, 
the low level of skilled workers and lack of adequate technicians and engineers in some 
countries such as Indonesia and Thailand can be considered as a major restraint to the 
effective adaptation and dissemination of new technologies in these countries. However, 
more recently these countries have attempted to improve the level of educational indicators 
through specific programmes. For example, the Thai government has given specific priority 
to the national efforts for directing its educational system to supply an adequate well-
qualified labour force for its industrial bases by placing emphasis on vocational and technical 
training. For instance, one can refer to the plan in which a six-year compulsory primary 
education has been proposed by Thai's state in the early 1980s [86]. Moreover, Thailand 
has also put especial emphasis on tertiary education, in an attempt to fill wide gaps in 
secondary and tertiary education. 
The public investment has been concentrated more on the expansion of primary and 
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secondary education in most East Asian countries. At the post-secondary leveL public 
spending has focused on scientific and technological education. Many of these countries also 
sent large numbers of their students abroad, particularly in some science and engineering 
fields and technologically sophisticated areas. The overall educational investments in these 
countries have been well-focused on the acquisition and mastery of technology. Thus, one 
can say that the high educational and skill levels in most East Asian countries can be 
regarded among the major factors of their overall success [87]. The high investment of 
education in Taiwan and S.Korea has been very productive in supporting their economic 
growth through concentrating on the lower level of education in the early stage of their 
industrialisation, and later on the higher education. For example, in Korea, enrolment in 
higher education increased twelve fold during 1945-60, under the simuhaneous influence 
of deh'berate government strategy to strengthen higher education and of the Confucian 
values placing great importance on education [88]. 
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Table 5.5 Investment in Technology and Skills in some successful countries. 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 1991 
As we can see in the Table 5.5, S. Korea and Taiwan have achieved the highest levels of 
educational enrolment in science and technology per 100,000 population, with enrolment 
ranging from 765 to 795. Taiwan has also successfully formulated its human resource 
development policies to meet the requirements of different stages of its economic and 
industrial development. One can also refer to the relatively high literacy rate in Taiwan 
(92%) and S.Korea (88%) and also the high level of research and development expenditure 
as a percentage of GNP in S.Korea (2.3) and Taiwan (1.1), as an important factor for the 
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better assimilation and absorption of foreign technologies. The growing rate of skills and 
R&D activities in East Asian first and second-tier NICs have also increased the level of their 
competitiveness and productivity in international market. 
As discussed earlier, the level of education and the quantity and quality of engineers and 
technicians in each country have been the most important factors in the assimilation and 
improvement of the imported technologies in order to become competitive in the 
international market. Each country has attempted to provide a relatively adequate number 
of technicians and engineers necessary for adapting and developing foreign technologies. 
Several institutes and polytechnics have been established in each country to train the 
technicians and engineers needed for national industries. Therefore, improving the quality 
and quantity of education indicators as well as increasing expenditure in R&D activities 
have been among the important elements in determining the level of indigenous 
technological capability in each country. It is also argued that East Asian NICs have been 
more successful in introducing more efficient techniques of production. For example, one 
can refer to high value-added per worker in manufacturing which have been considerably 
ahead of the other developing countries [89]. 
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Diagram 5.4 Some of the most important science and technology indicators in East Asian 
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Diagram 5.4 Some of the most important science and technology indicators in East Asian 
first and second-tier NICs 
As is shown in Diagram 5.4, some of the most important science & technology variables 
and indicators of the East Asian first and second-tier NICs, have been compared. These 
indicators include: the ratio of manufacturing exports to total exports, the ratio of industrial 
licensing to industrial value-added, the share ofFDI in GDP, the share of R&D expenditure 
as a percentage of GNP, the number of engineering students graduated and the number of 
tertiary students abroad. Each indicator or technology variable has been rated from lowest 
score of 1 to highest score of 5. It can be seen that S. Korea has obtained the highest score 
in terms of human capital including the number of engineers and graduated students per 
100,00 of its population from abroad. However, it can be seen that the second-tier East 
Asian NICs have attained lower scores in terms of their human resources indicators. 
Although Malaysia's score in terms of secondary school enrollment has been higher in 
comparison with those of its counterparts (Thailand and Indonesia), however, nearly all of 
these countries obtained the lowest score in engineering graduates per 100,000 of their 
population. 
5. 2. 6 The Confucian Culture and Ethic 
As indicated earlier, there are some other factors contnlmting to the East Asian success 
which can be distinguished from the previous factors in terms of every country's own 
condition and also the degree of its importance. The Confucian cuhure and ethic has been 
a relatively common factor in many of the East Asian countries which affected the quality 
of their human labour through the particular characteristics ofloyalty, hard work, work ethic 
and self-discipline, hierarchy and obedience, and the respect for education [90]. 
Confucianism also emphasises the importance of a protective and generous state, honest 
leadership, and mass defence to authority. The dominance of ethnic Chinese in business and 
commerce in most parts of South East Asia can also be seen as a result of Confucianism 
which was originated in China, but eventually spread throughout East Asia. Therefore, the 
Confucian heritage has also been used to explain the success of Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia, where the Chinese influence is significant. All of these countries have also been 
influenced by the tenets of Confucian cuhure. Although the confusion ethic in East Asian 
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necessary condition for development [91]. 
5.2.7 The Japanese and US aid 
It is argued that Japanese and US financial assistance to many East Asian countries in 
particular S. Korea and Taiwan played a relatively important role in the early stage of 
development of these countries. Japan also provided the East Asian countries with a certain 
amount of financing capital goods, technology, and know-how, which helped them to 
certain extent in upgrading their national technological capacity. For example, from 1962 
to 1980, Japan was the source of nearly 59 % of approved technology licenses, while the 
United States accounted for only 23 percent [92]. Moreover, as indicated earlier, while U.S. 
has been the major investor in some Latin American countries such as Mexico, Japan has 
been the largest source of FDI for most of East Asian first and second-tier NICs, in 
particular, Singapore, S.Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. 
The East Asian NICs, particularly S.Korea and Taiwan also depended heavily on US aid to 
finance their imports and improve the balance of payments in the post second World War 
period. U.S. aid to S.Korea accounted for almost $ 6 billion between 1945 and 1978, almost 
as much as the total aid provided to all African countries during the same period [93]. There 
were also about 42 to 47 per cent of Taiwan's commodity imports during 1953-6 and 82 to 
85 per cent of Korea's commodity imports during 1956-8 which was financed by US aid. 
Moreover, U.S. aid financed 95 % of Taiwan's trade deficit in the 1950s. However, the US 
financial aid began to decrease in early 1960s and in the case of Taiwan came eventually to 
an end in 1967 [94]. As indicated earlier, most East Asian first and second-tier NICs 
pursued the Japanese model of industrial and technological development in particular in the 
early stage of industrialisation which mostly emphasised massive technology transfer, high 
investment in human capital and industrial infrastructure, and strong outward-looking, 
export-oriented policies. One can also refer to the Flying Geese Model which shows the 
importance of Japan in the economic and technological development of most East Asian 
countries. The Flying Geese Model indicates that as Japanese wages increased and the Yen 
appreciated, production facilities and technology flowed outwards from Japan, first to the 
four NICs (S.Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong), then to the second-tier NICs 
(Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) and to China. Later, as wage costs and technological 
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four NICs (S.Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong), then to the second-tier NICs 
(Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) and to China. Later, as wage costs and technological 
levels offour NICs increased and their currencies also appreciated, they too increased their 
outward investment into the second-tier NICs and China [95]. 
In other words, according to the Flying Geese mode~ the technological leader countries 
such as Japan and other developed countries transferred their technology to the other 
countries with a lower degree of industrial and technological development such as the East 
Asian first-tier NICs. As these countries close their technological gap with the technological 
frontier countries through the catching up process, they can also export some of their 
products \Wich were previously produced by more advanced countries. Therefore, the very 
close co-operation of the East Asian countries through trade, culture, and history have 
helped them to take advantage of each other's experience in production, marketing, 
management, and policy making. Therefore, the Flying Geese Model shows that developing 
countries can also replicate the models of other successful countries with a relatively similar 
characteristics. 
Country 1986 2000 
Indonesia Early to Middle Middle to Late 
Thailand Middle Late to ffigh-Tech 
Malaysia Middle to Late Late to ffigh-Tech 
Taiwan Late to ffigh- High-Tech 
Korea Late to High- High-Tech 
Table 5.7 The catching up process of industrial and technological development in the East 
Asian first and second-tier NICs (1986-2000) 
5.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As discussed in detail, the successful experience of East Asian first and second-tier NICs in 
rapid industrial and technology development can have valuable lessons for other LOCs. The 
most important common success factors of these countries which can be more applicable 
to other developing countries are: the early transition to outward-looking, export promotion 
policies, substantial and efficient investment in development of human resources, effective 
role of government intervention, and an appropriate technology transfer and development 
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to adapt and absorb high and modem technologies more efficiently. However, some other 
non-economic factors such as authoritarian governments, Confucian tradition and US and 
Japanese financial aid in the early stage of their industrialisation were among the relatively 
less important success factors of these countries; although they have influenced to some 
extent labour productivity, saving behaviour, financial and macroeconomic stability and 
other aspects of successful performance in these countries. Therefore, the success of these 
countries can not only be as a resuh of a single factor, but because of a series of interrelated 
factors. 
As indicated earlier, ahhough the Flying Geese Model indicates that the East Asian second-
tier NICs have been successfull to follow the first-tier East Asian NICs and both pursued 
the Japanese model; however, it seems that other LDCs may not easily replicate some 
aspects of past successful experiences of East Asian countries. It is argued that some of the 
most important circumstances which provided an appropriate environment for their success 
no longer exist. For example, due to a less favourable environment for a successful export 
promotion policy in the present very competitive international market, it seems difficult for 
other developing countries as newcomers to be as successful as East Asian countries in the 
implementation of an export promotion policy. However, the successful experience of some 
East Asian second-tier NICs such as Malaysia and Thailand which managed to expand their 
manufactured exports more rapidly than did some of the first-tier East Asian NICs such as 
Korea and Taiwan earlier, can be a good reason for opposing this idea. Moreover, it is also 
argued while today's developed countries were developed in the period when there were no 
other more advanced economies, today's LDCs can take advantage of being latecomers and 
therefore their growth might be more rapid than those of their predecessors. In other words, 
LDCs can be more successful through a catching up process which does not need to 
reinvent the wheel. Therefore, it can be generally said that other LDCs can also achieve 
similar and even better results if they pursue the same model and a set of appropriate 
policies which have previously been experienced by successful countries in particular East 
Asian first and second-tier NICs. 
Another important and valuable lesson which LDCs can learn from the successful experience 
of East Asian first and second tier NICs is that they need to create an appropriate and stable 
macroeconomic environment with a high level of investment and the low level of inflation, 
which are essential for successful industrial and technological development policies. 
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macroeconomic environment with a high level of investment and the low level of inflation, 
which are essential for successful industrial and technological development policies. 
Moreover, the convergence and consistency of the package of policies mainly export 
promotion, human resource development and technology transfer and development policies 
in East Asian first and second-tier NICs have also played a significant role in their rapid 
industrial and technology development. As discussed in detail earlier, the early shift to the 
outward-looking and export promotion policies in most of East Asian NICs resuhed in a 
significant expansion of exports in these countries which in turn led to an increase in their 
overall growth performance. 
Moreover, these countries adopted an appropriate technology transfer strategy 
concentrating on the development of their indigenous technological capability as well as 
acquisition of new and modern technologies in order to promote the level of 
competitiveness and productivity of their products in the international market. The effective 
implementation of export-oriented and technological development strategies have also been 
followed by efficient and large investment in their technical human resources which enabled 
them to strengthen their absorptive capacity of high and modem technologies. Moreover, 
the government in these countries played a key role in directing and conducting efficiently 
these policies by providing adequate infrastructure and facilities. The close cooperation 
between private enterprise and the government has also been a central element in the success 
of these countries. 
Despite the successful implementation of a set of appropriate policies which led to their 
success, the policy makers in these countries have also adopted some incorrect policies 
which to some degree delayed the rapid process of their industrialisation. However, an 
important point which also contributed to the success of these countries is that policies have 
been reversed very quickly if the experience showed them to be ineffective. As an example, 
one can refer to a decrease in S. Korea's Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation drive in early 
1980s, the abandonment of selective industrial policies in Malaysia in the early 1980s and 
Indonesia's strong policy response to macroeconomic instability in mid-1980s. Therefore, 
the policy makers of the LOCs can also learn that a successful policy to a large degree 
depends on the ability of society to place efficiency and public interest on effective and 
flexible policy making, including the ability to reverse failed policies. 
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of rapid industrial and technological development. Since their overall growth performance 
has been unique among other countries in other part of the world, and one may not find any 
other set of policies other than East Asian success factors, it seems that other developing 
countries would do well to adopt their model. 
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CHAPfER 6: INDUSTRIALISATION POLICIES IN IRAN 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Iran is a resource-rich country which is located in a strategic area of 1.65 million square 
kilometres, with the Caspian sea, Turkmanistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the north, Turkey 
and Iraq to the west, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in the south and Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to the East, and with a population of more than 60 million people. It is one of the 
major oil exporting countries in the world and has also substantial gas and mineral reserves 
including coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, and sulfur. Moreover, Iran 
has a relatively good transportation network, including about 4,850 km of railroads, 140,200 
km of highways, more than 14 main ports, 132 ships, and 261 airports [1]. According to the 
recent World Bank report (1995), Iran's Gross National Product (GNP) amounted US $ 62 
billion at the market price of 1994, which has grown by an average growth rate of 8.1 % during 
the period 1989-1992. During this period the manufacturing sector grew with an average 
growth rate ofll.5% [2]. 
:! 
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6.2 AN OVERVIEW OF INDUS1RIALISATION POLICES BEFORE REVOLUTION 
As the experience of the most of the countries studied earlier indicates, the industrialisation 
process of these countries was started by the adoption of an import-substitution policy which 
emphasised more the production of consumer goods substituting the imports. In Iran, as with 
many of these countries, efforts for industrial development of the country commenced in the 
early 1960s, by adopting the same pattern of import substitution which was aimed at producing 
previously imported consumer goods with those manufactured domestically. Import 
substitution has also been implemented by introducing some specific measures such as high tariff 
protection, import quota systems, fiscal incentives and investment, in order to protect the infant 
industries. It is argued that the adoption of an import-substitution industrialisation policy may 
have been inevitable due to the relatively underdeveloped structure of Iranian industry in the 
early 1960s. 
As the experience of the successful East Asian countries shows, the success of an import 
substitution strategy in the long-term depends on the ability to shift successfully to an export 
drive. Therefore, in Iran. it was also hoped that the implementation of the lSI would enable the 
country to set up necessary supportive industrial skills and know-how required for a later 
transition to export-oriented industrialisation. A number of new industries were established, 
mainly in food processing and textiles, rubber manufacturing, chemicals, and some electrical 
industries, with the main objective of creating an adequate infrastructure and industrial base 
inCOlPorating new and a re1atively modem technologies. During the period between 1960-1972, 
import substitution accounted for about 26% of the growth in an manufacturing output, 6.6% 
of the increase in consumer goods output. 50.1% for intermediate goods and 63.5% for capital 
goods. Moreover, manufacturing value added grew with an annual average by 12.3% over the 
1963-72 period, and its share in total domestic value added increased from 12.6 to 14% [3]. 
According to a UNIDO survey, Iran's manufacturing sector grew about twice as mst as the 
average growth of this sector in other developing countries in this period [4]. Moreover, the 
GDP per capita increased with an average annual growth rate of about 9.3 %, during the period 
1963-78, ranking Iran as one of the fastest growing developing countries in the world [5]. his 
argued that the rapid rise of industrial output in this period was mainly due to the capacity 
expansion in some established import-substituting industries stimulated by domestic demand [6]. 
However, the agricuhure sector did not have a significant growth rate in this period with 
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average ammal gro\\1:h rate of about 4.4 %, which was less that ono-third of the average gro\\1:h 
of the industrial and manufacturing sector [7]. 
Sector Third plan Fourth plan Fiftbplan 
(1963-68) (1968-1973) (1973-78) 
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual 
Agriculture 
-
4.6 4.4 3.9 7.0 4.0 
Domestic oil 5.0 13.6 15.3 15.2 n.a. 0.7 
GOP 6.0 9.7 10.0 11.4 n.a. 6.9 
Non-oilGDP 6.3 8.7 8.1 10.5 15.0 13.3 
Industrial and mines 
-
13.7 124 13.0 18.0 15.5 
Services 
-
8.0 5.7 14.2 16.4 15.3 
Table 6.1 Average Annual Growth Targets and Achievements of Iran's Five Year Plans (in 
percent) 
Source: Pesaran, M.H Int. 1. Middle East Stud. 14 (1982), P: 50S. 
Despite several significant achievements as a result of import substitution such as the expansion 
of an industrial base capable of producing consumer products for the domestic market, as 
similar cases in some countries studied earlier such as Indonesia and Mexico show, this policy 
caused some negative effects on the Iranian economy. It is argued that due to a low level of 
quality, and Jack of efficient productivity levels, most import substituting industries were unable 
to produce the products for competing in this international market. Moreover, because of a 
heavy dependency on imports of components and equipment required for the production of 
consumer products which were mainly financed by on revenues, they were not also able to 
compete with similar importing products of cheaper price and better quality. Therefore, it is 
believed 1hat the import substitution industries in Iran were mainly created for the final assembly 
ofwhat had already been manufactured in developed countries or by nndtinationals [8]. 
One can also add that heavy reliance on on revenues to import the necessary equipment and 
parts needed for domestic production of previously imported goods led to an increase in 
iIqlorts and an increase oftedmological dependency. Iran continued to be highly dependent on 
on revenues as a major source for financing its imports while most other Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs), apart from relying on primary exports and foreign loans, improved their 
mamDctured exports to pay for a proportion of their imports of capital and intermediate goods 
[9]. Despite several attempts to reduce this high dependency of the country on the on income, 
2S0 
the total value of non-oil exports constituted only 2 percent of the exports [10]. 
There has been a shift of industrial development from import substituting consumer goods 
industries towards intermediate and capital goods during the second phase of the import-
substitution policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Together, intermediate and capital goods 
contributed to about 80% of the overaRgrowth of imports in this period [11]. The relative share 
of intermediate goods imports grew with an annual average of 11% between 1960 and 1973, 
and by 1979, Iran's large industries relied on 56.7 percent import of the foreign inputs for their 
production processes [12]. Furthermore, the required materials, components and parts for the 
industries were characterised not to be produced locally or not in sufficient local supply or not 
of high enough quality, and finally were higher in cost than those of imported materials and 
parts. Therefore, one can see that import substitution industrialisation led to an increase of 
imports and the new industries required additional imports of capital goods. For example, 
imports of electrical and non-electrical machinery increased from $ 176 million in 1960 (28 % 
of imports) to $ 964 million in 1972 (35 % of total imports); imports ofmeta1 and chemical 
products more than quadrupled in the same period [13]. 
As indicated earlier, most consumer goods produced by private firms were unable to create 
employment opportunities and were characterised by low productivity and therefore could not 
compete in international markets. This was because they were mostly capital intensive, labour 
saving and being buih through assembly line processes. Moreover, the inflation and a rapid rise 
in wages of the labour force caused mostly by the oil-boom of 1973, led to the high cost of 
producing industrial products and therefore further complicated their export. Thus, import 
substitute industries were unable to reduce the dependency on the import of foreign inputs and 
to create a self sufficient industry sector. The imports grew from $ S60 million in 1963 to $ 18.4 
billion in 1978, and most were for the manufacturing sector [14]. According to another figure, 
imports increased at an average annual rate of 12.6 percent [15]. 
One should also note the crucial role of state intmvention in the protection ofinfimt industries 
in this period. The state supplied 60 % of all industrial investment in the period between (1973-
78), and also imposed 200-300 % tariffs on many imported goods in order to protect the local 
industries [16]. Moreover, as is mentioned earlier in the case of Mexico and Indonesia, the 
government protection of the industrial sector had created an inefficient industrial sector which 
could not compete in the international market. However, as is shown in the case of some 
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successful countries such as S. Korea, the protectionist policy may lead to the productivity 
growth of some of the infimt industries. A number of infimt industries such as electrical and 
transport machinery were temporarily protected by the Korean government in the early stage of 
its industrialisation, which led to some extent to developing their productivity and 
competitiveness. 
Therefore, it can be argued that ahhough the Import Substitution Industrialisation (lSI) policy 
may cause inefficiencies and low productivity of manufactwing industries, as experience of some 
successful countries such as S. Korea and Mexico indicated, lSI was essential in the early stages 
of their industrialisation and provided a supportive base for a transition to an export promotion 
policy. Nevertheless, it is generally argued that continuous lSI make the local industries 
inefficient and uncompetitive after a long period of government protective tariffs and subsidies. 
This is also due to the fact that the high level of protectionist policy provided domestic 
producers with little incentive to minimise costs or to attempt to promote international standards 
of quality for competition in international markets. It is also argued that the heavy restrictions 
on import of intermediate goods can lead to an overvalued exchange rate which is in tum 
harmful for exports. 
As indicated earlier, following the continuous implementation of the import substitution policy, 
the government in Iran encouraged the private sector to establish and develop the consumer 
goods industries through the introduction of various measures such as tax credits, grants and 
loans. Some financial institutions such as the Industrial and Mining Development Bank oflrm 
(IMDBI), the Indu&trial credit Bank oflrm (ICBI), and the Development and Investment Bank 
of Iran (Dml) were established by government in order to stimJlate industrial development by 
assisting in the creation, expansion and modemisation of private firms and through encouraging 
and sponsoring participation of private investment. One can say that the IMDB played an 
iIqlortant role in mobilising fureign private and domestic industrial development and particularly 
in the modem industries. 
As discussed earlier, while the government emphasised more the development of consumer 
goods industries in the early stage of import substitution, the industrialisation polley during the 
later stage of lSI, concentrated more on construction of large-scale and capital intensive 
industries than the smaB-scaJe labour-intensive industries [17]. Large number of capital-intensive 
and heavy industries have been established such as the machine-building industIy in Tabriz and 
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Arak, the tractor manufacturing company in Tabriz, an integrated iron and steel complex in 
kfilban, and several other heavy and capital-intensive industries which will be further explained 
later in this chapter. A number of auto-manufacturing companies mostly owned by the private 
sector were also established in the late 1960s and early 1970s through joint ventures with 
General Motors, Citroen, Chrysler and Leyland for assembly plants of various kind of cars, mini-
buses, buses and trucks. For example, the Iran National Industrial Company was the largest 
auto-manufacturing company, and was established in 1969 as a joint venture with Rootes 
Motors ofEng1and with a capacity of more than 60,000 cars per year [18]. 
The industries which were created in this period can generally be divided into three categories: 
1. The industries which relied on import offoreign technology and machinery, but were 
not dependent on foreign expertise and raw materials, such as the textile industry, 
and the food processing industry; 
2. Industries which were dependent on foreign technology and expertise but did not 
need to import raw materials from abroad, such as iron-melting, copper and 
petrochemical industries; 
3. The industries which were dependent on foreign technology, machinery and 
expertise, mostly operating by assembly-line methods, such as the auto-
manufacturing industty. 
Selected Level of production Growth rate Level of production Growth 
industries (1973-74) (%) (197417S) rate (%) 
Automobiles SI,OOO 0.1 73,000 43 
Buses 1,627 31.S 1,911 31.S 
Trucks & Vans 23,223 49 29,365 25.7 
Electricity 12,093 miDion (kwh) 26.0 14,005 15.8 
Vegetable oil 189,000 (tomes) 3.3 239,000 (tomes) 26.5 
Sugar 700,000 (tomes) 4.6 761,000 (tomes) 8.7 
Cement 3,401,000 0.9 4,628,000 36.1 
Refrigerators 2S7,000 31.1 309,000 20.2 
Cigarettes 13,449 (million) 4.1 14,389 (million) 7.0 
Paints 25,000 (tomes) 6.0 33,000 (tomes) 33.9 
Table 6.2 Production level of selected industries between 1973 and 1975. 
Source: Bank Markazi (Central Bank of Iran) annual report 
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The above table gives us a picture of the production level often manufacturing industries for the 
period 1973-1975. It is estimated that small-scale and traditional industries, such as textiles and 
carpets, constituted about 35% of total industrial output. During the period between 1962-72, 
the light consnmer industries such textiles and food processing grew 10.70/0, intermediate goods 
industries such as steels and petrochemicals 19.3%, and capital goods industries such as cement 
and e1ectrica1 goods 21 % [19]. It is argued that the increase in oll revenue in October 1973 led 
to a substantial increase in government expenditure and massive imports, which in tum resulted 
an imbalance of payment and budget deficit bymid-1975. Moreover, it is also argued that the 
adoption of the big push industrialisation policy following a slwp increase in oll revenue in 
1973, caused serious damage to rural and agricuhural development as wen as the absorptive 
capacity of the economy. This was mostly due to complete neglect of the agricuhural sector, 
which led to the countIy's heavy dependence on imports of food in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, 
it is also believed that the countIy could not utilise effectively the large amount of foreign 
exchange earned as a result of increasing its oll revenues, due to infrastructural constraints and 
financial mismanagement. In other words, instead of an investment in the development of the 
countIy's industrial inftastructure, and efficient utilisation of natural and human resources, most 
petro-dollars were spent on imports of consumer and luxury products [20]. 
It is generally believed that industrialisation in Iran in the 1970s was nothing more than 
assembly-line production using imported parts [21]. As indicated earlier, there were some 
factors which mainly contributed to Iran's unsuccessful experience of import substitution 
industrialisation. The most significant factors were: the low productivity and high cost of 
mamtfactmed products; lack of effective management in some industrial units; lack of adequate 
infrastructure required for rapid industrialisation (for example, lack of an adequate 
transportation network such as sufficient port facilities, caused so many shlps to wait for more 
than six months to unload their cargoes and therefore resulted in wastage of materials); 
negligence of the agriculture sector that caused large immigration of f8nners to the urban areas; 
the overgrowth of the service sector which widened the gap between rural and urban areas and 
increased imbalance income distribution. 
Therefore, the import substitution policy graduaUy lost its positive effects in the 19708 and 
could not provide a favourable envirODDJeDt for domestic industries to compete in the 
international market and also could not create adequate employment opportunities for a 
country's large labour force [22]. There were some major obstacles which led to failure of the 
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creation of self sufficient import-substitute industries. These included the shortage of a skilled 
labour force and lack of managerial expertise in industrial units, low productivity and lack of 
standard quality control systems for manufactured products, low level of research and 
development activity and lack of sufficient facilities for providing investment for the 
development of the industrial units. Therefore, the consequences of import substitution 
industrialisation were high costs of production, a decrease in qua1ity of products because of the 
heavily protected domestic industry, and continuous dependence on world markets, both to 
build new production capacities and to maintain existing capacities [23]. 
As indicated earlier, the continuous policy of import substitution in the1960s and 1970s 
prevented the industrial sector from promoting its qua1ity standards and productivity level 
needed for competition in the international market. Some government attempts to develop 
export promotion activities were inadequate and ineffective. For example, the introduction of 
some export incentives such as the 100% tax exemption for domestic firms which could export 
15 % of their production along with other policy measures had no significant effects for 
expansion of non-oil exports. This was mostly because these measures were not adequate to 
develop a comparative advantage in the local industries and manufacture products to compete 
in the intemational nwket. As the experience of some East Asian Countries such as S. Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia in rapid transition to a successful export promotion policy 
showed, this needs an appropriate mix of protection, skills development, managerial training, 
technology transfer, and research and development policies and strategies. 
Moreover, the export promotion strategy was further constrained by the very high demand 
levels of the domestic market relative to the domestic production levels and the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to satisfy local demand before considering export possibilities [24]. Another 
reason for neglecting non-oil exports was the increasing rate of oil income since the late 1960s 
which led to a sharp decline in non-oil exports. Ahhough the non-oil exports increased from 
$128.2 million in 1963 to $ 634.7 million in 1973, the share of non-oil exports to total exports 
full shatply from 23 % of the total exports in 1963 to 15% in 1972, and after the oil boom of the 
1973, shatply declined to 2% of total exports [25]. Furthermore, the structure of Iranian non-oil 
exports mostly consisted of small-scale and tradition industries such as carpets, cotton, leather 
and skins, and agriculture products, which remained almost lDlchanged for a long period [26]. 
One can also refer to an overvalued rial as another obstacle in the promotion of non-oil exports, 
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in particular rugs as wen as some agricuhural products (pistachios, caviar, dates) in this period 
(1970s). As the experiences of some countries in particular East Asian first and second-tier 
NICs indicated, the real depreciation of their currency was among the most effective policy 
measures for their successfu1 and rapid transition to an outward-looking, export-oriented 
policies. However, in the case of Iran, the exchange rate has been kept oveIValued artificially to 
encourage the import of capital and intermediate goods. For instance, one can refer to the 
damaging impact of an oveIValued exchange rate to Iran's most important non-oil exports. It is 
believed that despite the better quaHty oflranian rugs and carpets, the oveIValued exchange rate 
resuhed in an increase in cost oflocal production of rugs and carpets which faced competition 
from producers in countries such as India, Pakistan and China with lower costs of production. 
Fmthermore, an oveIValued exchange rate means that \Wile imports were being subsidised, the 
export from Iran became much more difficult [27]. 
h mould also be added that, since the oil boom of 1973, manufacturing wages rose by 2.6 times 
which resulted in an increase in the cost of production of manufacturing products and led to 
reducing the exports of manufacturing goods [28]. Moreover, as a result of country's oil 
revenue in October 1973, some resource-based industries in which Iran had a comparative 
advantage such as textiles, footwear, food processing industries were neglected in favour of 
other import-based and capital intensive industries such as the auto-manufacturing industries, 
which affected the country's capacity of the non-oil exports. Therefore, one can see that some 
of the industrial progress during the period between 1963-1973 came to a halt as a result of post 
oil boom (1973) economic and industrial policies. 
Ahbough the adoption and implementation of an import substitution policy in Iran in the 1960s 
was at a time that many other dcMJoping and newly developed countries also followed the same 
pattern in the earlier stages of their industriaHsation, but there was at least one major difference. 
While many of the other newly industrialising countries (such as S. Korea and Taiwan), in 
addition to relying on primary exports and foreign loans, also proiuoted their manufacturing 
exports to pay for a proportion of their imports of capital and intermediate goods, Iran, thanks 
to its large natural resources such as large on and gas reserves, could not provide moo support 
for export-oricmed industries as in the successfill East Asian countries. Moreover, as indicated 
earlier, the expaimce of the East Asian NICs in particuJar S. Korea and Taiwan showed that an 
early transition to an export oriented strategy enable them to promote the level of productivity 
and efficiency to be more competitive in the international market. Most East Asian first and 
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second-tier NICs switched to export promotion industrialisation policies, as they fOlmd that their 
manufactming products were mature enough to compete in the international market. Moreover, 
as discussed in the case of some oil producing countries such as Indonesia and Mexico, the 
transition to an export promotion industrialisation policy did not take place until they faced a 
severe financial crisis as a consequence of the sharp decJine in the oil prices which had serious 
effects on their oil revenues. Therefore, it can be said that the reliance on oil incomes can be 
considered as a major factor contributing to their failure in an early and successful shift to EPP. 
However, \\Ihile the government in Mexico and Indonesia tried to decrease their dependency on 
oil incomes during the second stage of import substitution policy, no such effort OCCWTed in Iran 
dwing the same stage of the import substation policy, and Iran remained heavily dependent on 
oil exports [29]. 
Having analysed some of the major problems and obstacles of the industrial development 
~ process in the 1960s and 1970s (the pre-revolutionary period), one can refer to the following 
points as a major obstacles in the development of Iranian industries: 
1. There were no appropriate industrial policies and programs for the development of 
industries in the past, and most Iranian small and large scale industries were 
established through interests of particular individual or groups. 
2. There was little effective co-operation between the various branches of the industry 
sector and the university research institutes. 
3. Most industries established in this period, in particular heavy industries, were 
extremely dependent on the foreign materials and inputs. 
4. Most industries suffered from lack of technicians and engineers, due to the inability 
of the education system to train the expertise needed for industries. 
5. There was an excessive concentration of most industries near Tehran (about 50 
percent of aD large manufacturing firms) which led to some major problems such as 
pollution of the environment and unbalanced distribution of fitcilities for industries 
located in other areas of the country. 
6. Following the high protectionist import-substitution policy and high level of wages, 
the price of local manufacturing products were nmch more expensive than similar 
products which were produced in some foreign countries and therefore could not 
compete in the international market. 
7. The low productivity level of many industrial units resulted in the higher cost of 
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production of locally produced goods in comparison with the similar products 
manufactured in abroad 
8. Most industries suffered from inappropriate imported technology which was not 
adapted to local conditions. 
9. The industrial units did not have the appropriate R&D needed for better adaptation 
and absotption of foreign technology. 
10. Lack ofadequate inftastructure and facilities such as comrmmication systems (roads, 
railways, etc .. ) 
11. Most industries relied heavily on importing capital and intermediate goods which 
required substantial financial resources. 
12. Most induaries suffered from a low level of production and productivity which was 
mainly due to the high cost of producing their products and lack of an appropriate 
distribution system. 
Moreover, some major problems emerged from the rush to industrialisation fonowing the oil 
boom in 1973, such as lack of absorption capacity for adaptation and assimilation offoreign 
technologies and their values (cuhural effects), low productivity and inefficiency of industries, 
serious bottlenecks in infrastructure, increased dependency on import of components and parts 
and heavy government expenditure which led to an unbalanced economy. Moreover, as has 
already been pointed out, the industrialisation policies of the 1960s and 1970s, \\hich mainly 
focused on producing the consumer goods previously imported from abroad (import-
substitution policy), could not utilise the massive financial, human and natural resources of the 
countIy, md even led to more dependency on imports, and contributed to the weaknesses of the 
industrial structure of the country. Therefore, the lSI policy could not create a base for a 
successful shift to an export-led industrialisation policy due to the existence of inefficient 
industries unable to compete in the world market, and unwillingness of the government to 
promote the productivity oflocal industries. 
One can generally say that not only the Shah's ambitious aim to make Iran the fifth 
indnstria1ised country in the world was not achieved, but it also led to national unrest and finally 
resuhed to his overthrow from power in 1979. h is stated that ''the Shah once again 
underestimated the impact that the rapid industrialisation and mbanization and rising 
dependence on Westem technology and culture might have upon Iran's social and political 
structure" [30]. However, according to a report pubHshed in FOItmle magazine, "even if oil 
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price remains high, the Shah has a chance of transforming Iran into a middle-rank power with a 
fiDrly substantial economy, which at least needs a couple of generations in terms of technology 
and education." [31]. It is also argued that if a substantial amount of the foreign exchange 
gained from the oil boom of 1973 was invested more efficiently in the development and 
utilisation of the country's large human and natural resources, and in promotion of indigenous 
science & technology, the result would have been much better than it was in the late 1970s. 
Ahhough the pre-revolutionmy industrial and technology transfer policies may have made some 
contribution to the development of some industries, this period is believed to offer little guidance 
in terms offuture trends in technology transfer, and can not serve as a base period from which 
to plan for future trends. However, it can provide us with some useful evidence regarding the 
integration of industrialisation and the country's overall national development policy. 
6.3 THE POST- REVOLUTIONARY INDUSTRIALISATION POUCIES 
During the first years of the post-revohrtionary period, Iranian industry faced a serious crisis 
including the flight of some factory owners abroad, and the sIwp decline of production dming 
a period of mass demonstration and strikes against the Shah's regime which eventually led to the 
end of the monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic republic in 1979. Since the victory of 
the Islamic revohrtion in Iran, the creation of an independent industrial structure based on 
society's needs and demands was among the top priorities of the government. Therefore, in 
order to achieve this goal, the government attempted to formulate a long term plan for 
reconstructing the industries, through the nationalisation of basic industries, the appointment of 
new managers, the provision of facilities such as financial credits for changing the production 
line of some industries and establishing some new institutions for controlling the production 
activities of the industry sector. Due to the dependency of the industries on importing 
intermediate parts and components, the Central Bank allocated RIs 85 billion (each dollar equal 
to about 74 Rls at that time) for the industries to import their necessary requirements and 
clearing their delayed loans in 1980. But due to some problems such as lack of adequate 
supervision and planning for the spending of these credits, only RIs 25 billion had been used by 
the end of 1980 [32]. 
According to a SUlVey in 1980, the total manufacturing products decreased by 28% from the 
previous year [33]. As indicated earlier, the reduction in the manufacturing products can be 
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mo&tl.y attributed to the problems regarding the provision of the intermediate and raw materials, 
\Wich constituted about two-thirds of the required inputs for the local industries, was imported 
from abroad The heavy industries were faced with a lack of skilled pel'sonnel acquainted with 
the advanced technology required fur operating these establishments. During 1979, 708 permits 
for estabJisbing new industrial units were issued, showing an increase of 63 percent. The 
proposed capital cost of these units was RIs. 17.6 billion, showing a 10 percent increase over the 
corresponding figure of a year ago [34]. Fonowing the nationalisation of the basic industries in 
July 1979 and approving the law for the expansion and protection of Iranian industries, the 
government nationalised about 483 stated-owned enterprises and established a new institution 
called "The National Iranian Industries Organisation" (NDO) in order to direct and control these 
industries. According to the constitutional law, the country's industries were divided into four 
categories as fonows: 
1. The basic, strategic and heavy industries including oil, gas, iron mehing, copper, ... 
which were also nationalised before; and also the other important industries which 
are used in sbip-builcting, aviation, and auto-manufacturing such as the aluminum and 
steel industries. 
2. Those industrial firms or factories which were owned by individuals closely linked 
with the previous regime and who had left the country. 
3. Those fully-assembled, bankrupt and debtor firms which had a huge debt on the 
banks and could not repay their loans. 
4. Those firms which belonged to legitimate owners. 
The National Industries Organisation of Iran sustained a loss of about R1s 60 billion for about 
290 of the nationalised industrial firms which were debtors of the local banks and could not 
meet their loan repayments, both interest and capital [3S]. The constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, which was approved in November 1979, emphasised the increase of those 
agricultural and industrial products which could meet the general needs and lead the country 
towards se1f:.sufficiency. According to the constitutional law, an the large and basic industries, 
the large mines, banking, insurance, foreign trade, power generation, dams and the large-scale 
irrigation networks, radio and television, post and telegraph, shipping and aviation, roads and 
railways were declared as public sector and administered by the government. The industrial 
development policy in the constitutional law also placed its main emphasis on such short-term 
and long-term objectives as encouraging industrial activities which could provide the basic and 
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general welfilre for all of the people in the country, directing the industrial sector towards 
self-sufficiency and reducing their dependency through an increase in local manufacturing 
products. h also emphasised the creation of more employment opportunities through increasing 
the skill and training of the labom force of the country. 
Another important aspect of the constitutional law included encomaging the expansion of 
technical and scientific researches and efforts for promoting research and development activities 
in order to achieve the economic and industrial development of the country [36]. It appears 
from the contents of the constitutional law that it is essential to adopt an appropriate strategy in 
order to achieve the overall objectives of the economic, social and industrial development of the 
country. This strategy should be formulated based on analysing the conditions, importance and 
the background of the industrial sector of the country. 
The share of the industrial sector in GDP increased from 14.2 % in 1979 to 15.1% in 1980. 
The recession in industrial sector activities resuhed in a decrease in the production of 
manufactured products. By 1982, 87% of manufacturing firms employing over five hundred 
workers were government owned or controlled. Nearly one thousand public enterprises 
accounted for 70 % of the labour force and 75 % of the value added in industrial establishments 
with 10 or more employees [37]. The total value of manufacturing products of the large 
industrial units in constant prices increased from R1s 475 billion in 1980 to R1s 694 billion and 
Rls 821 billion in 1981 and 1982 respectively. The value of the per capita production at constant 
prices increased fromRls 1.2 million in 1980 to Rls 1.4 million in 1983, which grew about 12% 
during this period [38]. 
Following the decentralisation policy, in 1981 the Ministry of Industry and Mines which was 
responsible for planning and directing the industry and mineral sector of the country was divided 
in three new ministries; the Ministry of Heavy Industries, responsible for the basic, strategic, 
heavy and capital intensive industries, the Ministry of Industry, responsible for tight durable and 
non-durable consumer and intermediate industries and also broadly in charge of industrial 
development and policy co-ordination; and the Ministry of Mines and Metals, which was 
responsible for the geological exploration of minerals and some heavy industries such as steel 
and copper melting. In addition there were several industrial organisations operated lDlder the 
control of each of these ministry. For example, one can refer to the Organisation for Promotion 
and Renovation of Iranian Industries (OPRII) which is considered as a major institution for the 
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Ministry of Heavy Industry; the Organisation for National Iranian Industries (ONIl), which 
controlled a number of nationalised industries under the supervisioruuy of Ministry of Industry; 
and the National Iranian Steel Company (NISI), directed by Ministry of Mines and Metals. 
Since the beginning of the Iraqi attack on October 1980, most industries which were operating 
in pJaces near the war zones were not able to continue their production. Due to some problems 
in unloading the necessary components and parts for factories from the major ports located near 
war fronts, most industries operated beyond their production capacity. Although the war made 
serious and destructive impacts and problems on the overall economic and industrial 
development of the country, such as massive immigration of civilians living near the borders 
with Iraq, the shortage of exchange for industries to import their required parts and 
components, destroying some of the infrastructure and factories in particular those located near 
the war areas, it is argued that some war related industries were significantly improved. Despite 
the various problems iq>osed by the war on the Iranian economy, in 1981 the total value added 
of the industrial sector increased by S. 4 % in comparison with the year before, which could 
indicate that the industrial sector accommodated the war conditions [39]. 
In 1982, the government introduced the first Five-Year Plan (1983-1987), aimed at increasing 
the industrial value-added of the industrial sector by 14.1% per year. In order to achieve this 
goal, the plan necessitated the completion and implementation of current and new industrial 
plants and improvements in the country's industrial infrastructure as wen as adoption of some 
policy measures to increase productivity through maximised use of the capacities and promoting 
local technological capability. Despite the important objectives which were specified for the 
industry sector, however, the agriculture sector was determined as a major focus of the plan. 
The industrialisation policy which was introduced in the plan was the same pattem as the 
previous irqxnt-substitution policy with more emphasis on the heavy industries. The long-term 
objective of the plan was self:.sufficiency and economic independence. It was also aimed at 
concentrating on importing technology and reducing technological dependency. In order to 
achieve this aim, self:.sufficiency study groups have been formed to study and research in the 
methods of manufacturing the parts and basic materials required by the Iranian industries. 
Moreover, manufacturing technology has been imported along with importing the required 
machinery. The industrial policy maJdng bodies have been adding conditions to the contracts 
with foreign companies to include the importation of the relevant tedmology as IDIlCh as 
possible [40]. 
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The other policy measures of the plan especially in the industrial sector emphasised adopting a 
decentralised system; increasing the productivity level of the labour force through training; 
improving the maintenance system and the ability to repair the units; increasing the local content 
of industrial enterprises; expanding the designing and the production of industrial parts and 
machines; expanding the industries which produce the essential goods required by the COWl try; 
decreasing the dependency on oil revenues by an increase in non-oil exports; and developing and 
expanding suitable industrial cuhure in various parts of the country, in particular the rural areas. 
The plan also emphasised the creation of inter-sectoral Hnkage, and the growth of intermediate 
and capital goods industries. The plan envisaged an average growth rate of9 % for the economy 
\Wich was to be achieved by an annual average growth rate of7% in agricuhure sector, 14.1% 
of industry sector, and 9.8% in construction [41]. 
Total investment in the plan projected a figure of about Rls 12,985 billion ($ 166 billion). The 
pIan also aimed at promoting greater industrial investment through closer public co-operation 
with the private and cooperative sectors. Therefore, special emphasis was placed on 
encouraging investJ:nfnt in sman and medium scale enterprises. Moreover, it also emphasised the 
government policy of protecting and promoting industrial units in order to enhance the local 
productive capacity. Due to an increase in the country's oil revenue which caused an increase in 
the imports of industrial raw materials and components, as wen as promoting the managerial 
expertise of many nationalised industrial units, the industrial activities were expanded in 1982. 
For example, the production level of many basic industries such as Is&ban Steel Mill and Arak 
Aluminum Factory showed filvourable increase. 
The industrial value added 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Industry and mine 995.1 1135. 1294.5 1476.5 1684 
Industry sector 895.5 1021.5 1165. 1328.8 1515.5 
Mine sector 99.6 113.5 129.5 14.7 168.5 
Table 6.3 The projected industrial value-added in the first plan (83-87) in billion Rls, (constant 
prices of 1982) 
Source: The Plan and Budget Organisation, P:33. 
Approval of the pIan was delayed by the parliament (MajIes), because of some unreaHstic and 
ambitious financial assumptions and objectives, and the argument about different aspects of the 
plan between some official and non-official authorities. WIth several problems caused by the 
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intensifYing war with Iraq, and the sharp decline in oil prices during the mid-1980s, it was never 
put into effect. The number of new industrial units that started operation or were expanded in 
1983 reached 743 with a total capital ofRls. 21.1 billion. There was also an increase in the 
amount ofloans and credits given by the Industrial and Mining Bank to the private and state-
owned industrial firms by 28.9 % in 1983, amounted to RIs. 25.4 billion [42]. The export of 
industrial products in 1983 was about $ 24.2 million, accounted for 6.8 % of total non-oil 
export with about $ of 354.8 million. The manufactwing products of machinery and metal 
equipment, basic metals and chemicals were also increased in this year by 37.6%,31.7% and 
24.1 % respectively [43]. Despite some improvement in the relevant figures ofmanufactwing 
production, the consistent dependency of the industrial sector on foreign exchange earned from 
oil incomes for its machinery, technical know-how and raw materials, made local industrial 
activity conditional upon the continuous availability of foreign exchange. 
In 1983, the large industrial units which were directed by the government produced more than 
70% of the total manufactured products and about 71% of industrial value-added in that year. 
This indicated that the government and public sector controlled and administered most of the 
industrial activity in this year which was mostly concentrated in the production of capital and 
consumer dmable industries. However, in 1984, of the 6,5951arge industrial plants, 5,649 were 
operating on private basis and 947 by the public sector. Furthermore, 2,060 plants (31 %) were 
administered by individuals, 2,543 (39%) by officially registered companies other than the c0-
operatives, 197 (3%) on a co-operative basis and 1,796 (27%) as unofficial companies [44]. 
The sharp decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s due to over-supply by some oil exporting 
countries, caused the decline of the countIy's oil revenues and therefore led to a sharp decline 
in importing the required inputs for the industrial units. Moreover, the government's investment 
in industIy and mines fell considerably, by 18.50/0, reaching uound 104,000 million RIs in 1985 
[45]. A review of the composition ofgovemment investment in the industrial sector in 1985 
shows that a great portion of this investment (66%) was allocated to the establishment and 
expansion of metal and smelting industries. From the amount invested in this industty, RIs 30.1 
billion were allocated to the MinistIy of Mines and Metals for starting and operating the 
Mobarakeh Steel Complex in Isfahan; RIs 11 biDion and mother R1s 8.6 biDion to the National 
Steel company of Iran to be utiljsed for the Ahvaz Steel Complex and Steel MiD of Isfitban 
respectively; R1s 3.4 billion to the National Copper Industries oflran for the establishment ofa 
copper smelting plant; and RIs 2.8 biDion to the Industrial Development and Renovation 
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Organisation (IDRO) for the establishment of the copper-related industries [46]. 
The total industrial value-added decreased in 1986 and amounted to Rls 371 billion a reduction 
of7% compared with 1985. The share of industrial value-added in GDP accounted for 12.1 % 
\Wich the share of intermediate and oonsumer industries were 50.7 %, and 39.8 % respectively. 
The dependency of the manufBctmed products on the local resources was 31.5% and the capital 
goods industries with 70% and consumer durable industries with about 64% were among the 
most dependent industries on importing their components and materials from abroad As 
indicated earlier, the sharp decline of oil prices in 1985 made the Iranian government place 
more emphasis on increasing the country's non-oil exports and decrease the heavy reliance on 
the oil income. As a resuh of the policies adopted by the government, the non-oil exports 
enjoyed a significant rise during 1986, reaching $ 916 million which mainly consisted of 
traditional and agricultural products. However, a comparison of data for the first four months of 
1985 and 1986 indicated that the share of industrial goods in non-oil exports feB by 78% while 
the share ofagricu1tura1 and traditional goods increased by 100 %. Thus, the share of industrial 
goods, agricuhural and traditional goods, and mineral ores in 1986 were 2.2, 94.8, and 3 
percent, respectively [47]. 
In 1987, the total industrial value-added reached to Rls. 1414 billion, of which consnmer goods 
industries had Rls. 636.5 billion, intermediate goods industries with Rls. 697.7 billion, and 
capital good industries RIs. 80 billion. The export of manufBctured products reached $ 70 
million and the share of manufactured exports in the industrial value-added and non-oil exports 
were 0.7% and 9.8 % respectively in the same year. Moreover, a total of Rls. 221 billion were 
invested in the industIy sector, of\\hkh about 30% (about Rls 9S billion) of this investment was 
allocated to metals and meta1-sme1ting industries (such as Mobarakeh Steel Company, Ahvaz 
Steel Complex, and Steel Mill of Isfahan), 47% in the new industrial units with 1 to 9 
employees, and 21% to the new industrial units which had employed 10 to 49 workers and 
about 2% was allocated to the industrial units with more than 50 workers [48]. In 1988, the 
industrial va1ue-added reached to Rls. 1414 billion, (consumer industries with Rls. 636.3 billion; 
intermediate good industries with RIs. 697.7 billion; and capital goods industries with Rls. 80 
billion). However, COJqlared to the relevant figures of 1984, which gained the highest industrial 
value added, it appears that the industrial activity in 1988 was about 72% of 1984. This is 
mostly due to a sharp decline in oil prices during mid-1980s and a consequence reduction of 
foreign exchange needed for importing the materials for industry sector. In 1988, the industIy 
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sector was 30.9% dependent on the local materials and equipment [49]. Following the 
announcement of a cease-fire and the end of the war with Iraq, the government adopted new 
policy measures including reconstructing war-damaged production Jines, completing semi-
finished projects and utilisation ofmwsed production capacities. The overall activity of industrial 
sector between 1983-1988 can be shown in the following table. 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
The industrial value added (billion RJs) 463. 491. 480. 371. 350. 318. 
The share of industrial value added in GNP (%) 13.6 14.4 14.2 12.0 11.7 10.7 
The share of capital good industries in industrial ~added 13.4 15.2 13.1 9.5 8.4 7.4 
(%) 
The share of intennediate goods industries in industrial ~ 48.5 49.1 49.8 50.7 51.3 51.1 
added(%) 
The share of consumer goods industries in industrial ~ 38.1 35.7 37.1 39.8 40.3 41.5 
added 
The productivity of industrial products (1000 Rls) 1567 1608 1583 1413 1419 1424 
The dependence of industrial products on the local materials 24.1 24. 26.3 31.5 31.0 30.9 
(%) 
The share of industrial exports in industrial value Iddec:l (%) 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.7 
-
The share of industrial exports in non-oiI exports (%) 7.3 7.6 13.7 6.S 9.8 
-
Table 6.4 The Industry Sector between years (1983-1988) 
As can be seen from the table 6.4, the relatively low level of industrial value added per GNP, 
the low level of capital good industries in industrial products, and the Hmited share of 
intermediate goods industries were among the major weaknesses of the industrial sector during 
the period 1983-1988. As one can also see, the share of industrial value added decreased at an 
average annual rate of 7.2 % (in 1973 constant prices). The total industrial value added of 
capital goods industries during the period 1983-1988, also reduced by an average annual rate of 
15.2%. The share ofintermectiate goods industries in total industrial value-added increased from 
48.5% in 1983 to 50.70,1, in 1986, and reached in the following years to 51.3%. The dependence 
of industrial products on local materials which was about 24% in 1983, increased to 31.5% in 
1986.1heproductivityofindustrialproduction decreased during the period 1983-1988, with an 
annual average rate of 1.9 %, of which the capital goods industries contributed most of 
reduction, with an annual average of9.1 % [SO]. 
As one can see, the share of industrial exports in non-on exports increased from 7.3 % in 1983 
to 9.8% in 1988, however, this figure had a sharp decline in COIq)arison with that of 1979 
which was 30%. This can be attributed to some factors sudl as the restricted capacity of 
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industrial products to compete in the international market and the low level of quality standard 
in some manufacturing products. One can also see that, during this period, whenever the 
countty benefited from an increase in oil revenue, the industrial products also increased because 
of allocation of more foreign exchange to the industrial sector for importing their required 
materials and components. It can be said that the protectionist policies of the prt>-revolutionary 
period were also continued in the early 1980s and during the 8 years Iraq-Iran war, and the 
industrial sector was heavily protected through imposing tariffs, preventing imports of certain 
products, the restricted allocation of foreign exchange rate for specific industries, and price 
regulation oflocal and imported industrial products. It is also argued that the overall policies 
tmdertaken dming the 1982-88 period emphasised more the strong involvement of government 
and the public sector in managing the economy, the import substitution and inward-looking 
policy, price contro~ industrial regulation, and direction towards a seJt:.sufficiency. By 1987, it 
was estimated that about 60-70% of the entire domestic economy and 90 % of foreign trade 
were directly or indirectly run by the government [51]. 
Following the cease-fire and election of the new president (Hashemi Rafsanjani), attempts were 
made to design a comprehensive reconstruction and economic development plan for the 
countty. Therefore, the new first five year development plan was sent to the parliament (maj1es) 
in August 1989 for approval and was finally approved in January 1990 with a total expenditure 
ofRls 29,316 biDion($ 120.7 billion). The general objective of the FIVe Year Plan (1989-1993) 
was as follows: 
1. The reconstruction and renovation of infrastructure and production capacity, and civilian 
centres which were damaged in the war. 
2. The increase in growth rate of per capita income, employment, and reducing dependency 
with emphasis on se1f.sufficiency in the strategic and agriculture products. 
3. The promotion of quality and quantity of educational system with more concern on the 
development of science and technology in particular for the ymmg generation. 
The FIVt>-Y ear Development PJan (1989-1993) also aimed at developing the industrial sector by 
renovation of the existing industries; giving priority to the capital and intermediate goods 
industries; emphasising industries that use domestic resources; encouraging private and foreign 
investment; reducing the dependency on foreign inputs and technology and improving the 
management and industrial technology. Some of the quantitative objectives of the industry 
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sector in the pIan were considered as following: 
1. An average annual growth rate of 14.2% for the overall value-added of the industry sector, 
fromRls 1414 billion in 1989 to RIs 27S0 in 1993 (in 1989 constant prices). 
2. An annual average growth rate of 24 % the for value-added of industrial capital goods 
industrial, from RIs 80 billion in 1989 to RIs 23S billion (at 1989 constant prices). 
3. An annual average growth rate of20% and 4.2 % for the value-added of intermediate and 
consumer goods industries respectively. 
4. An estimate ofan increase in exports of manufactured products from $ 70 million in 1988 to 
$ISS million in 1989, and to $ 1,027 million in 1993. This amount was assumed to be 
accompJished mostly by the export of consumer goods, basic metals and petrochemical 
products. 
S. An estimation of an annual growth rate of 8.6 % for productivity level of labour forces in 
industry sector from R1s. 2,472,000 in 1989 to RIs 2,739,000 in 1993.(in 1988 constant 
prices), which was supposed to be achieved mainly through increasing the utilisation of 
existing industrial capacity. 
6. An average annual growth rate of 11.6% for investment in the industrial sector which was 
estimated to reach a total figure ofRls 1,932.2 billion, included RIs 914.3 billion in the public 
sector and Rls 624.8 billion in private sector during the period (1989-1993). This investment 
was planned to be spent mostly in the intermediate industries such as petrochemicals and 
metal smelting, and the capital intensive industries. 
7. A predicted average growth rate of 8% and 4.8% for GNP and per capita production 
respectively. It was also forecast that the lDlemployment rate would decrease to 14% with 
the creation of 394,000 new jobs per year, and with an average annual growth rate of S.2% 
in the productivity level of the labour force. 
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Value- Value Value- value- The average 
added added added added growth per 
(1989) in (%) 1993 in (%) annum(%) 
billion R1s. RIs 
billion 
Industrv sector 1414 100 2750 100 14.2 
Consumer industry 638.3 45 780 28.4 4.2 
Intermediate in~ 697.7 49.3 1735 263.1 20 
Manufacturing industry 432.5 62.0 1285 74.0 24.3 
Canital industrv 800 5.7 235 85 24 
Table 6.5 The growth rate and value added in different sectors ofindustIy during the Five 
Year Plan (1989-1993): 
Source: The First Five year Plan (1989-1993) 
Some of the other most important objectives of the first Five Year Plan (1989-1993) were as 
follows: 
1. Development of industrial plants capable of producing primary materials and semi-
manufactures including fOlmdries, stee~ copper, zinc, lead and ahmriniurn plants. 
2. Development of the power industry. 
3. Estab1isbment of new petrochemical complexes. 
4. Maintaining the existing industries, renovating their production lines and raising the 
quality of production. 
5. Absorbing private capital from trading in the industrial sector, by transferring the 
small and medium scale plants to the private sector. 
6. Removing obstacles which have disrupted the profitability of industrial plants, 
relaxing some of the price controls and export and import regulations, and tax 
exemptions, are among the measures contemplated. 
7. Efforts to increase the export of industrial products to meet the foreign exchange 
requirement. 
8. The creation of a stable economic environment which is a prerequisite for private 
investment in productive activities. 
9. Establishing and expanding engineering design units in order to absorb data, know-
how and technology. 
10. The ·optinmm use of hardware (as defined in earlier chapters, ie. industrial 
installations) capabilities and being economical in project investment. 
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11. Collaboration with important foreign companies (MNCs) through joint ventures. 
12. Allocating 0.5% of government owned manufacturing sales to the Research and 
Development in the industrial sector. 
13. Revising and reconsidering the labour law in order to increase productivity. 
14. Selecting an appropriate industrial strategy, (inward and outward orientated). 
15 Determining a new pattern of consumption in the direction of society's needs. 
16. Promotion of domestic technology levels by strengthening the design and 
techn010gical capabilities within the COlDltry. 
17. Emphasising the development and expansion of those industries which rely on local 
natural resources. 
18. Moving towards seJf:.sufficiency and independence from importing semi-
manufactured components by strengthening the manufacturing of them within the 
COlDltry. 
19. IdentifYing, attracting and adapting imported industrial technologies and research and 
development activities in modern technologies 
20. Creating all facilities for promotion of industrial exports, including establishment of 
free industrial zones. 
Moreover, the most important industrial poHcies in the five year plan also emphasised some 
aspects such as the reconstmction of infrastructure and factories which were damaged during 
the eight-year war with Iraq, completioin of Imfinished projects and plants, increasing the 
production of capital goods industries, the maximum usage of intermediate goods industries' 
production capacity, more efforts towards the better adaptation and the absoIption of industrial 
technology and increasing R&D activities for the expansion of manufacturiog products, in 
particular handicrafts. TherefoIe, the government's main fucus during the implementation of the 
first five-year development plan was the reconstruction of the country through the adoption of 
some specific policy measures including privatisation of state-owned industrial enterprises 
mainly through expansion of Tehran Stock Exchange; deregulation of financial services; and 
promoting the non-oil exports by introducing various export incentives to exporters including 
devaluation of local CUlTeIlcies and establishing FrZs; encouraging private and foreign 
investment; and trade Iiberalisation policies [52]. 
It can be said that since the beginning of the rll'St rIVe Year plan the country's industrialisation 
policy switched from inward-1ooking and protectionist policies to outward-looking, export 
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oriented policies. However, despite the plan's emphasis on expansion of non-oil exports, the 
implementation of import substitution policy has also been continued. Therefore, the industrial 
strategy for the First Five Year Plan (1989-1993) was announced as a sirnnhaneous pattern of 
import-substitution and export promotion policies. The parallel implementation of both 
strategies suggested by the plan means that while the reliance on imports of foreign consumer 
goods can primarily be reduced through their substitution with locally-produced consumer 
products, efforts should also be made for the exports of those products with which the counuy 
has a comparative advantage and can compete in the international market. Therefore, with 
simultaneous implementation of import substitution and export promotion policies, it was 
hoped that the plan could achieve its short and long term. objectives which mainly emphasised 
country's economic and industrial progress. In other words, one can see that the export 
promotion policy was not considered as an ahemative to import substitution, but as 
complementary. 
As a resuh of implementing a set of effective policies which bas been previously discussed such 
as structural adjustment, stabilisation, trade Jiberalisation, privatisation and export-oriented 
industrialisation policies, the counuy's overall economic and industrial performance was 
significantly improved. For example, the industrial production witnessed a noticeable growth 
rate of8 % in 1989 and the GOP grew with an annual average growth rate of8.9 % during the 
period of first plan (1989-1993) [53]. The value of the non-oil exports increased very rapidly 
and regi&tered a remarkable growth after 1990. This was mostly due to the introduction of some 
export incentive measures such as allowing exporters to sen their foreign exchange earnings 
from export of their products at the free market rate, facilitating the imports of materials and 
parts required for producing for exports, and tax and custom duties exemptions. 
Following an increase in the oil prices in 1990 which resulted in the doubling of the foreign 
exchange revenues from the oil sector between 1988 and 1990, the government expanded its 
extensive reconstruction and development projects. Due to adoption of trade Jiberalisation and 
the increase in the counuy's oil revenues, the amount of imports rose dramatically to over $ 25 
biltion in 1991 from about $ 13 billion in 1989. Moreover, many large projects were completed 
during the period between 1989-1992. According to data and information presented by the 
President ofJran \\hen submitting the second Five-Year Plan in 1993, during this period (1989-
1992), production of cement bas grown by 6%, stee1250/0, copper 16.60/0, abunininrn 26.3%, 
the heavy auto-industries 30%, the light auto-industries 280/0, and road construction machinery 
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49%. Various policy measures were undertaken for promoting and facilitating industrial 
production and development. Some of these measures which were adopted to liberalise 
industries, such as the facilitation of the import of raw materials, machinety and spare parts, and 
the gradual elimination of pricing and distribution controls, had a major impact on the expansion 
of manufacturing activities. Also a total ofS 9.2 billion was allocated to the industrial sector in 
order to expand further industrial production. WIth the utilisation of additional productive 
capacities of the existing establishments and the newly established industrial units, the 
production of the Jarge manufacturing facilities grew by 29 percent, mostly in basic metals such 
as iron and steel, fabricated and non-ferrous metal products, machinety and equipment and 
chemicals [54]. 
As indicated earlier, the government adopted a series of policies (such as Jibera1isation, 
stabilisation and privatisation policies) along with the simnhaneous implementation of the plan. 
As a resuh of these policy measures, many agreements were completed with major foreign 
firms to reconstruct and develop some of the industrial factories and bases, mainly in the steel, 
aluminium and auto-manufacturing industries. As an example, one can refer to some of the 
short and long-term goals fur the expansion of these industries, such as an increase in the output 
of steel industIyto more than 10 millions tonnes a year by the mid-l990s which could place Iran 
among the top 25 steel producers [55]. Increase in industrial products was attained through 
further utilisation of the existing labour force. According to a swvey about the production 
process in heavy industries in 1990, total value of production of these industries grew by 64% 
(at constant prices). This growth has been more than 63 % in capital goods industries, 65% in 
intermediate goods industries and around 57 % in durable-con.4II11DeI'-goods industries [56]. 
As mentioned earlier, during the first three years of the plan, some e1fective policy measures 
have been implemented in order to increase the country's industrial output, such as providing 
foreign exchange needs of local industries at a competitive rate for importing required raw 
materials and machinery, removing price controls on manufactured goods and further utilisation 
of production capacities of industries. As a result of these measures, the industrial value-added 
grew by 20.6% in 1991 and the share of industry sector in GDP increased from 22.4 % in 1990 
to 23.70.4 in 1991. Moreover, the large domestic demand along with the avaiJable raw materials 
led to more growth in m8Dufacturiog capacity utiIisatioJl in 1991. The production of some heavy 
and large manufacturing such as auto-manufacturing industries (automobiles, vans, minibuses 
and motorcycles) generated considerable growth, in some cases more than 200 percent in 1991 
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[57]. 
The privatisation process of many statc>-owned enterprises which was started by selling their 
shares on the Tehran Stock Exchange in 1990 was continued in 1991. The shares of 30 
companies affiliated to the National Iranian Industries Organisation (NITO) with a total value of 
over Rls. 201 billion and also the shares of32 companies affiliated to the Bank of Industry and 
Mine (BIM) with total value of Rls. 85 billion were transferred to the private sector at the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. By mid-1991, a total of about 250 firms had the approval of the 
council of Ministers, and the process of privatisation has been accelerated with selling a share 
of77 factories to the private sectors valued about Rls. 37 billion. There was also a remarkable 
growth in the number of permits for establishing industrial units which grew by 45.7% and 86.8 
% for heavy and light industries respectively. Moreover, as a result of the government policy 
measures to encourage private and foreign investment, the private sector invested about $ 66 
million during 1989-1990 [58]. It should be noted that despite a relatively significant 
privatisation of statc>-owned industrial enterprises in the early stage of the implementation of 
FIrst FIVC>-Y ear PIan, the process of privatisation has slowed down due to some reasons mainly 
financial crisis in the later stage. 
In addition to the creation of a favourable environment for the expansion of exports, some 
further export incentives were also introduced to accelerate the growth of non-oil exports. The 
Export Development Bank has been established in 1991 with initial capital ofRls.50 billion 
aiming at determining appropriate policy guidelines for better recognition of the country's 
comparative advantages and further expansion of non-oil exports through provision of required 
financial support. Other export incentives included the return ofup to 11 % offoreign exchange 
designated for exports to exporters, and provision of credits and foreign exchange for those 
industries which exports their products and led to a substantial increase in the value industrial 
exports by 173.30/0, reaching $ 660 million in 1991 in comparison with the $ 241.5 million in the 
year before. The total amount of non-oil exports was also increased in 1991 and reached $ 
2,514 million, which showed a growth rate of 90 % compared with 1990. The share of 
industrial products in total value of non-oil exports increased from 18.4 % in 1990 to 25 % in 
the 1991. Exports of home applimces with 199.5 0/0, chemicals with 153.5% and vebicles with 
210.6 % had the highest share in the growth of industrial products. Among the major receivers 
of Iran's non-oil exports, Germany with $ 792.5 million, UAE with $390 and Turkey with $320 
million were ranked the top importers of the Iranian non-oil exports in 1991 [59]. As is shown 
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in the funowing table, total industrial exports increased from Rls. 4291.1 million in 1990 to Rls 
21939 million in 1991. 
The industry sector 1990 1991 
Value Weight Value Weight 
million Rls. tonnes million (Rls) tooncs 
Chemical 16 3922 1191 211295 
Elec1rical 27 131 312 601 
Metal industries 6.1 91 11854 24482 
Food industries 1002 18265 1651 26125 
Textiles industries 2395 2410 6162 6948 
Mineral industries 845 680223 769 105019 
Total exports 4291.1 75042 21939 374470 
Table 6.6 A comparison of industrial exports in 1990 and 1991. 
Source: The Ministry of Industry (1992) . 
Thcgrowtb. 
Value Weight 
millionRls tooncs 
7147 5288 
1055 358 
- -
65 43 
157 188 
-9 -85 
411 -47 
. Accorcting to the statistics produced by the Central Bank oflran, the total value added ofIarge 
industrial units grew by 20.6 % in 1991 which was more than the projected rate of 12.9 in the 
plan. The production of metals had a substantial growth rate with steeI4S%, and aluminum 
10%. In 1992, the fourth year of the implementation of the plan, new measures were taken 
toward trade Iiberalisation and privatisation of the further public enterprises, removing the 
obstacles and distortions to industrialisation, and promoting new investment in the industrial 
sector. Following the adoption offurther policy measures including decentralisation, elimination 
of red tape in issuing industrial permits, reduction of economic involvement of governmental 
organisations and placing more emphasis on the policy making role of industrial ministries, and 
provision of some customs ficilities, resulted to the growth of the industrial valw>added by 3.2 
% in 1992. (a 1989 constant prices). In heavy industries, the production of steel with a growth 
rate of 27% reached a record high at 3.S million tons in 1992 and exceeded by 19 % the 
targeted goal for production. In the tight industries, there was an increase in the production of 
float glass, automatic washing machines and colour 'IV by 29 %, 3So/o, and 24% respectively 
[60). 
The National Iran Productivity Organisation (NIPO) was estabHshed in September 1992 to 
increase productivity in particular in the industrial sector. The NIPO's main objectives included 
creating a national impetus fur productivity improvement, developing human resource 
management through the impJementation of training courses, seminars, etc, thereby transferring 
the productivity concepts and tools to managers and workers, and publisbing books, and articles 
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on different aspects of productivity for various social categories [61]. As stated by the Minister 
of Industry, the productivity level in the industrial sector has increased by about 34% during 
the First Five Year pIan [62]. Another figure indicates that output per worker has increased by 
about 20% during the pIan, which has mainly been as a result of capacity utilisation. However, 
per capita productivity of the labour force in the country's industrial sector showed an average 
annual decrease of 0.7% during the period between 1977-1988, which was mostly attributed to 
the stagnation of industrial output in this period [63]. 
Fonowing the policy measures for the expansion of non-oil exports and in particular industrial 
exports, such as removing administrative red tape, and the provision offoreign exchange and 
customs facilities, the export of manufacturing products grew by 37.3 % in 1992 comparing to 
the previous year and amounted to $ 651 million, which also indicated the upward trend of the 
industrial exports during the period 1989-1992. The total non-oil exports rose to $ 2.93 billion 
in 1992, showing 12.3 % growth, which mostly exported to countries such as Germany with 
25.1%, Turkey with 12.0 %, UAE with 11.3%, Italy with 7.4% and Switzerland with 5.4% 
[64]. Among industrial products exported in 1992, the exports of transportation vehicles 
increased by 253.9%, copper bar by 150.2%, detergents and soaps by 70%, and chemical 
products by 46.4% in comparison to the previous year. 
In 1993, which was the last year of the First Five Year Plan, the implementation of structural 
adjustment policies entered into its most critical and sensitive stage, with the efforts for 
reunification of the exchange rate. However, due to a decline in oil prices and consequent 
decrease in the COlDltry'S revenues which in tum led to some imbalance of payments, the 
government imposed import restrictions in 1993 in an effort to reduce foreign exchange 
expenditure which had negative nq,acts on the process of economic and industrial development. 
As indicated earlier, because of the high dependency of industry sector on imported inputs, the 
production of ID8IllJfilcture goods fell slwply and growth ofvaluo-added in this sector declined 
to 1%. However, despite the fureign exchange shortage, most of the planned infrastructura1 and 
industrial projects for this year were completed According to a report, the National Iranian 
Industries Organisation (NIIO) exported $ 37.5 million worth of products in 1993, an increase 
of54% in comparison with the previous year [65]. 
Moreover, due to the high cost of foreign materials required by the industrial sector, this sector 
increased the use of domestic raw and intermediate materials and this led to an increase in the 
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share of domestic goods in production and also decrease in the dependency on importing 
fureign inputs, which in tum contributed to the increase in the volume of non-oil exports in this 
year. In 1993, about 18% of the import of inputs required for industrial exports was financed by 
non-oil exports, thus indicating the movement towards decreasing the dependency on oil 
revenues [66]. According to some statistical figures, non-oil exports with domestic content 
grew by 470/c, in 1993 comparing the previous year, and its share in total non-oil exports reached 
19 %. The total amount of non-oil exports increased to $ 3.7 billion in 1993 and the trend of 
industrial exports was still upward and its value, with a growth of23 %, amounted to $ 1.2 
billion, which had a share of 33% in the non-oil exports [67]. Moreover, since 1993, in the 
context of considerable depreciation of the rial, substantial import substitution has taken place 
in such areas as construction materials and intermediate goods for the petroleum industry. In 
1993, intermediate goods and raw materials comprised 63 % of imports, fonowed by capital 
goods (25%) and consumer goods (11%). Germany, Japan, and Italy were Iran's major 
suppliers of these goods [68]. 
Exports to Iran ($ million) Imports from Iran ($million) 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1994 1993 1992 1991 
Germany 1,600 2,430 3,500 4,000 825 778 750 900 
Dubai 1,180 871 740 565 240 213 200 196 
Japan 933 1,500 2,650 2,525 2,760 2,500 2,600 5,870 
France 816 725 770 915 1,030 1,430 1,090 1,370 
Italy 720 1,250 2,200 1,800 1,000 1,330 1,800 1,688 
U.K 443 742 1000 920 203 365 290 285 
U.S. 326 616 748 520 0 1 1 260 
S.Korea n.a. 500 560 557 na 1000 1000 1000 
Austria 270 280 383 375 100 80 120 na 
Netherland na 260 483 514 na 1,050 1,000 1,170 
Argentina 27 248 324 323 na 0 0 0 
Turkey 250 240 395 430 690 650 237 80 
Bruil na 260 350 427 166 289 954 na 
Belgium 180 334 390 400 41 40. 1,000 1,000 
Spain na na 270 387 na na na 728 
Austra1ia na 260 260 274 na na 10 10 
Canada na 200 294 265 na 185 103 60 
Others 3,255 1284 7683 9,803 9,945 8,089 6,845 1383 
Total 10,000 12,000 23,000 25,000 17,000 18,000 18,000 16,000 
Table 6.7 Iran Selected Trade Partners, 1991- 1994 ($ million) 
Source: Iran Quarterly Report, Economic outlook, 1995, P: 25 . 
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In 1994, the privatisation of state-owned industrial firms continued through selling their shares 
with the total value of Rls. 793.4 billion in Tehran Stock Exchange, which had a 53.9 % 
increase over the previous year. With the end of the First Five Year Plan in 1994, several 
industrial projects in particular in the petrochemical, steel and metal smehing industries were 
completed. It is argued that the completion of these industrial plants and supply of their products 
enabled the country not only meet the domestic needs and substitute for the import of similar 
products, but some of their products have also been exported. For example, one can refer to the 
steel industry whose output increased three-fold during the period 1989-1994 and amounted to 
an estimated 4.8 million metric tons in 1994, with almost a third of this amOlmt exported [69]. 
Moreover, as a resuh of introducing various export promotion policy measures during the First 
Five Y ear ~ mainly custom duties exemption for exporters, facilitating the importation of 
required materials for producing the outputs, and allowing the exporters the exchange earned 
from exports of their products on the free market rate, non-oil exports grew from less than one 
billion dollars in 1989 to $ 4.5 billion in 1994. Moreover, since the implementation of the Five 
Year Plan, there has been a considerable growth of the industrial output in particular in some 
heavy industries, and metal production industries. For example, the supply of steel products 
amounted to 4.7 million tons, showing 20.5 % growth in 1994 and production of various 
aluminium products also enjoyed a growth of 17 to 29 %, and the production of linc sheet 
tripled, compared to the previous year [70]. As indicated earlier, during the Plan a number of 
new plants started their operation and some of the Imfinjshed projects were completed and 
reconstructed. It seems necessuy to study briefly the most important manufacturing sectors and 
plants in Iran in order to have an overall view of the country's industrial infrastructure. The 
following is some of the most important production projects in some selected industries which 
were mostly implemented during the period 1989-1993. 
6.4 PElROCHEMICAL INDUSlRY 
The petrochemical industry is one of the most important sector of Iran's industries, considering 
the country's vast potential oil and gas reserves which can be used as an input for producing 
petrochemicals. Many petrochemical complexes have been established since the mid-1960s. 
However, National Iran's Petrochemical Industry (NIPC), which has been established since early 
1965 to assist the development of this industry, continued its important role in the expansion of 
several petrochemical p1ants dming the implementation of the Frrst FIVe-Year Plan (1989-1993). 
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During this period, NIPC invested about $ 7 billion in the industry to add nearly S.5 million 
tODD.es to the annual capacity. Furthermore, the NIPC is expected to spend a further $ 4 billion 
between 1994 and the end of the century to raise the output level to 12.6 million tonnes a year 
by the year 2000 [71]. According to the new strategic program for the petrochemical industry 
in the next 20 years, it is predicted that the total output of petrochemicals would reach 18.5 
million tones by the last year of the program (about 2015). It is also projected that the export 
of petrochemicals will reach to the 11.5 million tonnes by the end of the program, from about 
1.9 million tonnes in 1994 [72]. Therefore, one can see that Iran has a substantial potential 
capacity fur petrochemical exports, due to its comparatively broad and diverse production base, 
and the availability of appropriate human resources, technical know-how and expertise in 
manumcturing ofpetrochemica1s. 
Some of the important petrochemical plants include: 
• Sbiraz Petrochemical Complex was one of the first petrochemical complexes, estabHshed in 
1963 with the cooperation of a group of a French companies. It was origina1ly called the 
Chemical FertiIim' Plant in Marvdasht, and is currently operating with a capacity of200,000 
tonneslyear ammonia phosphates, 84,000 tonneslyear of methanol, IS00 tonneslyear urea, 
600 tonneslyear nitric acid, 750 tonneslyear ammonium nitrate, 7000 tonneslyear 
bicarbonate, 3000 tonneslyear hydrochloric acid, 23,000 tonneslyear caustic soda, 22,000 
tonneslyear sodium hypochlorite and 10,000 tonneslyear liquid chlorine [73]; 
• Kharg Chemical Complex was estabHshed in 1966 with a daily capacity of 600 tons of 
sulphur and 6000 tons of liquid gas. However, it was damaged through Iraqi air attacks 
during the war (1980-88), and has been reconstructed and resumed production since 1989, 
with a fuJI production capacity of SOOO tonnes per year PVC, sulphur and Liquid Petroleum 
Gas (LPG) mostly for export; 
• Rui Chemical Complex became operational in 1970, and its activity was interrupted during 
the war with Iraq. The reconstruction of the complex began' since 1989, and has been 
operating with a capacity of 49S000 tonnes per year sulphur, 720,000 tonnes per year 
ammonia and 700 tonnes per day (tonnes per year) di-8IDIIlOIIhun phosphate; 
• Abadan Petrochemical CoIq>Jex: was established in 1970, to produce PVC, primaIy materials 
of plastics, primary material of detergents, and potash. Its operation came to a halt after the 
Iraqi attack in 1980. However, the reconstruction of the complex started in October 1989, 
and since then, it has been operating with a capacity of 40,000 tomes per annum PVC, and 
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30,000 ta caustic soda; 
• Iran Carbon Company was established as a joint venture with 20% share ofNIPC, 30% to 
Industrial and Mining Development Bank, and 50 % to American Kabout Company and is 
currently operating with a capacity of 15,000 tpa carbon black [74]; 
• Farabi Petrochemical Plant, was established in 1972 as a joint venture with Japanese 
companies and is located in Mabshabr producing mainly softener materials for plastics, 
anidric fetalic, and phthalic anhydrides; 
• Razi Petrochemical Complex, is located in Mahshabr near Bandar Khomeini producing urea 
and diammonium phosphate and azote fertilizers; 
• IsfBhan Petrochemical Complex, came on stream late in 1991 with a $ 250 million aromatics 
pJant with a capacity to produce 75,000 tonnes per year benzine, 44,000 paraxylenes, 22,000 
orthoxylene and 20,000 toluene; 
• Arak Petrochemical PJant: an NPC and Bank Melli (National Bank) joint venture (NPC S 1 % 
and Bank Melli 49%), located in a 750-hectare site west of Arak (central province). There 
has been a licensing contract with Italy's T.P.L, in cooperation with the Dutch company 
K T.I for the Elfin unit. It comprises 15 units with a designed annual production capacity of 
60,000 tonnes of high density polyethylene, 60,000 tonnes of low density polyethylene, 
50,000 tonnes of polypropylene, 25,000 tonnes ofpolybutadiene, 30,000 tonnes of vinyl 
acetate, and 105,000 tonnes of ethylene glycol [74]. It can also produce 14 kinds of other 
basic petrochemicals, rubber and chemical products including a capacity ofSOO,ooo tonnes 
/ year urea and 330,000 tonnesl year ammonia; 
• Tabriz Petrochemical PJant: \Wich is considered as a third giant petrochemical complex, with 
construction supervision by Engineers India and in cooperation with an Ita6an subsidiary of 
Tec1inipetro~ providing feedstock for the newly finalised downstream units, and DaeHm of 
South Korea, producing 100,000 tonneslyear polyethylene, 65,000 tonneslyear polystyrene, 
14,000 tonneslyear rubber, 12,000 tonneslyear latex, 50,000 tonneslyear propylene, and a 
55,000 tonnes per year benzene extraction unit worth $80 million, md Technic ofFrmce 
and 1EL ofhaly designed the equipment and the instaDation of a high density polythene and 
butane plant with a capacity of 107,000 tonnes per year; 
• Bandar (Imam) Khomeini Petrochemical Complex: is the COlDltry'S biggest petrochemical 
complex, with a total cost of about $ 5,540 million. It was firstly established in the 1970s, 
called the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Complex, but the project remained incomplete due to 
some difficuJties, mainly the severe damage caused by war. Since the end of the war in 1988, 
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several contracts have been signed with France, Italy, Germany and S. Korea in order to 
reconstruct and complete the plant. In 1991, the liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) unit of the 
complex was put into operation with the potential export capacity of 500,000 tonnesl year. 
The exports, under an agreement with the South Korean firm Daewoo, are worth S 65m a 
year and could be doubled if the two sides agree. The agreemart is part of advanced sales of 
the products at Bandar Khomeini whose second phase opened in August 1994 [76]. The 
complex has sold $ 900m of its production in advance to finmce its construction; 
• Khorasan Chemical Fertilizer Plant: producing 420,000 tons per year sulphur coated urea 
and 65,000 tons per year agricultural sulphur; 
• Khorasan Petrochemical Complex: built with an investment of over Rls.1.2 bi1lion and as a 
fertilizer complex with a capacity of330,000 tons per year of ammonia and 495,000 tons per 
year of urea. The complex used technology licensed by Kellogg of the UK for the ammonia 
unit and by Stamicarbon of Netherlands for the urea unit. There is also a S 450 million 
investment to build a fertiliser complex during the first plan period; 
• Orumiyeh Herbicide Plant: the construction has started on this plant with a capacity of 1,500 
alch1or, 1500 butaclor, 10,000 mono-ch10r0-acetic acid, 1500 chloroacetyl clJloricle and 
2,500 dimethyl aniline tonnes per year. 
Moreover, there are some CUlTent projects undertaldng in the petrochemical industty including, 
the paraxylene extraction with a total capacity of 160,000 tIyr, a metbmol project with the 
capacity of about 660,000 tIyr, the sixth olefins project to produce ethylene, high density 
po1yethelene, stIyrme, high nq,act and general pmpose polystyrmes with a capacity of 307 ,000 
tJyr, and the engineering plastics projects to produce polycarbonate. 
The NIPC has also listed five big plants as priority projects during the Second Five-Year Plan 
started in March 1995. The five projects are: a methyl tertWy butyl ether (MTBE) plant in the 
south to manufacture the additive to help produce 500,000 tonnes ofunleadecl gasoline a year; 
the doubling of the annual capacity of the olefin unit of the Bandir Khomeini petrochemical 
complex to 530,000 tonnes; a metbmol unit on Kharg Is1and, with an annual capacity of 
600,000 tonnes; and two plastics projects. The new ficilities will require a government 
invest!] art ofS 1,800 million. Based on statistics reported by the Plan and Budget Organisation, 
the volume of petrochemical output rose to 4,369,000 tons by the end of 1993, bringjng 500 
million doDars in foreign cumncy fur the country. The petrochemical reached to 11.8 million 
tomes in 1996 compared to 2 million tODnes in 1979 [77]. Despite the significant expansion of 
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the petrochemical industry during the recent years, however, it is argued that some major 
constraints such as lack of skilled labour force, and shortage of foreign exchange to import 
necessary machinery and equipment, are preventing this industry from further improvement. 
The fonowing table shows the production capacity and consumption of petrochemicals in 1990 
and their predicted figures for 2000. In the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1995-1999) 
an investment of 11,000 billion rials is to be made in the petrochemical industry which will 
increase its capacity from 9 million tonnes in the First Development Plan to 12 million tonnes. 
According to the estimates of the second plan, 60% of the petrochemical production of Iran will 
be exported. The expected export items will be plastics and chemical products such as MlBE 
(methyl-t- butyl ether) \\bich is used fur making lead-free petrol and has a very high added value 
[78]. 
Petrochemical Capacity (tons) Consumption (tons) % share of Iran in 
product Middle East 
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Ammonia 1093 1650 381 1,316 14 16 
Aromatics 7 900 28 225 9 18 
Olefines 43 1,600 8 958 0.3 14 
Methanol 90 850 14 98 6 23 
Plastics 60 1000 324 1,043 38 51 
Rubbers 
- 13S 27 119 77 73 
Synthetic fibres 117 163 160 294 90 92 
Total 1410 6,298 942 4,053 14 21 
Table 6.8 The production capacity and consumption of petrochemicals in 1990 and their 
predicted figures for 2000. 
Source: MEED (Middle East Economic Digest), 22 May 1992, P: 10. 
6.5 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 
Because of country's large mineral resources in particular an estimated amount of 1,070 million 
tonnes of iron ore, much emphasis in this sector has been given to steel production plants and 
development of iron-ore mining [79]. The Iran's National Steel Company (NISC), which was 
established in early 1980s to monitor the country's large still plants, mainly Isfahan steel miD, 
Mobarakeh steel complex and Ahvaz steel complex. The Isfahan Steel Mill has been estabHshed 
in 1965 near Isfitban in CC21tral part of the country with technical assistance of the former Soviet. 
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Union, and with initial capacity of producing 750,000 tons per year. In 199111993, the mill was 
expected to produce a record 2.4 million tons of steel (mostly low-grade construction beams). 
Contracts have been signed with Japan's Nippon Steel and Italy's Danieli in order to transfer the 
know-how and technical expertise. The production capacity ofIsfahan steel mill was expected 
to increase to an annual average of 4-5 million tonnes by 1996. The Mobarakeh steel complex 
is one of the country's Jargest steel complexes. The construction of the plant started in 1979, but 
was put into operation in 1991 with a total capacity of2.4 million tonnes of steel sheet a year. 
Several contracts have been signed with some major foreign steel companies such as Italy's 
Italimpianti and Japan's Kobe steel in order to increase the complex's output. A tum-key 
contract was signed in Janwuy 1989 to build another pJant on the site to produce laminated steel 
products, with an initial investment of nearly 52 billion. Contracts have been signed with 
Marubeni and Kobe Steel of Japan, to develop Chador Malek iron ore mines to supply the 
Mobarakeh steel complex [80]. 
The Ahwaz Steel ~lex, a tbreo-unit direct reduction pJant using natural gas, was established 
in 1975 through the initial contract with a European-American consortium and with a sponge 
iron capacity of 330,000 tons and intended total capacity of2.53 million tons per year [81]. 
Despite severe damage caused during the war, three of its phases started operation with a 
capacity of 550,000 tonnes a year in 1989. The overaD. design capacity of steel production by 
the Ahwaz complex has recently reached 1.65 million tons of steel ingots, using the direct 
reduction method, and 1.55 million tonnes ofbillet and steel slabs. There has been a contract 
between Iran's National Steel Company (NISC) and Japan's Kobe steel Company, for 
increasing the production capacity and transferring the technological know-how and training of 
the labour force. After combination of the three main steel complexes, (Ahwaz steel complex, 
Kavian steel complex and the Iran national steel industry group ),the countty's total steel 
production capacity has increased by 2.5 minion tons. 
The Isfahan Steel Company has its own research and development organisation \Wich in 1994 
designed and built a pRot direct-reduction module using a new technology which is c1aimed to 
be better than US's Midrex process installed by Japan's Kobe Steel at the new Mobarakeh miD. 
h has also applied for a patent in Germany and planned to convert the old Isfiaban mill to direct 
reduction and press for its use in an new steel mills in the country. Contacted in the US, Midrex, 
which has 67 % of the world's direct reduction market, initiaDy said it was not aware of the 
Iranian plans. After checking, Midrex said there was indeed a plant at Isfiban using a different 
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teclmology, but that it may not be new and only a refinement of an unused existing technology 
[82]. 
The country's Steel production increased from about 1.1 million tonnes in 1989 to 3.8 million 
tonnes in 1992. The average annual growth rate of iron-ore output during the first five 
development plan was 24.2 %. Iron-ore output reached 6,290,000 tons in 1994 from 1,850,000 
tonnes in 1988. Moreover, according to a latest report by "The Metal Bulletin", Iran stood in 
the 28th place in the list of the world steel producers in 1995 for the production of 4. 7 million 
tons of steel [83]. Iran has also emerged as a steel exporter, with about 1.5 million tonnes, 
mostly to East Asian countries [84]. 
6.6 COPPER PRODUcrs INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Copper is one of the country's most important mineral reserves, which is mostly located in 
Sarchesbmeh copper mine in Kerman province, with total estimated reserves of 1,223 million 
tonnes [85]. The Iran National Copper Industries Company (NCIC), as a part of Ministry of 
Mines and Metals, is mainly involved in the exploring, and expanding the new and existing 
copper mines in order to increase the country's copper products. The Sbabid Bahonar 
(Sarcheshmeh) Copper Complex is the country's biggest manufilcturer of copper products, 
producing various copper and copper-alloyed products, copper pipes, wire, copper and brass 
sheets and straps, copper and nickel alloys, and coins and tinsel The complex has a design 
capacity of 144,000 tonnes a year, consists of copper mines, mills, and enrichment, melting and 
purifying units. It has also design capacities for production of gold and silver of 400 kilograms 
and 12 tonnes a year [86]. Several agreements have been signed with some large foreign 
companies including Autolrumpu of Finland, Krupp of Germany for building smelting and 
casting units, and the Marubeni corporation and Kobe Steel company, both of Japan, for 
constructing roDing unit. 
Moreover, new copper deposits, at Sungun in Northwestern part of country and Meiduk near 
Sarcheshmeh, are being developed to provide inputs, in order to raise the capacity of the 
complex from 144,000 to 200,000 tonnes a year. The plan is to increase copper output from 
Sarcheshmeh copper mine and smelter, near Kerman, from 92,000 tonnes in 1990 to 200,000 
tonnes a year. As recent data indicates, the production of anode copper increased from 58,000 
tons in 1989, to 102,000 tons in 1994, showing 22% of annual growth [87]. The electric cable 
industly is seen as a prominent area for exports but it needs modem technology and expertise to 
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be able to compete in the international market. The total copper production rose to 416,000 
tonnes during the first Plan (1989- 1993) from 165,000 tons, indicating an average annual 
growth of20.2 % [88]. 
6. 7 ALUMINIUM MANUFACfURlNG PRODUcrs 
Arak Ahuninum Company was constructed in 1967 as a joint venture between Iran with 70 % 
of the share, and Pakistan, US Reynolds Metals Company, holding 25% of the share. The Arak 
aluminium factory is capable of producing 45,000 tons of ahuninum bars in its reduction unit, 
and 120,000 tons of alloys in its casting unit. Since the implementation of the first plan, e1forts 
have been made to raise the production and to increase the design capacity to 120,000 tonnes 
a year [89]. The aluminjum powder used by the industry is imported at 100,000 tonnes a year 
mostly from Australia. The other Abnninium plant, Ahun Pars which was set up in 1977 in 
Saveh in Central Province, has a cold roDing plant with an annual capacity of 12,000 tonnes. 
The Almahdi AhlTninium complex, claimed to be the largest in the Middle East, has recently 
been built in Bandar Abbas (a major southem port), by a joint venture with the Dubai based 
Jutemational Deve10pmem Corporation Company (L D. C.) holding 40% of shares. The smelter 
is to have an initial output of220,000 tonnes of a, increasing gradually to 330,000 tonnes per 
year. The complex wiD. include a 300-400 MW power station and a desalination plant. 
According to a report by the Ministry of Mines and Metals, the output of ablTninium stood at 
90,100 tonnes in 1994 from over 28,000 tonnes in 1989, indicating 26.3% annual growth rate, 
\\hile the target for the first development plan was 18.5% [90]. 
6. 8 CAR MANUFACfURlNG INDUSTRY 
During the FlI'St FIVe Year Plan (1989-1993), in the automobile manufacturing industry, there 
were two new types ofbuses, one new type of minibus, two types of car and for the first time 
the production of cars has been achieved with manufilcturing of more than 50% of their 
~euts by local manufacturers. FoBowing an attempt for privatisation of most state-owned 
enterprises, major car manufacturing plants including Iran Khodro, SAIPA, Pars Khodro, Iran 
Vanet, Khavar, KhodroWS82'Jl1l, Zamyad, Moratab, Iran Kaveh and Shahab Khodrow which 
mostly were under the control of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, were put on sale by the Stock 
Exchange in 1992. Assembly and manufacturing plants have also been completed by the large 
state-owned car companies that are being privatised. However, as a recent report by UNIOO 
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(1995) indicated, several attempts to introduce a locally-designed "national car" to replace the 
existing type (Peykan) has been unsuccessful so far [91]. Therefore, due to heavy dependency 
on imports of parts and kits, the Iran's auto-manufacturing industry stitllacks a selfsufficient 
capacity to manufacture a complete domestically-produced car. 
Iran Khodrow is a pioneer producer of passenger cars, vans, minibuses, ambulances, buses, and 
bus engines. In 1989, it signed a $ 1,500 million contract with Peugeot of France to set up local 
rnanufactming filcilities to assemble 60,000 Peugeot 405 engines to be used in Paykan passenger 
cars. Another project of Iran Khodro includes the expansion of its bus producing unit, to tum 
out 4,000 Mercedes B~ 302 buses a year. Iran Khodro, has also exported 1,070 various kinds 
ofvebicles including 500 Peugeot cars, 501 minibuses, 119 buses and 33 ambulances to Russia 
in 1993 [92]. 
SAIP A is another country's major manufacturer of various types of vehicles mainly through 
assembly and CKD (Complete Knocked Down) kits. It has mainly assembled passenger cars 
including Renauh 5 and Renauh 21 under licence from Renauh of France, Diane (Citroen) as 
wen as Pride (Kya motors ofS. Korea) and Nissan of Japan. In addition, several contracts have 
also been signed with Mercedes of Germany, Fiat of Italy and Daewoo of South Korea to set up 
filci1ities for the assembly of passenger cars. Moreover, a joint-venture agreement has also been 
signed with AWD-Bedford of UK to assemble 2,000 trucks a year. SIPA produced 21,300 
Renauh-5 cars and Nissan pick-up trucks during the first eight months of the 1992. The Sazeh 
Gostar company, a design and engineering affiliate of the Industrial Development & Renovation 
Organisation (IDRO), with the latest computer technology and working under a systems 
approach requiring a high degree of specialisation, has been drawing complete designs of the 
Reoau1t-5. While copying the Renault-5, the company is designing new parts for other cars such 
as Nissan Patro~ Jeep, Land Rover, and Mercedes and Volvo heavy vehicles. 
According to a report by the Minister of Heavy Industries, during the period 1988-92, the 
average growth in vehicle production was as fonows: Vans, 3.9%; lorries, 2.9%; buses, 2.5%; 
minibuses, 2.2%; station wagons, 2.1%; cars, 1.6% [93]. 
6.9 REA VY MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT INDUSlRY 
The most important heavy machinery and equipment manufacturing facilities in the country are 
located mainly in Arak in the central part and Tabriz in the northwest of the country. As 
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indicated earlier, the Arak Machine Manufacturing Company (Machine Sazi Arak), was 
estabJished in 1969 with technical and financial assistance from the former Soviet Union, and 
with a capacity of20,OOO tons, for the production of machinery, boilers, cranes, conveyer belts, 
and agricuhural equipment. There was an agreement with the German Krupp company in early 
1989, to produce 1,500- cubic-metre-a-day desaHnation plants with 70 % local content, to be 
increased to 85% [94]. The Tabriz machine Manufacturing Company (Machine Sazi Tabriz), 
was put in operation in 1972 with technical assistance from former Czechoslovakia, with a 
capacity of 10,000 tonnes of lathing and miJJing machines, lathing plates, drilling and grinding 
machines per year. It was also designed to produce 50,000 electro-motors, 10,000 compressors 
and spare parts and 3,300 small diesel engines. Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company (Tractor 
Sazi Iran) was formed in 1968 with technical assistance of Romania and with an annual design 
capacity to produce 18,000 Massey-Ferguson tractors through assembly operation, 10,000 
tractors and industrial engines, 7,450 troneys, casting parts and ironworks. In 1987, its 
production capacity was planned to expand to about 30,000 Massey Ferguson tractors, 36,000 
perldns engines, 54,000 tonnes of casting and 36,000 tonnes of ironworks. WIth a combination 
of the Romanian and British Massey Ferguson techniques, the company could produce a new 
type tractor \\hlch is stronger than other types by 10 horsepower [95]. Azar abb Company was 
established in Arak in 1984, with an investment of about Rls 30,000 million and design capacity 
of 25,562 tonnes to manufacture steam boilers for power plants, and equipment for the oil 
refineries and other plants in the country. Several contracts have been signed with Japanese 
COIq)anies, incbuting a joint venture with Japan Steel Works company to build steam boilers for 
the country's major power stations. 
6.10 FOOD, AND FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRIES 
This industry covers a total of about 928 large and about 8000 small production plants. The 
avai1abiIity of the raw materla1s required and the relatively expanding export markets, has helped 
the industry to achieve an average growth rate of7.8% in the last' few years [96]. One of the 
most recent examples from the food processing industry is a 50-SO % joint venture between 
Swiss food manufacturer company, Nestle, with Iranian fiunily firm, Nowzad, to build a $ 44 
million baby food factory near Tehran with a primary capacity to produce 20,000 tonnes per 
year of infant fommla and cereal in September 1994. 
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6.11 CARPET MANUFACTURING 
Carpet weaving, which involves 4-S million people, is still the most important branch of the 
handicrafts industry. There are about 18 factories involved in machin~made carpets with an 
annual production valued at $ 1. S billion. The exports of hand-made carpets and rugs which is 
the largest figure among non-oil exports, constituting about SO% of non-oil exports, has 
recently faced a crisis and amounted to only $ 968 million in 1995 which showed a 40 % 
decline from the previous year ($1.4 billion). This is mostly due to fluctuation in exchange rate 
and competition from machin~made carpets of other countries such as China, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh with very low prices. Furthermore, the government decision in 
requiring the rug exporters to sen to the banking system their foreign exchange earnings at the 
official rate has also slowed down the export of rugs. Moreover, shortage of raw materials and 
the US trade ban with Iran (announced on May 1995) which was one considerable market of 
Iranian carpet and rugs is also viewed by the UN report as other factors contributing to reducing 
its exports [97]. However, due to relatively reduced dependency of the carpet and rug 
industries on importing foreign inputs and materials, most of the revenues from the export of 
rugs and carpets can be used as a source to assist for the further expansion and development of 
this traditional industry. 
6.12 TEXTILES, KNfITING AND LEATHER INDUSTRY 
This industry is one of the oldest in Iran, and probably the first to start using modem techniques. 
The textile industry includes a number of spinning, weaving, and knitting plants producing a 
variety of woven and knitted fabrics with yam spun from different natural and synthetic fibres. 
The number of large plants in this industry fen from 1,221 in 1982 to 1,112 in 1987. Domestic 
demand for cloth amolDlts to 900 million square metres per year. One of the important knitting 
and weaving manufacturers in Iran, Cbit~Ray, started in early 1989 insta11ing 150 sets of very 
modem weaving machinery, mostly imported from (former) Czechoslovakia. This company is 
exporting nearly SO,OOO metres of cloth per month. However, this industry, Hke other 
industries, needs to import some of its basic materials such as polyester and acrylic fibres from 
abroad. According to the available data, the total number of operating spindles amounted to 
about 1.S million in 1993 while the number of weaving and knitting machines amounted to 
approximately 4000 [98]. 
Moreocer, some important industrial plants and projects undertaken during the FJrSt F1V~ Year 
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Plan (1989-1993) include: a $52 million paper manufacturing plant~ 27 new cement plants with 
a total capacity of 13.7 million tonnes a year which could raise annual output by the mid-l990s 
to 33 million tonnes a year; a joint venture with a Swiss firm for repairing war damage to the 
Neka Power Station on the Caspian Sea along with building another power station, powered by 
two 137 megawatt gas turbines near Neka; building a $ 260 million power plant with the help 
of a German company in Gillan northern Iran; the plumbago smehing unit in Zanjan; the gold 
sme1ting unit ofMoteh (near Moteh Gold Mines); the DMT manu&cturing plant, producers of 
synthetic fibres, PVC and rubber manufacturing plants in some cities in Iran; the serum 
manufacturing plants in Masbhad and Tabriz; the lAB unit, manufacturers of detergents, the 
textile industries and textile machinery; the ship building yard at Neca in northern Iran; and the 
pharmaceutics units. During this period, a total of about 1000 industrial plants became 
operational each year. About 300 engineering design units and 245 assembly design units have 
also been established in heavy industries. The expansion and development of these units during 
the next Five Year Plan can play an important role in increasing the ability and capability of 
learning and assirmlating know-how and foreign technologies. During the period of the first plan 
(1989-1993), the production of cement grew by an average growth rate of 60/0, stee125.2%, 
copper 16.6%, abJlnimun 26.30/0, and the auto-manufacturing 29% [99]. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Industry 214,611 216,226 215,416 193,529 170,91 
Food and sugar 4,962 4,774 3,791 12,800 348 
Textiles, handicrafts and leather 2,724 2,760 7,493 6,810 6,237 
Cellulose and printing 
- - -
9500 
-
Chemical and petrochemical 18,893 37,905 35,535 88,118 82,215 
Non-metallic minerals 7,401 2,605 1,435 7,050 
-
Metal and metal smelting 164,678 154,300 122,846 45,150 47,845 
Mechanical 5,165 6,779 28,000 750 15,000 
Transportation vehicles 6,564 
-
170 
- -
Damaged estab6~ment project 721 1,090 2,682 
- -
Industrial supeIVision & research 2,193 3,577 7,17.7 11,122 9,175 
Technical assistance 10,309 2,436 6,287 12,229 10,092 
Mining 51,859 94,334 100,138 118,759 156,58 
Total 266,470 310,560 315,554 312,324 327,50 
Table 6.9 Government Development Payments for Manufacturing and Mining Sector (Million 
Rials) 
Source: The Central Bank oflR. Iran, Annual Review, 1994-95, P: 30 
288 
According to a report by the Minister of Industry, of the total amount of Rls 7,500 billion, and 
$ 14 billion (from oil sales revenues) were invested in the industrial sector during the period of 
Frrst FIVe Year Plan, 55% of the sum was invested by the public sector and 45% by the private 
sector. The investments made by the government went mostly to infrastructure projects and key 
industries such as petrochemicals, steel and auto-manufacturing industries. Industrial exports 
grew by 40% and reached a total value of $ 1.2 billion in 1993. Domestic production of 
petrochemical products rose to 5.5 million tons in 1993 from half a million tons in 1989. The 
production of various types of steel increased from 1.4 million tons in 1989 to more than 4 
million tons in the last year of the plan (1993) [100]. Fonowing the implementation of the 
privatisation policy during the first plan (1989-1993), a substantial amount of private investment 
has been attracted. For example, Industrial and Mining Bank of Iran offered 69 million shares 
of state-owned enterprises, with a total value ofRIs 480 billion ($ 160 million) on the Tehran 
Stock Marlret. Moreover, about 300 companies with the total value of$ 700 million have been 
transfunned to the private sector since the implementation of privatisation programs in the First 
Plan [101]. 
Having compared the achievement of the targeted figures during the FII'St FIVe Year Plan, as a 
report by the Plan and Budget Organisation indicated, 1989-1990, the va1ue-added in the 
industrial sector grew by 8% and 11.2% in 1989 and 1990 respectively compared to the 
projected figure of 14.2% growth rate of industrial output for the period of the plan. The annual 
growth rate of value-added in capital goods industries has been 25% in both years, more than 
thepJanned target of24%. Targets for the annual growth rate of intermediate goods industries 
has been 20% while the actual rates have been 10% and 23.7% in 1989 and 1990 respectively. 
According to Bank Markazi reports during 1990-1991, labour productivity in the industrial 
sector had a growth rate of 25% and capacity utilisation reached 40-50% with oil related 
industries operating at near full-capacity [102]. 
As indicated earlier, the plan was aimed at the average annual growth rate of 4.2 % for 
consnmer goods industries value-added, however according to some statistics, the real average 
annual growth rate for value-added of consumer good industries in the four year of the plan was 
much more than the target figure. The fiUlure in achieving some of the above targeted figure 
(such as annual growth rate for intermediate industries), can be mainly attributed to some factors 
such as: giving foreign exchange subsidies to industrial investors for importing machinery and 
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equipment \Wicll1ed to a decrease in their demand and tendency for producing domestic capital 
goods; lack of adequate supportive quotas and tax on imports; and the Jack of technological 
capability and decentralisation of decision making due to the existence of three ministries in 
charge of the industrial sector. 
Having analysed the targeted figure for non-oil exports in general and industrial exports in 
particular, non-oil exports were expected to increase to $ 17.8 billion during the Plan period 
(1989-1993) half of which was assumed to be the contribution of manufacturing exports. 
However, the total value of non-oil exports has been $ 11. 7 billion over this period. The plan 
has also fiiled to achieve the targeted figure for the exports of industrial products. As indicated 
earlier, targets for exports of industrial products have been, 543.8; 692.9; 950.9; 1310.9 and 
3740 million dollars for the period between 1989-1993, however, the actual figures for export 
of industrial products have been, 154.7, 234.2, 722, I04S.2, and 1243.4 million dollars for this 
period [103]. h is argued that the unstable and inconsistent exchange rate policy was one of the 
major factors affecting the performance of non-oil exports and in particular manufactured 
exports. Ahhougb the initial devaluation of currency which was implemented in accordance with 
the trade Iibera1isatim policy since 1989, resulted in some very favourable effects on increasing 
exports (increasing non-oil exports from about $ 1 billion in 1989 to about $ 3 billion in 1992), 
severe fluctuation in the value of the floating exchange rate caused to a shatp incfease in the 
price of domestic products due to their heavy dependency on imports of materials and 
components which in tum affected the value of exports. 
Moreover, following the government decision to unifY the exchange rate in Apri11993 (the 
devaluation of the Rial by 95.6%), the government annolDlced a new floating exchange rate 
sub&tfuting the previous JDJ1ti-rates exchange rates. However, due to some problems caused by 
the severe mortage offoreign exchange and the trade ban imposed by the U.S government, the 
exchange rate unification could not be accompHshed. Moreover, although the experience of 
some countries studied before (such as Indonesia, MaJaysia., etc .... ) indicated the favourable 
effects of devaluation of their currencies, in Iran, due to heavy dependency of domestic 
industries on importing their required materials and parts from abroad, the devaluation of Rial 
led to an increase in the price of these materials and therefore led to high cost of production 
which in tum resulted in loosing the competitiveness of domestic products in international 
markets. The widening gap between official and free exchange rates (the free market rate was 
26()0,4, higher than the official rate by May 1995) had some inflationary pressure on the economy 
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\Wich made government officials introduce new policy measures in May 1995 to prevent further 
soaring prices. These new measures included fixing the official rate at Rls.3000 per dollar and 
requiring exporters to sen their foreign exchange earnings at the official rate within a period of 
three months (6 months for carpets) have had negative effects on the amOlmt of non-oil 
exports. Exporters are also allowed to use up to 50% of their export value to import basic 
materials into the country. 
Some of the other most important reasons for the weakness of industrial exports were as 
follows: 
1. Lack of precise recognition of the country's export regarding its comparative 
advantages, 
2. Lack of adequate quality standards for local industrial products, 
3. Lack of consistent exchange rate policies during the implementation of the plan (1989-
1993), 
4. The unrealistic and ambitious targets for industrial exports, 
5. Heavy dependency on the import of foreign inputs for producing industrial output, 
(about 65%) 
6. The lack of sufficient export incentives for the domestic industrial producers (private 
and public) 
7. Lack of a competitive environment both from inside and outside the country, 
8. The high cost of production due to low levels of productivity , 
9. The lack of adequate absorptive capacity for the adaptation of the imported technology 
and low technological capability, 
10. The lack of strong supportive regulations for encouraging industrial exports and the 
existence of some administrative barriers and red tape, 
11. Lack of efficient managerial and technical expertise, 
12. Inadequate industrial infrastructure and relatively low level of private and foreign 
investment in the industrial sector, 
13. The existence of unused industrial capacities in most of the industrial investment, 
14. The lack of adequate marketing expertise and inadequate packaging, 
However, some steps were taken to tackle these obstacles in particular the weaknesses of 
industrial exports. These include more investment in industries which are involved in the 
291 
packaging of exporting products, greater emphasis on promoting quality control and standards 
levels of the products, and active participation in international trade &irs in order to learn more 
about various ways of penetrating international markets with the right products [104]. 
Moreover, an OVeMew of the composition of non-oil exports during the period between (1971-
1992) indicated that the share of manufacturing exports has never exceeded 22%, and 
agricultural and traditional goods contributed the majority of most of non-oil exports. 
1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
I Agricultural and traditional goods 69.9 93.3 79.8 74.4 85.7 79.1 75.0 69.6 
Metal ores 5.5 3.0 6.5 3.2 2.6 2.5 1.5 1.2 
Industrial goods 24.6 3.7 13.8 22.5 11.7 18.4 18.2 21.3 
Other 
- - - - - -
5.3 7.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.0 
Table 6.10 The Composition of Non-oil Exports during the period between (1975-1992) 
Source: Plan and Budget Organisation Iran, Tehran. 
Regarding the targeted figure of 15% for the average annual growth rate of the industrial and 
mining sector, it is estimated that the real rate was 7.6% over the first three years of the plan, 
achieving only 53% of its projected growth rate. However, the growth rate of ID8t1Ufitcturing 
sector declined to 3.2% and 1% in 1992 and 1993 (fourth and fifth year of the plan) respectively 
[lOS]. As indicated earlier, in addition to the above mentioned points, some factors such as the 
lack of consistent and coherent strategy for industrialisation; the existence of several decision 
making centres in the industty sector; lack of adequate managerial and technical expertise; 
inability to generate adequate employment opportunities; lack of adequate inter-sector linkage 
within industty sectors; the inappropriate technology and obsolescent processes of most 
industries; low productivity levels; the slow process of privatisation of industrial enterprises, 
inadequate and inefficient utilisation of natural raw material; the shortage of aBocated foreign 
exchange and credit; a relatively low capacity utilisation; and unplanned facilitation of imports 
during the second year of the impJementation of the Plan (inadequate protection of domestic 
industries against fureign ~orts1 were among the most important reasons for the failure of the 
Plan to achieve its actual target for the growth of the industrial sector. Moreover, as indicated 
earlier, a continuous heavy dependency of manufacturing sector on imported inputs for its 
growth, led to its decline when the country faced the shortage of foreign exchange as a 
consequence of decreasing oil prices. 
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Having compared the other targeted and actual figures of the plan, one can note that while the 
plan envisaged an average annual GDP growth rate of8.1 % for the period between (1989-
1993), GDP grew by an average annual rate of 7.2% in this period. However, the average 
annual GDP growth rate in the first two years was significant (10%) and above the projected 
rate. The high growth rate achieved during the first half of the plan can be mostly contributed to 
the initial effects of the trade and foreign exchange liberaJisation and the utilisation of mused 
capacities in the economy, along with increase in the oil prices following the Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait. Moreover, the figure for the average annual growth rate for ratio of investments to 
GDP was projected to be 19.70/0, but its actual rate in the first four years of the plan was 10.6%, 
only 54% of the expected rate. Thus only a small portion of the GDP was invested in the 
economy. 
The different economic sectors 1984-1988 1979-1984 1989- 1993 The targeted 
The avo growth The avo growth The avo growth figure of plan (%) 
Oil 1.4 4.9 5.9 6.1 
Industry and mines 2.2 -8.5 8.6 9.5 
Water, power and gas 1.5 7.8 9.1 15.0 
Construction 4.8 7.1 127 9.1 
Services -17.5 3.3 5.3 14.5 
Gross Domestic Products (GOP) -18.1 3.7 6.5 6.7 
Table 6.11 The average growth rate of different economic sectors during the period between 
1979-1993 
One can refer to some obstacles and problems which prevented some of the targets and goals of 
the plan being completely achieved such as; swift revisions to the plan; shortage of technical and 
managerial expertise; ineffective bureaucracy; different sources of policy making and lack of c0-
ordination between them; inconsistent and lDlstable regulations and ftuctuation in exchange rate; 
high dependency on the oil revenues for financing the reconstruction plant and imports of 
required inputs fur local industries, and lack of adequate utilisation oflocal productive capacity. 
Sectors 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual 
Agricuhure 4.2 3.7 4.6 8.1 6.1 5.1 7.1 7.4 8.S 3.S 
Oil 21. 7.7 9.6 19.9 3.4 11.12 11.3 2.1 3.0 S.S 
Industries and mines 14. 6.6 15.2 13.4 14.6 17.2 16.4 4.7 13.8 2.1 
Water, electricity and gas 6.5 11.0 7.0 19.4 11.7 15.5 5.3 8.5 47.8 9.4 
Services S.1 1.8 7.1 9.7 7.2 9.9 7.0 8.0 7.0 2.9 
Construction 29. -1.7 15.7 29 12.4 16.0 10.0 7.9 6.5 2.9 
Gross Domestic product 7.9 42 9.2 11.5 6.8 10.12 8.S 6.00 8.4 3.3 
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Table 6.12 A comparison of planned and actual objectives of the first five year plan (1989-
1993) 
As the implementation of the First Five Year Plan ended in 1993, the government officials 
decided to study and evaluate the overall achievement of the first plan in 1994, to analyses the 
strength and weaknesses needed for designing future plans. The Second Five> Y ear Plan (1995-
1999) which officially started from 21 March 1995 (the beginning of the Iranian new year) 
aimed at some overall objectives such as an average GOP growth rate of 5.1 %, an average 
growth. rate of 4.3% for agricuhure, 5.9% for industries and mines, and an average growth rate 
of 8.4% for non-oU exports with total value of$ 24 billion during the plan, which seems to be 
lower than similar targets in the first Plan [106]. However, one can see the high priority and 
great emphasis placed on the expansion of non-oU exports during the second plan. In order to 
achieve its goals in increasing non-oU exports during the period 1995-1999, the Plan considers 
some export incentives measures such as, improving export regulations and smoothing the 
administrative procedures of exports, removing nonessential procedures and bureaucratic 
customs, centralising the government receipt of custom tariffs, introducing export insurance and 
guarantees, assisting exporters with their international marketing operations, providing exporters 
with up-to-date information through estabHshment of data banks, as well as offering export 
facilities such as export credits. The plan also projected the total fixed investment to be 
increased by an average of24.6 % ofGDP during 1995 - 2000 as one of the basic targets for 
growth. in this period. Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) is also projected to increase from R1s 
2403 billion in 1995 to R1s 3056 billion in 1999, by a 6.19 % annual compOlmded growth [107]. 
In addition to the above quantitative targets, the Second Plan also aimed at continuing the 
development and COIq)Jetion of plant from the rlI'St Plan, reform of the countly's administrative 
system, and improvements in income and weahh distribution, in particular in rural areas. 
Moreover, economic stability and reduction of foreign debt are considered as two of the 
principal objectives of this plan. In order to assist the improvement of rural and undeveloped 
areas, an amount ofRIs. 3000 billion has been allocated during the Second Plan. The Second 
Plan has also provided fur introducing some measures in order to increase efficiency in domestic 
production, promoting local technological capability, increasing manufacturing output and 
industrial exports. Some of these measures inc1ude the reduction of tariff rates, more efficient 
use of the COUIItIYs existing industrial potential and comparative advantages, and continuing the 
iIqmJvemeIlt of the COUIItIYs infiastructure such as transportation networks and COJDDIImication 
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systems. 
Some of the most important objectives of the Second Plan (1995-1999) in the industry sector 
are: increase in industrial production; the development of the quality of local manufacturing 
products in order to compete in the international market; the development oflocal technological 
capability; the provision of necessary facilities for more and better attraction of foreign 
investment and technology; the maxinnun utilisation of the existing industrial capacity; the 
establishment and development of small-scale industries with high technology which can 
associate and compete with the local medium and large-scale industries; the development of the 
handicraft industries in particular in rural areas; and the development of industrial investment in 
particular in petrochemicals, the agricultural industries and electronics. The industrial policy in 
Second-Plan has also placed more emphasis on continuing the restructuring and privatisation 
process of the F'trst Plan, greater intensity towards export promotion industrialisation policy and 
more utilisation of potential domestic resources and industrial capacity. Moreover, some of the 
most important quantitative objectives of the industrial sector during the Second FIVe-Year 
Development Plan (1995-1999) are: 
1. A total investment of about RIs 20,000 billion in addition to S 6-8 billion in the 
industries, 
2. The average growth rate of 6.2% for industrial value added during the period of the 
plan, 
3. The average growth rate of 10% for engineering and software design activities, 
4. The expansion of the industrial applied research activities so that their value will reach 
0.3% of total value of industrial production by the end of the plan in 1999. 
5. Increasing the share of technicians and skilled labour working in industry sector from 
3% to 4% in the end of the plan. 
6. Increasing the exports of carpets and handicrafts to an average annual ofS 1.6 billion, 
7. Increasing the production of petrochemicals, steeL copper, phunbago, zinc and 
aluminium to an average annual rate of 13 million tons, 7 million tonnes, 200,000 
tonnes, 40,000 tonnes, 60,000 tonnes and 230,000 tonnes respectively by the end of 
the second plan (1999). 
8. The total value ofRIs. 20,000 billion investments in industries and mining in terms of 
fixed prices of the 1993. 
9. The total ofS 10 billion of manufacturing exports during (1995-1999). 
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According to the Plan, before signing agreements with foreign companies, the government is 
required to oblige them to transfer know-how and technical knowledge along with the training 
of the loca1labom. It seems also essential to pay more attention to enhancing local industrial and 
technological capacity when purchasing foreign machinery and equipment in order to facilitate 
the transfer of know-how and technical expertise embodied in those machinery and equipment. 
The second plan is also aiming to improve Iran's international competitiveness, through the 
adoption of some trade and exchange policy measures such as reunification of the exchmge 
rate, e1imination of tariff exceptions for all public enterprises, and providing sufficient protection 
for domestic production. The government also hopes to increase Iran's industrial 
competitiveness and exports by encouraging the adoption of good management techniques, 
acquisition of modem and up-to-date technologies, and pursuing consistent and coherent 
policies. The prlvatisation policies implemented in the First FIVe-Year Development Plan are to 
be oontirmed with higher speed and with aim of the leaving only 10 % oflranian industry in the 
public sector by the year 2000. 
Economic indicators (%1 
RealGDP 5.1 
Oil 1.6 
I Agricuhure 4.3 
Industry and mining 5.9 
Services 3.1 
I Imports 4.3 
Oil exports 3.4 
Non-oil 8.4 
Table 6.13 Qwm1itative Targets (average growth rate) in Second FIVe-Year Plan (1995-1999) 
Somce: Central Bank oflR. Iran, Economic Trends, Economic Research Department, P: 20 
The Second Plan is also aimed at expanding support for small and medium scale industries, in 
particular in rural areas. As indicated earlier, among the ~ targets of the Second Plan 
is the average annual GOP growth rate of5.1 % for the period between 1995-2000. However, 
it seems essential for Iran to continue to intensify the stabilisation and outward-looking policies 
in order to sustain this targeted figure, bearing in mind the experience of first plan which 
achieved a high growth rate in the first two years of the plan but ten shatply in the latter years. 
Having considered its 1arge potemial natural and human resources, Iran can achieve most of the 
second plan's targds through nq,Jemmtation of a set of sound policy ftameworks and providing 
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an appropriate environment for overall growth. It is also essential to emphasise more on the 
efficient utilisation of the country's potential assets in particular those in which the country has 
a comparative advantage, such as petroleum and vast natural gas reserves, substantial 
agriculture and other valuable minerals such as copper, zinc, gemstones. Therefore, efforts need 
to be made to maximise the efficient use of country's national and human resources. 
As indicated earlier, despite the government attempts to reduce the dependency on oil revenues, 
it seems that oil continued to dominate the country's merchandise exports, which averaged 
about $ 18 billion per year in the period between 1989-93, with about 85 % from oil [108]. The 
oil revenue is also projected to amount to $ 72 billion during the period between 1995-1999. 
However, the Second Plan envisaged a slower growth rate for the oil sector ( average annual 
rate of3.2 %). As indicated earlier, there has also been an especial emphasis on the growth of 
the non-oil exports which expected to increase to an average annual of $ 5 billion over the 
second plan and win amount to a total value of$ 27.5 billion by the year 1999. This can be 
achieved through the adoption of comprehensive export promotion policy measures including 
giving export incentives to exporters and concentrating on products in which the country has a 
comparative advantage, such as carpets, fresh and dried vegetables and fruits, spices, 
handicrafts, canned foods, fresh flowers, electric goods, fabrics, paints and petrochemicals. In 
1994, a total value ofS 4.5 billion, non-oil products were exported which had a 15% growth 
rate in comparison to 1993. The non-oil exports in 1994 consisted of$ 1.69 billion of carpets 
and other handicrafts, $ 1.17 billion of industrial products, $ 985 of agricu1tura1 goods, $ 63 
million of minerals and $ 547 million other goods and products [109]. 
Product Value ($ billion) 
Textiles and clothing 0.25 
Chemical and cellulose 1.16 
Food and pharmaceutical 0.32 
Non-metallic minerals 0.22 
Petrochemicals 2.23 
Metals 2.24 
Carpets and handicrafts 7.00 
Trucks 0.14 
Buses 0.06 
Others 1.91 
Total 15.80 
Table 6.14 Projected value of manufactured exports by major product group, second 
development plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1995 -2000) ($ billion) 
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Source: Plan and Budget Organisation, Draft of Second Social Economic and Culture 
Development Plan of the Islamic Republic oflran 
There is also an especial emphasis on attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Second 
Plan, as one of the major sources offoreign capital and technology during this period (1995-
1999). This can be done through the implementation of the new Foreign Investment Law, 
expansion of Free Trade Zones and creation of political and macroeconomic stability. The plan 
also projected using up to $ 10 billion foreign capital and credits in the form ofbuy back, for 
investing in the development projects and expansion of the country's infrastructure. The plan 
also projected a current account surplus in order to repay foreign debts. Debt seMce payments 
wouId average about 16 % of goods and seIVices exports compared to 29% at end-I994 [110]. 
In order to seIVice the foreign debt, the government adopted a strong import compression 
policy whereby imports decreased from $ 25,190 billion in 1991 to $ 19,287 billion in 1993, 
16.1 billion in 1994 and $12.7 billion in 1995. As a result of this policy measure, trade and 
current account had a surplus of$ 6.3 billion and $ 3.3 billion, in 1994 and 1995 respectively 
[111]. Therefore, it seems that even if excluding the flow offoreign capital and investment, the 
country's current account surplus would be able to cope with foreign debt repayment. 
1995/ 1996/ 1997/9 1998/9 1999/20 Total 
Total revenue 17637 18762 19857 21440 22486 10018 
Non-oil 4565 4940 5446 5984 6589 27524 
Oil 13072 13822 14411 15456 15897 72658 
Oil products 666 578 556 652 668 3120 
Crude oil 12406 13244 13855 14804 15229 69538 
Exports 2344 2419 2449 2535 2529 12276 
Price Der barrel 1450 15.00 15.20 16.00 16.50 
-
Table 6.15 Foreign Exchange Revenues Projection in Second Development Plan (In $ 
millions) 
Source: Azizi, A "Iranian Economy", Presented in the ~ce on Iran in London, 
1995. 
6. 13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, having smveyed the industrial policies of Iran during the pre-revolutionary and 
post-revolutionary period, one can find several common features in the industrialization 
experience oflran with those of oil-exporting countries such as Mexico, and Indonesia. As 
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indicated earlier, like many other developing countries, Iran adopted import substitution 
policies in the early stage of industrialisation in 1960s which mainly emphasised on the 
creating an industrial sector capable of producing consumer goods for domestic market. 
Despite some positive effects of lSI on Iranian economy in particular in the first stage of its 
implementation such as development of an consumer and intermediate goods industries 
which could meet to some extent the domestic needs, however, due to lack of an 
appropriate level of productivity, these industries were not mature enough to compete in 
international market. Moreover, as indicated earlier, heavy reliance of most local industries 
on importing the raw materials and equipment which financed mainly by oil incomes 
resulted to technological dependency. Therefore, there has been a close linkage between 
the oil revenues and the industrial outputs. Whenever, there was a decline in the country's 
oil income as a resuh of reducing oil prices, this in tum affected the industrial performance 
of the country. 
As discussed earlier in the case of some East Asian first and second-tier countries as well 
as countries such as Mexico, and Turkey, the government in these countries played an 
important role in adoption of some effective policy measures which directed them towards 
a successful transition to an export oriented industrialization phase. For example, the 
governments in Mexico and Indonesia, which have been among the major petroleum 
exporting countries, managed to decrease their dependency on oil revenues in the second 
stage of the import substitution policies. However, as indicated earlier, there has not been 
a serious effort and specific policy measures in Iran during the same stage in the 1970s, and 
the country remained heavily dependent on oil incomes. Moreover, as discussed in detail 
in the case of the East Asian first and second tier NICs, it is argued that the early shift to 
an outward-looking and export promotion policies in these countries from the previous 
import substitution policies has been among major success factors of these countries in 
rapid industrial and technological development. 
The government in these countries adopted effective policy measures including various 
export incentives such as tariff and custom-duty exemptions for importing required inputs 
for the exports, low interest rate loans and financial credits for exporters, and providing an 
appropriate and stable macroeeconomic environment needed for the successful 
implementation ofEPP. Furthermore, they also managed to develop an industrial base in 
the later stage of import substation policy which have the potential capability to 
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manufacture products for international market. In Iran instead, no such efforts and policy 
measures have been undertaken, and as explained earlier in this chapter, the government in 
Iran continued the implementation of lSI and protectionist policies in the 1970s and early 
1980s. As discussed earlier, only a few steps have been taken during this period for shift to 
an export-oriented industrialization policy which were not adequate enough to create an 
appropriate environment for successful transition to an EPP. Therefore, the implementation 
of lSI in Iran could not create an industrial base to be able to compete in international 
market because they were mostly immature and lacked the appropriate level of productivity 
and competitiveness. 
However, as already indicated, due to a sharp decline in oil prices in mid-1980s and the 
announcement of a cease-fire in 1988, the government introduced a series of export 
promotion and h'beralisation policies under implementation of the first five-years 
development plan aiming at promotion of non-oil exports and the consequent reduction in 
dependency on oil revenues. Despite a significant performance in GDP growth rate and 
expansion of non-oil exports in the first two years of the plan which were mostly as a result 
of efficient utilisation of the unused production capacities of the country, this was not 
sustained due to lack of macroeconomic stability, and effective and consistent policy 
measures. As is shown earlier in this chapter, although several attempts have been made to 
reduce the dependency on oil revenues during the past years, Iran still heavily relied on its 
oil revenues in order to finance the imports of industrial inputs needed for the 
manufacturing sector. This dependency can be considered as a major obstacle in the 
expansion of non-oil exports and industrial progress of the country. As surveyed in the case 
of some oil-rich countries such as Mexico, Indonesia and to some extent Malaysia, these 
countries managed to reduce significantly their dependency on oil exports through investing 
in the areas which they have a comparative advantage and capability to compete in the 
international market. Moreover, these countries develop a supportive intermediate and 
capital goods industrial base which could partly provide the necessary parts and equipment 
for the other industries with large export potentials. 
300 
REFERENCES 
1. World Factbook, 1995. 
2. World Bank, Islamic Republic of Iran, Economic Management and Prospects, 
November 1995. 
3. Walton, T. "Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran", 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1980, Vol 4, PP: 271-292. 
4. UNIOO, World Industry Since 1960: Progress and Prospects, New York, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation, 1979, P:38. 
5. Amuzegar,1. Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic, lB. Tauris & Co Ltd 
publishers, 1993. 
6. Kavoussi, R. M. " Trade Policy and Industrialisation in an Oil Exporting Country: 
The Case of Iran, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol 20, July 1986, PP:453-
472. 
7. Pesaran, MH The System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-revolutionary 
Iran, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 14, No:4, November 1982. 
8. Yaghmaian, B. ''Internationalisation of Capital and the Crisis of the Iranian 
Economy", Review of Radical Political Economics, VoL 20, No 2, pp: 40-56. 
9. Pesaran, M.H. Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran, in 
HAfshar (eds), Iran a Revolution in Turmoil, MacnriJJan, 1985, pp:lS-51. 
10. Katouzm, H "The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926, 1981. 
11. Yagbmaian , B. "Internationalisation of Capital and the Crisis of the Iranian 
Economy" Review of Radical Political Economics, VoL20, No:2, 1988, pp:40-S6. 
12. For further information, see Statistical Centre of Iran, A survey of Insufficiencies 
and Dependencies of the Large Industries of the Country, Tehran, 1980. 
13. Clawson, P." Capital Accumulation in Iran" in P. Nore and T. Turner (eds), Oil and 
Class Struggle, 1980, pp:143-171. 
14. Katouzian, H "The Political Economy of Modern Iran, Depotism. and Pseudo-
Moderni~ 1926-1979, ", London, Macmillan 1981. 
15. mRD (International Bank of Reconstruction and Development ) 1986, World 
Development Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
16. Halliday, F. "Iran: The Economic Contradictions" in MERIP (Middle East Research 
& Information Project), July-August 1978, VoL8, No.6, pp:9-18. 
301 
17. Paukert, F. and others, "Income Distnl>ution, Structure of Economy and 
Employment, The Philippines, Iran, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia", Croom 
Helm London, 1981. 
18. Amuzegar,1. "Iran: An Economic Profile", The Middle East Institute, Washington 
D.C. 1977. 
19. Katouzian, H. " The Political Economy of Modern Iran, Depotism and Pseudo-
Modernism, 1926-1979, Macmillan Press, 1981. 
20. Banouei, A.A " Planning and Development Under the Monarchy and the Islamic 
Government of Iran: A Critical Assessment", International Studies, Vol29, No.1, 
1992, pp:41-54. 
21. Nazmd, N. "Comparative Economic Studies, Vol 31, Fa1l1988, Part 3, pp:33-54. 
22. Looney, R. and Frederiksen, P. C. "The Iranian Economy in the 1970s: 
Examination of the Nugent Thesis", Middle Eastern Studies, October 1988, 
Volume 24, No: 4, pp: 490-495. 
23. Looney, R.E. "Economic Origins of the Revolution", Pergamon Press Inc, 1982. 
24. Vakil, F. Iran's Basic Macroeconomic Problems, A twenty-year Ho~ Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol2S, No:4, July 1977, pp:713-729. 
25. Katouzian, H The Political Economy of Modern Iran, Despotism and Pseudo-
Modernism, 1926-1979, Macmillan Press, 1981. 
26. Nazemi, N. " The Iranian Economy: Past and Present", Comparative Economic 
Studies, Vol 31, Fa1l1988, Part 3, pp:33-S4. 
27. Lautenschlager, W. "The Effect of an Overvalued Exchange Rate on the Iranian 
Economy", International Joumal of Middle East Studies, Vol 18, No: 1, Feb 1986, 
pp:31-52. 
28. Jazayeri, A "Economic Adjustment in oil-based Economies", Avebury, 1988. 
29. Looney, R. E. Origins of Pre-Revolutionary Iran's development Strategy, Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol 22, January 1986, No:l, pp:l04-120. 
30. Walton, T. "Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran", 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1980, Vol 4, pp: 271-292. 
31. Kraar, L. " The Shah Drives to Build a New Empire", Fortune, 90, 1974, P:192. 
32. Central Bank of Iran, The economic report and balanced sheet, 1358 (1979-1980). 
33. The Iran's statistical centre, A survey of insufficiencies, dependencies of large 
industrial units in 1980, resulted from statistical analysis of large industrial units in 
302 
1980. 
34. Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report and Balanced Sheet 1358 (1979-1980). 
35. Ettalaat, " The Nationalisation of Industries, The End of Industrial Oligarachy in 
Iran", (in persian), 24.04.1363. 
36. The Constitutional law of Islamic Republic of Iran, the chapter 4, adapted from 
article 43 and 44. 
37. Karimi, S. "Economic Policies and Structural Changes Since the Revolution", in 
N.R Keddie and E. Hooglund " The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic", 
Syracuse University Press, 1986, New York, pp:32-54. 
38. Razagbi, E. "Eghtesade Iran" (The Economy of Iran), Nashre Nei, (Nei Publishing), 
(in persian), 1987, P:389. 
39. The Central Bank of I.R IRAN (Bank Markazi), Annual Report and Balance 
Sheet, 1982. 
40. Iran Yearbook (1988), MB Medien & Bucher mbH, Bonn, 1988. 
41. Plan and Budget Organisation (PBO), "The First Five Year Macro-economic 
Social-Cultural Plan of Islamic Republic of Iran 1362-1366 (1983-1987)", 
Approved by economic council, 9th Shahrivar (1361). 
42. Bank Markazi (Central Bank of 1.1. Iran, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, 
1362 (1983). 
43. Bank Markazi (Central Bank), Economic Report and Balance Sheet, 1362 (1983). 
44. Iran Yearbook, MB Medien & Bucher, Bonn, 1988. 
45. Bank Markazi ( Central Bank of 1.1. Iran), Economic report and Balance Sheet, 
1985. 
46. Bank Markazi, (Central Bank of Iran), Economic Report and Balance Sheet, 1985. 
47. Amirahmadi, H "Revolution and Economic Transition, The Iranian Experience", 
State University of New York Press, 1990. 
48. Chamber of Commerce and Industry," The condition of industrial sector in 1987", 
Vol 10, 20 Day of 1368 (in persian)]. 
49. Bank Markazi (Central Bank ofI.R Iran), "Economic Report and Balance Sheet", 
1367 (1988-89). 
50. Bank Markazi, Central Bank of Iran, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, 1989. 
SI. Amuzegar, J, " The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution", Middle 
Eastern Journal, Volume 46, No:3, Summer 1992, PP:413-42S. 
303 
52. Ehteshami, A. "After Khomeini, The Iranian Second Republic", Routledge, 1995. 
53. Bank Markazi (Central Bank ofI.R. IRAN), Economic Report and Balance Sheet 
1368 (1989). 
54. Bank Markazi (Central Bank) of I. I. Iran, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, 
1369 (1990-91). 
55. Petro sian, V. "Iran: Special Reports", Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 
February 21. 
56. Bank Markazi (Central Bank ofI.R. Iran), Annual Review 1369 (1990). 
57. Bank Markazi (Central Bank) ofI.R. IRAN, Economic Report and Balance Sheet 
1370 (1991). 
58. Hunter, S. T. " Iran After Khomeini", Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, 1992. 
59. Bank Markazi (Central Bank ofI.R. Iran), Economic Report and Balance Sheet 
1370 (1991). 
60. Bank Marlwi ( Central Bank ofI.R. IRAN), Economic Report and Balance Sheet 
1371, 1992. 
61. National Iran Productivity Organisation (NIPO), Iran Productivity Bulletin, 
(January 1993), Tehran, Iran. 
62. Intmational Ettela'at, 9 Mordad 1374 (311uly 1995). 
63. Mardukhi, B. "Industrial Productivity in Iran Experiences and Perspectives", Iran 
Exports and Imports, March-Apri11995, No.34, pp: 25-26. 
64. Bank Markazi (Central Bank) ofI.R. IRAN, Annual Review, 1371 (1992). 
65. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran, Country Report, 2nd quarter 1993. 
66. Iran Commerce, ''In 2003, Iran will be independent of oil export to supply import 
needs", Quarterly Magazin, Vo12, No.2, 1994, pp:7-8. 
67. Bank Markazi (Central Bank) ofI.R. of Iran, Annual Review, 1372, 1993. 
68. IMF, "Islamic Republic of Iran, Recent Economic' Developments", Report 
No.95/121, December 1995. 
69. Iran Business Monitor, August 1995, P: 11. 
70. Bank Markazi (Central Bank ofI.R. IRAN), Annual Review, 1373 (1994-1995), 
P:8 
71. MEED (Middle East Economic Digest), 22 May 1992, P: 10 
72. International Ettelaat, No: 406, 31anuary 1996. 
304 
73. Alerassoo~ M. "Iran, Towards a New Economy", A MEED Profile, 1993, EMAP 
Business Information Ltd, 1993. 
74. Iran Yearbook 1993, MB Medien & Bucher MBH, Bonn, 1993. 
75. UNIDO, Islamic Republic of Iran, Industrial Revitalisation, Industrial Development 
Review Series, E.I.U, 1995. 
76. MEED, (Middle East Economic Digest), 12 August 1994. 
77. Ettela'at Intemation~ 10 March 1996. 
78. SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Third Series ME / W0269, 16th Februry 1993. 
79. UNIDO, I.R. IRAN Industrial Revitalization, United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation, 1995. 
80. Alerassoo~ M. "Iran, Towards a New Economy", A MEED Profile, 1993, EMAP 
Business Information Ltd, 1993. 
81. UNIDO, I.R. IRAN Industrial Revitalization, United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation, 1995. 
82. Iran Quarterly Report, " Focus on Industry", 1995, P:40. 
83. Ettela'at Intemation~ Feb, 8, 1996, No:433. 
84. Business Monitor International Ltd, " Iran Annual Report on Government 
Economy, 1995, P:75. 
85. UNIDO, I.R. IRAN, Industrial Revitalisation, Industrial Development Series,1995. 
86. Iran Yearbook, 1993, Bonn, 1993, P:358. 
87. Ministry of Mines ans Metals, 28 August 1994. 
88. Mines and Metals Ministry's Report on First Development Plan, SWB, Weekly 
Economic Report, Third Series MEW / 0350, 13 September 1994. 
89. Iran Yearbook, Bonn, 1993, P:359. 
90. Mines and Metals Ministry's Report on First Development Plan, SWB, Weekly 
Economic Report, 6 September 1994. 
91. UNIDO, I.R. IRAN, Industrial Revitalisation, UNIDO,1995. 
92. Iran Yearbook, 1993, MB Medien & Bucher mbH, Bonn, 1993. 
93. Interview with Minister of Heavy Industry, V.O.I.R.Iran, 25 July 1993. 
94. Iran Yearbook, MB Medien & Bucher mbH, Bonn,1993. 
95. Ibid, P:352. 
96. Iran Yearbook, 1989/90, M & B Publishing Co, Bonn, 1989, P: 14 -23. 
97. Iran Business Monitor, August 1995, P:l1. 
305 
9S. United Nation Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), ''1.R. of Iran, 
Industrial Revitalisation", UNIOO, Industrial Development Review Series, 
Published by Economist Intelligence Unit for UNIOO, 1995, P: XXVII. 
99. Adapted from the Report by President ofl.R. IRAN for presenting the second five 
year plan to Majlis (Parliament), December 1993. 
100. Keyhan Havai, Issue No: 1096, August 31, 1994, (9 Shahrivar 1373), P:31. 
101. Shahabi, S. ''Investment Policy in Iran, Paper presented at the Conference on " 
Iran: Partner or Pariah?, Organised by the Royal Institute of International Affilirs, 
Sponsored by Meed, 14 November 1995, London. 
102. The Central Bank ofl.R. IRAN, (Bank Markazi), Anual Review, 1371(1992). 
103. The Plan and Budget Organisation, The SUlVey of the fist five--year plan. 
104. Iran Business Monitor, VoL4, No:9, P: 11. 
lOS. Nateghian, F. ''Industrial Challenges Facing Iran in the Third Millennium", Paper 
presented to the fourtheenth annual conference of the Centre for Iranian Research 
and Analysis (CIRA), March 2S-31, 1996. 
106. The Plan and Budget Organisation, (peyvast Layeheh Barnameh Duvom), The 
annex to the Second Plan for Economic, Social and Cultural Development of the 
I.R. Iran, Azar 1372 (1993/4), in persian. 
107. Shahab~ S. "Investment Policy in Iran", Paper Presented at Conference on Iran: 
Partner or Pariah?, Organised by the Royal Institute of International Affairs", 
Sponsored by MEED, 14 November, 1995, London. 
lOS. World Bank, Islamic Republic of Iran, Economic Management and prospects, 
November 1995, P:3S. 
109. Iran Business Monitor, Vo14, No:9, Sep.199S. 
110. World Bank, Islamic Republic of Iran, Economic Management and prospects, 1995. 
111. Azizi, A. " Iranian Economy", Paper presented in Conference Iran: Partner or 
Pariah ?, London, 14 Nov. 1995. 
306 
CHAPTER 7: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND TECHNOWGY 
TRANSFER IN IRAN 
7.1 TECHNOWGY TRANSFER AND FDI TO IRAN IN THE PRE-
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 
As in the other cOlmtries studied before, technology transfer in Iran has played an important 
role in achieving economic and industrial development during the past years. The history 
of technology in Iran dates back several centuries when Iran was an exporter of the 
technology of the time and was a centre of development, exchange of ideas and sciences. 
As indicated earlier, since the adoption of import substitution policy in the early 1960s, the 
use of imported technology was widely practised in Iran. As an example, one can refer to 
the proportion of foreign technology during 1965-70 that was estimated by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) [1]. 
Year Payments for patents, Payments for Total ($) 
licenses and trademarks management and other 
($) technical services ($) 
1965 1,065,000 998,000 2,063,000 
1966 815,000 2,282,000 3,087,000 
1967 1,238,000 638,000 1,921,000 
1968 1,762,000 1,158,000 2,920,000 
1969 6,139,000 1,455,000 7,594,000 
1970 1,722,000 1,588,000 3,310,000 
Table 7.1 Payments by Iran for Technology Transfer in Dollars during the period 1965-70 
Source: UNCTAD/TD/I06 
As is sho\W in the table 7.1, a total of nearly $3.3 million was spent in 1970, which was 0.03 per 
cent of GDP on that year, compared to a total of $2.1 million payments for transfer of 
technology spent by S. Korea for the same year. According to the statistics published by United 
Nations Industrial Development Centre, UNIDO, the share offoreign technology in Iran was 
93.1 per cent in 1965,92.7 per cent in 1970, and 96.8 per cent in 1976 [2]. In other words, Iran 
was in a period of absolute technological dependence, because most of its required technology 
had to be imported from foreign countries. Most of the foreign technology contracts 
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concentrated in mannfilctming and mining sector which accolDlted 70% of the contracts, out of 
which "pharmaceutical" and "electrical products", mainly radio and television set assembly 
plants, have the first and second highest number oftecbnological contracts with foreign firms 
[3]. 
During the first phase of import substitution in Iran, DDlch technology was transferred mainly 
through imports of machinery and capital goods, tum-key plants and acquisition of licenses 
(know-how and patents agreements). As an egq>le, one can refer to the two largest producers 
of motor vehicles, Iranian National and Khavar Companies, much operated through a licensing 
agreement with foreign companies in the UK and Germany. h is argued that technology 
transfer by licenses had some advantages such as a relatively low cost, greater likelihood of 
success, and a shorter completion time. However, many licensing agreements were 
BCCOIq)anied by a series of restrictions imposed by foreign licensers, and could not contribute to 
promoting the manufacturing capability of local firms. Furthermore, the licensing of new 
industrial products has been made mostly regardless of implications for employment. There were 
also other channels of acquiring foreign technology in Iran including the establishment of a set 
of joint venture and technical assistance agreements with foreign firms which were used mostly 
in the chemical and petrochemical industries, steel and electric machinery. For example, of a 
total of267 technology transfer CODtracts in the period between 1963-77, about 103 were in the 
form teclmical assistant agreements, 86 in the form of establishment of foreign subsidiaty and 58 
in the form of joint venture agreements [4]. 
Many of the country's large-scale industrial plants including petrochemicaJs, cement, steel, 
vehicle assemblies, started their operation through tum-key projects which did not promote the 
know-how and the skiDs of the labour force. Moreover, there has been a relatively heavy 
reliance on imported parts and equipment in some industries such as the auto industry which 
was mainly operated by assembly from imported inputs and CKD (Completed Knocked Down) 
packs. However, some of the components and equipment requirecHbr the local industrlal units 
were built in the country or were copied from imported technologies such as plastic making 
factories. This method, which is known as reverse engineering, is used by many countries, 
especially Japan in the early stage of industrialisation. h should be noted that due to relatively 
sophisticated technology embodied in some parts and components such as motor engines, the 
local maDufilctnring of these parts through reverse engineering becomes also difIicuJt and needs 
high levels of technical expertise. Another obstacle in using this method may be the low quality 
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of many locally produced components in comparison with similar products imported from 
abroad, which resu1ts in higher costs of production. 
The acquisition of foreign technologies was also formulated within the framework of Iran's 
industrial development plan through some other informal methods such as introducing modem 
technical subjects in vocational schools and universities; continuous collaboration with the 
international technical and scientific organisations, and sending students and researchers to 
universities abroad to obtain high degrees in science and engineering [5]. Some other methods 
ofteclmology transfer such as buy-back contracts have recently been examined. Because of the 
shortage of imported materials and parts needed for the industrial sector, some local 
manufacturing firms tried to enter into buy-back contract with the foreign firms which would 
agree to provide required materials and components and in return would buy-back the finished 
products. However, it is argued that this method faced serious difficulty due to the low quality 
and productivity levels and high production costs oflocal firms [6]. 
Like some countries such as S. Korea which adopted restrictive policy measures towards the 
How of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the early stage of industrialisation, in Iran, FDI has 
also played a relatively less important role in comparison with the other channels of the 
acquisition of foreign technology. For example, FDI ranged between 0.04% and 0.24% of 
gross investment between 1964-1974 and represented only 38.3 % of total capital movement to 
Iran and its share in non-oil sector accounted only 4% of total investment [7]. The 
petrochemical industry ranked first among the industrial sectors in attracting FDI fonowed by 
the rubber industries, pharmaceutical and chemicals, and electrical and electronic industries. A 
swvey of about 168 cases ofFDI approved by the Centre for the Attraction and Protection of 
Foreign Investment (CAPFI) during the period between 1956-1974, which make up more than 
80% of total FDI into Iran in this period, considered variables including national origin, 
tDu1tinationaIity (whether the supplier is a MNC or non mdtinational), industry category 
classification, investment size, and the share offoreign equity. In the case of the national origin 
ofFDI, US with 36%, fonowed byW. Germany with 15.190,4, and Japan with 12.81% were 
among the major countries vWich invested in Iran in this period. Moreover, the results showed 
that 86% of supplier firms involved in FDI in Iran were mllbinationals and the other 14% 
consisted of non-mJhinational. In terms of industrial category classification, pharmacentica1, 
chemicals and petrochemicals with 37.2% of total FDI, and industrial machinery and equipment 
with 36% were among indu&friaJ sector attracted a relatively larger share ofFDl Moreover, the 
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size of investment ranged from a low of 2 miDion to a high of 3,204 miDion Rls, with the 
average investment of340 miDion Rls. Furthermore, foreign equity ranged from 13% to 100% 
of registered capital [8]. 
1955-63 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Rubber industries 197 52 376 256 70 502 118 231 155 
Pharmaceutical and chemicals 159 64 126 203 204 223 274 248 351 
Electrical lndus1ries 77 63 34 78 20 153 176 244 276 
Metallurgicallndus1ries 105 18 28 95 66 128 283 263 118 
CoosIruction Industries. 368 40 29 0 47 38 64 77 74 
Petrochemicallnduslries. 0 0 0 67 52 37 2,907 0 64 
Auto& transport Industries. 98 5 19 17 35 86 77 245 76 
Food industries 30 0 50 2 7 19 32 36 24 
Motor oil refining Industries. 0 0 0 97 8 60 10 64 22 
Mining 291 27 146 113 159 274 103 297 140 
Hotels 0 0 0 0 0 50 30 9S 55 
Air plane, Helicopter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 209 0 
Glass and china-ware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 22 
Agro industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 83 
other 22 11 0 30 0 13 0 179 12 
Total 1,347 280 808 958 668 1,583 3,264 2,527 1,472 
Table 7.2 Gross Inflow of Foreign Capital and Loans to Iran Through to Centre for 
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments in Different industries during (19SS-71) 
(In Million Rls). 
Source: Bank Markazi Iran cited in Saghafi nejad, T. 1976. 
Foreign Direct Investment in Iran dming the pre-revoJutioruuy period was mostly inward-
oriented and was directed towards production for the local market of products previously 
imported. This was also because of Iran's large domestic market which encouraged foreign 
~ to ilq>1ement an inward oriented investment. According to the Law for the Attraction 
and Protection of Foreign Investments of 19S5, foreign investors who obtain the required 
approval from the government would enjoy such facilities as the same legal protection as 
granted to local investors, the exemption from foreign exchange regulations, and the 
govel1l111ent's guarantee offair compensation in the event ofnationaHsation or legislation \Wich 
results in the loss of the foreign investor's share of the invtstment. This Jaw provided for the 
establishment of a Centre for the Attraction and the Protection of Foreign Investment (CPAFI) 
affiliated to the Ministry of Economy, for overa1l decision-1081dng responsibility regarding the 
flow of foreign capital and investment. Despite the very limited amount ofFDI during the first 
eight years after enacting this Jaw, due to the rapid growth rate and creation of a 
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macroeconomic and political stability, the flow ofFDI increased over eight times during the 
period between 1963-1970 and reached to 1,472 million R1s in 1971 [9]. 
As indicated earlier, due to restrictive policies towards the flow of Foreign Direct 
Investment, only 38.3% of the total capital movement to Iran in the 1960s was achieved 
through FDI, and in 1967 the FDI outside the oil sector accounted for only 4% of total 
capital movement. At this stage, much technology was transferred mainly through imports 
of machinery and acquisition of licenses. In the period between 1962-67, total non-oil 
foreign investment amounted to about $ 160 million through the Centre for Attraction and 
Protection of Foreign Investment. However, according to the report by Central Bank of 
Iran, in the period between 1963-69, total foreign investment including the oil sector 
amounted to about $ 1 billion, 90% of which was in the oil sector [10]. In the industrial 
sector, petrochemical, rubber, pharmaceutical and metallurgical industries were among the 
major industrial sectors which attracted about $ 43 million during the years between 1968-
1970. There were about 193 joint ventures between Iran and its foreign counterparts [11]. 
Following the oil boom of 1973, the sharp increase in Iran's oil revenues, and the 
introduction offurther incentive measures such as a 50% tax exemption, foreign investment 
in industries grew at a significant rate. As an example, foreign investment in petrochemical 
industries alone was $ 2.3 billion mostly from Japan and Germany in 1974. It was estimated 
that by 1976, a total of 197 investments projects had taken place from 21 industrialised 
countries to Iran which were mainly concentrated on petrochemicals, steel manufacturing, 
auto-manufacturing, and electric appliances. It was also estimated that US firms accounted 
for one third offoreign investment in Iran in the late 1970s [12]. Despite the large amount 
of foreign investment in the 1970s, the total flow of FDI to Iran in 22 years of foreign 
investment was less than the amount invested by MNCs in Mexico in 1979 [13]. 
According to data about multinational companies (MNCs) activities in Iran in 1973, there 
was investment in 116 companies with different investment rates of below $ 1 million and 
large MNC-Iranian joint ventures with capital between $ 100 million to $ S billion. A total 
of 34 companies operated with an investment below $ 1 million and providing services such 
as transportation, movies, hotel management and shipping. The next larger group consisted 
of 22 firms with capital from $ 1 to $ 5 million which were mostly companies involved in 
small-scale manufacturing and the assembly of imported parts and equipment, such as 
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motorcycle assembly; china and glass; lighting equipment; ceramics; electrical equipment; 
medical instruments; tractor assembly; marketing and insurance. Another bunch of 19 
companies possessed capital levels from $ 5 to $ 10 million which were mostly in textiles, 
clothing, and small appHances. There were about 24 MNCs operating with capital between 
$ 20 to $ 72 million which involved mainly in intermediate level industrial manufacturing, 
e.g. pipes and tubing, metal products, cast iron, tires, detergents, car engine assembly, and 
petrochemicals. The last group of multinationals with a capital investment of between $ 100 
million to $ 5 billion, engaged more in petrochemicals, paper, puJp and lumber. However, 
there were a few of the largest multinationals with the a capital of more than $ 1 billion, 
such as Iran Helicopter industries specialised in assembling Bell helicopters, and the Iran-
Japan petrochemical complex with a capital of $ 5 billion, owned jointly by the Iranian 
National Petroleum Company and two major Japanese firms, Mitsubishi and Nishuwai [14]. 
Country 1968 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Total 
U.S.A 855 349 1090 797 589 1324 5004 
U.K. 242 29 25 52 135 148 631 
Germany 178 131 662 130 238 1730 3069 
France 67 102 23 61 629 214 1096 
Italy 6 5 
- - - -
11 
Japan 
-
221 1659 2867 1707 2728 9182 
Holland 33 5 
- - - -
38 
Sweden 25 32 
- - - -
57 
Switzerland 50 - - - - - 50 
LuxembourA - - - - - - -
Other 9 462 585 593 678 393 2720 
Total 1465 1336 4044 4500 3976 6527 21858 
Table 7.3 Private foreign investment inflows to Iran through the Centre for 
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment (in Million IUs) 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, Iran 
However, as indicated earlier, MNCs, in many cases, did not transfer the real technical 
know-how and managerial expertise required for promoting the country's indigenous 
technological capability. It is argued that MNCs mostly entered into a series of simple 
assembly operation and tum-key contracts with Iranian domestic industrial firms which led 
to heavy dependency on the imports of components and parts. Moreover, many MNCs 
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which were involved in technology transfer activities in Iran did not help themselves by 
training local workers to facilitate the effective adaptation, and assimilation of technologies. 
Furthermore, some MNCs imposed several restrictions to prevent local firms from being 
their technological competitor in the future. MNCs' investments were also focused more on 
domestic-oriented production activity and therefore did not contn"bute to promoting the 
productivity and efficiency level of local industries. It can be added that MNCs investment 
had also some negative impacts on Iranian industries including over pricing the components 
and parts needed for manufacturing the products which in tum resulted in high costs of 
local production. The MNCs investment activity did not increase the amount of industry 
value-added in many local industries. One can also refer to the insignificant contn"bution of 
FDI to gross capital formation is the local manufacturing industries. During the period 
between 1965-1976, foreign investment in the manufacturing sector accounted, on average, 
for only 5.1 % of the total capital formation in that sector [15]. The following table shows 
the comparison between the percentage of local value added in production in those 
industries which obtained 60 % of total FDI in 1962 and 1973. 
The type of industry The percentage of local value- The percentage of local value-
added to production in 1962 (%) added to production in 1973 (%) 
Electrical equipment 54 41 
Basic metals 29 22 
Non-electrical equipment 79 31 
Chemicals, pharmaceutical 41 35 
Rubber 41 33 
Paper 57 29 
Transportation vehicles instruments 38 24 
Table 7.4 A comparison of the industrial value-added in some Iran's local industries in 1962-
1973 
Source: Bank Markazi. of Iran (Central Bank of Iran). 
The law concerning attraction and protection of foreign investment in Iran, which was ioitially 
passed in 1955, was revised in 1974. The government began to impose some new restrictive 
policy meaues including allowing foreign investors up to 35% equity share in high teclmology 
industries, 25% in general manufacturing, and 10% in the traditional industrial sector. Fonowing 
the adoption of restrictive measures towards FDI, many foreign firms filvoured licensing 
agreements, in particular in the manufacture of durable consumer goods. Ah:hough MNCs' 
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licensing were mainly with the local state-owned firms and in particular with the Industrial 
Development and Renovation Organisation (IORO), the majority of licensing agreements were 
signed with private firms in Iran. Moreover, machinery, chemical and petrochemical and 
electrical and electronic equipment industries were among the Iran's major industrial sector 
which used licensing for transferring technology. 
As indicated in the analysis of technology transfer mechanism, MNCs usually enter into a 
licensing agreement with the LOCs' local enterprises, to obtain more income from selling their 
second-hand technologies which in tum assist them in financing the development of new 
technologies. Moreover, MNCs can also reduce their production cost through selling their 
licensed technologies to LOCs and therefore make them more competitive in the international 
market. Many DJdtjoationals considered licensing as a 'lneans of testing production conditions 
in Iran and getting acquainted with likely eventual investment pattem" [16]. During the 1960s, 
licensing was mostly used fur encouraging the private sector to invest in manufilcturing activities 
primarily in production of consumer goods and later in intermediate and capital goods [17]. 
Firms were set up under the license and supeIVision of foreign companies to assemble mainly 
consumer goods which needed to import parts and materials from the DDdtjoationals or their 
subsidiaries. Therefore, one can say that the domestic firms were becoming heavily dependent 
m the foreign cmerprises fur their licensing, know-how, expertise, and supplyiog required parts 
and components for the production of coosumer goods [18]. It is argued that one of the major 
reasons for large dependency of most domestic industries on importing the parts and materials 
was the restrictions imposed by foreign licensors (nuJlrinationals). Some of the major 
restrictions imposed by MNCs in the licensing agreements were to oblige the licensee not to 
produce the \Wole or any part of a product similar to, or competitive with, the licensed product; 
not to use the technology of any competitor; and not to cooperate with other sellers of the 
Iicalsed product. Due to the enactment of law restricting the MNCs investment activity in Iran 
to minority ownership, it is argued that they compensated for this by imposing some restriction 
on the local industries, which made them more dependent on the parts and components [19]. 
Moreover, the low level of local content in Irmian industries was also caused by lack of a 
supportive local industrial base to produce the required parts and components in Iran rather 
importing them from abroad. 
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7.2 FDIAND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 
After the revolution and following the adoption of nationalisation policies, most foreign 
investments were also nationalised and some foreign participation cancelled. The volume of 
Foreign Direct Investment in Iran \\hich had a sharp decline after the revolution and had become 
insignificant during 1979-80, amounted to R1s. 12 billion in the year 1980. This amount was 
totally invested by Japan for the completion of the Irano-Japanese petrochemical project. 
Despite the inflow of this investment by the Japanese, no effective measures were taken by the 
Japanese investors to complete this project [20]. Iran also imposed restrictions on foreign 
brand-named goods produced under licensing agreements, ordering licensees to introduce 
Iranian names. Producers would no longer be granted access to foreign exchange to pay for the 
use of foreign trademarks. Several reasons were given for the new restrictions, including the 
cost of payments, the necessity to buy raw materials from abroad, and the use of a foreign name 
propagated foreign cuhure [21]. 
The introduction of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in particular those located in the Persian Gulf 
islands, Kish, and Queshm, was among the most important government activities to attract 
foreign direct investment and transfer of technical and managerial expertise to the countIy. 
Moreover, there were other free zones in other areas of the countIy such as SiIjan free zone in 
Kerman province (central part of Iran), Chah Bahar free zone in southeast of the countIy (near 
the border with PaJdstan), Bandar Anzali in the north (a port on the Caspian Sea), Jolfa and 
Sofian in the northwest (near border with the Turkey), Sarakhas in the northeast (near the 
border with Turkamenistan), and Khorarnsbabr in southwest of the countIy. 
The main objectives of these zones are to speed up infrastnlctural activities, promote economic 
growth and investment, increase incomes, create productive employment, participate actively in 
world and regional markets, produce, process and export industrial goods and to expand public 
services. These free zones offer a number of incentives such as tax exemptions, custom duties 
holidays ofup to 20 years, the permission of 100% ownership of capital by foreign investors, 
free repatriation of profit and providing transport and other facilities, in order to attract as much 
as private domestic and foreign investment. For example, the industrial commercial zones in 
Chah-babar, due to its strategic position and its access to rich marine resources of the Oman Sea 
and regional markets, has offered some specific incentive measures in order to attract as much 
FDI as possible. These incentives include; lmlinrited partnership shares for foreign and domestic 
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resources; secmity offureign investments and freedom of capital and profit transfer; 15 years tax 
exemption on revenues; authorised importation of machinery and raw materials without customs 
tariffs; and free entrance offoreign nationals into the zones [22]. 
Ahbough these mnes had fivourable effects in promoting the domestic and foreign investment, 
it is, however, argued that they were not as successful as FfZs in other developing countries in 
Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, not only in attracting foreign investment in productive 
activities but also in encouraging export activities. It is stated that some of these zones had 
become a channel for imports of mostly consumer goods [23]. As an example, the value of 
imports increased from $38.5 million in 1989 to more than $ 800 million in 1993 in Kish 
Island[24]. Moreover, except the Kish island \Wich had some facilities for a long time, many of 
these zones lacked adequate inftastructua1 facilities such as aitport, recreational, and modem 
comtmmication facilities, water, electricity and energy utilities. As constructing these needed a 
large amount of financial investment, Iranian and foreign private investors did not show any 
tendency to make such investments, to create an effective and suitable conditions for the 
extension of productive and export-oriented industries. However, a part of the development and 
infrastructure expenses of the zones was provided through the tempomy transfer of land to 
investors. 
The Qeshm Free Authority (QFA) was established in 1990 on Qeshm Island which is the 
country's largest free zone, in order to attract more foreign investment mostly in energy-
intensive and heavy industries as wen as export-oriented industries. Moreover, the vast natural 
gas reserves of the island, estimated at 2 million cubic meters have been oifered at one tenth of 
the international price to potential foreign investors in energy intensive industries. Although the 
QFA had some SUCCieS9 in deve10ping the inftastructural base of the island, such as construction 
a 108-room hotel as a joint venture with Malaysia, and establishing a steel complex with an 
investment of about $2S0 miDion from Kobe of Japan, a power plant with Siemens of Germany, 
a cement factory by a joint venture with China and a fertiliser plant with India; it has had less 
success in facilitating exports and has been used more as a channel for imports. For example, 
the vo1ume ofiqKxts into Qesbrn Is1and chning March 1992-1993 was more than 145,000 tons 
of goods va1ued approximately at 700 billion R1s (equivalent to about $ 500 million). Moreover, 
a glance at the goods imported shows that a considerable part of goods inc1uded CODSIuner 
luxury goods such as perfumes, eau de cologne, artificial1lowers, watch ribbons, hair pins, etc 
[25]. This can be mostly attributed to inward-looking nature of most investment and the 
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existence of the country's relatively large domestic market. However, effort is currently being 
made to encourage more export oriented investment to these areas. 
According to the Law for the Administration of Commercial and Industrial Free Zones, which 
was approved by Partiament on August 29, 1993, the zone's trading activity with foreign 
countries, after customs registration, are exempted from the application of the import/export 
reguJations [26]. The new Jaw also exempted the import of goods manufactured in the free trade 
zone to other parts of the country from payment of all or part of the customs duties and 
commercial profit tax upon approval by the cabinet. The new law has also introduced a number 
of incentives for attracting foreign investment such as a tax holiday for enterprises set up 
ventures and investment in FIZs for the first 15 years of activity, foreign ownership ofup to 
100 0/0, more relaxed rules applying to human labour, the issues of permits and visas for foreign 
nationals, and possible credit from the central authorities for inftastructura1 and productive 
projects. According to recent data, by June 1995, 16 joint ventures had been approved by the 
colDlcil of ministers mostly with European and Asian firms, amOlmting to $ 900 million, and ten 
investment projects were being negotiated. The new sectors for which foreign investment have 
been approved were fibre glass pipes, cassette tapes, heavy diesel engines, special chemicals, 
passenger cars, powdered milk/baby food, and a hotel As indicated earlier, it is projected that 
during the Second Five Year Plan (1995-1999), FDI will amount to $ 2 billion per year [27]. 
However, following the approval of the law by ParHament on April 1996 which allowed the 
free transfer abroad and into Iran of hard currency from trade zones, the law has recently been 
amended by Maj1is (partiament), which appeared to place some restrictions on the law. 
According to the amendments, Iranian banks set up in the free zones should be 51% owned by 
the government and that opening Iranian or foreign banks in the zones should be proposed by 
the central bank and approved by the cabinet. It is argued that the shortage of domestic capital 
and the absence of essential technology in Iranian industry were among the major factors in 
making the need for foreign investment. As indicated earlier, following the implementation of 
the First Five-Year Development PIan (1989-1993), some policy measures were also taken to 
promote the indigenous technology capability through transferring appropriate technologies to 
the country. Moreover, the government proposed some guidelines and regulations for the 
industrial units to facilitate the transfer of the appropriate technology in the Industry Sector. 
Some of the most m.>ortant policy measures during the Frrst FIVe-Year Development pIan were 
as follows: 
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1. The industrial units should arrange technology transfer agreements with the collaboration of 
relevant specialists with technical expertise. 
2. The industrial units were restricted in the extension of technology agreements with foreign 
co\Dltries. 
3. The industrial units will receive new investment and additional credits when they achieve their 
technological objectives. 
4. The industrial units can only buy mass machinery and equipment from abroad when this may 
lead to the transfer of know-how to the CO\Dltry. 
5. The industrial units should have appropriate human resources for receiving and using the 
technology from the start of the technology agreements. 
6. The industrial units should provide adequate facilities for their own R &. D and engineering 
design sections, (e.g. allocating a percentage of their sales in R&D activity). 
7. The industrial units should import more modem and new technologies which would enable 
them to revive their existing machinery. 
8. The industrial units should invest more in developing absmptive capacity level for an effective 
adaptation, assimilation and absotption of the imported technologies. 
9. The industrial units which enter into the joint venture agreements with foreign companies 
(MNCs) should be monitored by legal experts, managers and specialists. 
10. According to this plan, priority has been given to those technologies that are less capital intensive 
and more labour-intensive without any dependence on international monopolies. 
Moreover, as indicated earlier, the government's industrial and technology policies during the 
first fiv~year development plan mostly emphasised the liberalising of the prices of most 
industrial products, promoting domestic technological capability and seif:.sufficiency, and 
transferring industrial activities to the private sector, in order to improve the competitiveness 
and productivity. Some of the most important objectives of the First FIVe-Year Development 
Plan (1989-1993) in development of technology were as foBows: 
1. Promotion of technological capability through training the local technicians and skilled labour 
for efficient adaptation and assimilation of imported advanced teclmology. 
2. Development of indigenous technological capability with an increase in research activities and 
estabtishment and further expansion of countIy's science and technology inftastructure. 
3. Providing statistical and information capabilities to facilitate research and development studies. 
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4. Decreasing the dependency offoreign know-how, machinery and equipment by applying a self-
sufficiency strategy in the country. 
5. Establishing an appropriate logical policy for technology imports, by setting norms and 
regulations in order to remove monopoHzed restrictions on technology contracts. 
6. Choosing an equitable technology distribution policy to eliminate social and economic 
injustices. 
Having identified the level of technology in a country, according to the SUlVeys of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), there are four kinds of 
indicator to measure the level of technology in a COlDltry. These indicators are [28] : 
1. Indicators of social and economic development such as welfilre worker systems and social and 
education systems. 
2. An indicator of diffusion such as productivity, organisation, research etc. 
3. Indicators of production and distribution such as the amounts of fertilizers used per hectare, the 
number of kilometres of railway Jines, etc. 
4. Indicators of scientific capabilities such as the percentage of research workers in that COlDltry, 
and research and development budget per GNP. 
According to the above indicators, the level of technology in Iran has been in a relatively 
satisfactory condition compared to other developing COlDltries. In order to determine the 
position of Iran in the industrial world, UNIDO (United Nation Industrial Development 
Organisation) referred to several variables and factors, but information about most of these 
factors is not available in Iran. One of the most important factors is the ratio of industry value 
added in comparison to the world norm of industry value added. According to the figures which 
are published by UNIDO, Iran's portion of world industrial production is about 0.17%. 
Considering the fact that the population of Iran is 1% of the world population, Iran's industrial 
value should increase to 1%. Some researchers indicate five other factors for determination of 
technology level in a COlDltry, as follows : 
1. Level of literacy, ie. the proportion of the population over the age of 18 'Mio are literate, 
2. The research and development budget as a proportion of GNP. 
3. The ratio of heavy industry value added in proportion to the industry value added of that 
COlDltry. 
4. The level of higher education, that is the ratio of student numbers in WJ.iversity in proportion to 
319 
the population of that country. 
5. The ratio of researchers in every ten thousand of the population. 
The value of a special coefficient for each of these five factors is needed in order to weight the 
factors for the determination of the overall technology level in each country. The weighting 
coefficients fur each factor are estimated for Iran as: 0.1 for the first; 10 for the second; 0.33 for 
the third; 3 for the fourth; and 1 fur the last factor. Thus if each coefficient multiply by its 
reJated mctor, an indication of the level of technology can be obtained. For example, the figure 
is 15.8 for Iran; 12 for Algeria; 89.1 for USA; 73.1 for Japan and 65.5 fur Germany. The 
percentage of each mctor in Iran has been estimated as 50 fur the first; 0.1 fur the second; 21.2 
for the third; 0.4 for the fourth and 1.5 fur the last one. 
There is another way to determine the technology level in a country. This method indicates the 
position of the technology components and technology parts in each country. ffwe consider the 
ideal situation, 1000/0, then we have the funowing figures fur each factor fur Iran: 
1. Research and development less than 5%. 
2. Design and engineering less than 10%. 
3. Industry units established less than 20-30%. 
4. Productivity and maintenance of industrial mcilities 70-80%. 
5. The level of infrastructure, transportation, and distribution 70-800.4, of the ideal position. 
It can be said that because of lack of knowledge about important aspects of technology, there 
is less concentration on this in Iran. The table 7.5 shows the technology level in heavy industIy, 
and industry and mining sectors of Iran, considering the four components of technology; techno-
ware, info-ware, orga-ware, human-ware. It can be seen that technoware which consists of 
tools, equipment, machines, vehicles and physical facilities is in a better condition compared with 
other technology components. 
Technoware Infoware Orgaware Humanware 
Heavy industry 58% 22% 30.5% 31.5% 
Industry 41.36% 36.36% 31.26% 40.4S% 
Table 7.S The percentage of technology components in heavy industry and industry sector 
Having surveyed the overall problems relating to technology transfer in the industIy sector 
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during the past years, one can identitY to some of the most important problems as follows: 
1. Lack of a constant and appropriate industry and technology development policy and 
strategy. 
2. There was neither adequate research and development laboratories, nor was there 
collaboration with other research laboratories, which led to the lack of absotptive 
capacity of imported technologies and low qua1ity of their products. 
3. Some mctories lacked an experienced production manager to control the quality 
standard of their products. 
4. Some industrial units produced large quantities of waste material. One of the methods 
of prevention of waste would be reduction oflosses during the production process. 
5. In some mctories, the raw materials which were used in the production process were 
not standardised for purity, quality and quantity. In addition, there should be special 
machinery for preparing materials before using them in the assembly line. 
6. Another problem is that imported technologies which were used in Iran could not 
adapt to the different weather and geographical conditions, and the different skills of 
the labour force. 
7. Sometimes there was a difference in quality of the parts produced by one mctory and 
the similar items in another local industrial unit, which indicated the lack of a standard 
and quality control system for most capital and intermediate goods which were 
produced locally. 
8. Heavy dependency on foreign parts and materials seems to be one of the most 
important problem of Iran's manufBcturing. Vehicles, machinery, electrical goods, and 
many other important industrial items like cars are mainly produced by the assembly of 
imported kits or parts. Major industry is 56.7% dependent on imports of materials for 
its production. The percentage rises to a staggering 84.8% for the machinery, 
equipment, tools and metallic products industries; followed by 79"A, for the paper and 
card binding industry; 71.1% for chemicals; 5S. 7% for textiles, clothing and leather; 
54.6% for basic metals; and 35.8% for wood and wooden products. The lowest 
percentage is 29.1% for the food, drink and tobacco industry. According to another 
statistic, the dependency on importing fureign inputs for the capital goods, intermediate 
and consumer goods industries were 85%, 70%, and 65%, respectively [29]. 
9. Foreign exchange shortage is seen to be another problem for improving the technical 
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capability of the industry sector. This is because the heavy reliance on imports of 
primary materials and parts needs a large amount of foreign currency. 
10. Machinery wear and tear can be another disadvantage which can increase the cost of 
production and reduce efficiency and productivity. A large quality of machinery and 
equipment were imported in the past and as indicated earlier the level of techno-ware 
or macl1inery and physical instruments in Iran's industrial sector is in better position in 
cmq>arison to the other technology cmq>oneots. However, it seems that some of these 
machines and equipment need to be replaced with new and modem units. 
11. Shortage of trained skilled workers and technicians has been another problem of the 
industrial sector. The lack of adequate engineers and technicians led to low absorption 
levels of foreign technologies. In spite of several attempts, such as a continuous 
increase in the budget for education and vocational training, the demand of industrial 
sector could not be met. This will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
12. Another source of difficulties was the lack of linkage between the imported technology 
and Iran's existing indigenous resources. In other words, the imported technologies 
have not been compatible with Iran's indigenous resources. It is argued that the 
technologies developed in advanced countries and being transferred to the developing 
countries are for their own benefit, and not for the benefit of the developing countries. 
For example, Iran could gain little benefit from importing the capital intensive 
technologies ~ were transferred after the oil boom of 1973, and financed through 
oil revenues, due to their Jack of contribution in creating employment opportunities for 
the country's relatively large human resources. As it is believed, this led to an acute 
state of dependent capitalism, with its harmful consequences [30]. Moreover, there 
were some differences in the cultural, reHgious and other social aspects of Iran 
cmq>ared with those of the places from \Were the technology was imported. In other 
words, the massive importation of intermediate and capital goods, under the 
implementation of the import substitution policy oftbat period (1970s), led to 811 
increase in the COlDltI)"S dependence on capital intensive and advanced technologies 
\\bicl1 created little employment opportunities. Moreover, due to major differences in 
the physical, socio-economic and cu1tunl aspects of Iran and that of its technology 
!Ilppliers, the imported technologies were not entirely adapted to the local conditions. 
13. The other criticism which is often directed towards the imported technologies is that 
they included some UDn~ry industries for consumer goods which could be 
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produced locally. Moreover, there were some cases in which similar and identical 
products and teclmologies were imported by different local firms. For example, during 
the period between 1962-77, of the total number of243 technology contracts, there 
were about 90 \\hich re1ated to consllmer goods, such as air conditioners, refiigerators, 
food products etc. Therefore, it can be said that a relatively significant share of the 
country's earnings from oil sales in the past was allocated to imports of consumer 
goods technologies which were contrary in opposite direction of country's industrial 
strategy, aimed at replacing the imported consumer products with the similar 
domestically produced goods. 
14. There were not weIl-designed and overall regu1ations and guidelines for local industrial 
firms \Wich were involved in technology transfer activities. This was because of a lack 
of a specific organisation or institute for this pwpose .. 
15. As indicated in the previous chapter, another major weakness of Iran's industrial and 
teclmological structure was the domestic orientation of many local industries. Because 
of continuous implementation of an inward-looking policies, little attention was made 
to promote the quality and productivity of local industries to compete in the 
international market. Although some export incentives were introduced, such as tax 
exemption for industrial firms which could export 15% of their products in early 
1970s, this along with other measures, was not conducted seriously due to the 
increase in oil revenues in 1973. Moreover, more recent attempts to expand the export 
capacities of the industrial sector, despite some primary success, could not expand 
significantly the share of industrial exports. This is mainly due to a low level of 
productivity and quality of industrial products which can also be a result of inadequate 
local technological capabi1ity. 
In a survey of 27 firms which were operating in the Iranian American Joint Ventme (IAN) 
during (1971-1976), only six adapted their technology to the economic environment of Iran 
[31]. The lack of technology transfer by these companies was related to the assembly natme of 
their production process in Iran. The lack of skilled labour and the inadequacy of the supply of 
parts and raw materials caused many firms to refrain from carrying out the entire production 
process in Iran. In a few cases where the technology was adapted, it was explained by the firms 
that their technology was relatively more capital-intensive in Iran compared to their operations 
in other LDCs. Beyond this, there were some clumges in the product design, deaHng mostly with 
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the marketing aspects of the product in Iran. 
According to this survey, the major factors which were identified by some foreign firms, and 
which affected foreign investment in Iran were political stability and market conditions, higher 
rate of profits, and favourable government policies. These were among the most important 
factors in encouraging investment by foreign firms in Iran. Moreover, as indicated by some of 
the foreign firms, among the factors preventing them in investing in Iran were government 
bureaucracy and red tape, tight price contro~ restriction offoreign ownership (the maximum 
ownership of 35% by foreign investors) which was stated by many firms led to reducing their 
efficiencies. However, despite the maximum foreign ownership allowance of was 3S 0/0, it is 
argued that most foreign large firms and nndtinational companies controned the production 
process of the large modem industries in Iran through mechanisms other than share holding. 
Many foreign firms a1so compJained about lack of adequate transportation and storage facilities. 
Important tati1f reductions and tax exemptions were pointed out by foreign firms among major 
incentives given by the Iranian government. This survey also showed that foreign firms were not 
successful in adapting their technology to the economic environment of Iran. This was largely 
due to the assembly nature of their production, which was incompatible with the lack of skilled 
labour, and the insufficiency of raw materials and parts in Iran. 
7.3 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT ACTIVIfIES IN IRAN 
The fact that only 2% of world R&D is done in developing countries and that they receive less 
than 1% of world patents are seen as causing a low ability to adapt and create new technology 
and products for these cowtries (LOCs). As the experiences of some successful East Asian 
Countries show, research and development activity is esatial for every countly in order to 
modify and improve the imported technologies, and also to. generate and develop new 
technologies and products. Moreover, as is also shown earlier, the heavy investment in 
development of the human resources enable these countries to absorb and assDmlate more 
efficiently foreign technologies. While developed countries expend about 3% of their GNP on 
researclt and deve1opmeat, developing countries only allocate between 0.01% and 0.6 % of their 
GNP on research and development. Thus, improving effective R&D activities and also 
increasing the number of scientists and engineers has been among major factors for successful 
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technology transfer in these co1Dltries. 
According to statistics pubHshed by United Nations Education, Scientific, Cuhural Organization, 
UNESCO, a total of$47 million has been spent for R&D activity in Iran in 1972, which was 0.2 
percent of GNP. Figures for some other C01Dltries such as India were $ 256 million (0.4 per 
GNP) in 1973, S. Korea $ 128 million (0.7 per GNP) in 1974, and Indonesia $ 47 million (0.2 
per GNP) in 1975 [32]. TherefOre, it can be said that little attention was paid to the research and 
development activity in comparison to other developing co1Dltries in the 1970s. There was no 
significant R&D programs by large industrial firms, and most licensing contracts with MNCs 
lacked a provision fur such programs. Moreover, Iran also lagged behind many other developing 
countries in terms of the number of scientists and engineers. For example, the total numbers of 
scientists and technicians were 217,632 persons in 1974, in comparison with that ofS.Korea 
with 1,650,094 in 1976 [33]. Therefore, the lack of adequate research and development activity 
as well as a low level of scientists and technicians can be considered among the most important 
obstacles in the promotion of the country's technological capability in that period. 
As outlined in a UNIDO document, Less Developed C01Dltries (LDCs) also possess only 12.6 
percent of global stocks of scientists and engineers in research and development (R&D), of 
which 9.4 percent are concentrated in a few co1Dltries of Asia [34]. For example, as fur the 
number of researchers per million of population, while this number was 4,800 and 3,300 in 1985 
for Japan and USA respectively, the average for the developing co1D1tries is about 500. In 1987 
this number was a mere 82 in Iran (assnming that one-third of an university academic staff are 
engaged in R&D), much has been very low in comparison to other developing countries [35]. 
The education system in Iran followed a highly centraHsed French model during the 19405 and 
1950&, but since the 1960&, the American influence became increasingly important, especially in 
terms of course structure and organisation at the tertiary level At the tertiary level, by 1979, 
Iran had 29 universities and 206 institutions of higher education, with about 172,000 students. 
However, since the 1979 Revolution there has been a significant refurm in the education system 
in terms ofits cwriculum and text books. The Ministry of Education is responsible fur an levels 
of pre-tertiary education, including teacher training. There have been several modifications in 
the pre-tertiary level For example, at secondaty level a greater emphasis is placed on technical 
and vocational training, with the establishment of Factory Joint Technical and Vocational 
Schools (FJTVS) in 1988. In terms of tertiary education, the Ministry of Culture and Higher 
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Education (MCHE) which has been formed following the merger of the previous Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education and the Ministry of Culture and Arts. However, there are a 
number of other higher education organization, such as the COlD1cil of Higher Education 
Development, and Higher Council of Planning. In 1988, there were over 100 institutions of 
higher education in Iran with more than 204,862 students; of these, 30 were universities, 14 are 
university complexes and colleges, 5 were non-government colleges and 36 were higher 
education centers and technical institutes affiliated to various ministries and government 
agencies [36]. 
It can be generally argued that there were several efforts and investments in development of 
human resources in past decades. According to data pubHshed by UNESCO, the percentage of 
school-aged children in primary and secondary schools increased from 16% in 1950, to 30% in 
1960, 52% in 1970 and was estimated at 67% for 1980 [37]. However, as is shown in the 
following table, despite the sIwp increase in the number of elementary, secondary, and 
vocational and technical education during the period 1959 -1972, the shortage ofa skilled 
labour force and lack of adequate scientists and engineers led to inefficient use of foreign 
technologies in this period 
1959 1979 
Number of Enrollment Number Enrollment 
institution of 
institution 
Elementary education 9,289 1,327,000 18,030 3,534,000 
Secondary education 1,163 253,000 2,425 617,000 
Vocational and technical 91 8000 277 57,000 
Teacher training 5S 4,000 88 26,000 
Higher education 
-
23,000 
-
74,000 
Table 7.6: A comparison of number of institution and enrollment rate during (1959-1972) 
Source: Bank Markazi of Iran (Central Bank of Iran) 
On the other hand, the rush to industtiaHsation as a result of the oR boom of the 1970s, required 
the parallel expansion of a skilled labour force and technicians, and due to the inadequate 
number ofteclmicians and skilled workers, the government had to import about 480,000 from 
abroad. 25% were skilled, 50% technicims and semi-skiD.ed, and the rest were unskilled 
workers. According to a report by the Plan and Budget Organisation, the shortage of labour 
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was estimated to be about 721,000 during the period between 1973-1977. Moreover, as is 
mentioned earlier, nmch technology in this period has been transferred mostly by large scale 
turn-key projects such as petrochemicals, cement, stee~ and vehicle assemblies which added 
very little to the development and spread ofloca1 skills and technology. It can also be added that 
despite the large increase in the government revenues as a resuh of the oil boom in 1973, in the 
period between 1974-1978, the government spent only 4.7 per cent of its budget on education 
compared with 5.6 % in 1971-74 [38]. 
During the period between 1982 and 1987, the total number of students in primaIy education 
(children aged between (6-11) increased ftom 5,659,000 in 1982 to 7,377,000, in the year 1987. 
Moreover, this figure increased to 8,817,000 in 1989, and reached 9,863,000 by the year 1993, 
\Wich covered more than 79010 of the children aged between 6-11. According to data published 
by the Ministry of Education, the number of students in secondary school (high schools) 
increased from 942,000 in 1980 to 2,244,000 in 1993 [39]. The public budget allocated to the 
education sector increased from 42.5 billion Rls. to 73.8 billion R1s. In 1988, an average increase 
of 11.6%. In the school year 1987-88, more than 12 million students were enrolled in primaIy, 
junior high schoo~ and high school level Moreover, the number of students in the institutes of 
higher education increased from 145,809 in 1984-85 to 250,509 in 1988-89, an annual average 
growth rate of 14%. The number of university graduates, which was 19,944 in the academic 
year 1984-1985, reached 28,637 in 1987-1988 and the total number of graduates at university 
level from public institutions was projected to amount to 192,310 during the Fll'St FIVe-Year 
PIan (1989-1993). However, in addition to the public universities and colleges, there is a large 
non-govemmenta1 (private) university called "Is1amic Azad University" with many branches all 
over the country, which has operated since 1982, taking tuition fees from the students. The 
number of students of this university studying in various fields of science and technology in its 
different branches, recently amounted to about 500,000 students. Thus, the total number of 
students in the institutes of higher education (public and private) exceeded one million students 
in 1995. 
Moreover, in order to increase the literacy rate which is considered to be one of the most 
important indicators for the country's social, cuhural and economic development, and also in 
promoting the productivity and absotptive capacity of the Jabour force to better adaptation of 
imported technologies, the Literacy Movement Organisation (LMO) was established in 1979. 
Following organising 532,121 classes for about 8,248,628 illiterates, the literacy rates of adults 
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increased to 73.2% in wban areas and 48.4% in rural areas by 1985. According to another 
figure, the overall rate of literacy increased from 47.5% in 1976, to 62% in 1987 covering 23 
million of population [40]. However, due to population growth the number of illiterates 
increased from 14.20 to 14.80 million during 1976-1986 [41]. 
1980 1985 1990 1993 
Total 7,898 10,561 14,044 20,186 
Kindergartens 172 107 227 133 
P"Liu..uu. v schools 4,799 6,788 9,370 9,863 
Junior high schools 1,575 2,210 3,233 4.440 
High schools (day and nights) 942 1,589 1,770 2,244 
Technical and professional schools 202 195 230 3,404 
Colleges and teacher training 6 46 84 102 
Others 202 221 285 
-
Table 7.7: Number of students by education establishments, 1980-1993 (in Thousands) 
One can also refer to the substantial government efforts to expand vocational and technical 
training for the country's large labour force. In order to formulate specific policies for 
technical and vocational training, and also coordinate technical and vocational training 
activities at the state level, special committees were created in 1982 upon the 
recommendation of the High Council for Coordination of State Technical and Vocational 
Training. These committees have experts in the areas of industry, agricuhure, services, and 
medicine, and are mostly active in coordinating planning and policy formulation, but also 
evaluate and supervise the methods of technical and professional training. Furthermore, as 
indicated earlier, the industrial units were to allocate 0.2% of their total sales for training 
and research. The total government budgets allocated for technical and vocational training 
increased from Rls. 42.5 billion in 1983 to Rls. 73.8 billion, with an average growth of 
11.6% [42]. 
Description Total Male Female 
Total technical & vocational 21210 17041 4169 
Technical school 12241 12211 30 
Commercial & vocational 78853 37475 41378 
Aaricu1tural school 10828 10828 0 
Table 7.8 Number of students at different technical and vocational schools (1989-1990) 
However, more emphasis has been placed on training in the universities. The students of 
engineering and science courses are particularly encouraged to attend training programs of 
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a few months duration at various stat~owned or private industries. The number of technical 
and vocational students at school level were expected to increase from 213,047 from 1989 
to 316,297 in 1993, with annual growth of 8.2%. Therefore, one can see that unlike the 
relative neglect of training a sk:i1led labour force in the pre-revolutionary period, there have 
been great efforts for training and education of the human labour force. As recent statistics 
indicated, about 320,000 workers were trained in 1992 and this increased to 500,000 by 
1993. Following the implementation of the First Fiv~Year Development Plan (1989-
1993), some of the most important policies and strategies regarding to human Resource 
Development (HRD) which were identified in the plan were as follows: [43] 
1. Creating scientific and highly specialised centres at suitable universities and 
improving academic standards at other institutions of higher education and 
research; 
2. Maximising and fully exploiting the country's scientific, educational, specialised, 
and research potentials (both basic and applied); 
3. Creating close ties between universities and other centres of higher education on 
the one hand, and the production and research departments of ministers involved 
in production; 
4. Making appropriate use of technology, tools and equipment in a way that will 
ensure the optimal utilisation of the labour force; 
5. The provision of detailed educational planning and launching the new educational 
system, and formulating and implementing higher as well as technical and 
vocational education systems; 
6. Conducting studies on techniques of enhancing productive efficiency and 
expanding specialised technical and vocational on-th~job training programs in 
private, cooperative, and public sectors. 
7. Establishing close links between the universities and higher education institutes 
on the one hand with public and private production and research centres. 
Moreover, in the first plan special targets have been set for development of the human 
resources and the expansion of employment opportunities for the country's large labour 
force. These measures and objectives include; increasing per capita labour productivity by 
an annual rate of 5.2%; increasing productivity of the labour force through promoting 
managerial techniques, training "the professional and qualified managers for the industrial 
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sector. In order to achieve this objective, the High Council for Coordination of Technical 
and Vocational Training was created to monitor and co-ordinate the implementation of 
HRD programs in different industrial sectors. Despite a significant quantitative 
improvement in the number of students at all levels, there are some difficulties and 
constraints such as the lack of a planning system responsible for educational and 
development purposes; imbalance distnbution of human and financial resources among 
different regions and various school levels; and lack of clear vision about the state's 
employment policy (44). 
The Second Five Year Plan (1995-1999) is also aimed at further expansion of primary and 
secondary education as well as higher education, professional training and physical 
education. The total budget devoted to education is to grow by 115% from Rls 4789.3 
million in 1993 to R1s 10302.7 million in 1998. The second plan also aimed at creating two 
million new jobs by 1999 (45). The Rand D expenditure per GNP during the First Five 
Year Plan (1989-1993) was 0.35%, of which nearly 85% was allocated to ministries and 
less than 15% to the universities and other institutions. For example, among the total 
amount of41,490 billion R1s R&D budget in 1993, the funds of32,800 billion R1s granted 
to ministries and about 8,700 billion R1s to universities. (each SU.S. is approximately 1700 
Rls in 1993). The First Five Year Plan also aimed at increasing the number. of full-time 
researchers per million of the population to reach to about 300 by the year 1993 from 82 in 
1989 (46). 
7.3.1 The Research and Development Centres in Iran 
The overall research and development centres in Iran can be classified in fom groups, 10 
institutes in medical and related science, 30 institutes in social and human science, 13 
institutes in agricuhure and natural science and 2S institutes in industrial and technical 
engineering. Some of the important research and development centres which are managed 
by different ministries are presented in the fonowing sections. Most of these centres are 
categorized as centres doing technical and engineering research. However, a few of these 
centres are not engaged in purely basic and applied research and are not included in groups 
of social, medical, agricultural and technical science. 
Organization for Scientific and Industrial Researchers of Iran (OSIRI) is one of the 
country's largest research organizations and was established in 1980 as an associate of 
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Ministry of Cuhure and Higher Education. This organization has concentrated its activities 
on the three areas of research, pilot plant projects, and production. The main objectives of 
this centre include doing research in various industrial and technological projects through 
providing financial and physical facilities, assisting the production units during earlier stages 
of their operation and approval of laboratory and pilot plant stages, co-operation with the 
country's universities and research centres, designing education and training programs for 
researchers, and spreading the outcomes of the researches throughout the society. This 
organization also has several branches in major cities including capital and centre of 
provinces. The director of this organization is deputy minister of culture and higher 
education. The National Scientific Research Centre (NSRC) which is also an affiliate of 
the Ministry ofCuhure and Higher Education, was established in 1984, with main objective 
of developing special research councils in order to help in solving problems of researchers 
in various fields, co-ordinating the research activities of various research centres and 
determining appropriate rules and regulations regarding to establishment, expansion or 
closure of the country's research centres. 
The Centre for Science and Research Policy (CSRP) is the other associate of the Ministry 
ofCuhure and Higher Education which was established in 1970, aiming at determining the 
country's scientific and research policy, and determining research priorities and planning 
long term programs in order to increase the efficiency of the research system. The Centre 
for Research and Development of the Science and Technology of Polymeric Material 
(CRDSTPM) which is also an affiliate of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education was 
established in 1986 and is involved in both research and education. Its main objectives 
include performing basic and applied research in cooperation with other research centres, 
designing specific education and training programs in planning, development, production, 
and usage of materials in production, and in the use of goods such as rubbers, plastic and 
other polymeric materials. 
The Centre for Research of Properties and Usage of Materials and Power (CRPUMP) is 
linked with the Ministry of Cuhure and Higher Education with the main objectives of doing 
specific research in usage of material and power in electronic industries, energy generation, 
ceramic, petrochemical and metallurgy, etc. It is also responsible for enhancing the 
collaboration between other industrial research centres involving researches in the same 
area. Research Centre for Industrial & Trade Development was established in 1964 by the 
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Ministry of Economy to undertake research surveys and feasibility studies for the 
fomw1ation of industrial policies within the framework of the overall economic policy. The 
main objectives of the centre were: formulation of policies and programmes in the fields of 
foreign and domestic trade consistent with the objectives of the country's development 
plan; and collection and interpretation of economic and technical data for the guidance of 
potential investors in the private sector. 
The Centre for Heavy Industries Researchers (CJDR) is an associate of the Ministry of 
Heavy Industries and was established in 1984, concentrating in both research and 
production activities including designing and developing machinery; collecting and 
publishing data and information about different industrial and production fields of the heavy 
industries; and providing special technical services in various industrial and production 
fields. It should be noted that following the approval of legislation by Parliament the 
Ministry of Heavy Industries has recently merged with the Ministry of Industries. The 
Centre for Researches and self-sufficiency Services of Iran (CRSSI) was established in 
1981 in accordance with the Organization for Expansion and Renovation of Iran's 
Industries which is affiliated to the Ministry of Heavy Industries. The main goal of this 
Centre is to facilitate the co-ordination and collaboration between the various research 
centres and industrial units, in order to reduce technological dependency and achieve Self-
Sufficiency, by strengthening the country's indigenous technological capability. 
The Institute of Standards and Industrial Research in Iran (ISIRI) which was established in 
1959, with the main objectives of the standardisation of industrial, agricultural, and mine 
products. It is also aimed at ensuring the quality standard of the products for exports. 
Applied Researchers Centre (ARC) is associated with the Organization for Expansion and 
Development of Iran's Industries and established in 1974, involved in such activities as 
education and training, production and research. Centre for Researchers and Development 
of Technology (CRDT) which is an associate of the Ministry of Mines and Metals and was 
established in 1983. It is located within the Mobarakeh Steel Complex and its activity is 
mainly concentrated in solving problems or difficulties regarding the manufacturing of steel 
as wen as designing specific programs for development and modernisation of technological 
know-how required for producing various steel products. The Centre for Research and 
Aluminum Engineering Services of Iran (CRAESI) under the supervision of the Ministry 
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of Mines and Metals was established in 1982, aiming at enhancing skills and technical 
knowledge in the Aluminum industry. The Research Centre of the Oil Industry was 
established in 1958 by the Ministry of Petroleum, with the main objective of developing 
science and technology of the oil- related industries. The Centre for Handicrafts and Small 
Scale Industry was established in 1964 as an affiliate of Ministry of Economy, with the 
main objectives of improving the quality of local handicrafts by utilizing the surplus labour 
in the rural areas, and expanding the handicrafts products. 
The Chamber of Industry & Mines which was established in 1964 by the decree of the 
council of Ministers with main objectives including, improving and expanding the country's 
industries and mines; co-ordinating the industrial and mining groups activities and 
promoting the quality of industrial and mining products. The Centre for Power Researchers 
(CPR) is an associate of Ministry of Power and was established in 1982 to perform 
research for the electrical industry. There are other research centres which are subsidiaries 
of one ministry or university or operate independently. For example, The Institute for 
Finance Studies (Ministry of Trade and Finance), Iran Statistics Centre and the Informatics 
high-Council of Iran (Plan and Budget Organization), The Industrial Management 
Organization and The National Iranian Industries Organization (Ministry of Industries). 
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Figure 7. 1 The most important industrial research and development centres in Iran 
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The following table is the comparison between three of Japan's most important research 
and development institutes namely, Japan Institute of Invention and Innovation (JIll), Japan 
Research Development Corporation (JRDC) and Japan Information Centre of Science and 
Technology (nCST), with one of the Iran's major research and development centre, The 
Organization for Scientific and Industrial Researchers (OSIRI) of Iran in 1983. 
R&D centres The Year of The number of full- The budget in 1983 ($ 
establishment time personnel 1000) 
JIll 1904 250 48,181 
JRDC 1961 220 33,043 
nCST 1957 329 32,348 
Total 
-
779 113,572 
OSIRI 1980 480 6000 
Table 7.9 A comparison of the full-time personnel and budget of Japan's R&D centres 
with the Organisation for Scientific and Industrial Researchers in Iran 
According to this table, each person in Japanese R&D institutes spends an average of$ 146,000 
per year in Research and Development, while this amount was $12,500 per year per person in 
Iran. As is sho\W. in the table 7.9, the R&D activities in terms ofboth the expenditure and 
number of researchers have been totally inadequate in Iran and steps have been proposed to 
increase these activities considerably during the new FIVe-Year plan. The general conclusion 
from the pre1iminaty investigations of R&D activities in some LDCs and Iran is that the 
problems ofI..ess Developed Countries in this regard can be summarised as fonows: 
1. Research objectives in LDCs were determined without considering their technological. 
requiremmts, \\hich are derived from the social and economic concerns of their society. 
2. Most of the research work done in these countries has no connection with production, 
and the products of this research supplies little to world matkets. 
3. There is insufficient coordination between the research and development institutes of 
within LDCs in general and Iran in particular. 
Having uveyed Iran's overall human resource development policies during the past years, one 
can see that despite significant increase in various quantitative educational indicators, some 
problems such as a re1atively high growth rate of population in the 1980s (3.2%) led to an 
increase in demand fur primaIy and secondaty education, low productivity level of labour force, 
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and lack of relevance of the content of higher education with national needs, and affected the 
qualitative performance of the educational system. Moreover, the educational system in Iran 
was not generally designed to produce intermediate skills and proficiency in regard to the needs 
of industry, agriculture or even seIVice sector and public organisations. As indicated earlier, it is 
argued that the educational system was too theoretical and academically oriented, and paid very 
little attention to increasing practical experience for engineers. 
In order to tackle these problems and to increase the productivity of the labour force, the first-
five year plan aimed at increasing per capita labour productivity by an annual rate of 5.2 %. This 
target was to achieve through adoption such measures as reduction of over employment in the 
seIVice sector, increased productivity through managerial techniques, on the job training, and 
using well qualified and experienced managers for the key positions. Some other efforts have 
been taken in order to promote the quality of educational system in accordance with quantitative 
expansion. This including paying more attention to science and engineering subjects in the 
higher education rather than humanities, and combining vocational-technical programmes with 
general education in high school (secondary) level. 
7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As indicated earlier, like many other developing countries the acquisition offoreign technologies 
and technical know-how has played a very important role in industrialisation of Iran in past 
decades. Despite the massive transfer of technology and machinery and equipment from abroad 
in past years, it is argued that the actual transfer of manufacturing technology has been neglected 
and the transfer of industrial technology was taken place mostly through importing machinery 
and equipment, ignoring the essential know-how. This was mostly due to the problems in 
transferring the know-how needed for the adaptation and assimilation of foreign technology to 
local condition. In order to tackle this problem, a number of Research and Development 
institutes were established to adapt foreign technologies through research and development 
activity. h can generally be said that despite the massive importation of foreign technologies in 
the pre-revolutionary period, Iran could not create an appropriate environment needed for the 
adaptation and absorption of these technologies. As indicated earlier, some general problems, 
such as Jack of an adequate skilled Jabour force, the implementation of an extreme protectionism 
policy which led to inefficient utilisation of natural and human resources, lack of sufficient 
indigenous technological capability, and heavy reliance on importing inputs, parts and equipment 
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required for manufacturing the outputs and products, were among the major problems 
contributing to a relatively unsuccessful experience of technology transfer in this period. 
Having compared the experience of Iran in technology transfer and FDI with that of East Asian 
first and second-tier NICs, one may find some common features as wen as major differences. 
As indicated earlier, like S. Korea which adopted a restrictive policy towards flow ofFDI in its 
early stage ofindust:ria1isation, FDI has played a less important role as a method for transferring 
technology into Iran. This was mainly due to a relatively long trend of protectionism and import 
substitution policies which filvoured manufacturing products for the domestic market. While 
most East Asian first and second-tier NICs designed a long-term and appropriate technology 
transfer strategy which emphasised more building up a strong indigenous technological base in 
these countries, however, in Iran such a strategy was not in the main context of development 
strategy although the necessary conditions were clearly present. As indicated earlier, the lack of 
an appropriate technology transfer strategy as a centerpiece of an overaR development 
industrialisation policy led to the creation of an dependent industrial sector on imports of parts 
and components. Despite an increase in Iran's oil revenues in 1973 which set Iran in a relatively 
better position in terms of foreign exchange reserves in comparison with many East Asian 
countries, as explained in the previous chapter, Iran could not manage to utilise these large 
financial resources to establish and develop the strong industrial and technological base needed 
for a successful industrial and technological development. 
The early transition to outward-looking, export promotion policies enabled East Asian first and 
second-tier NICs to promote their productivity level in order to be more competitive in 
international market. Moreover, the participation in the export markets encouraged these 
countries to increase their teclmologicalleaming and efficiency through e1fective adaptation, and 
absmption offoreign technologies. However, in Iran instead, the continuous implementation of 
import substitution policies gave little incentives for adapting foreign technology to local 
conditions and achieving maximum efficiency. As discussed in the previous chapter, although 
lSI policy in Iran was accompanied by the massive transfer of foreign technologies in the early 
stage, the long-term implementation of this strategy created inefficient local industries \Wich 
were unable to compete in the international market due to their low level of technological 
capability. 
While many East Asian first and second tier NICs invested heavily in development of their 
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human resources, Iran lagged far behind in this regard, despite relatively intense efforts to 
promote the country's level of skilled workers and scientists and engineers. Moreover, as 
discussed in detail in the previous chapters, many East Asian first and second tier NICs, in 
particular S. Korea (2.3% of GNP) and Taiwan (1.8% of GNP), allocated a significant amount 
of financial resources to research and development activities which has played a critical role in 
the promotion of their indigenous technological capability. In addition, most R&D activities in 
these countries have been done by private research centres. There has been a relatively low level 
of R&D expenditure as a percentage of the GNP (0.3%) and most research and development 
activities are concentrated in government institutes and universities. The government in the East 
Asian first and second-tier NICs has also played a critical role in directing a set of effective 
policy measures to accelerate the industrial and technological development in these countries. 
In terms of technology transfer, there has been a specific Ministry or governmental institution 
which has formulated and monitored an appropriate strategy and guideline for their acquiring 
and adapting fureign teclmology to the local conditions. The government in these COlDltries has 
effectively intervened in the promotion of the productivity and technological efficacy of the 
manufacturing products, which is an important prerequisite for their expansion of exports and 
for competing in the international market. In Iran, instead, there has not been a specified 
Ministry or organisation directly responsible for fomwlation of an overaU technology transfer 
strategy based on the country's needs and capabilities. 
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CHAYfER EIGHT: 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having summarised some of the major conclusions and findings of this research, the 
following points emerge. As is shown in the analysis of the theoretical framework (chapter 
2), the product life cycle theory, technology gap theory and dependency theory can be 
identified among the most significant empirical validations to apply to IDCs. These theories 
can explain better the reasons for the transfer of technology across national borders. While 
according to the product life cycle theory both developed and developing countries can gain 
benefits from the technology trade, the dependency theorists have emphasised the other side 
of the coin, that is, the negative aspects regarding international technology transfer. 
Moreover, unlike the technology gap theory which can be applied most appropriately to 
developed countries, the dependency school of thought originated in the developing 
countries and concentrated more directly on the problems and constraints within these 
countries. 
As extensively discussed in the theoretical framework, the dependency theorists argued that 
the imported technology from the developed countries is often inappropriate for the 
developing countries and only reflects the actual resource endowments of the developed 
colDltries and therefore leads to the technological dependency ofLDCs on DCs. However, 
while the dependency school of thought criticised muhinational companies for their 
lDlwillingness to transfer appropriate and real technology to the LDCs, it can also be said 
that MNCs playa very important role in transferring technology to these countries, since 
they possess the majority of the world's stock of advanced and high technologies. 
The conceptual analysis of international technology transfer in the chapter 3 identified and 
analysed the most Dnportant channels by which technology can be transferred across national 
borders. It can be said that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), licensing and joint venture 
agreements are among the most important methods of technology which have been used 
widely by many developing countries. It is also found that in order to be successful in 
international technology transfer, LDCs should choose the most appropriate mechanism, 
based on their absorptive capacity of the imported technology, their technology and trade 
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policy, and cost benefit analysis. Furthermore, as extensively discussed in the conceptual 
analysis of the international technology transfer mechanisms, it has been found that while 
FDI is believed to be the most important and widespread channel of ITT, the joint venture 
agreement is considered as one of best channels for the ITT, due to its several advantages 
such as sharing the risks and benefits by both recipient and supplier. Joint venture contracts 
can also provide an appropriate environment for local training in the recipient country and 
better absorption and assimilation of imported technology, due to willingness of both parties 
to a successful technology transfer. It is also argued that transfer of technology through joint 
ventures enable the recipient country to share in the use of technologies which they could 
never explore alone. However, one can say that the success of most joint venture 
agreements to a large degree depends on the compatibility of goals and objectives of both 
supplier and receiver of technology. 
licensing agreements, on the other hand, are mostly used by those countries which have a 
relatively higher level of absOIptive capacity. LDCs are usually reluctant to use licensing as 
a channel for acquiring foreign technology due to some restrictions imposed by licensors 
which affect negatively the successful transfer of technology. However, as discussed in the 
analysis of first-tier NICs such as S. Korea and Taiwan, these countries have mostly 
acquired foreign technologies through licensing and importing capital goods, and have 
successfully adapted and assimilated the imported technology licenses. These countries make 
the maximise use of licensed technology with little technical assistance from the suppliers 
of technology (licensors). There are several other mechanjsms of International Technology 
Transfer which were discussed in detail in chapter three. However, the main determinants 
of these mechanisms mostly depend on the technological policies of the recipient country, 
its level oflocal technological capability, the trade relationship between the recipient and 
supplier, and the motivation, purpose, criteria and bargaining power of the recipient country. 
Moreover, different kinds of institutional factors may also affect the ability of the recipient 
country to select the most appropriate channe~ such as the restrictive regulations of the 
recipient country toward transferring foreign technology. Therefore, it can be generally said 
that choosing an appropriate mechanism can play a critical role in the success of the 
international technology transfer. It seems that LDCs should choose a method of technology 
acquisition which not only transfer the machinery and hard-ware, but which can also include 
the technical and managerial know-how and soft-ware in order to be adapted and absorbed 
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efficiently to the local conditions. 
This research has also extensively examined the success factors for international technology 
transfer and industrialisation of some of the first and second tier East Asian NICs as well as 
some other countries such as Mexico and Turkey. Therefore, a comprehensive case study 
analysis was undertaken based on the experiences of these countries in their rapid industrial 
and technological development. The extensive analysis of these countries' success factors 
can be very useful for the other LDCs including Iran in order to adopt a collection of 
appropriate policy measures which led to rapid industrial and technological development of 
these successful countries. The reason for choosing the first and second-tier East Asian 
NICs is obviously because of the significant performance of these countries in the rapid 
industrial and technological development. It is believed that the successful experience of 
these countries in technology transfer and more broadly in economic development can give 
valuable lessons for other developing countries who wish to follow the same path of rapid 
industrial and technological development. As is already identified, most of these countries 
are different in some features such as the size of their market, resource endowment, 
geographical location, and different level of industrial and technological capability. 
However, one can find the commonality in their success factors in the rapid industrial and 
technological development. 
8.1 SIMILARITIES IN THE SUCCESS FACTORS 
As discussed previously in detail, many of these countries adopted a series of appropriate 
policies and strategies which played a very important role in their successful experience of 
technology transfer and more broadly rapid industrialisation. Although each country adopted 
its own specific strategy in accordance with its technical and economic requirements, there 
has been a common framework for successful transfer and deyelopment of technology. As 
is shown in the following table, the success of these countries has not been the result of a 
single factor, but because of a series of interrelated factors. However, as explained 
extensively earlier, some particular factors such as adoption of export promotion 
industrialisation policy, massive investment in the human resource development and 
improving education system, along with the acquisition of foreign technologies have 
contnDuted most to their industrial and technological development. 
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Table 8.1 A comparison of the important success factors in some selected countries 
As discussed extensively in Chapter five, there have been different points of view about the 
most critical success factor for the rapid industrialisation of these countries. However, it 
can be said that the adoption of outward looking, market-oriented and export promotion 
policies have contn"buted most to the success of these countries in comparison with other 
factors. However, as already explained in Chapter four, in most countries in the SUlVey, the 
adoption of export promotion was accompanied with some other policy measures including 
effective transfer of modem and new technologies, as well as stabilisation, h"beralisation and 
human resource development policies. It should also be noted that the early transition to an 
export promotion policy in many of these countries, in particular S. Korea and Taiwan, took 
place when most other developing countries followed the inward-looking, import 
substitution policies. It can also be said that the conditions and environment for a successful 
implementation of an export promotion policy have become more difficult for those LDCs 
as late comers in the current very competitive intemational market. 
Therefore, it is essential for LDCs to promote their technological capability through the 
adoption, adaptation, and assimilation of new and modem technologies as well as 
development of their human resources in order to achieve a successful expansion of their 
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manufacturing exports. Moreover, the experiences of most countries under the survey 
showed that the adoption of various policy measures including stabilisation, structural 
adjustment and hberalisation policies enabled these countries to create the stable 
macroeconomic environment needed for an effective implementation ofEPP. As is shown 
Table 8.1 and explained in detail in chapter five, there have been some other factors with a 
relatively less degree of importance contnbuting to the success of East Asian first and 
second-tier NICs such as the Confucianism ethic, the authoritarian nature of their 
governments as well as substantial amounts of US and Japanese financial aid. 
It can also be said that the adoption of an export promotion policy by each of these 
countries led to a considerable increase in their GDP growth rate and rapid expansion of 
their manufacturing exports. However, while the first-tier East Asian countries such as 
Taiwan and S. Korea shifted to the Export Promotion Policy (EPP) in the very early stages 
(late 1950s and early 1960s respectively), most second-tier East Asian countries such as 
Malaysia and Thailand adopted EPP in early 1970s. Some oil-producing countries such as 
Mexico, Indonesia, and Iran, however, adopted the EPP after a sharp decline in their oil 
revenues in the mid-1980s. Turkey is also another country which shifted to an EPP policy 
after a severe economic crisis in the early 1980s. Although the shift toward an outward-
looking and export-oriented strategy resulted in a significant growth rate for all these 
countries, as the experiences of most of these countries indicated, the adoption of import 
substitution policy in their earlier stage of industrialisation was essential for a successful 
transition to export promotion policy. The adoption ofEPP in most of these countries was 
accompanied by the implementation of some effective policy measures such as the 
introduction of a large number of export incentives such as tax rebates, financial credits for 
exporters, exchange rate devaluation, and establishment of export processing zones. 
However, as discussed in detail earlier, in some countries such as Turkey and Iran, the 
adoption of EPP has taken place simultaneously with the implementation of structural 
adjustment and stabilisation policies in order to provide the macroeconomic stability needed 
for a successful export expansion. Moreover, these two countries have also taken advantage 
of the creation of a huge capacity utilisation which had not been utilised beforehand. 
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Figure 8.1 A comparison of export expansion and GNP per capita growth for the selected 
countries during 1970-1995. 
As is shown in the Figure 8.1, GNP per capita growth rate has increased with a shift to EPP 
from the previous import substitution in most of these countries. Although the adoption of 
EPP resulted in a rapid growth rate and industrial and technological development for these 
countries, some countries have been much more successful than others in the 
implementation of this policy. As explained earlier in detail, in some :first tier NICs such as 
S. Korea and Taiwan, the implementation ofEPP was much more effective and stronger 
than the other countries which had followed the same pattern of industrialisation. In S. 
Korea for example, as a result of some supportive policy measures in the early 1960s, such 
as favourable credits and tax incentives for exporters, the manufactured exports increased 
from $ 390 million in 1963 to $89.04 billion in 1994 [1]. S. Korea along with Taiwan are 
the star performers of EPP, which started with dramatic increase in exports of light 
industrial products and then shifted toward exports of heavy industrial products [2]. 
Moreover, the adoption of a strong EPP gave these countries better access to foreign 
technologies and also led to their heavy investment in absorption and adaptation of imported 
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technologies in order to increase their productivity and efficiency level to be more 
competitive in the international market. The strong export-oriented policy also associated 
with some structural changes in the economy, such as a rise in real wages, shifting 
comparative advantage from labour-intensive to skill and technology-intensive industries. 
As is explained in the case of Mexico, like many other oil producing countries, it changed 
its previous import substitution policy to export promotion policy when the country faced 
serious problems caused by the debt crisis of 1982, followed with a sharp decline in oil 
prices in mid-1980s. Therefore, a series of policy measures were undertaken from the early 
1980s in order to make the non-oil industries more productive and competitive. These 
measures included the introduction of open policies towards Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI); implementation of trade h"beralisation through reduction of import tariff and quotas; 
devaluation of the real exchange rate along with sustaining macroeconomic stability to keep 
the inflation rate at an acceptable level; introduction of various export incentives for local 
exporters such as large credits for exporters; and provision of the necessary inputs required 
for production of domestic outputs, and establishment of Mexico's free trade zones known 
as maquiladoras. 
Moreover, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFI'A) which was established in 
1992 between Mexico, U. S and Canada, can be considered as another major factor for 
promotion of Mexico's manufactming exports due to its large effects on increasing the level 
of productivity and competitiveness of Mexico's manufactured products. The adoption of 
EPP in Mexico has also been associated with much more emphasis on acquisition of the 
appropriate technology required for increasing the competitiveness of its manufacturing 
products. The other countries under survey in the country study analysis, such as Malaysia 
and Thailand, which can be ranked as the East Asian second-tier NICs, shifted to EPP in 
the early 1970s from the previous import substitution policy. As discussed in detail in the 
case study analysis, various export incentives were introduced by the Malaysian government 
including the estabtisbment of export processing zones, tariff and custom duties reductions, 
providing long-term financing for exporters, upgrading marketing and promotion of skills, 
and open policies toward the flow of FDI into that country. As a result of these policy 
measures, Malaysia's manufacturing exports increased an annual average of IS% in 1970s, 
22% per year in the early 1980s, and 13.3% per annum during the period between 1986-
1992. However, it is believed that Malaysia's most recent export growth has been mainly as 
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a result of an increasing level of export-oriented FDI which accounted for about 82% of 
Malaysia's overall exports [3]. 
There have been similar policy measures for Thailand in the implementation of the EPP, 
including tax exemptions, electricity rebates, low interest loans, rediscount facility for 
exporters, estabHshing export processing zones, full tax exemption on imported inputs used 
in export activities, and open policies toward the attraction ofFDI. This series of export 
incentive measures resuhed in an annual average growth rate of 40% in Thai manufacturing 
exports during the period between 1968-89. Despite several common features between these 
two countries, the role of the export processing zones in Malaysia has been more significant 
than that of its neighbour in the attraction of export-oriented foreign investment. Although 
a1most all of these countries obtained a certain degree of success in the implementation of 
export promotion policies. However, some East Asian first-tier NICs such as S. Korea and 
Taiwan have been more successful in comparison with the other countries. Moreover, as 
explained earlier, one can also find several similarities in the introduction of various export 
policy measures in these countries. However, while some countries such S. Korea 
emphasised more the allocation of favourable credits and tax incentives for exporters, others 
such as Taiwan relied more on fiscal incentives including low interest export loans and the 
estabtishmeot of export processing zones. Furthermore, while S. Korea shifted to the export 
of heavy and chemical industrial products in its second phase of export-oriented strategy, 
Taiwan, on the other hand, continued the export of light and labour intensive manufacturing 
products. 
Despite the significant export performance of some successful countries such as S. Korea, 
this country has recently faced serious problems in sustaining its previous high growth level. 
While exports grew at an average rate of 26% per year between 1986-1989, the Korean 
export growth rate declined sharply in the early 1990s and reached only 6.7% in 1992 [4]. 
Some factors such as labour disputes, rising wages, a high rate of inflation, and a widening 
trade deficit are among the major factors contnDuting to this decline. Moreover, due to a 
decrease in Korea's competitiveness in the world market, the Korean government is 
undertaking new policy measures such as increasing the share of research and development 
activity in GNP to 3 or 4 % until 1998, more training programs for its labour force, and 
more investment in high-tech industrial products, in order to improve its level of 
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technological capability and competitiveness. 
As noted earlier, the first-tier East Asian NICs such as S. Korea and Taiwan have adopted 
much more strongly the export promotion policy than the second-tier resource rich East 
Asian NICs. Therefore, it is very important for a specific country to implement effective and 
strong export incentive measures in order to be successful in export performance. 
Moreover, as is pointed out earlier, one of the most important factors for the high growth 
rate and rapid industrialisation of East Asian countries in comparison with their Latin 
American counterparts has been their early rejection of inward-looking and import 
substitution policies in favour of outward-looking and export-oriented policies with 
elimination of several export barriers. As the experiences of the more successful countries 
showed, the adoption of export promotion policy was not the only important factor 
contributing to their success, but there has been a package of inter-related policies which 
led to their significant industrial and technological development. Moreover, it should be 
noted that some specific criteria for the significant export performance such as the rapid 
increase in world demand for exports during the 1960s and early 1970s may no longer exist. 
Therefore, it is very difficult for a country as a late starter in international market to be as 
successful as those countries which adopt this policy in the very early stage of industrial and 
technological development. In an increasingly competitive international market, in order to 
be successful in export expansion, a late-comer LDC needs to allocate a huge investment 
in the development of its teclmological capability and promotion of those products in which 
this country has competitive advantage. 
Despite the very significant role of export promotion policy in the rapid industrial and 
technological development of most succasfid countries, other important factors have played 
a vital role in the success of these countries. These include massive flow of foreign 
technology and investment, effective human resource development policy, along with the 
efficient role of government in directing these policies. As explained earlier in detail, the 
heavy investment in education and effective human resource development policy enabled 
most of these countries to absorb and assimilate imported technology more rapidly and 
easily. The accelerating use of new technologies forced these countries to improve the 
quality of their labour force for better absorption, assimilation, and adaptation of imported 
technologies. Most countries under the analysis have designed specific programs for the 
expansion of education at all levels and the promotion of training and skills of their labour 
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forces. However, as explained in detail in the analysis of the selected countries in particular 
the East Asian first and second-tier NICs, the educational indicators and levels have been 
varied in the countries of the swvey. It can be said that the higher the number of skilled 
workers, technicians and engineers in a country, the higher the level of technological 
capability of that country would be. Moreover, as the experience of successful countries in 
the rapid industrial and technological development shows, the Research and Development 
(R&D) activities have also played a very important role in the effective absorption and 
assimilation offoreign technologies as well as promoting their local technological capability. 
It can be said that LDCs required a stock of highly educated and skilled-workers in order 
to absorb and adapt the imported technology effectively. Therefore, they should adopt 
extensive human resource development programmes such as increasing the number of 
institutions for higher education (with more emphasis on science and engineering courses), 
and vocational and on-the-job training which can assist the promotion of the productivity 
and efficiency of their labour force. In other words, it is essential for LDCs to invest heavily 
in the development of their human resources including promoting the entire range of 
engineers, technologists, technicians and skilful labour force. Moreover, they also need to 
increase their R&D activities through increasing the R&D expenditure as a percentage of 
GNP. However, each country must adopt its own specific HRD strategy in accordance with 
its unique technical and economic requirements. 
As the analysis of the selected countries showed, many of these countries also employed 
various methods of acquiring technologies in order to strengthen their technological 
capability. There were also major efforts to maximise the degree and level of absorption and 
assimilation of imported technology. The experiences of more successful countries in an 
effective transfer of technology shows that the adoption of an appropriate technology 
transfer mechanism based on each COlDltry'S absotptive capacity and technological capability 
maximised the efficient adaptation of imported technologies to their local needs and 
conditions. While some resource-rich countries mainly East Asian second-tier NICs 
transferred foreign technology mostly through attracting substantial amount of FDI, the 
other countries with a relatively limited natural resources used other methods including 
importing capital goods and machinery, joint venture and licensing agreements. However, 
fewer of these countries formulated an appropriate plan and specific policy for the 
technology transfer within their overall national development framework. Most of the 
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countries surveyed imposed no restrictive measures and regulation on technology transfer 
and flow of FDI. However, some countries such as S. Korea employed a relatively 
restrictive regulation on FDI in the early stage of industrialisation. Moreover, as indicated 
in Chapter five, some East Asian first and second-tier NICs established specific institutions 
or a separate Ministry which were responsible for passing specific guidelines and regulations 
as well as monitoring technology transfer contracts. 
8.2 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS 
As discussed earlier, many of the countries surveyed, in particular East Asian first and 
second tier NICs have experienced a relatively similar pattern of rapid industrial and 
technological development. It can be said that the identification of the most important 
factors contnouted to the success of these countries, and these can provide some useful 
guidelines and lessons for the other LDCs to adopt for their technological development. 
However, despite a relatively successful experience of industrialisation, they also faced some 
serious obstacles in the process of their industrialisation. The recognition and analysis of 
these constraints can also assist the other LDCs, by avoiding them in their path of 
technology transfer and development. One of the major common constraints has been a 
heavy reHance on the import of raw materials and parts and the components required for the 
production of the outputs. This technological dependency which has been common in many 
of these countries to different degrees, is considered to be mainly due to inadequate and 
insufficient supportive industries and weak levels of industrial inftastructure. Moreover, as 
is discussed in the analysis of theoretical framework, it is believed that the multinational 
companies and developed countries did not transfer technology properly and therefore this 
led to technological dependency for LOCs. 
As is shown in the case study analysis, almost all the countries surveyed have relied on the 
import of intermediate and capital goods, components, raw materials, and parts, but with 
different levels of dependency. For example, 22.4 % of goods manufactured in Korea in 
1990, were based on importing foreign parts and inputs, in comparison with 6.2% in Japan, 
and 1.6 % for US [5]. Most countries being studied have neglected the development ofan 
efficient local supply base of parts and components and suffered from high dependency on 
foreign parts and components. However, some countries such as Thailand have established 
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a relatively strong industrial base \Wich is less dependent on the importation of foreign parts 
and components. Moreover, as discussed earlier, while some countries have provided the 
foreign exchange needed for importing the required raw materials and components partly 
from the export of their manufactured goods, some other countries such as Iran, Indonesia 
and Mexico relied heavily on oil revenues as a major financial support for importing required 
inputs. Therefore, it is necessary for the LDCs to develop a strong and supportive industry 
for providing the materials and parts required for producing the outputs and therefore lessen 
their technological dependency. 
As noted earlier, the shortage of adequate numbers of scientists and engineers and lack of 
skilled human resources has been another major obstacle to the development of technology 
and its assimilation, and the absOlption offoreign technology, in most of the countries being 
studied. The level of shortage of skilled labour and scientists differs with each country. For 
example, despite a relatively substantial increase in some educational indicators, such as 
literacy rate, some East Asian second-tier NICs such as Thailand and Indonesia are lagging 
behind the first-tier East Asian NICs such as S. Korea and Taiwan in the number of 
technicians and engineers. For example, while S. Korea and Taiwan have achieved the 
highest level of educational enrolment in science and technology per 100,000 of their 
population, with enrolment of765 and 795 respectively, these figures have been 85 and 16 
for Malaysia and Indonesia respectively [UNCTAD, 1991]. 
Moreover, the low level of research and development activity as a percentage of GNP in 
some countries such as Indonesia (0.3), Thailand (0.3) and Iran (0.4), can also be considered 
as another important impediment to the effective transfer of technology and their long term 
technological progress. Therefore, it is crucial for the LDCs to increase their investment in 
education and R&D activity in order to accelerate effective and successful technology 
transfer and promote their local technological capability. The lack of adequate industrial 
infrastructure and unstable macro-economic conditions have been among the other problems 
that most countries under survey faced in their experience of industrial and technological 
development. As is shown in detail earlier, some countries such as Mexico, Turkey and 
Indonesia, suffered from serious macro-economic instability and financial crises in different 
period of their industrial and technological development process. These crisis, which mostly 
occurred as a result of the sharp decline in oil prices in the case of Mexico and Indonesia in 
the mid-1980s, affected severely the flow of foreign direct investment and technologies to 
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these colDltries. Moreover, the lack of adequate industrial infrastructure and the unbalanced 
distribution of facilities and income in some countries such as Thailand and Indonesia also 
affected the procedure of successful technology transfer into these countries. 
It should be also added that despite the effective role of government in most countries under 
swvey, the state in some countries such as Turkey has been overextended, and this has been 
identified as a major constraint in the process of industrial and technological development 
in these countries. Therefore, it is essential for the other LDCs which want to follow the 
same pattern of industrial and technological development to adopt certain policy measures 
such as structural adjustment and stabilisation policies to keep the stable macro-economic 
environment needed for a successful technology transfer and development. Moreover, LDCs 
should establish and develop institutional infrastructure such as an effective colDJmmication 
systems and transportation networks which are considered as necessary physical conditions 
for successful transfer of technology and development. 
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Table 8.2 Some important constraints on technology transfer and development of some 
selected countries 
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Having analysed the key success factors and the major constraints of some selected 
countries in technology transfer and industrialisation during the past three decades, one can 
draw some general lessons and recommendations for the other LDCs which decide to pursue 
the similar pattern of industrial and technological development. One of the major lessons 
that other LDCs can learn from the experiences of these countries is that they have adopted 
an appropriate and effective technology transfer strategy which has been supported by some 
other policy measures including development of human resources and creation of a stable 
macroeconomic environment. Moreover, the adoption of export promotion policy in most 
of these countries accelerated the flow of foreign investment and technologies in these 
countries have also been implemented through the effective role of their governments. 
Therefore, there is an essential need for every country to design and formulate an 
appropriate technology transfer policy based on their overall national development strategy 
aiming at the development and promotion of indigenous technological capability as well as 
the adaptation and absorption of imported technology and customising it for local market. 
Moreover, LDCs should also improve the quantity and quality of their human labour as well 
as the level of their industrial infrastructure which are also essential for an effective and 
successful transfer of technology into these countries. 
8.3 THE LESSONS FOR IRAN 
As indicated earlier, the experience of the successful countries in rapid industrial and 
technological development can provide valuable lessons for other LDCs including Iran. As 
the analysis of country surveys shows, the adoption of export promotion and outward 
looking policies has been identified as the most critical success factor for these countries in 
particular East Asian first and second-tier NICs. The importance of an EPP in the rapid 
industrial and technological development of most countries under survey suggests that Iran 
needs to implement a continuous strong outward-looking, export-oriented strategy in order 
to be able to build up the modern industrial base required for accelerating the pace of 
country's industrial and technological development. 
As explained in Chapter six, due to heavy reliance on the oil revenues, the government in 
the pre-revolutionary period made little effort to expand the exports of non-oil products. 
During the post revolutionary period, and in particular during the period between 1980-
1988, due to factors such as the Iran-Iraq war, the government's main objective was to 
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manage a war economy based on an inward-looking, import substitution policy. It was only 
after the sharp decrease in oil prices and the announcement of the cease-fire in 1988 that the 
policy-makers in Iran attempted to switch to an export-oriented policy in order to expand 
non-oil exports. The main objective was to expand the country's non-oil exports and 
therefore reduce the heavy dependency on oil-income as a major source of foreign exchange 
earnings. However, it should be noted that, as pointed out in Chapter six, ahhough the 
emphasis was placed more on the expansion of non-oil exports and introduction of export 
policy measures during the implementation of the First Plan (1989-1993), the previous 
import substitution policy has been continued. 
Despite the relatively successful implementation of the export promotion policy in the late 
1980s and early 1990s which has mainly been because of utilisation of unused production 
capacities, however, in the later stage, the expansion of non-oil exports encountered serious 
difficulties, mostly due to the financial crisis of 1993. Moreover, while some countries such 
as Indonesia and Mexico which are also known as late starters in the adoption of outward-
oriented export promotion policies, could manage to a large degree to reduce the 
dependency on oil revenues through diversUYing their manufacturing products, Iran 
remained heavily dependent on oil as the main source of its income and exports. Therefore, 
Iran can learn from the experiences of these countries that in order to maintain a successful 
export expansion, it needs to formulate and design some specific programmes for 
diversUYing its manufacturing products for export. This in turn, required an appropriate 
technology transfer strategy based on the country's overall industrial and economic 
development. This can be achieved through the regular and extensive flow of the new and 
modem technologies based on the country's demands and capabilities; the massive 
investment in developing the human resources through an effective human resource 
development plan including education and training of the labour force, on-the-job and 
vocational training; and increasing the research and development activities in order to 
promote the indigenous technological capability. Therefore, It can be said that developing 
the country's indigenous industrial and technological capabilities as weB as its human 
resources can play a vital role for the successful expansion of manufacturing exports. 
Moreover, the country should also create a stable macroeconomic environment to assist the 
consistent and effective implementation ofEPP. 
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The other overall lesson that Iran can learn from the experiences of the some successful 
countries, in particular East Asian first and second-tier NICs, is the role of government in 
directing a set of appropriate policies and strategies in the rapid industrial and technological 
development in these countries. The government in most of these countries also formulated 
and designed a series of consistent long-term (usually five-year) and effective development 
plans which acted as guidelines for rapid industrialisation of these countries. A significant 
point in the process ofpolicy making in most of these countries, in particular S. Korea and 
Taiwan, has been the flexibility as well as the top-down nature of their decision making. 
The adoption of a top-down approach seems to be essential for a country to catch up 
technologically with developed countries. As indicated in the case of S. Korea and Taiwan, 
the policy making in these countries has been efficiently done by a group of experts, 
economist, professionals, advisors, and administrators, and very quickly. Moreover, the 
policy makers in these countries have been very flexible in the case of changing the 
ineffective policies very swiftly. Moreover, the state in most of these countries has played 
an important role in creating and developing an adequate infrastructure required for efficient 
absorption and adaptation of foreign technologies into the local conditions. 
Another important lesson which the experiences of the countries surveyed particularly the 
East Asian first and second-tier NICs can provide for Iran, is the important role of human 
resource development policies in the successful technology transfer and development in 
these countries. As pointed out in Chapter five, a strong linkage has been found between the 
development of human resources in these countries and their indigenous technological 
capability. Therefore, the existence of well-qualified and educated labour force seems to be 
essential for a country wishes to be successful in technology transfer and development. As 
it was also pointed in Chapter five, the heavy investment in promoting the education at all 
levels enabled most East Asian first and second .. tier NICs to assimilate and absorb imported 
technologies more effectively. Moreover, most of these countries also placed their emphasis 
on increasing research and development activity in order to promote their technological 
capability. 
In spite of some significant achievements in the expansion of educational indicators during 
the past few years, for Iran as a large country with a population of more than 60 million, 
many under the age of 16, this has not been adequate. Therefore, more effort and investment 
needs to allocated to education at all levels, in particular to higher education. Moreover, 
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further steps need to be taken to establish a strong linkage between universities and 
institutions for higher education, and industrial enterprises, in order to meet their demands 
and needs. It should be also added that Iran needs to improve the share of R&D as a 
percentage of GNP from current 0.4% to about 1% of its GNP for next five years in order 
to make maximum use of imported technologies as well as developing its indigenous 
technological capability. Moreover, as indicated in Chapter seven, there has been almost no 
substantial research and development activity by the private industrial enterprises in Iran. 
Therefore, priority should be given to the allocation of more R&D budget for universities 
and those research institutes which are undertaking applied researches. 
Iran can also learn from the experiences of some successful countries in their rapid industrial 
and technological development, that importing technology to these countries was not an 
alternative, but complementary to indigenous technological capability. Therefore, it can be 
said that an appropriate technology transfer strategy for LDCs including Iran can be a 
simultaneous adoption of transferring the required technologies from abroad and 
strengthening the local technological capability. 
8.4 THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Having concluded the analysis of success factors of some selected countries in their 
experience of technology transfer and industriaHsation, there are a number recommendations 
and suggestions for LDCs in general and Iran in particular as follows: 
I. As the experiences of successful countries sudl as S. Korea indicate, the estabHsbment 
of a special centre for technology transfer appears to be essential to organise studies 
to determine which areas Iran should promote for the advancement of technical 
education and technological innovation to meet its national needs and objectives. This 
centre can be either an independent Ministry such as that of S. Korea and Malaysia, 
(Ministry of Science and Technology), or an organisation under direct control of the 
President. The main activity and responsibility of this centre can be concentrated on 
some important issues as following: 
• Providing and formulating the appropriate policies and plans for the 
development of science and technology; 
• Designing an appropriate technology development strategy as a part of the 
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country's overall economic development plan; 
• Formulating a suitable strategy for an effective adaptation and assimilation 
of imported technologies; 
• Designing a strategy for the creation of technology culture and providing a 
suitable environment for the growth of local talents, creativity and 
innovation in the country; 
• Formulation of an appropriate strategy for the training and development of 
the skills of human resources in the industrial sector; 
• Providing adequate and necessary information on the availability and 
development of appropriate technologies; 
• Creating co-operation between industry and the research and development 
institutes on the one hand and the government on the other hand; 
• Formulating effective regulations for importing technology and the 
evaluating technology transfer agreements; and 
• The identification of priorities, capacities and needs for an effective and 
successful technology transfer. 
As is indicated earlier, in order to be more successful, the science and technology 
strategy should be linked and connected with the country's overall development 
strategy. 
2. In addition to the above mentioned responsibilities for this centre, it seems also 
essential to establish a science and technology planning council which can be 
administered under the direct control of the main centre, with specific responsibilities 
for ensuring an overall plan for integrating the human resources and infrastructure 
needs to optimise effectively the transfer of appropriate technology to Iran, and to 
advise on priority areas for innovative technological development. This overall 
national plan should link the programme for industrialisation, with plans for the 
development of engineers, scientists, and technicians; plans for adaptation and 
innovation of technology; and plans for expanding infrastructure facilities and services. 
Moreover, it is also recommended to set up a National Science and Technology 
Information System, in order to promote the access to information on Science and 
Technology issues, in particular those related to technology developments. An 
effective information system is also essential for efficient absorption, and the 
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adaptation of imported technologies to local conditions. It can also facilitate the rapid 
and effective dissemination of information on research within the country, and also to 
constitute a source of information on research outside the country. 
3. As is shown earlier, the adoption of export promotion policies is among the most 
important success factor for industrial and technological development of some NICs 
in East Asia. The export promotion policy enabled these countries to make the best 
use of their relatively cheap labour in order to compete in the international market. 
The export promotion policy also encouraged them to increase their efforts for better 
adaptation and absorption of foreign technologies. Therefore, for Iran as a country 
which is highly dependent on the oil revenues, it seems essential to emphasise more 
the expansion of non-oil exports through the greater emphasis on the export 
promotion policy. This is mostly because the COlDltty cannot rely on oil revenues in the 
long term as the main source of foreign exchange due to declining oil resources and 
prices. Therefore, the development of a non-oil export sector capable of replacing the 
oil income is very important for the long-term and overall prosperity of the country. 
Despite the government efforts to shift to export promotion policy from the import 
substitution policy, Iran still needs to place more emphasis on creating an appropriate 
environment for the expansion of exports. As explained in detail in Chapter six, in 
spite of a primary growth rate of non-oil exports in the early stage of the First Five-
Year Plan, there has recently been a declining trend in the country's overall non-oil 
export performance. 
One can refer to some factors such as lack of effective export incentive measures, and 
continuous heavy dependency on oil revenues, as well as an unstable and inconsistent 
fiscal and Monterey policies, to be major obstacles in the expansion of the country's 
non-oil exports. However, non-oil exports are projected to reach the total value of 
$ 27,524 million during Second Five-Year Plan (1995-1999). In order to achieve this 
target, it seems necessary to intensify various export incentives, including tax and 
custom duty exemptions, export credits and loans to local exporters, the expansion of 
FfZs with more emphasis on attracting export-oriented FDI, and a stable and coherent 
macroeconomic policy based on simultaneous devaluation of exchange rate and low 
inflation rate. 
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As is mentioned earlier, some oil producing countries such as Mexico and Indonesia, 
which share common features and characteristics with Iran, could manage to sustain 
a relatively successful non-oil export expansion, in particular the manufacturing 
exports. This is mostly due to the adoption of a series of appropriate measures, 
undertaken by these countries, such as the introduction of various export incentives 
including tax exemptions, financial credits, a gradual and effective devaluation of their 
exchange rate, elimination of the export biases, establishment of export processing 
zones, and attracting a large amount of export-oriented FDI, creating a relatively 
stable macroeconomic environment, increasing productivity level, adopting open-door 
policies towards technology transfer and FDI, strengthening the industrial and 
technological infrastructure and promoting the skills of their labour force in order to 
increase the adaptability level of imported technologies, developing the quality 
standards of their industrial products, and maximising the use of their comparative 
advantage in order to compete in international market. It seems that the experience of 
these countries in relatively successful implementation of an export promotion policy 
can have some valuable lessons for other developing countries with similar situations 
such as Iran. 
Therefore, it is recommended that Iran pursue strong outward-looking, export 
promotion policies with little or without simuhaneous introduction of inward-oriented, 
protectionism and import substitution policy measures. Moreover, as the experience 
of some successful countries in the implementation of export promotion policies 
shows, it would be better for Iran to strengthen primarily those industries and areas 
in which it has already a comparative and competitive advantage, such as labour-
intensive and resource-based industries as well as some of its traditional handicrafts, 
such as carpet. In the later stage, it will be necessary to develop some of its high-tech 
and capital intensive industries. This in turn, would need a larger investment in 
developing the country's infrastructure including commnnication system, 
transportation networks, as we1l as upgrading the educational indicators and skill-level 
of the labour force in order to assimilate and absorb the new and modem technologies 
to the local conditions. It is also essential for Iran to sustain the stable macroeconomic 
condition needed for an effective and successful implementation ofEPP. 
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4. As is indicated earlier, despite a great increase in education and training facilities and 
a relatively substantial body of skilled labour, technicians and engineers in Iran in 
particularly in the post revolutionuy period, the country still requires many more than 
the current number of technicians and engineers, in the view of the expansion and 
diversification of the industrial products and promotion of the country's capacity for 
efficient assimilation and absorption of the advanced technology. Moreover, as 
indicated earlier, due to the lack of practical experiences for engineers graduated from 
universities, it seems essential to revise the educational system so that instead of great 
importance being placed on memory work, much more attention should be paid to 
practical and empirical work, with modifications to the methods of teaching, and 
probably to the curricuhun, for science and technology. Furthermore, as the successful 
experience of the East Asian NICs showed, the large investment in their human 
resource development has played a very important role in the rapid industrial and 
technological development in these countries. However, DIlch of the public investment 
focused on the lower level of education (primary and secondary level) in the early 
stages of their industrialisation, and in the later stage, on the expansion of the higher 
education level Therefore, it seems necessary for Iran to invest more in education at 
all levels through increasing public expenditure on education as a percentage of 
country's GNP. It is also essential to expand further the number ofumversities and 
institutions of the higher education in order to increase the number of university 
graduates required for industries' needs, in particular in the area of science and 
engineering. 
More steps need to be taken to bring university education closer and more relevant 
to the needs of industry. These can include a wider use of sandwich courses, and 
projects which contain exposure to practical training in real-life situations for 
undergraduate students. The experience of some successful countries has shown a 
very close relationship between the universities and industry in these countries, mainly 
through the joint engagement in appJied research and pilot plants which were financed 
by government and industrial firms and carried out by research institutes md 
universities. In some countries the university professors were also involved in 
consuJting and managing some industrial projects. In addition to the expansion of their 
education level both quantitatively md qualitatively, the high degree and intensity of 
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the on-the-job training in these countries also significantly affect the technological 
capability of their human resources. Therefore, it is essential for Iran to increase on-
the-job training for its labour force to enable them to adapt efficiently the imported 
technologies, and thus increase technological capability. It seems necessary to 
establish and develop some specific institutions concentrating more on co-operation 
between the industries, universities and the private industrial enterprises. 
5. Having considered the country's vast natural and human resources, it is essential to 
maximise the efficient use of the country's potential natural, mineral, and human 
resources. As an example, the substantial amount of gas, which has made Iran the 
owner of the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, could be used as an 
alternative for the oil revenues as well as input and basis for competitive petro-
chemical and metallurgical industries. !fIran takes most advantage of its potential and 
significant endowments, and what is essential, implements a constant economic policy 
framework, it can achieve an equitable and average growth rate of around 5 % per 
year on average for the period 1995-2000. In order to achieve this figure, which is 
the same target growth rate projected in the Second Five-Year plan, as is estimated 
by the World Bank, it will require the investment to GDP ratio to rise to an average 
of25% and national savings to reach an average of about 28% ofGDP. As noted in 
Chapter six, the rapid growth rate of about 9% and 10 % in the year 1990 and 1991 
was mostly as a resuh of the utilisation of unused capacities. Therefore, it seems 
essential to design a specific plan for the maximum utilisation of country's potential 
resources. 
6. As the experience of some of the successful countries in East Asia showed, these 
countries have made extensive use of the various methods of technology acquisition, 
including formal and informal channels, much have played a critical role in promoting 
technological capability and industrial and technological development. While many of 
these countries acquired foreign technology through the importation of intermediate 
and capital goods and machinery, turn-key contracts, in the earlier stage of their 
industrialisation, Foreign Direct Investment (PDI), joint venture and licensing 
agreements have been among the major channels of obtaining technology in the later 
stage. However, one can see that PDI has played a very important role in the 
acquisition offoreign technology and managerial expertise in most of these countries. 
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Iran has also employed different methods for obtaining technology and know-how, 
mostly including setting up joint venture agreements with foreign firms, turnkey, 
technical assistance and licensing agreements, and attracting FDI. Although the 
government has taken several measures such as establishment of Free Trade Zones 
(FTZs) in some islands of the Persian Gulf and other areas in the country and 
liberalising some of regulation to encourage FDI, it seems that additional measures 
are needed in order to boost FDI into the country. This can be done through further 
open policies towards FDI, expansion ofFTZs, additional tax exemptions and free 
custom duties, and providing adequate infrastructure and facilities for foreign 
investors in these areas. Moreover, as indicated in chapter six, much of the FDI which 
flew to the FTZs has been inward-oriented and included to some extent consumer 
goods. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce some specific measures to encourage 
more export-oriented FDI. Therefore, it is crucial for Iran and the relevant authorities 
to clarify and formulate constant and stable regulations and policy measures to 
enhance foreign direct investment based on the Second Five Year Plan objectives. 
7. As already noted, it seems essential for Iran to put more emphasis on the export 
promotion policy as well as the human resource development policy which in turn are 
a prerequisite for the industrial and technological development of the country. As the 
experience of the East Asian countries shows, research and development activities 
have played a very important role in the promotion of indigenous technological 
capability as well as absoIptive capacity for importing advanced technology in these 
countries. In order to become competitive in the international market, Iran has to 
develop further its research and development activities through the allocation of more 
R&D expenditure as percentage of GNP particularly industrial research. Iran needs 
to improve and expand its R&D level and activity in order to be able to acquire high 
and advanced technologies more effectively. Therefore, more investment should be 
allocated for R&D activities involved in the adaptation and assinn1ation of foreign 
technologies rather than on initially adopting them. In addition, measures are 
necessary to encourage R&D institutes to become strongly involved in supporting 
local industrial and technological development. It is also necessary to expand the 
industrial research institutes regarding the needs and skiDs oflocal industry, university 
and the government organisations. Furthermore, special attempts are needed to co-
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ordinate the research activities of industrial firms, public institutions and research 
centres and universities. It seems also essential to encourage private industrial firms 
to allocate more investment in the R&D activities. This can be in the form of 
allocating a larger percentage of their sale in research and development activities. 
8. The state has also played a very important role in East Asian NICs in providing the 
effective and stable macroeconomic environment needed for successful 
implementation of a set of appropriate policies which led to the rapid industrial and 
technological development of these countries. The state in these countries can also be 
characterised as strong, efficient, market friendly, and relatively less interventionist. 
The government in these countries changed the previous policies very quickly when 
they found them to be ineffective. The government in Iran, can also effectively be 
involved in such a features as identification of the country's potential capacities and 
needs, formulation of appropriate policies for science and technology development 
and their goals and objectives, recognition of priorities, and designing a set of 
appropriate policy measures needed for successful industrial and technological 
development. As indicated earlier, the government can also play an important role in 
the rapid transition to an export oriented policy. The role of government during this 
transition period towards a more outward-oriented economy is to use the country's 
oil based resources to improve an infrastructure network needed to improve the 
industrial products capable of competition in international markets. Moreover, the 
government should also implement appropriate policy measures to train adequate 
technicians and engineers for a successful absorption of imported technology. As the 
experiences of East Asian countries indicate, the government in these countries invest 
in those industries in which the private sector may be reluctant to invest. 
Although the experience of successful East Asian NICs cannot be easily replicated, 
due to some dissitmlarities and special circumstances unique to these countries, some 
very important success factors of these countries which were discussed extensively 
earlier, such as an effective and supportive government role, export promotion policy, 
and human resource development policy, can be extremely useful for other LDCs 
including Iran who want to pursue the similar path of rapid industrialisation. However, 
it seems necessary to add that the mere replication and imitation of these successful 
countries' pattern and policies without considering the local conditions and the 
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country's potential capacity and needs could lead to negative results. 
9. The cultural and social value system is one of the critical factors for efficient 
assimilation and adaptation of foreign technologies. The Confucian culture and ethic, 
which can be characterised through some aspects such as hard-working, self-
discipline, hierarchy and obedience and high respect for education, is considered to 
be another success factor for the East Asian NICs. As explained earlier in the pre-
revolutionary experience of Iran, in the massive transfer of technology which mostly 
occurred after the oil boom of 1973, most imported technologies could not be 
absorbed and adapted to the local conditions of Iran due to some major differences 
between social, cultural, and traditional values of Iran and those of donor countries. 
Moreover, the pace of change caused by big push industrialisation policy was so fast 
that it caused a serious social crisis which eventually led to the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. Therefore, it seems crucial for the country to develop a strategy and guideline 
for creation of an appropriate environment and technology culture needed for effective 
adaptation and assimilation of advanced technologies. 
As already mentioned, the suggested centre for formulation of country's overall 
science and technology policy could also take this responSlDility. This can be in the 
form of a specific department, under the supervision of the main centre, which might 
be called inter-cultural comnnmication (the exchange of ideas and information that are 
dependent on culture) between the donor and receiver of technology transfer. It is 
mainly because of this problem that Iran has not obtained the best from agreements 
made for joint enterprises for the estabHsbment of technology in the past, which might 
be due to the lack of understanding by foreign firms of the country's culture and social 
value system and vice-versa, and also inadequate local capability to absorb the 
imported technologies. Therefore, special studies should be undertaken in order to 
establish procedures for selecting technology that w~uld produce far less cultural 
shock This institute could also formulate the overall strategy needed for the creation 
of an appropriate policy environment and technology cuhure, encouraging research 
and development and innovative activities and team works, promotion of capacity for 
chmging some of the customs and working habits of the labour force in the direction 
of efficient absorption and assimilation of imported technologies. 
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10. The current Second Five-Year Development Plan has put more emphasis on self-
sufficiency in agricultural products. In spite of significant achievement in the growth 
of agricultural products during the implementation of First Plan (1989-1993), it is still 
not adequate enough to make.the country self-sufficient and independent in importing 
agricultural products. Moreover, having benefited from the existance and availability 
of diversified natural and mineral resources, this can well provide the basis for the 
country's development and expansion of industrial outputs. Therefore, much effort 
needs to be made to design the policies which make the maximum use of the country's 
large agricultural potential capacities and natural resources. Moreover, as the 
experience of successful countries, in particular that of resource-rich countries shows, 
the development of the agriculture sector in these countries was a prerequisite for 
their success in industrial and technological progress. Moreover, adequate attention 
should be paid for a balanced and equitable distnoution of income and facilities 
throughout the country. Therefore, more emphasis should be placed on improving the 
infrastructure of those areas of the country which are less developed in comparison 
with the more developed regions of the country. 
11. Technology transfer should also be in accordance with the country's national goals and 
priorities. As the experiences of the East Asian countries showed, most of these 
countries suffer from technological dependency or heavy reliance on importing foreign 
parts and materials for producing their manufacturing products. As discussed in 
Chapter six and seven, Iran is also heavily dependent on the import of foreign parts 
and materials, which in turn is dependent on the foreign exchange earned from oil 
revenues to finance the import of these materials. This heavy reliance on importing 
material parts which are mainIy financed by oil incomes caused some serious problems 
for country's industrial products. As it can be seen that the overall performance of the 
industrial sector was affected whenever Iran was faced with a sharp decline in oil 
prices and the consequent decrease in its oil revenues. While the successful East Asian 
countries could improve their manufacturing exports to finance the import of 
intermediate and capital goods, Iran instead relied continuously on the oil revenues 
to pay for these products. Therefore, it is necessary to develop the supporting 
industries capable of providing a proportion of the country's requirements. 
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12. As indicated earlier, having surveyed the technology level of the Iran's industrial 
sector, considering the four components of technology, it has been found that the 
percentage of orgaware, which consists of management practices, has been lower in 
comparison with the other components of technology. Despite the significant 
development and expansion of programs for training the industrial managers during 
recent years, this has not been adequate enough for the further development of the 
country's industrial sector. As the experience of some successful countries in 
technology tiansfer and development shows, the success of these countries to a large 
degree relied on the effective and high managerial expertise in these countries which 
were involved actively in the process of long-term technology transfer and 
development planning. Therefore, it seems essential for Iran to establish specific 
institutions to train well-qualified and high professional managers with high capability 
in team- work and problem solving. 
13. In order to accelerate the technological development of the country, it seems essential 
to implement a plan of action to set in place the major perspectives relating to 
technology development. This plan should include a number of basic principles some 
of which have already been identified. As mentioned earlier, research and development 
activity is essential for promoting the technological capabilities needed for the efficient 
absorption of modem imported technologies. R&D is also among the major methods 
for making industries competitive in international markets. Therefore, it should be 
rooted in an overall national technological plan, and more investment is needed to be 
allocated to R&D activity both by public and private sectors. As the experience of 
some successful COlDltries with rapid technological development indicated, adaptation 
of existing know-how through development research with supportive basic research 
has been among the most effective ways for successful technological development. As 
already indicated, another major principle for the technology development plan is the 
development of human resources through the training of skilled engineers and 
technicians needed for efficient adaptation and asshm1ation of imported technologies. 
14. The transfer of appropriate foreign technology and know-how can playa significant 
role in the industrial and technological development of every country. As the 
experience of some countries, in particular East Asian first and second-tier NICs 
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surveyed in Chapter four and five showed, many of these countries adopted. open-door 
policies towards flow of FDI which has been among major source of foreign 
technologies, managerial and marketing skills for these countries. In Iran, however, 
there has not been a significant effort to attract much FDI. Like S. Korea, which 
adopted a relatively restrictive policy measures toward FDI in the early stage of 
Industrialisation, FDI has played less important role in transferring technical know-
how in Iran in past years. However, as explained in detail in Chapter seven, some steps 
have recently been taken within the country's First Five Year Plan (1989-1993) to 
boost FDI. These include establishing several Free Trade Zones (FfZs) and Economic 
Especial Zones (EEZs) and the introduction of various incentives tax exemption and 
free custom duties, and the enactment of new law for foreign investment in FfZs, 
which also offered several new incentives for foreign investors. However, as is also 
noted in chapter seven, despite a significant increase in the flow ofFDI during the 
period of First Plan, it seems that the country needs to attract a larger amount ofFDI, 
which can also be considered as a major source for the flow oftechnicaI, managerial 
and marketing skills. Therefore, further effective policy measures as well as a 
consistent and stable macroeconomic environment will be needed in order to achieve 
the Second-Five-Year (1995-1999) objective target ofS 2 billion ofFDI per year. 
15. As the experience of the East Asian countries shows, importing foreign technology, 
and the development oflocal technological capability in these countries have not been 
alternative but complementary activities. Therefore, it can be concluded that Iran 
should adopt a strategy of technological transformation which pursues the following 
two closely related and mutually compatible objectives: on the one hand plans must 
be prepared soon for making technology an element indigenous to Iran. This cannot 
be done without long range planning for that purpose and without the realisation that 
it does involve more effort and thought than obtaining technology from foreign 
sources. The promotion of the country's indigenous capability can also take place 
through the creation of a research and development infrastructure with appropriate 
linkages to the production structure and thereby lessen their technological 
dependence. Secondly, it is also necessary for the country to adopt open policies 
toward the massive acquisition and diffusion of foreign technologies which promote 
its capability to compete in international market. Therefore, ifboth of these processes; 
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strengthening the local technological capability, and importing appropriate technology 
from abroad; are achieved simultaneously, each one can help the other as is shown 
in the diagram: 
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Figure 8.2 The appropriate technology transfer strategy for LDCs 
16. As already identified, for a developing country such as Iran, in order to be able to 
compete in the current very competitive international market, it needs a large 
investment in development of local technological capability along with increasing 
research and development activities both in public . and private sectors. As the 
experiences of some successful countries indicate, they could enhance the level of 
their competitiveness by introducing various incentives for public and private research 
institutions and universities to place greater emphasis on R&D activities and also 
establishing some industrial parks and science cities to promote their local 
technological capability. The establisbment of the industrial parks will result in a 
strong industrial and technological base as well as utilising efficient methods in 
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production and management which in tum can increase the level of the country's 
competitiveness. Industrial parks in these countries are also affiliated, formally or 
informally, to universities and research institutes, and dedicated to science and 
technology for products and manufacturing. 
As an example, one can refer to the Hinchu Science-Based Industrial Park which was 
established by the Taiwanese government in 1980, and can be considered as one of 
the most successful examples of a high-tech park in Asia. Therefore, it is 
recommended that industrial parks should be established in Iran with the financial 
support of government, and effective and close cooperation with private industrial 
firms sought in order to promote the capability to produce high-value goods 
competitive in world market. Moreover, despite a significant improvement in the level 
of country's industrial and technological infrastructure, it seems that there is still some 
further investment required to develop the technological infrastructure, including 
cotnmJmication systems, transportation networks, and a well-structured informatic in 
system. 
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that it is not intended here to present an extensive and 
detailed plan for the future of the country, which is already formulated broadly in the Second 
Five-Year Plan (1995-1999). However, the above points can be considered as the overall 
recommendations and suggestions which may be used as complementary for the country's 
future trends in technology transfer and more broadly industrial and technological 
development. 
As the analysis of some successful colDltries (including S. Korea and Taiwan as the first tier 
East Asian NICs and Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia as second tier NICs, Turkey and 
Mexico) in industry and technology development shows, some similarities are found 
between each of these countries and Iran's overall situation. As a major oll producing 
country, Iran shares similar characteristics with Indonesia and Mexico which have 
substantial oll reserves. However, as explained extensively earlier, while these two countries 
have developed a significant non-oil manufacturing base as a resuh of a successful shift to 
export promotion policy, Iran is still lagging behind in this regard. Therefore, Iran can 
benefit from the specific experiences of these two countries which could reduce their heavy 
reliance on oil revenues successfully. 
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There are some other common features between Iran and the other countries which have 
been surveyed in detail earlier. For example, the experience of Turkey which is one of the 
Iran's neighbours and among its major trading partners can also have very useful 
implications for the current and future trends of the country's overall national development. 
As elaborated in Chapter four, Turkey is among the successful countries to diversify and 
increase its manufilcturing exports after switching to an outward-oriented, export promotion 
policies in early 1980s. Moreover, Iran can also draw very effective policy guidelines from 
the successful experiences of the East Asian first and second-tier NICs in rapid and 
significant technology transfer and development. It should be noted that despite the useful 
and valuable lessons which the successful experiences of each of these countries can provide 
for other LDCs including Iran, however, this does not mean that LOCs generally and Iran 
in particular should adopt completely the same patterns and models of these countries. As 
indicated in Chapter four and five, there might be some major differences in terms of 
infrastructure capability and science and technology level among different LDCs which make 
the condition difficult for pursuing the same path and the whole policy packages of the 
successful countries. Moreover, it cannot be ensured that the adoption of the same policies 
and models of these countries would lead to the similar results for other LDCs including 
Iran. Therefore, it is essential for the policy makers ofLDCs to consider and assess their 
needs and capabilities before any decision in replicating the model of the successful 
countries. In other words, what is more important for LOCs is that once they should select 
a set of the appropriate policy measures of the successful countries, and adapt these policies 
to their own socio-political, cultural, and economic environment. 
8. 5 CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH TO KNOWLEDGE 
It is generally necessary for every research to identify some of its most important results 
and findings which can make some original contribution and useful implication for the 
specific area of research. There has been some increase recently in research in the general 
area of Intemational Technology Transfer. However, many researches carried out in this 
area have generally been at the micro-leveL and have focused more on investigating the 
problems related to technology transfer between firms. In other words, very little effort have 
been made to find an overall technology transfer policy for LDCs in general and Iran in 
particular. Therefore, this research has attempted to fill this gap through adopting a macro-
approach in finding the most appropriate technology transfer strategy for LOCs in general 
and for Iran in particular, based on the experiences of successful countries in technology 
transfer and development. 
A comprehensive literature swvey has been done in terms of theoretical framework as well 
as conceptual issues of technology transfer in order to identify the most important 
theoretical base which can be applicable to LDCs. Despite the existence of several school 
of thought such as neoclassical and structuralist, who discussed the different aspects of 
technology transfer and its role in industrialisation ofLDCs, no specific and precise theory 
of technology transfer has directly been applicable to the overall conditions of LDCs. 
However, it has been found that the policy makers in LDCs can use some useful implications 
from the existing theoretical framework of technology transfer and development, in 
particular the views of dependency school of thought. 
In terms of conceptual issues of technology transfer, as discussed extensively in Chapter 
three, a systematic model for technology transfer process has been developed in order to 
analyse in depth the process of successful technology transfer. Moreover, technology 
transfer procedures have also been formulated by using a matrix, which could provide the 
most appropriate direction for the acquisition of foreign technology in a LOC. A 
comprehensive analysis of technology transfer mechanisms has also been carried out in 
order to identify the most appropriate channel for an effective and successful technology 
transfer and development. It is realised that the choice of appropriate mode of acquiring 
foreign technology mainly depends on the technical capability of the recipient country as 
well as its overall national industrial and technology development policy. 
An extensive and empirical case study has also been undertaken based on the experiences 
of some selected countries, successful in technology transfer and industrialisation. Some of 
the most important success factors of these countries in effective technology transfer and 
development are identified as critical success factors in order to apply them to the other 
LDCs including Iran. The adoption of a set of appropriate policies, in particular outward-
oriented, export promotion policies are determined as the most key success factors for the 
rapid industrial and technological development of these countries. Moreover, the most 
appropriate technology transfer strategy for LDCs can be recognised as the parallel use of 
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imported technologies along with the development of their indigenous technological 
capability. 
This research has also investigated an in-depth analysis of the industrialisation policies and 
technology transfer status in Iran during the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
period., in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of Iran's past and present overall 
national industrial and technological policies, which in tum could have useful insights for the 
its future plans and policies. Finally, some very useful and important lessons and policy 
implications are drawn based on the analysis of the success factors of some selected 
countries which have some common characteristics with Iran. The overall industrialisation 
strategy for the future of Iran is suggested to be a strong outward-oriented, export 
promotion policies as wen as a stable and consistent macroeconomic, h'beralisation, and 
foreign exchange policies which are necessary and pre-requisite for smooth and successful 
implementation ofEPP. Moreover, as indicated earlier, primarily, in the first stage and for 
a short period., it might be better for Iran to concentrate on developing its labour-intensive, 
resource-based industries based on small-scale and intermediate technologies, and also on 
the expansion of exports of those products in which Iran has already a comparative 
advantage such as carpets, etc. However, for the long-term period and in the later stages, 
it seems essential for the country to develop its capital intensive industries, based on high 
and modem technologies, in order to be more competitive in the international market. It is 
hoped that the findings and resuhs as wen as the overall recommendations of this research 
can be useful for the policy makers in LDCs in general and Iran in particular in designing the 
appropriate overall national development policy framework. 
8.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has attempted to identify the appropriate plan and policy frameworks for an 
effective technology transfer and development for LDCs in general and Iran in particular. 
Therefore, a comprehensive case study was adopted based on the empirical and practical 
experiences of some selected countries in successful technology transfer and 
industrialisation. The success factors of each country have been systematically analysed and 
compared in order to find the best policy and strategy which can be applicable to the other 
LDCs in general and Iran in particular. However, every research has some limitations in 
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particular in terms of time, the availability of adequate and sufficient data, and the specific 
area of investigation. Therefore, it is important to consider these restrictions, in particular 
that of time limitation, in order to identify some area of research which has been less 
investigated and needs to be further analysed for new researchers who wish to continue in 
the same area. Despite the attempts of this research to cover as many aspects and 
dimensions of International Technology Transfer and its role in the industrial and 
technological development of the LDCs as possible, it could not encompass every feature 
ofITI. 
For example, this research has avoided the political dimension of International Technology 
Transfer. Due to the importance of the political aspects of ITI and its effects on the 
successful technology transfer and development, and also because of lack of an adequate 
research in this area, it seems necessary for other researchers to fill this gap. Moreover, 
because of some 1imitation in terms of sufficient data, this research has adopted a relatively 
qualitative approach in terms of identification of the most critical success factors of the 
chosen countries. There can be some areas for new researchers who are more interested in 
adopting a more quantitative approach in particular in terms offirm-Ievel and micro-point 
of view. However, as indicated earlier, there is increasing research on the IT experiences 
of some specific firms and companies in LDCs. In terms of Iran, further research may be 
needed to analyse other aspects of technology transfer into Iran. For example, one area 
which is little examined is the study of International Technology Transfer to Iran from the 
transferor point of view, the question of the motivation, benefits and the overall reasons and 
factors which encourage a developed country or MNC to transfer technology to a LDC such 
as Iran. Another area of research which would be helpful is assessing and examining the 
formulation of an appropriate legal framework for the international and domestic regulation 
for the effective technology transfer and development ofLDCs such as Iran. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: 
KOREA'S INDUSTRIALISATION AND TECHNOWGICAL DEVEWPMENT 
The Republic of Korea is a developing country that has achieved a remarkable economic 
growth over the last three decades. Since 1965, Korea has been transformed from an 
underdeveloped, agricultural country to a newly industrialised country (NIC). It is believed 
that the course of industrial growth of Korea has been one of the outstanding success stories 
of international development. Real GNP has grown more than 8 per cent per annum since 
1970. The rapid economic expansion was accompanied by a favourable qualitative change 
in the industrial sector whose GNP share rose from 25 per cent to 43 per cent in about two 
decades. It can be said that the main engine of rapid industrial development has been a 
smooth and rapid acquisition, assimilation and development of industrial technology under 
well-coordinated industrial and technology policies [I]. Hence, with its relatively fresh 
experience of industrialisation, the Republic of Korea may be able to provide some 
important lessons for industrial and technological development of other developing countries 
[2]. It could be extremely useful for government policy makers and advisors in other, less 
developed countries to study the evolution of Korean policy in order to gain ideas that may 
be applied to their own situations [3]. As Kumets (1994) points out, Korea is the model 
for LDCs because Korea's economic development has been outstanding. Korean 
development therefore provides a model for other countries intent on accelerating the pace 
of their own development [4]. 
In an attempt towards national development goals, Korea has recorded substantial 
achievements, through a series of trials and errors, in building a technically-qualified work 
force, improving national scientific and technical capabilities, focusing R&D investment, and 
establishing necessary administrative and support system The total science and technology 
drive was aimed at reforming the economy from a labour-intensive to a technology-intensive 
structure, and later to a brain-intensive structure. In other words, these efforts have been 
oriented towards accelerating the transition of science and technology's role from one of 
supporting national economic development to one of directing this development towards 
establishment of' a technologically $elf-reliant soci~. ~Th~ proCe~' of Korea's 
industrialisation, can be generally divided into five distinct phases. Each phase of Korea's 
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development has been unique and has its own characteristics. 
A.l REBUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION: 1953-1962 
Many people characterise the Korean industrial policy during the 1950s as one focused on 
import substitution. If one defines import-substitution industries as those that produce and 
sell for the domestic market, the Korean industries established during the 1950s were, for 
the most part, import-substitution industries. During this period, progress was made in 
reconstruction, including the restoration of transportation and communication networks. 
The government also completed a land reform program that had been delayed by the war. 
The most notable feature of the Korean economy during the 1950s was its dependence on 
US economic aid. The total aid from US and international organizations reached 
approximately $3 billion during this period. Although this aid was heavily biased toward the 
short term objective of economic stabilisation, it tied the country over during a difficult 
period and allowed it to make many important investments that formed the basis for 
subsequent development [5]. During this period, industrialisation was carried out under the 
protection of tariffs and quantitative barriers to imports. These measures were supplemented 
by local procurement programs implemented by the US Army, which led to the development 
of the plywood, tyre and construction industries [6]. During 1953-57, GNP in real terms 
grew at about 5 percent per year. During this period, foreign aid was an important factor 
in the nation's economic growth. A respectable but not outstanding rate of industrial 
expansion was achieved during the latter half of the 1950s, with import substitution for light 
manufactured and nondmable consumer goods playing the major role [7]. During the period 
1953-62, the Korean economy had generally experienced slow growth under an import 
substitution strategy. At a same time, however, the rapid rise in the level of education and 
the relatively equitable distn'bution of both income and wealth paved the way for future 
development [8]. 
A.2 TRANSITION FROM LOW TO mGH GROWTH, (EXPORT TAKEOFF) 
1960-69 
The 1960s can be regarded as the take-off stage of industrialisation in Korea. During this 
period, Korea was almost completely dependent on the help of advanced nations in the area 
of production facilities and technologies. Emphasis was placed on fostering strategic 
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import-substitution industries such as energy, fertiliser and cement while focusing on the 
development of export-oriented light industries. This period was characterised by primary 
emphasis on the importation of advanced technologies for application in the production 
processes of Korean industries, supplemented by problem-solving activities as the need 
arose in the field [9]. In 1960, the Korean economy was dominated by agriculture and 
mining. With few exceptions, the manufacturing sector supplied only simple consumer 
products. However, major industries established since 1960 range from chemicals and 
electronics to automobiles and heavy electrical equipment. Exports exceed 40 percent of 
GNP, with manufactured products constituting over 90 percent of the total [10]. 
The 1960s can also be said to be the period of formation of the external basis for the 
development of science and technology in Korea. The Korean government enthusiastically 
promoted the development of 8&T to support socio-economic growth. As a resuh, the main 
policy was concentrated on technology investment, which attained 0.3 per cent of GNP, and 
on manpower development and training of skilled workers [11]. In 1960's, the Korean 
government established a series of Five Year Economic Development Plans, the first of 
which was launched in 1962. The theme of the First Five Year Economic Development 
Plans (1962-1966) was modernisation of the nation by industrial development. It was the 
implementation of these plans that resulted in the outstanding economic development of 
Korea in the 1960's. Top priority of the plans was given to increased exports of 
manufactured goods. The plans thus necessitated use of a number of process "know-hows" 
and manufacturing technologies to permit the high volume of industrial production. 
However, in those years Korea did not have the technology to back up varied manufacturing 
activities. 
Generally, the level of industrial technology available domestically was too low to be 
efficient in producing export goods. Obviously, what was needed then was prompt 
importation of key technologies, followed by their adaptation and improvement to suit 
Korean conditions. Also needed were the infrastructure and support systems that would 
enable those industrial activities to proceed smoothly. Evidently, one of the supporting 
means called for industrial research and development institutions. Therefore, in Korea, 
during the 1960's, a number of industrial R&D institutes have been established. The Korea 
Institute of Science and Technology, (KIST) was one of the first and most important 
industrial research institutes which established for the transfer of research results to 
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industrial commercialisation. In 1976, KIST took an active part in establishing the fourth 
Five Year Economic Development Plan in so far as the technological aspects of the plan 
were concerned. In 1977, KIST conducted studies for the establishment of promotional 
policies for the long-term development of science and technology, and, in 1978, studies for 
a long-term strategy for technology development. 
In the 1960s, the education and training of technology human labour had been led by the 
government. The establishment of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAJS) as a 
postgraduate school in applied science and engineering was a turning point. KAIS led the 
nationwide upgrading of graduate education and contributed to the establishment of a mass 
supply system of high-quality scientists and engineers [12]. During the 1960s, Korea was 
also completely dependent on advanced countries for production facilities and technology. 
Therefore, the basic objective of the Korea's first five-year plan (1962-1966) was to develop 
a base for a self-sustaining economy that would not be dependent on foreign aid for its 
growth. The plan also emphasised the expansion of the industrial base, a rapid rise in 
exports, and improvement in technology [13]. The choice of the appropriate technology to 
adopt was a very important task for economic development. The choice of strategic 
industries for economic development was affected by the possibility of success in 
technological adaptation [14]. In the 1960s, the number offoreign technology agreements 
was rather limited, and during 1962-72, only about 320 agreements were made, with 
payments during this period of about $ 10 million [15]. During this period, the state 
encouraged exports and industrialisation by protecting infant industries and stimulating 
exports by offering favourable credits and tax incentives to selected firms. Export-oriented 
industrialisation, and a state policy combined with the free play of market forces, underlies 
Korea's phenomenal growth [16]. 
It can be said that since the early 1960s, Korean industrial policy has had two proximate 
objectives: encouraging exports and promoting infant industries [17]. Therefore, during this 
period (1962-1970) Korea's role as an exporter of manufactures was firmly established. The 
share of manufactured goods in total exports increased from 17.6 percent in 1962 to 76.1 
percent in 1970 [18]. The economic development plan during the 1960s also included 
programs for establishing infrastructure projects and targets for the private sector. 
Infrastructure projects were financed through the government budget. The government 
allowed private ownership and management in all industries except for import public 
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utilities. However, the government intervened in major decisions on investment, finance, 
imports of foreign capital, and location of major industries, even if the firms were privately 
owned. In effect, the Korean economic system in this period was a variant of authoritarian 
capitatism, in which enterprises were privately owned but management was shared between 
the government and the owners [19]. Therefore, one can say that Korea's rapid economic 
expansion in the 1960's was led by significant increases in export production financed 
principally by domestic savings channelled through government controlled financial 
institutions [20]. 
The second five-year plan (1967-71) identified labour intensive manufacturing as the source 
of the most rapid economic growth and encouraged investment in export industries at the 
expense of the other sectors. During this period, modernisation of the Korean industrial 
structure continued through a build up of the petrochemical, steel, electronics, and machine 
industries. The Second Five Year Economic Development Plan (1967-1971) also pushed 
forward the continued expansion of basic chemical industries, petro-chemicals, and the iron 
and steel industry. Efforts were also made to promote the development and expansion of 
export industries such as textiles and plywood. During this period, the GNP grew at an 
average annual rate of 10.5% while the industrial sector grew at the high rate of 22.2% 
[21]. It is argued that the strategies Korea adopted in the early 60's were to concentrate on 
industries aimed for import substitution and to select and develop technologies to support 
those industries. Korea's industrialisation process during this decade was also characterised 
by emphasising the selection of a few strategic leader sector industries, along with 
adaptation and assimilation of their technologies in order to proceed to the next more 
sophisticated technologies [22]. 
A.3 HEAVY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES DRIVE (1973-1979) 
One can consider the 1970s as the period of building and expansion of the technology 
foundation of the country and the growth stage of Korean industrialisation. The early stage 
was characterised by the effort to go one step beyond importing foreign technologies. 
Serious efforts were made to improve imported md domestic technologies while continuing 
to build Korea's technological capabilities through education and training [23]. On the 
nature of basic industry and infrastructure, the export-oriented industrialisation of the 
consumer goods sectors md the technology-intensive heavy-chemical industries became the 
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principal targets of economic development activities. At the same time, great emphasis was 
placed on the introduction of more advanced technologies through imitating and developing 
the imported and existing technologies. So, by the early 1970s, Korea was well on its way 
toward rapid industrialisation, characterised by a transition from labour-intensive, 
low-technology industries to labour and capital-intensive high technology industries such 
as heavy and chemical industries [24]. The government had selected six strategic industries 
including stee~ machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, petrochemicals, and non-ferrous metals. 
The Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) had performed R&D in these fields 
until the mid-1970s but could not effectively meet theses industries' massive technology 
demands [25]. 
In Korea, in the early 70s, basic design technology has not been developed in most of the 
important industries. Despite the transition to the export-led industrial development strategy 
in mid-1960s, large chemical firms was encouraged by the import substitution strategy which 
initially relied on joint ventures and turnkey installations. Shipbuilding, like construction 
operations, was undertaken on the basis of designs provided by customers with virtua11y no 
local technological inputs except for actual construction [26]. As it is noted Korea could 
achieve import-substitution and export promotion simultaneously by moving into an 
emerging role in the world market for standardised capital and intermediate goods [27]. 
Korea's decision to switch to development of Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) in the 
mid-1970s, demanded the introduction of new and higher level technologies [28]. The HCI 
drive drastically transformed the structure of the Korean economy, but there is still 
disagreement about its ultimate contribution to Korean development [29]. The shift from 
general export promotion to a sector development strategy, focused on heavy and chemical 
industries (HCIs), also presented a major change in policy in favour of specific industrial 
targets and a wide-ranging commitment by government in using trade and financial policies 
to lead resources to the HCI sector. Designed in part to accelerate changes in Korean 
comparative advantage, the HCI drive provided extensive support to large-scale, 
capital-intensive industries [30]. 
It can be said that the shift to HCI promotion drive was mainly because of two reasons. 
Firstly, Korea could no longer maintain its comparative advantage in light manufacturing 
industries mainly because of growing competition from other developing countries with 
lower wage rates comparing with that of Korea. It was also believed that the negative 
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effects of the rising protectionist barriers of labour-intensive light manufacturing products 
by industrialised countries that began after the first oil shock could be offset by exporting 
higher valued-added heavy and chemical products [31]. The second reason for adopting the 
new policy (HCI) was the importance of improving defence-related industries which 
emerged as a result of China's re-entry into the international community and fears of a 
possible withdrawal of US troops from Korea. Therefore, it appears that not only did market 
forces play a relatively peripheral role in the adoption of the HCI program, but political 
factors had a significant influence. The heavy and chemical industries that were the 
program's priority targets would provide the industrial infrastructure for defence 
technologies transferred from the United States, such as making tanks, and aircraft [32]. 
The HCI drive can also be viewed as a new phase of Korea's export-led strategy, which 
Korea moved from exporting low value added, labour intensive products towards exports 
of higher value added, technology intensive goods. As a result of Heavy and Chemical 
Industry (HCI) policies, the manufactured exports rose from 24% in 1973 to 46 % in 1979 
and accounted for more than half of Korea's exports in 1984. On the other hand, the HCI 
imports fell from 39% in 1974 to 24% in 1980 [33]. More importantly, HCI became the 
springboard of the renewed Korean export offensive in the mid-1980s. The Pohang Iron and 
Steel COIporation (POSCO), for instance, was central to Korea's transition from an exporter 
of labour-intensive commodities to an exporter of higher-value added, technology-intensive 
products, sharpening Korea's competitive edge in such industries as shipbuilding, 
automobiles, construction, and electronics [34]. HCI enabled Korea to become by the late 
1980s the world's second largest shipbuilding power and a major exporter of construction 
and engineering services [35]. 
Moreover, the other incentive to the development of heavy industry in Korea was believed 
to be a shift within the world manufacturing industry. Beginning in the mid-1960s, some 
heavy and chemical industries manufacturing moved their operations from industrialised 
countries to the newly industrialised countries, including Korea [36]. Despite of some 
significant achievement through the implementation ofHCI drive, there is a belief that the 
HeI drive was overambitious and resuhed in serious misallocation of resources. It is 
believed that the HCI drive resulted in substantial unusable capacity and concentrated 
investment in the economy's most capital intensive industries. More fundamentally, the HCI 
program substituted bureaucratic judgment for market tests and absorbed too much of the 
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economy's resources. In contrast to previous years, investment was not sufficiently 
conditioned on the test of export performance [37]. 
Nevertheless, in evaluating the policy, it must be observed that many of the goals of the 
policy were in fact achieved. Exports of heavy and chemical industries did not quite reach 
the target of 50% ofall exports by 1980, but exceeded the target only a few years later and 
reached 56% in 1983. In a comprehensive, dynamic perspective it is difficult to demonstrate 
that an ahemative policy would have worked better. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the 
HCI push produced, at best, mixed resuhs, and that some of Korea's recent success in heavy 
industry could have been achieved at lesser cost. For example, South Korea's steel industry 
has been successful because, unlike India and Brazil, it has pursued a competitive industrial 
policy, not an orthodox version of import substitution strategy. South Korea pursued its 
secondary lSI strategy, through Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive, to upgrade its 
industries and poise them for export market. As Song (1990) indicates, the premature heavy 
industrialisation programme in South Korea, while a deviation from the norms of structural 
balance and comparative advantage, was really a response to import dependence on raw 
material, and intermediate and capital goods [38]. 
A.4 UNSTABLE GROWTH AND RECESSION, 1978-82 
In the Fourth Development Plan, covering the period 1976-81, the government continued 
to give priority to the development of heavy industries; particularly machine building and 
chemicals, which were also designed as priority sectors during the preceding plan. During 
this period, attention also turned to the development of the high level industrial technologies 
needed in technology- intensive industries. This economic development plan marked a 
significant advance in the efforts to solve the technological problems of labour-intensive 
industries in preparation for the sophistication of industry anticipated for the 80s [39]. Under 
the Fourth Development Plan (1977-1981) the investment in manufacturing reached to $ 
10.3 billion which was two-thirds higher than in the previous plan. Within manufacturing, 
the Fourth Plan allocated two-thirds of investment to HCI, but this was only 3 per cent 
higher than HCrs share under the Third Plan [40]. Korea's Fourth Development Plan of 
(1977-81) also projected average annual growth in manufacturing of 14 per cent. 
Manufacturing was expected to increase its share of GDP from 27 to 40 per cent as 
agricuhure's share declined from 26 to 18 per cent. Overall, HCI was projected to increase 
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its share of Korean exports from 34 to 50 percent between 1975 and 1981, with machinery 
and electronics accounting for half of these exports. However, Korea faced an unstable 
growth rate and recession in the late 1970s. Real exports fell for the first time in 1979, and 
in 1980 economic growth was negative for the first time since the outbreak of Korean war. 
GNP dropped by 6.1 per cent. The fifth plan, which came into effect in 1982, was to be 
devoted to reducing government involvement in the economy and so creating the conditions 
for high and stable growth rates. 
A.5 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND LIBERALISATION POLICIES 
During this period price stability was emphasized for its positive effects on resource 
allocation, income distn"bution, the balance of payments, and for reducing external debt 
pressure by increasing international competitiveness. Major stabilization policies included 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies supported by an informal income policy. Moreover, 
from the early 1980s, Korean technology development focused on new knowledge intensive 
industries, including bio-technology, computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications. 
This suggests that in the early 1970s and 1980s changes occurred in patterns of direct 
investments from Japan and the United States [41]. In the 1980s, Korean industrialisation 
reached the point of self development, with the industrialisation of the previous decades of 
a foundation. A virtually independent capacity for development in light industry and a 
limited dependence on foreign technology in the heavy and chemical industry were 
characteristics of Korean industrialisation in the 1980s [42]. According to some analysts, 
the 19805 were a lost decade for Korean industry with respect to upgrading R&D, 
modernising plants and equipment, introduction of new technologies, and the development 
of new product [43]. 
The goal of economic development in the· 1980s was the achievement of the high leVel 
industriaHsation of an advanced nation. Accordingly, technological development strategies 
have been adapted to this purpose. In the establisbment of a national infrastructure for 
technological development, the main focus has been placed on developing technologies for 
knowledge intensive industries, and this course has been pursued strategically with a 
long-term perspective and in conjunction with the development of the necessary high-level 
manpower [44]. In the 19805, the countIy took another step forward towards the goal of 
being an advanced industrialised countIy. In the achievement of this goal, science and 
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technology played an active part, leading, rather than supporting, economic growth. 
Considerable support was provided for graduate education, basic as well as applied sciences, 
and university research in basic science [45]. Over a period of two decades, since it 
embarked on a strategy of outward-looking development, Korea has been successful in 
sustaining rapid growth through the promotion of exports. During the 1981-84 period 
exports of goods increased at an average annual rate of 14 percent, amounting to almost $30 
billion in 1984. The share of exports in gross national products (GNP) rose to more than 40 
percent by 1984 [46]. 
In the 1980s, Korea has also pursued a slow, but deh1>erate h1>eralisation policies, began 
with a package of measures aimed at minimizing government controls over credit allocation, 
and at reducing HCL drive. Support for strategic industries was decreased and reversed. 
Intervention since 1980 has only focused on the restructuring of distressed industries, 
support for development of technology, and the promotion of competition. In contrast to 
the libera1isation experiences in South America, there is little urgency to this effort. Korea's 
economic policies becomes as much a model for successful hoeralisation as its past policies 
now are successful export promotion [47]. Concern for improving technological capabilities 
was evident in Korea's Sixth Plan (1987-91), which called for increasing research and 
development expenditures from 2.0 to 2.5 percent of GNP by 1991 and stressed the 
development of basic research [48]. It is also evident in the Seventh Plan (1992-1996), 
which further expands the research and development share of GNP and produce a sharp rise 
in college and university enrolments. 
Korea has intensified its import h1>eralisation policy in the 1990s, especially regarding 
agricultural products. Korea's new competitive strategy calls for more active human 
resources development and higher-quality education. It seems that Korea now faces 
difficulties in establishing a competitive edge in capital and technology intensive 
differentiated products. Korea in 1990s is at different stage of development in which 
sophisticated technologies nmst be imported to upgrade its industrial structure. It introduces 
the concept of structural competitiveness to explain the rapid development of South Korean 
steel industry. Three elements of structural competitiveness are: state autonomy, sound 
economic policy and indigenous technological capability. These elements have a significant 
bearing on the bargaining capacity of the state, autonomous investment decisions, labour 
control, the acquisition and absorption of modern technology, and ultimately international 
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competitiveness. Global competitiveness of South Korea does not contradict the 
technological dependence of developing countries. Rather it suggests the kind of 
socio-institutional and economic policy contexts that are often necessary to foster 
competitive industries. 
In the next 15 years, the republic of Korea's major goal is to make a smooth transition from 
newly industrialising country to an advanced society. The role of science and technology in 
a future Korean society may be broadly stated as one of meeting feh needs by technological 
innovation and scientific advancement and realising long-term national goals for the next 
century [49]. DublmaD and Westphal (1982) argue that as the Korean experience 
demonstrates high indigenous levels of all types of technological mastery which has been 
mainly confined to production engineering has been sufficient [50]. South Korea has 
demonstrated an impressive capability, especially in heavy industries, in choosing which 
technologies to import, of adapting foreign technologies to local conditions, of improving 
on imported technologies and of generating new technologies domestically [51]. 
A.6 THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF KOREA'S INDUSTRIALISATION 
The successful industrialisation of Korea has been called "the Han-River Miracle" a 
description arising from the high speed of its economic development during the short period 
of thirty years since the early 1960s. The economic and industrial development of South 
Korea has been regarded as a spectacular success among less developed countries. The 
Republic of Korea impressive economic growth record over the past three decades has 
produced a new orthodoxy interpretation of the secrets of Korean success. The literature 
on Korean economic development refers to a number of factors, all of which no doubt 
played an important role in Korea's successful development. Of course, no single factor can 
account for Korea's success over the last years. 
Ilavi»:g surveyed the success factors of Korea's rapid industrialisation, one can point out 
some internal and external factors. The external factors include massive US aid in the 1950s 
md easy access to the US market in the 1960s and 1970s. One of the internal factors is the 
nature of state intervention in South Korea [52]. There are three other elements have been 
primarily responSl.'ble for Korea's success including an outward-looking development 
strategy, a high level of the education of the people, and a favourable international economic 
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environment [53]. Haliday (1987) has also indicated three general factors for Korea's 
success: a special relationship with the U. S, close links with Japan, and a system of 
state-directed development, or command capitalism. The US economic aid to South Korea 
reached to almost $6 billion between 1945 and 1978, almost as much as the total aid 
provided to all African countries during the same period [54]. Lie (1992) identifies four 
major factors as an adequate explanation of Korean " miracles". These factors are cheap 
labour, land reform and the consequent changes in the class structure, the developmentalist 
state, and the international political economic environment. All four were necessary causes 
of Korean industrialisation and economic growth [55]. As one can see in the Lie's point 
view, the chief comparative advantage of Korea in the world economy was its cheap labour. 
One can also say that the secret of Korea's success lay in the combination of long working 
hours, cheap labour, and the organisation of this cheap labour force into highly efficient 
system of production [56]. 
Among the most important factors of Korea's spectacular success, it seems that 
Confucianism has been one of the most important one. Koreans work hard because of the 
Confucian ethics, resulting in their economic success [57]. In Korea, where Confucianism 
was accepted in a more extreme form than in China, this social norm has been an underlying 
strength in terms of acquiring learning from imported technology and in the development 
of its own indigenous capability. Recalling Max Weber's thesis of the contn'bution made by 
the Protestant work ethic to the rise of capitalism, social scientists are willing to find a 
parallel work ethic in the case of Korea [58]. Confucianism also stresses learning, and the 
literacy rate of Koreans is high. The female literacy rate in 1986 was 90 per cent, while the 
rate of high school attendance in 1988 was 93.5 per cent [59]. Among the countries 
surveyed by the International Labour Office, South Korean workers had the longest working 
hours in the world, averaging 54.0 hours per week in 1987 [60]. However, Confucianism 
is a facilitating factor but not the major contnoutor to Korea's success. Confucianism has 
been with Korea for hundreds of years, and, in fact, it has been considered an obstacle to 
modernizing the Korean economy because it tends to look down on business, people 
engaged in commerce in general, and specialists such as people engaged in manufacturing. 
As a matter offact, Weber and others have used Confucianism to explain China's economic 
backwardness. 
Another important factor in progress of Korea is said to be the loyalty and dedication of its 
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people to their work, and persistence with which development programs have been carried 
out. Korea has also shown to the developing countries that borrowing of technology from 
advanced countries can be a way towards development. As Enos and Park (1987) believe, 
in Korea, local effort has been the most significant factor in its success in acquiring 
technology. It appeared that the Koreans' technical sophistication and commitment to 
industrial development allowed them to extract better conditions, ensuring a swifter and 
more effective transfer of technology than that obtained by other developing countries [61]. 
The strong link between export growth and productivity performance is another important 
point in Korea's success. Both in Japan and Korea, those sectors with the highest rate of 
productivity growth have also known the highest rate of export growth. This does suggest 
that export-oriented policies of both countries have been an important ingredient in their 
successful catch up in productivity with industrial countries [62]. Korean experience, unlike 
the Japanese, shows that sectors with high levels of protection have experienced the highest 
rates of productivity growth. These results seem related to the particular Korean policy, 
where a number of temporarily protected sectors, such as machinery and transport 
equipment, and electrical machinery, were supported through an infant industry policy, 
aimed at achieving productivity growth and competitiveness in the long term. It appears that 
this policy has worked rather well for Korea. 
Another factor of South Korean success, as Amsden (1989) noticed, is the existence of 
professional managers and salaried engineers. Both state and corporate bureaucrats require 
personnel to exploit the borrowed technology and make appropriate decisions. Amsden 
writes: "The hypothesis is that leading firms in late industrialising countries, if they are to 
penetrate world markets, must adopt usually pro-active production and operations 
management policies" [63]. She also refer to the massive increase in the number of engineers 
and technicians which increased tenfold between 1960 and 1980. Another outstanding 
features of Korea's development is the dominant role of large companies (Chaebol) in the 
economy. The relationship between the government md business was similar to that of 
principal and agent. The government formulated economic plans, and business was induced 
through a carrot-and-stick approach to carry them out and to meet the quantitative targets 
set by the government [64]. In the late 1980s, Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, and 
Daewoo, the top four chaebol, were regulars in fortune's list of the SOO leading industrial 
groups outside the United States [6S]. SamSlmg, Korea's top chaebol, was listed by Fortune 
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as the twentieth largest non-U.S. international company in 1987, which produced more than 
three thousand different products. It owns Korea's largest semiconductor company, its 
largest electronics firm, its largest semiconductor and trading company. Hyundai, the 
second-largest conglomerate, has forty-five subsidiaries, Korea's biggest automaker, its 
biggest shipbuilder, and its leading civil engineering firm. Daewoo, the fourth largest 
conglomerate, made up of thirty companies is in mineral extraction, civil engineering, 
textiles, chemicals, trading, consumer electronics, hotels, securities trading, machinery, 
automobiles, semiconductors, computers, and defence industries. 
Robert Wade (1992) pointed out four indicators for S. Korea's success. Firstly, the gain in 
its relative economic command over world resources measured by the increase in per capita 
income expressed in U.S dollars. Secondly, he refers to rapid transition from import 
substitution policy to export promotion policy in the early 1960s as another most important 
factor of Korea's success. For example, Korea's rank as an exporter of manufactured 
products to the U. S. increased from the 40th exporter of manufactures to the U. S in 1962 
to the fifth biggest exporter in 1986. The third indicator of Korea's success as wade added 
is industrial transformation. This refers to the rise of skill-intensive, high-value-added 
industries that are competitive at world market standards of cost and product specifications, 
having a sizable impact on the world economy. For instance, Korea has recently been the 
world's third biggest producer, after Japan and U.S of advanced semiconductor memory 
chips. 
The final indicator is the removal of poverty, the elimination of severe economic hardship, 
the expansion of positive rights. The Korean experience would confirm, Wade added, that 
much of the improvement in productivity commonly descn"bed as the resuh of "learning by 
doing" is the result of efforts to get more knowledge of production materials and of the 
ways they may be combined to permit machines to ran faster speeds, for example, efforts 
that are not (formal) R and D intensive but that are certainly production engineering 
intensive [66]. 
Koo (1994) summarised the success factors of Korea in the fonowing characteristics: 
• a sustained, exceptionally high rate of growth; 
• a structural transformation of the economy, in terms of both output and 
employment; 
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• with a substantial decline in agriculture and a rise in manufacturing; and 
• the growing importance of trade as a result of outward-looking, export-oriented 
growth policies [67]. 
Having surveyed the success factors of Korea's success in rapid economic and industrial 
development by many authors, it is essential to focus on the some of the most important 
factors of Korea's success, that is, the role of state, the importance of technology transfer, 
export promotion strategy and the role of human resource development. 
A.6.1 The Role of State in the Korea '8 Industrialisation 
The most important u1timate cause of Korea's success has probably been government policy. 
As most studies have considered Korean rapid development not just as the result of market 
forces, but primarily as the result of strong government policy directed through the market. 
It is believed that the republic of Korea has been one of the most highly interventionist 
economies in the developing world, and the content of its export orientation has been 
strongly influenced by the nature of its interventions [68]. Many researchers and writers 
have emphasised the positive role of the South Korean government in its rapid 
industrialisation. As Amsden (1989) has argued, state is the most important factor of Korean 
industrialisation. South Korea must be seen as a late industrialiser which the state has been 
the only organisation capable of raising the necessary capital to initiate industrialisation 
based on borrowed technology. In short, the state has been the key to late industrialisation. 
In Amsden's view, the Korean state is interventionist. She writes: "In Korea, instead of the 
market mechanism allocating resources and guiding private entrepreneurship, the 
government made most of the pivotal investment decisions. Amsden claims that " the 
government was merely a banker, ... but an entrepreneur, using the subsidy to decide what, 
when and how much to produce". Amsden also sees the drive for economic development 
on the part of the South Korean government as a product of nationalism and a concern to 
legitimate its authoritarianism and militarism [69]. 
In South Korea, the state has gone much further than supporting industry with simple 
subsidies, or what Amsden refers to as deh1>erately getting relative prices wrong. Where it 
has sought to induce new sectors or restructure existing ones, state agencies have identified 
foreign technologies and expertise that have been introduced to support domestic 
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developments. It is believed that Korean state's role, apart from the promotion of 
shipbuilding and steel industry has been to create a modern infrastructure, to provide a 
stable incentive system, and to ensure that government bureaucracy will help rather than 
hinder exports [70]. The state in Korea has intervened in the various aspects, particularly 
in the scientific and technological development. The government has taken various steps 
to develop indigenous technological capability. It is believed that the South Korean 
government policies helped Korean firms obtain technologies which they would not have 
obtained, mainly because of muhinational firms' unwillingness to transfer important 
technologies and the excessive competition among local firms. It is also observed that the 
Korea's successful absorption of foreign technology has to a large extent been due to the 
inteJ.Ventionist role of the state in the acquisition and development of technology [71]. The 
state policies has also employed in order to shape pattern of technology transfer through 
foreign direct investment and technology licensing. Of these two, technology licensing 
arrangements have played the dominant role in Korean technology transfer policy strategies. 
The government has also played an important role in accelerating the speed of transition 
from import substitution to Korea's export-led industrialisation [72]. Moreover, the 
dominance of industrial policy with view to industrial upgrading has been the most 
distinctive feature of Korean state intervention. The state has also promoted the overseas 
training of Korean managers and engineers, and it has encouraged the use of technical 
assistance from overseas, particularly in the form of independent consultants. The state has 
also been closely involved in negotiations to acquire technology licenses. As Choi (1994) 
indicated, Korea has grown fast because its governmental policies were "market friendly" 
or "market conforming". He refer to three aspects of Korean government policies as being 
"market mendly": the relatively small degree of price distortions, the government policies 
in promoting exports, and little support of government of those industries which were found 
to be unsuccessful in the world market [73]. 
Having compared the industrial development experience in Korea and Japan, one can see 
several similarities in the government role in the success of these two countries. State 
intervention of both countries extended deeply into economic affairs such as planning 
sectoral development, mobilising capita~ and controlling the cOIporate investment pattern 
[74]. However, in Korea, government management in the 1980s has become so widespread 
that the government is held responsible for everything that happens, good or bad. The linear 
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drive for development led by government, which characterised Korea for over 25 years, 
seemed suddenly to come apart, and government was blamed by all sides [75]. 
A.6.2 De Role of Human Resource Development in Korea '8 Industrialisation 
One of the other important factor of success of Korea's industrialisation is its large 
investment in human resource development. A large part of Korea's success in acquiring, 
d.iffilsing, improving and developing technology in the mature stage is due to its heavy 
investment in human resources [76]. It is also believed that the formation of trained and 
skilled labour force has been one of the outstanding facts about Korean technological 
development. Skilled workers, along with scientists, engineers and technicians have played 
a vital role in accelerating Korea's assimilation of imported technology and also 
development of its technological capability. 
Korea has spent a huge investment in human resources during its rapid economic and 
industrial development. The amount of total expenditure, both public and private, on 
education has regularly exceeded ten percentage of GNP, the highest level among all 
developing countries. The share of education in the total government budget, for instance, 
rose from 2.5 per cent in 1951 to over 22 per cent in the 1980. Government expenditure, 
however, accounted for only one-third of total expenditure in education, the remainder.being 
paid by the private sector and families, reflecting the high respect for education held by 
Korean society. The percentage of high school graduates .advancing to colleges or 
universities in Korea has been the second highest in the world after United States in 1990 
[77]. It is argued that the major contn"bution of education has mostly been in its interaction 
with other sources of growth in particular with technology acquisition [78]. 
As a resuh of Korea's large investment in its human resources, in comparative terms, Korea 
had the highest number of secondary students in the late 1970s as a percentage of the total 
post-secondary age population; the highest number of scientists and engineers per million 
people; and the highest number of scientists and engineers in R&D per million people. In the 
1980s, the great focus in human resource development has been on higher education. 
Enrolment ratios in higher education increased over 70 percent in six years between 1980 
and 1986. As a result, the number of scientists and engineers in Korea has more than 
doubled since 1980 [79]. Total expenditures for education amounted to 13.3 per cent of 
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GNP in 1984, including both private (6.9 per cent) and public (6.4 percent) spending. This 
is much larger than the Japanese figure of5.7 per cent in 1982, the American figure of6.7 
per cent in 1981, and the Singapore figure of 4.4 percent [80]. Moreover, Korea's aduh 
literacy rate (93.7 per cent) which has almost been as high as Japan (99.7 per cent) for 1985 
and more than twice as high as India (43.5 per cent) is one of the most important element 
in assimilating foreign technologies [81]. 
The flow of scientists has also played a key role in technology transfer. The setting up of the 
Korea Institute of Science and Technology represented the first attempt to bring some of 
the science graduates back to Korea. The number of overseas- trained Korean scientists and 
engineers is still relatively small, though the number increased sharply in the 1980s. 
Compared with the more than 50,000 scientists and engineers in Korea, there are between 
5000 and 7000 members of the Korean scientists and engineers in the United States, and an 
estimated 3000 in similar organisations in Europe and Japan. The numbers of Korean 
graduates returning is increasing, though many want to return to the universities rather than 
to industry, and the balance of skills is not always ideal, with the social sciences being the 
largest decline in 1985. In the electronics area, Goldstar had 50 employees with overseas 
doctorates working for it in 1989, compared with 38 for Samsung and 18 for Hyundai [82]. 
While Korea's pool of engineers and scientists is proportionally larger than that of most 
developing countries, it is rather small in comparison with that of Japan and United States, 
who are Korea's main competitors in high technology. For every 10,000 people in the 
Japanese labour force, there are 240 engineers. In the United States, the proportion is 160 
per 10,000. But in Korea, there are only 32 per 10,000 workers [83]. 
Overall, it can be said that human resource development, foreign technology imports, capital 
formation and indigenous R&D efforts are four major inputs to the promotion of 
technological capability. First, human resource development through education may be a 
most basic and crucial form of input, as technological capability is embodied in people. 
Second, capital formation, particularly in the form of imported capital equipment, is another 
important input, as it embodies both technology and technical knowledge that structure the 
activities involved in carrying out the conversion of inputs to outputs. Third, technology 
transfer from developed countries includes not only technical information but also training 
at both supplier's and recipient's sites, contnouting to the acquisition of technological 
capability. Fmally, technological capability may be acquired through and lead to indigenous 
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R&D efforts. Therefore, it was Korea's heavy investment in human resource development 
that made it possible to acquire technological capability rapidly and, in tum, to achieve rapid 
industrialisation during the mature stage. Korea invested heavily in human resources 
development even well before launching its industrialisation program. 
A.6.3 The Importance or Technology Transrer in Korea's industrialisation 
Technology transfer is of great importance to South Korea and the importing foreign 
technology has played a significant role from early stage of its industrialisation. Since 1962, 
the Korean government has offered several incentives to foreign investors and technology 
owners, realising that the acquisition of the advanced technical and scientific knowledge and 
skiDs ofindustriaHsed nations is vital to the rapid growth of the Korean economy. Korea has 
imported 1,467 items technologies between 1962 and 1979. This is, however, only one-tenth 
of Japan's for the period. Further, according to statistics compiled by the Federation of 
Korean Industries (FKI), 22% of the imported technologies were out of date and 51.4% of 
the companies are not sufficiently capable of absorbing and adapting new technologies [84]. 
These statistics point to the fact that the effort and investment directed towards research and 
development for adaptation of technology had been much less than satisfactory [85]. 
According to study by the Korean Development Institute, technology contn'buted to about 
6 per cent of economic growth during the period 1966-76, a relatively low rate compared 
with those figures for some developed colDltries such as Japan and U.S. with 22 percent and 
28 percent respectively for the period between 1963 to 1982. However, one should note 
that, during this period, the Korean economy was dominated by light, labour- intensive 
industries such as textiles, electronic parts and construction. It was, however, anticipated 
in the study that the contn'bution of technology would rise to an average value of about 13 
percent from the late 1970s to the 1990s due to structural change in from labour intensiVe 
to technology intensive heavy and chemical industries [86]. Another statistic indicates that 
between 1962 and 1984, there were 3,073 technology import agreements made between 
Korean industries and foreign technology owners including U. S. $ 1,043 million in royalty 
payments. Korea is evaluated as having a most favourable environment to receive foreign 
advanced technology [87]. For technology outputs, the number of foreign patent 
applications in Korea was about 3000 in 1976 and increased to 20,000 in 1988. Due to the 
poor performance of patent activities, Korea is heavily dependent upon foreign technologies, 
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so that the technology balance of payments in 1988 shows that technology imports were 100 
times as great as technology exports. 
Having regulated the acquisition of foreign technology and reviewed foreign technology 
agreements, some special policies have been adopted by the Korean authorities. The 
Technology Development Promotion Law, which provided for various incentives and fiscal 
and other concessions, was legislated in 1967 and revised in 1972 for the promotion of 
indigenous technology and adaptation offoreign technology and innovations. A Technology 
Transfer Centre was also established to assist in the examination and review of foreign 
technology agreements to provide technological information to local industry. By the 
mid-1970s, the policy toward foreign technology was primarily aimed at improving the 
bargaining position oflocal companies in Joint ventures and licensing agreements. Since the 
foreign capital inducement Law was enacted in 1962, there have been 5,443 cases of 
technology transfer approval, which entailed royalty payments of about $ 2.9 billion by the 
end of 1988. As industries develop, the demand for technology increases at a faster pace, 
and the technology so imported to satisfy such demand increases dramatically. 
Korea imported most of its necessary technologies from Japan which has the closest 
geographical, cultural and educational proximity with Korea. Despite some differences in 
management styles such as Japanese groupism and bottom-up decision making versus 
Korean individuatistic dynamism and top-down decision-making, Koreans have successfully 
adapted to the Japanese systems in their own way. The top-down decision making system 
was probably necessary for Korea to catch up with the Advanced technologies in a short 
period of time in a less expensive manner. Through economic expansion, Korea has heavily 
invested to strengthen its institutional capability to absorb foreign technologies. It is 
interesting to note that although 53 per cent of technology imports are from Japan compared 
with 25 per cent from the United States, the royalties paid to the latter are much larger than 
those paid to the fonner. This suggests that the technology imported from the United States 
is of higher level and more expensive than that from Japan. Korean technology transfer has 
been accelerated since the government has adopted an automatic technology inducing 
approval system for all industries in 1980. Furthermore, the approval system was changed 
to a report system in 1984 to make technology transfer much easier and more efficient [88]. 
An important feature of foreign technology transfer to Korea has been the relatively low 
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local content in several industrial sectors. The emphasis on export-oriented production often 
led to the acceptance of a high production of imported inputs for intermediate product. In 
1990, 22.4 percent of goods manufactured in Korea were based on foreign technology, 
compared to 6.2 percent in Japan, and 1.6 percent in the U.S. Also of Korea's total exports 
in 1990, 55% were based on foreign technology. [89]. As Amsden (1990) also refer to the 
high dependency of Korea on imported technology in most industrial sectors except textiles. 
She believed that Korean managers could never hope to manage in a tight, Taylorist 
top-down fashion, at least not initially, because no one at the top knew enough about the 
process (of production) to do so. Under these conditions, it was imperative to rely upon 
motivated workers, even if they possessed little more than formal schooling, to exercise the 
most fundamental skill of all, intelligence [90]. She also argued that the key to late 
industrialisation has been the ability to learn from the experience of foreign companies and 
adapt their technologies and expertise for one's own productive purpose. 
It is however theorised that the development miracle of South Korea is the result of 
reductions in technology adoption barriers in that country. Korea was able to acquire most 
of its technology with relative ease. Unlike Japan, much of its growth originated in 
traditional sectors of the economy, \Were production techniques were widely available [91]. 
In these sectors, the still low-skilled Korean workers were able to absorb the technology 
with relative ease and to make small improvements and adjustments of the technology. The 
main type of technology in the republic of Korea initially consists of simple processing and 
assembling technologies. One of the most serious problems in the field of S&T is the 
inferiority and insufficiency of the basic technology necessary for system design and the 
production of parts and materials [92]. Over the period 1976-88, Korea's technology 
capability showed fast improvement, the overall level rose about 1.8 times as high as in 
1976. It is most impressive that Korea caught up very quickly in technology inputs. Korea's 
technology-inputs capability passed Italy around 1985 and even Canada's around 1988. 
However, there is a large gap between technology-inputs in the process of fast 
industrialisation. It may take a long time to build an efficient innovation system, particularly 
starting from almost none. As in their study of Korea, Enos and Park (1987) have identified 
seven stages for Korea's technology transfer, including Planning, negotiations between 
suppliers of the technology and recipients, plant and equipment design, procurement and 
construction, instaDation and start-up, production and innovation, and finally subsequent 
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innovation [93]. 
Another study indicated three phases which mostly chosen by Korean firms for technology 
acquisition, including implementation, assimilation and improvement of technology. In the 
first phase, the implementation of production is based on assembly offoreign components 
and parts. The assimilation phase is accompanied by diftUsion of technical expertise to other 
firms in the industry while, in the final phase, the gradual improvement of foreign technology 
is associated with both product improvement and cost reduction. There were also generally 
two basic approaches used by the Korean government to speed up technology transfer in 
Korea. The first approach was to localise foreign products based on technology new to 
Korea. This involved reverse engineering, the employment of Koreans trained overseas in 
foreign companies, and other methods. A second approach by the Korean government was 
to restrict the access to certain sectors. In sectors chosen for domestic localisation, imports 
of the finished product were prohibited or severely restricted, and only local or joint-venture 
companies were allowed to enter [94]. Korea's experience on technology transfer shows that 
it had very restrictive policies toward formal mechanism of technology transfer (i.e. DFI and 
FL) but relied more on informal mechanisms (i.e. through the importation of capital goods 
and turnkey agreement) in early years of its industrialisation. However, Korea has also used 
some other methods for transferring foreign technology such as reverse engineering which 
is only possible when a country has highly trained human resources and entrepreneurship 
that enable it to assimilate and adapt foreign technologies embodied in physical items or 
technical information available in literature. As Westphal and Dahlman (1981), in analysis 
of the methods of technology transfer by Korean firms, found that through the process of 
export expansion, local Korean firms acquired substantial amounts of intangible technology 
and know-how by informal channels, such as exchanges with marketing agents from the 
advanced nations who have constant contact with product [95]. 
As discussed earliei', Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) has been a very limited source of 
technology for Korea [96]. During the 1960s, there were not much foreign investment in 
Korea, primarily due to questions about Korea's political instability and economic 
uncertainty. Moreover, in addition to relatively political and economic instability in the early 
years of its industrialisation, one can also refer to some other reasons for little role ofFDI 
in Korea. This included Korean's suspicions about the real motives behind FDI, and also the 
fact that the promotion of labour-intensive light manufacturing industries in the early stage 
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of economic development required less sophisticated technology, management, or marketing 
skiDs [97]. However, After 1960, regulations were slowly libera1ised and the normalisation 
of relations with Japan in 1965 was of especial importance in this respect. In the 1970s, joint 
ventures received higher priority than wholly owned subsidiaries. Due to a Korea's open 
policy for DFI in 1980s, Korea has received an increasing amount ofDFI, which Japan 
accounts for over 68 percent in the number of cases and 55 percent of the value, followed 
by the U.S. In 1987, the Foreign Investment Law was changed to remove most of the 
restrictions closing off certain sectors to foreign direct investment, and limiting the amount 
of investment allowed. As a result, the share of manufacturing industries open to foreign 
direct investment increased to 95.2 percent [98]. 
According to a report published by Korean Economic Planning Board in 1993, between 
1962 and the end of January 1993 there were 2,258 direct investments from Japan, 
amo\D1ting to a total of approximately $ 2.9 billion. Direct investments from Japan and the 
United States together account for 80% of all foreign direct investment. These patterns 
clearly show that Japan and the United States are the two major investors in Korean 
manufacturing industries. Foreign investment from both countries are concentrated in 
high-technology industries, with this pattern slightly stronger for the United States. 
However, it is argued that Korean policy makers preferred foreign loans to foreign direct 
investment. As a result, the share of foreign direct investment in total foreign capital inflow 
(except foreign aid) between 1962-83 was a mere 5% [99]. Even when foreign direct 
investment was allowed, foreign majority ownership was practically banned, with some rare 
exceptions, outside the Free Trade Zones. The fact that only 6% of MNCs in Korea are 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, compared to 50% in Mexico and 60% in Brazil, suggests a 
substantial degree of state control over foreign direct investment in relations to ownership 
[100]. Another example shows that FDrs contnlmtion to the growth of GNP in Korea in 
the 1972-1980 period amounted only to 1.3 percent, while its contribution to total and 
manufacturing value added was only 1.1 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively, in 1971, and 
4.5 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively, in 1980 [101]. However, FDI has been a 
particularly important vehicle for technological development in the establishment of much 
of the chemicals sector and, more recently, of major elements of the electrical and 
non-electrical machinery sectors. FDI has also contributed to technological development in 
the basic metals sector, but there is no foreign equity in the integrated steel mill [102]. 
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As it is mentioned earlier, much of the foreign technology has been transferred to Korea 
through importing capital goods. Such a policy to maintain its independence from foreign 
multinationals has been relatively effective in acquiring technological capability, since 
Korea's well-trained human resources and their entrepreneurial spirit enabled the country 
to learn quickly from foreign capital goods [103]. During the period between 1962-1986, 
transferring technology by the capital goods imports was 21 times that of other means of 
technology transfer in terms of the value. Another example shows that imports of capital 
goods were more than 20 percent of the value of investment in South Korea throughout the 
1970s. The imports of capital goods in Korea has also been accounted for 30 to 35 percent 
total imports over last two decades, reflecting the continuous diffusions of foreign 
technologies [104]. Therefore, one can say that in Korea, the transfer of technology has 
been heavily biased towards the importation of technology embodied in machinery and 
equipment. For most of major industries such as textiles, chemicals, shipbuilding, 
automobiles, electronics, heavy machinery, and iron and steel, technology was transferred 
through purchase of equipment. This embodied form of technology transfer was 
supplemented by the acquisition of design, joint ventures, licensing and the hiring of foreign 
experts. No systematic approach to technological capability development is evident. 
Different enterprises have followed different strategies. For example, in shipbuilding, designs 
are supplied by clients who purchase them overseas; in the electronics industry, licensing is 
widely practised. In the automobile industry, one enterprise (Daewoo) went into a joint 
venture with general motors, while another (Hyundai) produced Fords under licence. More 
recently, Hyundai has gone back to a joint venture with Mitsubishi for body design 
technology [105]. However, there were some heavy restrictions in use of technological 
licensing in some industries where local technological capability is consider to be advancing. 
It is also argued that the choice of production technology has depended more on market and 
export demand than long term technology policies [106]. 
According to survey of 112 exporting firms in 1976 which show that of total technology 
which was acquired from foreign sources by these firms, 20 percent was from foreign 
suppliers or buyers, 16 percent through foreign licences and technical assistant agreements 
and 13 percent from employees who had somehow gained experience abroad [107]. In 
addition to the methods of technology transfer which discussed earlier, there were some 
other pattern of technological development in Korea such as the so called imitator pattern. 
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In this method. local firms started with small and rather primitive technologies developed 
by themselves and gradually upgraded both processes and products through operating 
experience and using technical information and ideas that came from observing foreign 
technology. It appeared that many small scale capital goods producers initiated new product 
lines by imitating foreign equipment by copying imported models and using information from 
sales catalogues or from visits to foreign manufactures [108]. 
In sum, the Korea's experience of technology transfer indicates that developing countries 
can obtain most of important know-how and technical knowledge through some informal 
mechanisms such as reverse engineering free of charge. However, this is to large extent 
relied on technological capability of these countries. Moreover, Korean experience shows 
that high indigenous levels of all types of technological mastery are not necessary for the 
initial stage of industrial development. In the Korean case, a mastery that has been mainly 
confined to production engineering has been sufficient. The Korean example also suggests 
that by relying on foreign sources of technology, it is possible to choose a technology 
without having first mastered its use. [109] What is unique about the South Korean 
experience is not the importance of indigenous effort to assimilate technology. What is 
unique about the South Korean experience is the speed and effectiveness of acquisition and 
interplay between technological development and trade in the elements of technology. 
A.6.4 The Role of Export Promotion Policy in Korea's Industrialisation 
The Export Promotion Industrialisation (EPI) policy is believed to be a major factor of 
success for East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in general and Korea in 
particular. Korea wisely chose an outward-looking (EPI) strategy, that is, providing 
incentives for export activities in the early 1960s. Korea chose this strategy at a time when 
it was not universally recognised that world trade was growing fast and when 
inward-looking strategies, prescnoed by economic development theories of the 1950s and 
1960s, were still popular among most developing nations. It is important, however, to 
identify the Korea's success in diversifying manufactured goods for exports was another 
factor for the success [110]. 
It is believed that the phenomenal growth of the economy in Korea started with the 
transition from an inward-looking, or Import Substituting Industrialisation (lSI), strategy 
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to an outward-looking, or an Export Promotion Industrialisation (EPI) strategy. The 
turning point in this transition was a series of policy reforms around 1965, whose most 
important ingredients included the introduction of a unified, realistic exchange rate regime, 
trade liberalisation involving cuts in tariffs and the elimination of most quantitative 
restrictions, and a substantial increase in real interest rates. These policies are regarded as 
having radically improved the performance of the economy for the following reasons: 
Firstly, realistic exchange rates, by making export activities as profitable as they should be, 
allowed Korea to follow her comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries, and 
therefore to obtain the gains from foreign trade. Secondly, trade hberalisation improved the 
efficiency of the economy by putting competitive pressures on domestic producers. Finally, 
the rise in interest rates enabled the economy to invest more by mobilising more savings, on 
the one hand, and to use capital more efficiently by fixing the relative price of capital to near 
its realistic level on the other [Ill]. 
Since the adoption of export-promotion strategy in 1961, Korea has enabled to make 
efficient use of its resources in line with its comparative advantages. Through this strategy, 
Korea fully exploited economies of scale and took maximum advantage of a continuous 
inflow of foreign technology and know-how. As a resuh of (EPI) in Korea, the share of 
export in GDP increased from 10 percent in 1965-66 to over 45 percent by late 1980s [112]. 
By adopting an export-led growth strategy, Korea has succeeded in exploiting its 
comparative advantage and overcoming the constraint imposed by the size of its domestic 
market. The rapid growth of Korean exports and imports over the last decades has 
generated sizeable benefits for both Korea and its trading partners [113]. In Korea, the 
outward-looking orientation (EPI) has also played a central role in country's industrial 
takeoff, and is widely cited as a model for other developing countries. The success of 
Korea's (EPI) has often been ascribed to its "modestly pro-export" bias [114]. Neoclassical 
writers usually attribute the success of Korea's industrialisation to the adoption, in the early 
1960s, of a neutral, hands-off: outward-looking (EPI) policy. Export activity has proved to 
be a very important means of acquiring technological mastery. As a resuh of exporting, 
Korean firms have enjoyed virtually costless access to a tremendous range of information, 
diffused to them in various ways by the buyers of their exports. Exports thus appears to 
have offered a direct means of improving productivity, in addition to the indirect stimulus 
derived from trying to maintain and increase penetration in overseas markets. It is argued 
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that the strong export-orientation of the Korean economy facilitated the rapid acquisition 
of technological capability at least in two ways: 
1. As producers entered the international market, the keen international competition 
forced them to invest more in technological efforts. 
2. Informal technical assistance offered by foreign buyers to ensure that Korea-made 
products met their technical specifications provided invaluable help to Korean firms 
in acquiring the necessary technological capability. 
In other words, Korea's outward-looking policy appears to have been another important 
mechanism affecting the demand side of foreign technology transfer. Export promotion 
continually places pressure on firms to acquire foreign technology and to use it effectively 
in order to be able to compete in foreign markets. On the other hand, there is a growing 
body of empirical evidence that adoption of an export-oriented strategy leads to rapid 
technological development of labour-intensive industries. It is argued that the process of 
exporting leads firms to acquire new skills by workers. Hence pursuing an outward-oriented 
(EPI) strategy can be viewed as a general incentive that accelerates the accumulation of 
human capital and technology [115]. 
The adoption of export promotion policy in Korea was in the expectation that it would 
accelerate growth by relaxing the foreign exchange constraint and increase efficiency 
through resource allocation in line with comparative advantage. Therefore, since the 
adoption of export promotion strategy , exports have led the country's economic growth. 
Export expansion promotes growth because it is associated with outward looking or 
export-oriented policies that generate learning effects, encourage skill acquisition, and create 
the closer ties with more advanced economies that are needed to master up-to-date 
technology [116]. Exports also led to the establishment of new industries and promoted the 
acquisition of technological capability in existing industries. Exports were concentrated in 
industries in which South Korea either already had or could easily acquire the needed 
technological capability. It was in the late 1960s, however, that export activity became 
important in establishing new industries in which South Korea did not already have 
technological capability. The export-oriented industrialisation strategy adopted by Korea 
started with the labour-intensive light industries and was extended into the capital and 
technology-intensive heavy and chemical industries [117]. 
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The EPI strategy in Korea largely operated on the accumulation of production capability 
until the mid-1970s. It was also during the mid-1970s that the government began to give 
serious priority to technological development, and export activity likewise became an 
internal part of its efforts to promote the acquisition of technological capability more 
generally. Following the Heavy and Chemical Industry drive of mid-1970s, the Korean 
manufacturing exports were mostly dominated by heavy industrial products. However, an 
increase in Korean exports in 1980s was most visible in such products as various kinds of 
consumer electronics, semi-conductors, other computer related products, 
telecOlmmmications equipment and passenger cars. One can also say that the increasing of 
Korean manufactured exports were mainly the products of heavy and chemical industrial 
policy drive which had implemented a decade earlier. 
It is argued that Korea was able to adopt (EPI) strategy more readily and more successfully 
than, for example, the Latin American countries for two reasons. Firstly, Korea's 
comparative advantage in the initial stage of development more clearly lay in 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries than in most other developing countries. Secondly, 
an export-led growth strategy enabled the country to exploit its comparative advantage. The 
strategy also made it possible for Korea to employ completely the abundant factor (ie., 
labour) and to remove the constraints posed by the shortage of other factors (ie., natural 
resources) [118]. Korea has successfully exported its technologies to other less developed 
countries in particular those in Southeast Asia and the Middle East since the late 1970s. This 
has helped Korea to accelerate the adjustment of its industrial structure to the more 
advanced level As a matter of fact, Korea has been transferring self-developed technologies 
particularly in the areas of pulp, paper manufacturing, electricity, electronics and machinery 
as Korean technologies are considered to be more fitted to less developed countries than 
those of developed countries in terms of cost and factor intensity [119]. Korean 
technologies are said to be more appropriate than those of the United States and Japan in 
meeting the needs and conditions of other Asian developing countries, particularly those of 
labour surplus countries. This is because Korean technologies are considered to be more 
labour-intensive and of smaller operational scale than those of United States and Japan. 
Korea's experience in technology acquisition and assimilation will also be learnt by many 
Asian Developing Countries. 
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In sum, under Korea's strategy of export-led industrialisation, export activity has been 
important in exploiting static comparative advantage, export activity made it possible to start 
new industries much earlier than they could otherwise have been established without 
offering economies of scale. In turn, for all industries and for a long time after their 
inception, export activity added to technological capability, reflected in a wide variety of 
more technological change [120]. One can also say that Korea's spectacular export 
performance led to increasing confidence in the government's ability to initiate and direct 
national development strategy. Particularly, the take-off period demonstrated that a 
favourable macroeconomics framework, combined with aggressive export-promoting 
intmvention could lead to rapid growth [121]. Despite of the fact that EPI strategy has been 
a very important method of rapid industrial development, but it should also be noted that 
in the very highly competitive international market environment and many strong 
competitors, this strategy is sometimes seemed to be a high-risk strategy. 
A.6.5 The Role of R&D 
As it is explained earlier in the role of human resource development policies in Korea's 
success, the Korean government continued its industrial restructuring policy with active 
R&D and human resource development (HRD) programmes, given that without such 
programmes it is impossible to move up the technology ladder and upgrade industrial 
activities. As the survey by OECD notes that Korea has moved very fast in increasing its 
share of R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP, which reached 2.12 in 1989, which has 
been the highest ratio among the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). Korea 
has also made significant progress in expanding engineering education and the government 
played a very important part in increasing R&D activity [122]. The Korean government has 
also supported institutional R&D through a number of government assisted organisation in 
order to promote country's indigenous technological development. Among the largest are 
the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) and the Korean Advanced Institute 
of Science and Technology (KAJST). The establishment of Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST) in 1966, and its growth over the last decade or so, has marked a major 
turning point in the formation of Korea's research and development system Generally, the 
shortcomings ofresearch and development activities in developing countries seem from the 
small scale of their research agencies. Before the establishment of (KIST), most research 
activities in Korea were carried out in a incomplete way by public or government research 
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agencies operating on a small scale [123]. 
The remarkable increase in R&D expenditures has been mainly due to the sharp increase in 
the contributions of the private sector. The Korean government made serious efforts to 
encourage private investment, first by offering tax incentives. Though tax incentives for 
R&D activities had been offered in the 1970s, they were not sufficient to induce enough 
private R&D investment. In the 1980s some new incentives were added and existing ones 
were strengthened. There were also long-term, low-interest loans have been made available 
to those enterprises seeking to utilise in R&D for their newly developed technologies. As 
a result of these incentives, the share of the private sector in total R&D expenditure 
increased from 48 per cent in 1980 to 70 per cent in 1984, although the actual performance 
by industry is somewhat lower than these figures. The different arises from the fact that 
industry gives R&D to government-sponsored research institutes and universities [124]. 
Moreover, the number of research institutes in business firms increased from 72 in 1982 to 
about 1200 in 1991, and private investment in R&D activities increased from about 297 
million dollars in 1982 to about 3044 million dollars in 1990. During this period the national 
innovation system was buih up, triggered by the governments science and technology policy 
[125]. One can also note that in 1983, there were 114 independent institutions responSl'ble 
for 29 per cent of R&D, 216 universities and colleges were responSl'ble for 10 per cent of 
R&D, and 723 companies accounted for 60 per cent of R&D expenditures [126]. Most 
Korean firms, of all size, are rushing to form R&D organizations, partly because the 
government offers them tax incentives. By 1991, there were over 1000 private research 
institutes in Korea and the rate of investment in R&D is mushrooming rapidly [127]. 
In 1992, the Korean government launched an ambitious national R&D program, the HAN 
project in order to increase the competitiveness of domestic industries by increasing the 
indigenous science and technology capability. The sluggish domestic economy since 1989 
and growing protectionism against international technology transfer is considered to be the 
main motivation of Korean government to fommlate the HAN project. The total investment 
for the project has been estimated to be about $ 4.6 billion for the next decades of total 
investment, the public and private sectors have also been expected to make 56% and 44% 
respectively. It is hoped that the dependency of Korea's industry on foreign technology will 
be substantially reduced with the successful implementation of this program. 
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Although the large investment of Korean government in R&D activities, however the total 
resources devoted to R&D in Korea are small compared to those in some developed 
countries. In 1990, Korea spent only $ 4.7 billion while Japan spent $ 83.5 billion and the 
US spent $ 145.5 billion, France spent $ 22.5 billion, and the U.K spent $ 18.9 billion. 
Korea's total R&D expenditure of $ 4.7 billion may not be enough to insure the increase of 
innovation. Furthermore, the total number of researchers in R&D subsystem and the 
number of engineers ofhigh quality in the Engineering & Production subsystem may not be 
sufficient to produce successful technological innovations. For example, the shortage rate 
of engineers reached 12.6 percent in 1989 [128]. It is also believed that in terms of both 
government and private R&D, the 1980s were a lost decade for Korean industry from the 
point of view modernising plants, equipment and technology. There were also some trials 
and errors through the science and technology policy in the past national R&D programs 
[129]. Researchers in the R&D subsystems have little experience in the customer market. 
Because they lack knowledge about the marketing concept and marketing research, those 
in Engineering & Production cannot provide information on customers' continuously 
changing needs to the R &D subsystems [130]. 
In Korea, R&D funding was divided among universities, government-funded institutes, and 
firms. Although universities employ 79 percent of the Ph.D-level researchers, they received 
only 6.8 percent of the R&D funds. Government-funded institutes employing 15 percent of 
the Ph.D-level researchers spent 22.1 percent, and firms, with only six percent of the 
Ph.D-level researchers, spent 71.1 percent. Therefore, without the development of a viable 
R&D infrastructure and an industrial structure that encourages technological innovation, 
Korea's objective to become competitive in high technology products, is likely to be 
lDlSUccessful. Capital, efficient assembly, cheap labour, and hard work, the old ingredients 
of success are no longer enough. It can be said that, in many High-Tech areas, Korea's 
technology in assembly work is not too tar behind that of advanced countries. Korea, 
however, is more than ten years behind in the area of research and development. The 
government has formulated a long-range plan known as "Science and Technology Toward 
the 2000s". The major thrusts and direction of the plan are to strengthen Korea's R&D 
capability, to localise innovative technologies and to specialise in certain areas such as 
informatics, chemicals, precision machinery, bio-technology and new materials where the 
countIy can establish comparative advantage by the year 2000. According to the plan, R&D 
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investment will be boosted from 2.3 per cent in 1988 to 5 per cent of GNP, and the ratio of 
R&D personnel increased from 13 persons per 10,000 population to 30 persons. 
A.7 INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL POLICIES OF KOREA 
Given a phenomenal industrial growth in the past decades, Korea's industrial and 
technological policy is an informative subject that may offer useful implications for policy 
makers in other developing countries [131]. As discussed earlier, Korean industrial policy 
is notable for the important role of government in the economy. The political insulation and 
centralisation of decision making allowed the S. Korean state to implement a flexible 
industrial policy and by, extension, promote technological capability. Intervention in favour 
of emerging industries and specific promotion programs played an important role in Korean 
industrial policy during the 1970s. As newly industrialising cOlmtries like Korea mature, they 
will increasingly face industry specific pressures to intervene in support of declining 
industries, reflecting what has become common place in recent years in industrialised 
countries [132]. The Korean government planned intensive policies and strategies for the 
development of science and technology with many innovative supporting measures. 
Particular attention has been made directed towards the use ofhigh technology, for this was 
the path chosen by Korea to industrialise and to evolve an outward oriented economy. While 
less sophisticated technologies can surely serve the needs of some aspects of national 
development, Korea determined that the high technology path could afford them the most 
options in reaching development goals. In any case, the government believed that the 
industrial structure needed "upgrading" and that the new directions required large-scale risky 
investments which would not be undertaken by private firm without decisive government 
leadership . 
The technological development strategy pursued by Korea in the process of its 
industrialisation has been the introduction of appropriate technology from developed 
countries for assimilation and improvement while simultaneously promoting the 
development of a domestic capacity for technological development. The introduction and 
utilisation offoreign capital and technology from industrialised countries played a significant 
role in the technological development process in Korea. Moreover, other technology policies 
including the establishment of modem research and development institutes, large investment 
on the development of Korea's human resources, along with policies to promote 
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technological innovation have also been crucial to the success of the industrialisation of 
Korea [133]. There has been a gradual change in the centre of gravity of Korean industrial 
policy towards less selective intervention and more functionally-based industrial incentives 
at the beginning of the 1990s. the Korean government has also changed the direction of 
science and technology policy from a bottom-up to a top-down approach. The bottom-up 
approach in the past turned out to be unsatisfactory for increasing national competitiveness. 
In selecting key technologies, priorities were established by a long-term century through the 
cultivation of indigenous industrial technology and enhancement of national competitiveness 
[134]. Moreover, Korea's science and technology development policy also emphasised more 
on the development of capacity for the proper selection, assimilation and adaptation of 
imported technologies. 
Year Industrial development policy. Technological Development 
1960s Establishment of the foundation Expanding education and training in 
for industrialisation. science, technology and skills. 
Fostering (lSI) strategy. Facilitating the importation of 
The transition to (EPI) policy. advanced technologies. 
1970s The heavy and chemical Strengthening local technological 
industries drive. capability through promotion of 
Promotion of small and R&D activities. 
medium-sized industries. 
1980s Liberalisation and privatisation Extensive programs for training 
policies. Enhancing the quality qualified scientific and technological 
ofmanumcturedexports human resources. Liberalisation of 
through their diversification. technology imports. 
1990s Promotion of high-Tech More investment in developing 
modem and sophisticated 
technologies. 
Table A 1 Korea's industrial and technological development policies during the past three 
decades 
All in aD, various stages and processes of Korea's industrial and technological development 
strategies and policies during the past three decades can be shown in the table A 1. In sum, 
the Korean experience shows that technology policies on foreign technology transfer, 
technology diffusion, and R&D should change over time in response to changing extema 
environment. It is also indicated that technology policies become effective when three major 
components; policies to promote demand side of technology, policies to promote the supply 
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side of technology, and policies to provide effective links between demand and supply sides 
are well balanced. 
A.8 THE PROBLEMS AND OBSTACLES OF KOREA'S TECHNOWGICAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
There are some very serious obstacles to Korean long-term plan in competing with 
developed countries such as Japan and United States along the frontiers of high technology. 
One of the main obstacles is the massive financial resources which such an effort would 
demand. Korean companies will have to find new sources of capital if they want to compete 
in high technology products market [135]. A second key bottleneck is South Korea's 
continuous dependence on imported components, parts, general machinery, and basic 
materials. Most machines for Korea's growing industrial sector are bought abroad. Imports 
from Japan alone now make up a third of the value of Korean exports. The third critical 
constraint on Korea's industrial structure is its low capability for self sustaining technological 
innovation. Almost all of Korea's key advanced technologies are licensed, purchased, or 
copied from Japan and the United States [136]. The heavy technological dependence on 
foreign sources, particularly the Japanese, stems from the government's relatively low 
spending on R&D, preferring the easy route of licensing, buying or simply stealing finished 
technologies. 
The weak capability for technological innovation has made government officials worried 
about whether Korea will be able to transform itself into a High-Tech industrial power in 
the next decade. Korea's technology in assembly work is not too far behind that of the 
advanced countries, however, it is believed that Korea is more than 10 years behind in the 
area of research and development [137]. Korea is facing the difficult task of moving its 
manufactured exports towards high and advanced technology-intensive products by 
improving both product specification and conformance to standards. Korea has a number 
of advantages in its favour as it attempts to make this shift. A long term commitment to 
education at all levels continue its benefits and increasing investment in research and 
development, combined with continued rapid growth act as a great move towards 
technological change. However, the authoritarian style of Korean management, poor labour 
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relations and the low quality of components supplied locally are major problems, and 
companies and government will have to make efforts to overcome them [138]. The economy 
has recently encountered with large trade deficits, rising labour costs, and a declining rate 
of increase in industrial investment. However, it was argued that new plan had to make a 
fundamental contnbution to long-term national goals, but not to be mixed up with 
short-term industrial policy as firms had been seriously losing competitiveness in the world 
market. In fact, it is increasingly difficult for the country like Korea to push economic 
capability by depending upon the import offoreign technologies [139]. 
A.9 LESSONS FROM KOREA'S EXPERIENCE IN INDUSTRIALISATION AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEWPMENT 
It is believed that Korean experience of industrial and technological development may 
provide valuable experience for other developing countries. One of the most important 
lessons from the Korean experience, as explained extensively earlier, is that the success of 
the Korean economy is not the resuh of any single factor. It is the resuh of a combination 
of many factors and supportive government policies. Rapid growth is not only the result of 
hard-working workers or government policy. But as Edward Mason notes, too many other 
factors were also involved in the Korea's significant development [140]. The Korean 
experience should be of particular interest because the Korean economy is large, capitalist, 
and market-oriented and it has been one of the world's fastest growing economies during 
the past 30 years [141]. The Korean experience shows that a development strategy is a 
complex set of interrelated policies rather than a simple matter of trade regime, as is often 
implied by debates between the proponents of outward-looking and of inward-looking 
strategies. The Korean experience can also show the importance of a long-term dynamic 
perspective in managing industrial transition. A constant upgrading of the industrial 
structure based on the d~elopment oflocal technological and managerial capabilities was 
seen by Korean policy makers as the best way to achieve sustained growth and efficient 
structural change, and hence higher living standards. The state's control over technological 
transfers and foreign direct investments, and the state's commitment to long-term lending 
through state-owned banks and various special investment funds, have been vital in this 
respect. 
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The Korean experience represents that patterns of technology transfer cannot be explained 
simply by concentrating on what has been transferred from donor countries, such as the 
United States and Japan. Rather, we need to turn our focus to the host country and to the 
policy strategies that have been adopted to shape patterns of technology transfer. In short, 
the question turns from the economics of what, to the policies of how, technology transfer 
is accomplished [142]. The Korean experience also suggests that a rethinking of the concept 
of competition is necessary. Uhimately, competition is a means to achieve efficiency, and 
not an end in itself. Korea's experience in the past decade has also shown that there is a 
strong relationship between commodity exports and royahy payments for introduced foreign 
technologies. Such a relationship leads us to believe that an adequate supply of proper 
technologies is an essential factor that enables industry to produce goods and services for 
the international market. Therefore, Korea's science and technology development policy has 
emphasised development of capacity for the proper selection, assimilation and adaptation 
of imported technologies [143]. 
It is believed that industrial development in Korea has also been influenced to a great extent 
by the guidelines of the Five-year Economic Plans since the early 1960s. Building on the 
industrial reconstruction of the import substitution period, export promotion strategy was 
remarkably successful in promoting industrial, export and economic growth. According to 
source-ot:growth estimates, where import substitution accounted for one-third or more of 
the increase in GDP from 1955 to 1963 and export expansion less than 10 percent, their 
roles were reversed in 1963-1973 when the contribution of import substitution fell to 10-11 
percent and that of export expansion rose to 36-40 percent. Korea's experience also 
demonstrates that a high level of technological mastery in all aspects of the uses of 
technological knowledge is not required for sustained industrial development. This is evident 
from the fact that its mastery has progressed much further in production engineering than 
in project execution [144]. The Korean experience may be unique in the sense that it was 
supported by a set of typical institutions, but this does not mean that it is irrelevant for other 
countries which have different histories. Practically all successful industrialisation after the 
British one was based on conscious efforts to import and modify more advanced institutions. 
Fonower nations might also learn from the HeI promotion drive, for instance, Firstly, the 
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Korean HCI promotion was implemented within context of the broadly defined, 
outward-looking (EPI) strategy. Therefore, from the very beginning, it was different from 
import-substitution efforts made under an inward-looking strategy. Operating under an 
outward-looking development, structural problems that were causing economic 
inefficiencies were bound to surface much faster than they would under an inward-looking 
policy. The old-fashioned lSI strategy is not adequate, there is a need for selective 
protection that briefly control market forces. Built into these two diametrically opposed 
arguments is the debate on outward versus inward-looking strategies, that is, whether 
industrialisation is best attained through trade (Export-Oriented Industrialisation) or through 
domestic production for the home market (Import Substitution Industrialisation). Secondly, 
late developers can benefit from previous development experience provided they choose the 
right model. More importantly, however, the nature of industrial policy should reflect the 
characteristics of each country and the economic environment. At the same time, the choice 
of policy instruments or the nature of industrial policy should be adapted appropriately to 
changes in the environment and to different stages of development. Another general lesson 
from the experience ofK.orea is that it is difficult to implement an industrial targeting policy 
that is not basically in line with where the private sector is planning to go anyway. But it is 
worth noting that in Korea, where there were large firms interested in developing heavy 
industry behind protective tariffs, the HCI program became very large and absorbed more 
than half of all the industrial investment for several years [145]. Korean experiences also 
suggest the following directions towards the goal to a high technology society: 
1. The private sector should be encouraged to finance its own R&D activities. 
Initiatives and a sense of responsibi1ity on the part of entrepreneurs should be 
fostered in the process. 
2. Small and medium sized enterprises, as well as the major ones, should be included 
in efforts to utilise an advance technology. 
3. Industrial productivity is enhanced by the development of many minor technologies 
rather than a limited number of major technologies. The strategic goal should be 
commercialisation of technologies rather than simply the development of the 
technologies themselves. 
4. Research and Development activities involved in the assimilation of foreign 
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technologies should be given high priority. Creative adaptation is far more significant 
than mere imitation. Thus, far more capital should be invested in adapting imported 
technologies than is spent on initially adopting them. 
There are also other lessons from Korea's economic growth. Firstly, a stable policy 
environment provides a solid stage for adjusting to internal and external shocks. Secondly, 
investment in both physical and human capital is a key for economic growth, In Korea, 
increased factor inputs alone accounted for an average annual growth rate of over 5% 
during the 1970. Korea's experience should not be construed as an example that a country 
in the midst prolong economic crisis, can simultaneously undertake structural adjustments 
together with restrictive macroeconomics policies, transfer resources abroad and revive 
stagnant growth rate [146]. Korea has become a significant industrial power mainly as a 
resuJt of its proficiency in production. It thus appears that mastery of production engineering 
alone is nearly sufficient for the attainment of an advanced stage of industrial development. 
In the course of its industrialisation, Korea has effectively assimilated various elements of 
foreign technology. Transfers of technology have contnouted importantly to this process. 
Korea has also been pursuing high level economic development over the last several 
decades. It can be said that, in a country like Korea with its limited territory, few natural 
resources and high population density, it is skill and brainpower which provide the base for 
national development. Therefore, Korea put a high priority on industrial development, with 
the emphasis on the development of technology. Korea has also used the lessons of Japanese 
experience very effectively in developing its own policies in the past. The Japanese model 
remains attractive at this juncture, but some important differences are becoming significant. 
In its early stages, Japanese industrial policy relied on some of the same instruments that 
Korea later adopted to encourage investments in infant industry and to develop home 
markets as a base for international competitiveness. But in its later stages, Japanese policy 
has moved away from intervention, focusing instead on information sharing and 
co-ordination, and on indirect, functional support for new activities. In this context, and 
deprived of its earlier powerful tools, Japanese industrial policy has relied heavily on the 
co-operative relationships that connect Japanese business and government, and Japanese 
business and labour [147]. The success of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan has been attnouted by 
many economists to liberalisation or the freeing of markets from government control. 
Liberalisation did indeed occur in Korea about 1965 insofar as the exchange rate was 
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devalued, commercial lending rates were raised, and certain imports were decontrolled 
[148]. 
Korea's enhanced technological capabilities is also reflected in a recent survey of 1,110 
professors, researchers and business experts by the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology. The questionnaire survey on the perception of the community regarding 
Korean technological capabilities reveals that the average time lag in the development of 
technologies between Korea and Japan is four years. It also shows that Korea is five years 
behind the world leaders in advanced technology [149]. The experience of the Republic of 
Korea, also offers several policy implications for other less developed countries. Firstly, 
small entrepreneurial firms can be an important source of innovation and employment 
generation, even in less developed countries. Thus, the government in less developed 
countries should foster the formation of small entrepreneurial enterprises. Secondly, the 
public policies that promote the formation and growth of small entrepreneurial enterprises 
should be implemented early enough to create an environment for entrepreneurs to exercise 
their innovative sprit. Thirdly, small entrepreneurial enterprises that lack the expertise and 
resources to negotiate and import foreign technology through formal channel can benefit 
from informal transfer of technology through economic activities of foreign enterprises 
[150]. However, Lee (1992) believed that Korean model can not easily be replicated in 
many of the developing countries because the conditions that fuelled Korean growth do not 
exist in most developing countries [151]. Therefore, even though there seem to be some 
general features in the Korean experience that can be applied to the other LDCs, one should 
say that there are so many circumstances that are crucial yet unique to Korea. Hence, the 
Korean model is not easily replicated in other developing countries because it is heavily 
defined by institution. Some important institutional indicators such as education, literacy 
rates, ability in tax collection and organisational structure suggest that Korea has the highest 
institutional capability required to upgrade industrial technologies. However, institutional 
capabilities for technological development are very much influenced by the country's 
industrial strategies and policies. Korea has largely patterned its technology importation 
policies after Japan which further strengthened institutional technology capability. 
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APPENDIXB: 
TAIWAN EXPERIENCE OF TECHNOWGY AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
The successful experience of Taiwan, which has had one of the most rapid growth rate 
during the last three decades, has attracted several decision makers in other developing 
countries in order to replicate its model to their own country. Taiwan GNP growth rate 
increased from an average of 7.5 per cent in 1950s to an average of 9.7 per cent in 1960s, 
and 9.6 per cent in 1970s, and reached an average growth rate of 7.8 per cent in 1980s [I]. 
The success of Taiwan's economic and technological development, as investigated by many 
scholars, can be attnDuted to several factors which are more or less common factors of 
success among Asian Newly Industrialised Cmmtries (NICs). Some of the important factors 
of Taiwan's rapid economic growth can be listed as follows [2]: 
1. The existing of well-developed infrastructure and human resource laid by Japan 
between 1895 and 1945. 
2. US and Japanese economic aid (mostly 1950s and early 1960s). 
3. Early emphasis on agricuhure, including land reform, the spreading of improvements 
in technology, and the increase of inputs, such as water, fertiliser, and pesticide. 
4. The experience of the people who are willing to learn and to work hard. 
(Confucianism) 
5. The presence of a large group of trained and experienced professionals emigrated 
from the mainland. 
6. Export promotion policies 
7. The role offoreign technology. 
8. Social and macroeconomic stability. 
9. The government role. 
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According to the Kao (1991) the man-made "miracle" of the economic development in 
Taiwan can be concluded into three main forces [3]: 
1. Appropriate strategy of the government for economic development. 
2 Sensitivity of the industrial and commercial circles in catching the advantageous 
opportunity for investment. 
3. Hardworking labour dedicated to production. 
Brick (1992) has also pointed out to general factors such as a relatively modem 
infrastructure founded during the Japanese colonisation period; generous American military 
and economic assistance in post world war era; a Confucian work ethic and authoritarian 
political tradition. But the most significant factor in Taiwan's success as he believed is the 
filct that the island has taken full advantage of the opportunities free world trade has offered, 
that is, the export promotion policies [4]. Another study emphasised factors such as the 
ability and orientation of the government, the pursuit of an essentially free enterprise system, 
the impressive investment in human capital particularly in areas vital to economic 
transformation, and the critical role of post-war mainland immigrants, which produced the 
domestic environment and the incentive for transforming Taiwan from an agriculture 
economy to an industrial economy within the short period of a quarter of a century [5]. Tsai 
(1995) refers to some success factors for Taiwan's economic miracle, such as the successful 
Jandreformpolicy, the timely availability of US aid in the period 1950-1965, the upgrading 
of education, a stable social and political environment, the high employment rate, well-
planned investment in infrastructure, outstanding management skills, and government 
guidance. But the most significant factor of Taiwan's success, as he added, has been ~e 
effective development and utilisation of its human resources [6]. 
According to the Lin (1994), the success of the Taiwan's rapid growth can be attributed to 
many factors such as appropriate industrial policy, a stable fiscal and monetary policies, 
social reform, human resources and technology development in the country [7]. In a survey 
of industrial policy, productivity growth, and structural change in manufacturing industries 
in both Taiwan and S. Korea, DoDar and Sokoloff(1994) believe that a rapid accumulation 
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of physical capital, human capital, and technology have been the most important factors of 
the rapid industrialisation in both countries. They also refer to some other success factors, 
including high savings rate, strong investment in education, and export-oriented growth 
strategy that accelerated industrial and technological development in both S.Korea and 
Taiwan. Private initiative, they argue, was key to the accumulation of these factors, although 
it was government policies in both countries which played a key supporting role in providing 
a favourable environment for saving and investing [8]. The economic success of Taiwan can 
also be explained by the work ethic of the people, with their hardworking, productive and 
relatively high average standard of educational attainment. Confucianism, which advocates 
obedience, hard work, and respect for the learned, has been commonly regarded as the 
consistent factor for this characteristic of the labour force in Taiwan. However as was 
mentioned in the case of South Korea, it has been said that the weak investment in high 
technology sectors in Taiwan can be attn'buted to the same source, that is, Confucian 
culture. It is also argued that the success of Taiwan can be specifically attn'buted to cultural 
factors favouring development, excellent management of the economy, the favourable 
international and technological climate for growth, and quite simply hard work and 
dedication [9]. 
The role of an authoritarian government has been another internal factor affecting Taiwan's 
success. As Pang (1992) through an analytical framework from the state-centric approach 
discovered that the most crucial factor determining Taiwan's success was a relatively capable 
and autonomous state. He added that all of the other factors contn'buting to the miraculous 
accomplishments on the island could to a certain degree and in a certain way be linked to 
this central factor [10]. It is believed that a soft authoritarian regime like that of Taiwan, 
might be useful in ensuring the stable political and social environment necessary for 
economic development and modernisation. Moreover, the land reform and developing of 
agricultural sector in early years of Taiwan's development has also been among the internal 
factors of success [11]. One can also add the role of the educated elite in the second largest 
migration in Chinese history as another element in Taiwan's prosperity. Most of these 
migrants probably understood that the government's legitimacy would depend on a great 
extent on its economic performance. 
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B.I THE ROLE OF EXPORT PROMOTION POLICY 
One significant success factor of Taiwan's rapid growth has been its export promotion 
policy. As most studies such as Kuo (1983) refer to export promotion policy as a major 
contribution of to rapid development of Taiwan [12]. It is believed that the adoption of the 
export-led industrialisation was formed by the fact that Taiwan is a small island with limited 
natural resources, and also by immediate pressures, such as unemployment, shortage of 
foreign exchange, and even the advice of the U.S. aid. It is also argued that the shift of 
industrialisation policy from import substitution to export promotion during the late 1950s 
and the early 1960s was an important factor in supporting export expansion and increasing 
the production and growth rate [13]. The export-expansion strategy was clearly instrumental 
and helpful in Taiwan's success. Since adopting export-oriented strategy in the mid-1960s 
the growth national product (GNP) of Taiwan has grown by an average of about 8.9 percent 
per year, with the annual growth rate of industrial manufacturing, averaging 13.4 percent 
in real terms. As a result, the share of exports in GNP increased from below 10 percent in 
the 1950s to 60 percent in the 1980s. The value of exports increased from U.S.S 0.2 billion 
in 1965 to U.S. S50 billion in 1987 [14]. As a result of the adoption of export promotion 
policies, Taiwan moved from being the world's sixty-fourth biggest exporter in 1962 to 
being eleventh in 1986. By early 1988, Taiwan also ranked sixth in the world in terms of 
product value, accounting for almost 4 percent of total world production. The Taiwan's 
major exports in 1986 included electronics products (15.7 percent), garments (13 per cent), 
textile products (10.2 percent), metal and articles ( 5.3 per cent), and other manufactures 
(10.8 per cent) [15]. 
Having considered the rapid growth rate of manufactured output, the share of manufactured 
products in total exports rose from 28 percent in 1960 to 77 percent in 1970 and reached 
to 95.9 percent by 1993 [16]. During the early phase of export promotion policies, exports 
were encouraged by allowing a rebate on customs duties paid for imported materials used 
for export production, tax incentives, low interest loans and credits for exporters, direct 
subsidies, and government-sponsored export promotion and marketing facilities [17]. 
Taiwan's intense dedication to expanding its exports since the 1960s can be readily 
discovered in its ever present slogan of "everything is for export" which appeared on most 
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of the public buildings. However, it should be noted that Taiwanese firms' race to maximise 
their export productions has brought about serious environmental impacts. One of the key 
factor of Taiwan's export expansion strategy has been its relatively cheap labour force in 
early stages of industrialisation. In other words, for a labour surplus economy, like that of 
Taiwan, the most advantageous factor in competing for export markets was the labour 
force. Slowly increasing real wages was the key factor in promoting exports. Taiwan's 
abundant and cheap labour force, co-ordinated with simple processing technology makes 
its labour-intensive, nondurable consumer goods industries (e.g., textiles, clothing, and 
electronics) very competitive in world markets [18]. However in the later stage of 
industrialisation, because of a gradual rise in real wages, the country found it more difficult 
to compete with low-cost producers in some countries of Southeast Asia and China. 
Therefore, in order to remain competitive in the international markets, Taiwan changed its 
industrial structure by emphasising the higher value-added, more skill-intensive and capital 
intensive manufacturing, and expanding into business and services [19]. 
A particular feature of export expansion in Taiwan is that small and medium enterprises 
(roughly with employees ofless than 100) have played an important role in developing 
foreign markets. For the period from 1978 to 1985, export earnings of small and medium 
enterprises constituted about 65% of total export earnings in Taiwan. Furthermore, these 
small and medium enterprises depend very heavily on foreign markets. More than 70% of 
their total sales came from exports in 1981-1985, and their dependency on exports has 
increased steadily since 1972. Under the terms of export promotion, export firms benefited 
from low-interest export loans, custom duties rebates, and sales and stamp tax exemption 
[20]. It is believed that the participation of small and medium firms in exports, comparing 
with exporters of the S.Korea, made Taiwan's exports flexible and able to respond quickly 
to market conditions [21]. The establishment and expansion of Export Processing Zones 
since the 196Os, has been the next significant step towards increasing exports [22]. In fact, 
Taiwan was the first country which introduced these zones in order to attract foreign 
investment by which export-led industrialisation was expected to be encouraged, thereby 
resulting in employment creation, foreign exchmge earnings and transfer of technology [23]. 
The inauguration of these zones accelerated the flow of foreign technologies to Taiwan 
through training of local personnel and introduction of new manufacturing and marketing 
techniques. 
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However one can say that little direct technology transfer took place in the export 
processing zones. This was because of the predominance of assembly processes, the 
outward-oriented enclave character of these zones, the lack of complex production 
processes and the absence oflocal research and development activities. Most of the products 
manufilctured in these zones are characterised as labour-intensive and generally low-skilled, 
assembly or processing of parts or materials imported by foreign enterprises, such as 
consumer electronics, garments, toys, and electrical machinery. Therefore, it is believed that 
these zones have little effect on productivity improvement [24]. The zones operated like 
foreign enclaves, minimising the amount of contact between the local economy and foreign 
market, except in terms of the workers who moved in and out of the zones in response to 
new or better opportunities. Over time, however, it was the mobility of the labour force that 
proved to be one of the main vehicles for technology and skills transfer, especially in terms 
of middle-level management and technical personnel [25]. A percentage oflocal personnel 
who initially were trained to work in the zones went on to start up their own companies or 
brought their skiDs in to local economy for use in domestic firms. Under the its six-year plan 
(1991-1996), Taiwanese authorities has committed a total of USS 303 billion for 775 
projects including a high-speed railway, highway expansion, petrochemical plants, 
infrastructure for heavy industries, and the development of science and technology. It is 
expected the GNP increased from US $ 8000 in 1990 to US $ 14000 in 1996 and exports 
will reach US S 122.8 billion and imports US S 120.7 billion in 1996, placing Taiwan among 
the top ten countries in the world [26]. 
B.2 THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND FOREIGN DIRECf 
INVESTMENT 
The other significant factor in the Taiwan's successfbl experience has been technology 
transfer. The acquisition of foreign technology has been a very important part of Taiwan's 
science and technology programme, as Taiwan accelerated the transition from mass 
production of labour-intensive consumer goods to the manufacture of sophisticated capital 
and technology-intensive products. The key to Taiwan's ability to make effective use of 
foreign know-how was in its policy that adopted. Foreign technology was essentially viewed 
as a means to overcome domestic limitations for entering overseas markets [27]. Taiwan 
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has employed various methods to transfer foreign technologies. These methods were 
included licensing agreements, imitation, copying, or technology cooperation agreements 
[28]. It is believed that importation of capital goods has been one of the most important 
method of technology acquisition in Taiwan. Modem technology in Taiwan was embodied 
in machinery and equipment imported from abroad. The rapid pace of export-led 
industrialisation led to an increase in rapid rate of capital formation and technical progress 
through financing the importation of capital goods [29]. Technical co-operation particularly 
with Japanese and American firms has also been another important mode of acquiring 
foreign technology for Taiwan. This included purchase of patents, assistance of technicians, 
provision of technical information and blue prints, and personnel training abroad. The most 
important reasons for Taiwanese firms to enter into technical co-operation agreements with 
foreign firms were the development of new products, product quality and management. The 
practices of American and Japanese companies differ considerably in this regard. For Japan, 
technical co-operation became a vehicle to penetrate the Taiwan economy. In other words, 
Japanese firms used such agreements as a means to tie up local firms, by requiring them to 
buy parts, components, or raw materials [30]. 
Most cases of technical co-operation with Japan were focused on labour-intensive 
industries. Even though it led to transferring labour-intensive technology to Taiwan, 
however, it also makes upgrading Taiwan's industrial structure and technological capabilities 
more difficuh because technological dependency has hindered local R&D. It is believed that 
the Japanese enterprises had the lowest amount of research and development activities, with 
only 29.8 percent, in comparison with 76.S percent of the other foreign enterprises [31]. 
It is argued that most Japanese firms transferred technologies to Taiwan through joint 
ventures and licensing agreements, in order to penetrate Taiwan's domestic market for 
exporting to the United States and other countries. As Americans imposed quotas on 
Japanese imports, the Japanese assembled their parts in Taiwan for shipment to the United 
States [32]. In other words, one can say that Japanese firms encouraged technological 
dependence instead of transferring technology. It is believed that this fiilure by Japan to 
transfer its expertise has contn"buted to the fact that Taiwanese technology was relatively 
weak over a wide field. Many products which were imported from Japan, for example in 
electronics field, which could be produced in Taiwan if the technology were available [33]. 
However, it can be said that the Taiwan economy is much more linked with Japan's 
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economy not only in trade relations, but also in terms of acquisition of technology. The 
number of technical co-operation agreements with Japanese firms has been 1,733 since 1988 
more than three times that of US firm 586 cases. The geographic proximity (lower transport 
costs) and socio-cultural similarities (relative ease with which Taiwanese and Japanese 
work with each other) have been among the most important reasons of facilitating Japanese 
capital and technologies into Taiwan. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has also been another major source of technologies for 
Taiwan. It is believed that FDI contributed to Taiwan's economy mostly by introducing new 
technology. FDI fostered competition in the domestic market, helped to open up more 
foreign markets, and diftUsed new technologies. Between 1952 and the end of 1985, the 
number of approved investments from overseas Chinese and foreigners, grew to close to 
3,500 projects with an approved investment vohune of US $ 5.2 billion. At the end of 1985, 
47.4% of total foreign investment (without the foreign Chinese) came from the USA, 
20.7% from Japan, 14.2% from Europe and 11.8 % from other countries [34]. There were 
also about 3102 new cases ofIDI with total amolDlt of$ 11,331 million approved in period 
between 1986-1992 [35]. Political stability and domestic economic conditions in Taiwan 
have been among the important factors for Taiwan's ability to attract FDI. In a study of 
finding the major factors influencing MNC's decisions to invest in Taiwan, political stability 
was the third most important reason, after low labour costs and tax incentives [36]. 
According to another survey issued by the Business Environment Risk Index, Taiwan's risk-
index ranking has been ninth among forty-eight countries when factors like political stability, 
attitudes toward foreign investors, degree of nationalisation, administrative efficiency, 
financial structure, comrmmications, availability onong or short-term loans, and the overall 
economic situation are taken into consideration [37]. It is also believed that the supply of 
high quality human capital has been among the important factors for U.S. multinational 
companies to invest in Taiwan [38]. The example of the Singer company investment in 
establishing a sewing machine industry in Taiwan can be among the successful cases of 
Taiwan's technology acquisition through FDI. It is believed that the Singer company's 
investment in Taiwan sewing machinery in 1963 created significant potentials through 
providing technical assistance, and thereby contributed to its growth. Some factors 
contributed to Taiwan's success in growth rate of its sewing industry. Firstly, Taiwan's 
sewing machine assemblers and parts producers were receptive to new ideas and willing to 
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change. Second, the technology provided by Singer involved little or no capital expenditure, 
and hence its di1fusion was not only easier but cheaper [39]. 
In the past, over 90 percent of direct foreign investment in Taiwan went into manufacturing, 
partly because of restrictions on entry into other sectors, such as finance and insurance. 
Between 1952 and 1986, electrical and electronic appliances claimed the largest share of 
foreign investment, 30 percent of the total, fonowed by chemicals (15 per cent) services (11 
per cent), machinery, equipment and instruments (10 per cent), basic metals and metal 
products (7 per cent), non-metallic minerals (6 per cent), and banking and insurance (5 per 
cent) [40]. Taiwan has also invested in other countries particularly some of the other East-
Asian countries (ASEAN). Taiwan has been the largest and second largest foreign investor 
in the Philippines and Thailand respectively and also one of the top investors in Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Taiwan firms have also sold technology to local firms in these countries. 
After 1991, however, mainland China became the most popular country for Taiwanese 
investors [41]. For example, Taiwan technology dominates the booming shrimp-fimning 
industry in the Philippines and Thailand. Taiwan outward investment in manufacturing 
comes mostly from young home-based multinationals in the electronics and petrochemical 
industries. Taiwan's investments abroad has been motivated mainly by the economic factors 
such as the need to source cheaper inputs and products (mainly in ASEAN), to access new 
technologies (mainly in developed countries), to avoid protectionism (in developing 
colDltries), and to access new markets (throughout the world). The government in Taiwan 
had maintained a moderate to conservative attitude in monitoring, regulating, and 
controlling foreign investment despite its constant efforts of improving the investment 
climate. The state had defined what had been conducive to the society and economy through 
its evaluation of domestic and international situations and used various policy instruments 
under its control to utilise the foreign capital to achieve its goal. Although there were 
limitations to such state regulations and control, Taiwan had prevented the dominance of 
MNCs in most of its manufacturing industries. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the participation of foreign capital in Taiwan's domestic firms 
did indeed lead to their use offoreign technology. More than anything else, FDI contributed 
to Taiwan's economy by introducing new technology. That is, FDI constantly fostered 
competition in the domestic market, helped to open up more foreign markets, and diffused 
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new technologies. Taiwan has followed a relatively unrestricted and open FDI policy. For 
instance, Taiwan permitted the importation of second-hand machinery as investment capital, 
which neither harmed the local machinery industry nor impaired the efficient use of that 
particular capital [42]. Taiwan's policy in FDI and technology transfer also provided a 
reasonably good infrastructure and incentives for export-oriented environment which helped 
create many jobs. Thus, it become clear that Taiwan similar to other successful NICs, has 
achieved considerable success in assimilating foreign technology because of the suitable 
combination of well-implemented out-ward looking government policies and the 
strengthening the domestic technological capability. 
B.3 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT'S INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
POLICIES 
The other important factor of Taiwan's success is the role of state in providing basic 
infrastructure, controlling taxes and giving incentives and subsidies for the industrialisation 
of the country [43]. The state is also perceived to manage the processes of foreign 
technology acquisition in such a way as to maximise the impact of this technology on the 
local economy [44]. The state played a crucial role in the initial stage of the Taiwan's 
industrial development in the 1970s, and has continued to provide help and subsidies until 
the present time. Substantial government investments in infrastructure and human capital 
provided a vital prerequisite for rapid development. One can refer to two overall reasons for 
the crucial role of state in development of science and technology in Taiwan. The first 
reason as discussed earlier is the government in Taiwan was able to make heavier investment 
to develop the infrastructure. The other reason was the belief that market forces alone 
cannot lead to the desired speed and pattern of science and technology development [45]. 
The significant role of state in the successful experience of development of Taiwan has been 
due in part to the government's ability to modify policies and strategies when changing 
conditions so required. That is, when previously prescnoed policies and measures could not 
resolve new problems or difficulties, policy makers were always ready to propose new 
strategies and introduce new policies. Therefore, the formulation and implementation of 
these strategies and policies were products of informed and precise political and economic 
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calculations of the policy makers in Taiwan. Hence, the experience of Taiwan's success is 
called a man-made miracle. Having surveyed the active role of government as the 
entrepreneur and organiser in promoting the petrochemical industry, Chu (1994) shows that 
state have been leading the development in the ~ly stages of Taiwan's industrialisation. 
He concluded that the success of Taiwan and other Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) 
can mainly be explained to the use of both ,..-ket mechanism and state intervention [46]. 
In Taiwan, as in the other NICs, national government controls, along with the strengthening 
of local technological capability, have played an important role in term of successful 
technology transfer. The government had recognised very early that science and technology 
was to become a major thrust for economic growth and national competitiveness. Therefore, 
improving and promoting industrial technology and local technological capability was 
regarded as an integral part of the countryt s national program. The government policies to 
promote some strategic and defence related industries in early 1980s which had a significant 
impact on the development ofhigh technology industries in Taiwan can be a good example, 
explaining the critical role of state in enhancing technological capability in Taiwan [47]. 
One of the most important government industrial strategies has been the financial and tax 
policies designed to encourage domestic firms to adopt new technologies and innovations. 
It can be said that the finance system in Taiwan played an important role in its success. The 
Taiwan government employs a credit financial system, rather than the usual capital financial 
system firvoured by developed colDltries. In Taiwan, the government uses interest rates and 
foreign exchange controls to influence decision making in the private sector. This seems to 
be another effective way of persuading industries to cooperate with the government's 
development strategies. Moreover, in terms of the technological development, a number of 
related policies have been implemented aimed at improving the process of technological 
capability. These policies, including reducing taxes on importing technology and regulating 
the activities of foreign firms regarding direct investments, accelerated the flow of foreign 
technologies to the country. In Taiwan, the key to the exploitation of technology has been 
the adoption of strategies and policies by the government and firms to gradually reduce price 
distortions and barriers to competition, with the purpose of achieving a better functioning 
market economy, on the one hand, and the improving the quality of human resources to 
increase the efficiency of the work force, on the other. As a result, sustained economic 
growth along with equity in distribution has been attained with the continuous absorption 
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of new technologies. 
Ahhough Taiwan was rapidly h"beralising its economy, the government continued to playa 
guiding role in economic restructuring. In particular, since the 1980s it has intensified efforts 
to ensure that transfers of technology enhance the country's technological capabilities. The 
government in Taiwan pursued the strategy of industrial upgrading and technological 
development of the country also by encouraging local research and development activities 
and relaxing and h'beralising many of regulations governing foreign direct investment. As 
Denis Simon (1988) indicated, Taiwan has been fairly successful in promoting technology 
transfers to he1p upgrade its industrial structure [48]. In order to assess technological policy 
and to evaluate technological upgrading plans, the Science and Technology Advisory Group 
(STAG) was formed in 1979. There were other organisations such as National Science 
Council, the Council for Economic Planning and Development, the Industrial Development 
Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Industrial Technology Research 
Institute which founded to participate in the formulation of science and technology policy 
in the country. The role of Industrial Technology Research Institute can be compared with 
that of the Korea's Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) [49]. ITRrS 
most important role has been as a partner in high-priority government-inspired projects. 
Once the technology was received and mastered, ITRI then worked to diffuse the 
technology into the local market. ITRrs acquisition and development of new industrial 
technologies has led to structural changes and prosperous growth in many of the Taiwan's 
industries. In line with the government initiatives, ITRI has also provided technical 
assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises. It has also trained specialists in industrial 
technology to meet the needs of the Taiwan industries. 
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Source: Ching, IT. Technology in Society, Vol 10, No. 10, pp: 185-204. 
In Taiwan, technology transfer has been carried out through many other channels including 
seminars, workshops, training, consultation services, industrial transfer and join introduction 
offoreign technology. In 1992, the Industrial Technology Research Institute conducted over 
600 technical seminars, conferences, exhibits, and provided technical services to over 10,000 
companies. ITRI has also been benefited from corporations with many international 
organisations. As an example, the Taiwan semiconductor Manufacturing (TSMC), was 
completed in 1987 by joint venture with Philips of the Netherlands [50]. The government 
also built an approximately 35 square mile industrial park to assist the development and 
growth of high-tech industries. Unlike the earlier established Export Processing Zones, only 
high-tech corporations were allowed to operate in the park. There were a number of 
incentives such as low interest loans and generous tax advantages in order to attract foreign 
investors and overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to establish high-tech businesses in the park. 
Moreover, the park provided a base for Taiwan's shift from labour to knowledge-intensive 
production. The state has used a variety of means to ensure that the process and nature of 
technology transfer in the park will accord with its own objectives for future development 
of the country. The government also established funding for venture capital, financed high-
level research and development projects, and offered elaborate management and marketing 
assistance in order to promote the development of strategic industries such as computer and 
electronics industries [51]. The state has also provided a set of attractive incentives and 
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regulation for accelerating the flow of foreign technology and also for an effective and 
successful technology transfer. For example, according to the 1964 statute, an agreement 
for the purchase of a product or process technology can be made only if one of these 
conditions are met [52]: 
1. the agreement involves the production of a new product; 
2. the new technology will increase the volume of production, improve quality, or 
reduce production costs; or 
3. the new technology will lead to improvements in management or operation 
efficiency. 
The state also provided technical support to the industry sector through government-owned 
R&D institutes and universities. The state also invested, selectively, in a small number of 
companies working in scale-intensive, high - technology upstream sectors such as 
semiconductors [53]. Other activities of the state to improve the technological environment 
include development of a strategic plan for the creation of a viable informatics industry on 
Taiwan. The success of Taiwan's informatics and electronics industry has relied on the fine 
co-operation between government and the private sector. Once the private sector acquired 
the necessary conditions for development, the government adjusted its mission and role, 
preventing industrial policy from becoming rigid and avoiding the disastrous results arising 
from protectionism. Therefore the government in Taiwan by using an effective set of 
policies attempted to link the acquisition of selective technology with ongoing efforts to 
build up an indigenous science and technology capability. As a result, the government 
offered a large number of incentives to local industries to expand their investment in 
research and development activities in order to promote technological self-sufficiency. The 
state is also in charge with the task of further improving the environment and infrastructure. 
The state has encouraged the private sector in order to cooperate actively in building up 
indigenous S&T capacity. However, most of Taiwan's firms remained small or middle-
sized, and lacked the capital to invest in R&D filcilities and programs. Because of the limited 
size of the domestic firms in Taiwan, there has been little incentives for foreign companies 
to transfer technology through formal channels such as FDI and licensing. As a result, the 
"learning by doing" phenomenon has been tairly widespread among the Taiwanese local 
firms. 
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B.4 THE ROLE OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVEWPMENT 
The government of Taiwan has also made major investments in education and training, 
especially in the fields of engineering and science. As explained earlier, it is widely believed 
that the high educational and skill levels of Taiwan has been a major element of its success 
[54]. It is believed that education in engineering and other applied sciences is the most 
effective way of closing the very wide technological gap between the developed and the 
developing cOlmtries. Modem economic development is based essentially on technological 
knowledge. Taiwan's priority on technological education has therefore been as an indicator 
of its rapid industrial development. The government developed education at all levels to 
promote the overall quality of Taiwan's human labours. The strong educational policy the 
government adopted greatly improved the quality of the labour force and hence contn"buted 
to industrial development. An effective and modem primary education system was 
established during the period of Japanese occupation. Government policy has been important 
in promoting the educational level. Aside from its decisive role in shaping the entire 
educational system, the government has also devoted substantial amounts of money to 
education. Government expenditure for public education increased quickly in real terms 
from NT $ 4.4 billion in 1952 (1.7 percent of the GNP) to NT $ 162 billion ( 5.2 percent of 
the GNP) in 1988. The number of schools at all levels increased from 1,769 in 1952-53 to 
6,684 in 1990-91, and the percentage of the population with higher degrees rose from 0.12 
percent in the early 1950s to 2.27 percent in the early 1990s. The quality of education as 
measured by the level of public expenditure per student improved substantially. Public 
expenditure per student in real 1986 prices rose markedly from NT $ 2100 to NT $ 16,000 
at the primary level, from NT $ 9,500 to NT $ 26,600 at the secondary level [55]. 
Attending college or graduate school has also been the ultimate goal of the majority of the 
most of Taiwanese students. Between 1952 and 1988, the total number of college students 
rose rapidly, from 10,000 to 496,000. The number of graduate students grew from 0.1 to 
4.5 percent of this total. While in 1952, there were only four universities and four junior 
colleges, by 1989, Taiwan had 42 universities and 75 polytechnics or colleges [56]. 
Moreover, there was a sharp increase in the number of graduates in science and technology, 
which the ratio of S&T graduates to total graduates rose from 43.3 % in 1972 to 57.4 % 
443 
in 1992, and the majority of all graduates since 1981 have been S&T graduates [57]. The 
growth of educational opportunities has significantly improved the level of educational 
attainment of the labour force. Both formal education and post-school job training were 
important to the improvement of human resources, but formal education has widely 
recognised to be more crucial for Taiwan's educational expansion [58]. The impressive 
improvement in the quality of human resources obtained through increased investment in 
education has provided general human capital for the economy on the whole. The 
government substantial investment in human resources led to improving the quality of its 
workforce. Therefore, the improvement of the human knowledge and skills can be indeed 
the key to faster economic development. Despite of the Taiwan's very successful experience 
of development of its human resources, Taiwan suffered from a brain drain problem during 
the 1960s to the early 1980s. Many Chinese students who finished their advanced studies 
abroad did not return to Taiwan. Since mid-1980s, however, as Taiwan became a newly 
industrialised countries with a relatively high standard of living, the situation has been 
reversed, which many overseas chinese came back to Taiwan, bringing with them the new 
knowledge and technical and managerial skills [59]. 
Taiwan's total expenditure on Research and Development activity has increased from 0.48 
percent of GNP in 1978, equalling about $ 111 million to about 1.16 percent of GNP in 
1987 and reached to 1.65 percent in 1990. It means that R&D spending in Taiwan grew at 
an average annual rate of 12.1 percent, which has been faster than that of Japan (4.1 
percent) but slower than that of South Korea (14.3 percent) [60].The number of researchers 
also rose by 12.2% per year during the period between 1983-1990, and the annual 
expenditure per researcher increased from NT $ 0.92 million to NT S 1.65 million, or at an 
annual rate of6.8 % [61]. However, Taiwan's R&D expenditure per GNP (1.65%), has 
been less than that of U.S. (2.69%) and Japan (2.77%) and Korea (1.92%) [62]. The 
number of patents applied for in Taiwan has also remarkably increased. There were 10,411 
patents applied for in 1979, including 3,075 applications for patent device, 5,320 for utilities 
and 2,016 for new design. The number of patents applied for in 1983, amounting to 19,429, 
with 4,747 for patent devices, 9,029 for utilities and 5,653 for new design. The number of 
applications for patent devices per 10,000 people in Taiwan was 2.6 in comparison with 1.6 
and 21.3 in South Korea and Japan respectively. 
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In Taiwan, private sector has generally been weak in technological innovation. More than 
50 to 65 % of total R&D expenditure was undertaken by the public sector in the period 
between 1977 and 1988, and 32 to 47 % by private enterprises. Within private industry, the 
manufacturing sector had the highest R&D expenditure, which amounted to 95% of sales 
[63]. The weak capability of private sector in R&D activity however has mainly because of 
the lack of research capabilities of the prevailing small-and medium-sized manufacturing 
enterprises. Having considered three factors involved in transferring technology to Taiwan, 
that is, the government, foreign corporations, and local enterprises, one can say that the 
government has had the most control over the process of technology transfer. The function 
ofgovemment as a direct producer, however, has become less important in recent years, as 
private enterprises have shown themselves to be far more efficient in. that capacity. 
Nevertheless, government has remained as a leading player in the provision of public 
infrastructure which is essential to a dynamic investment climate and continued growth. 
Another important factor contnDuting to the Taiwan's successful economic development 
was the systematic, regular manner in. which development policy was implemented. As an 
example, one can refer to a systematic approach which was taken in targeting industries for 
development. In the earlier stages of industrial development, emphasis was placed more on 
the labour-intensive industries producing essential consumer goods. After a firm foundation 
had been created for these industries, Taiwan graduaHy shifted emphasis to more capital and 
technology intensive industries, manufacturing producer goods and consumer durable, and 
its strategy. 
B.~ THE US AND JAPANESE AID 
Another factor in Taiwan's successful industrial and technological development can be seen 
in the US and Japanese aid and investment since early stages of industrialisation of Taiwan. 
It is believed that the massive US financial aid helped Taiwan to solve its serious twin 
budget deficit and balance of payments deficit problems during the post-war economic 
recovery of Taiwan [64]. As it is discussed earlier, the US firms have also been a principal 
source offoreign investment and technology into Taiwan, and just as Taiwan has changed 
the focus of its activity away from simple, low-cost labour assembly operations to 
concentrate on high-technology sectors such as informatics and microelectronics, the 
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technological nature of American investments has shifted in the same direction. Taiwanese 
authorities devoted 26 percent of US aid to human resources development including 
personnel training in management, and 44.3 percent of the US financial aid was allocated 
to improving infrastructure, such as transportation, comnnmication, electricity [65]. 
Moreover, the US market has been the traditional target for a large percentage of Taiwan's 
exports. In spite of the approximately 50 per cent of Taiwan's exports going to countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region in 1992, the fact remains that many of Taiwan's exports are designed 
for use in the American market. The US has also been the main training ground for Taiwan's 
engineers and scientists, a larger percentage of whom returning home after receiving their 
education at the graduate level in America. Despite of this substantial financial aid to 
Taiwan in its early years of industrialisation, it is believed that the US aid was not the main 
factor in explaining Taiwan's miracle [66]. 
The Japanese has also played a very significant role in the Taiwan's success. As indicated 
earlier, according to some statistics on both foreign investment and technical co-operation 
reveal this fact that the Japanese companies have had more than twice as many cases of 
foreign investments with approximately $ 4.20 billion since 1991 and the number of 
Japanese technical co-operation agreements with Taiwan (2182) at the end of 1991 reveal 
another similar fact. Some observers have also believed that Taiwan's success was no more 
than a by-product of Japan's growth. Taiwanese labour employed Japanese machinery to 
produce goods for export to the Unites states. 
B.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In sum, Taiwan has undergone a fundamental change of status in the changeable 
international political-economic environment. Taiwan climbed from the bottom of the worid 
capitalist system to middle level as a newly industrialising country. Its economic system 
shifted from a closed system insulated from the external forces to a highly open system 
deeply involved in the international market. There has also been a major s1rlft from small 
scale labour intensive technologies to more capital intensive and high technology intensive 
manufacturing products. 
Having compared the experience of Taiwan with that of Korea, one can notice to some 
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similarities and differences. Taiwan and South Korea demonstrated important common 
features. Both Korea and Taiwan were under Japanese colonial rule during the specific 
period of time. There is a limited natural resources in both Korea and Taiwan, but they have 
a good human resource base. Both Taiwan and Korea followed similar development 
patterns, for instance, export-oriented policies, heavy and chemical industrialisation drive 
and liberalisation policies. There has been high level of rapid growth for both South Korea 
and Taiwan since 1960s. There were a similar tendency for both to move into the same 
pattern of fluctuations in the 1960s as the domestic economy of each became increasingly 
directed by the same external markets. There has also been similar shift to the drive for 
heavy industry in the 1970s. In spite of a slightly decline in their rapid growth in early 80' s, 
both countries have attempted to make the transition to a modem, technically advanced 
industrialised economy. However, one can refer to some different patterns and differences 
between these two countries such as the differences in the commodity composition of 
exports and in their scale in domestic production. Moreover, while S.Korea imposed 
restricted regulation on the Foreign Direct Investment (FOI), there has been a greater 
reliance on FOI for Taiwan as a channel of foreign technology acquisition [67]. Having 
compared the technology transfer modes of Taiwan and S.Korea, one can find out that, 
unlike S.Korea, where technologies were mostly transferred in the form of an arm's-length 
relationship with foreign firms and licensing, Taiwan relied more on the foreign investment 
and subcontracting as a means to acquire technology [68]. 
Due to the fact that Taiwan reached the take-off stage earlier than did South Korea, South 
Korea learned from Taiwan's experience before the 1970s and then started to learn more 
from Japan's experience after that. In other words, one can say that both South Korea and 
Taiwan have learned from each other. In both countries, the role of state in rapid economic 
and industrial development has been very significant. The state in S.Korea and Taiwan 
shares several common features, such as tendency of both countries to be strong, 
centralised, authoritarian, and deeply involved in their national economies. However, in 
Taiwan, the role of state has been much more moderate in comparison with that of S.Korea. 
In other words, while the state does not seem to have intervened in such detail as in Korea, 
it has none the less exercised the specific controls. Moreover, the government in South 
Korea has tended to enforce its policies to larger-sized enterprises, Taiwan's government has 
aimed to create an economic environment conductive to growth, with more emphasise on 
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the small-sized firms. Economic planning in Taiwan has been somewhat less extreme than 
in South Korea. The Taiwanese state has a1so exercised less direct control over private firms 
and intervenes in the economy through a large number of state-owned enterprises in key 
industrial sectors. The impact of export-oriented industrialisation policies on the social 
structure in each country was also different. While South Korea emphasised more the use 
of abundant labour as the major input factor of export promotion policy, Taiwan attnouted 
to a higher degree of capital intensity in export products. The state in both S.Korea and 
Taiwan has played an active role in suppressing labour movements through the corporatist 
control of labour unions. However, the Taiwanese state has been more welfare-oriented, 
paying greater attention to equity problems than the Korean state. Consequently, greater 
inequality in income distnoution has developed in S.Korea than in Taiwan [69]. 
As indicated earlier, both S.Korea and Taiwan pursued the heavy and chemical 
industrialisation drive in 1970s to upgrade their industrial structures. However, while 
S.Korea viewed it as a supportive for their national exports, Taiwan used it for the 
strengthening its existing industries. Moreover, while in Korea it was process-type industries 
like basic materials and petrochemicals in Taiwan it was machinery industries that led the 
shift of industrial activities toward the Heavy and Chemical Industries derive of 19705. 
Taiwan established a substantial technological and managerial basis in machinery and 
electronics in 1980s. On the other hand, Korea continued to rely on basic materials 
(especially iron and steel) and petrochemicals as a important base of its industrial 
development in 1980s [70]. It is also worth noting that while in Korea, the Heavy and 
Chemical Industrialisation (HCI) program became very large and absorbed more than half 
of an the industrial investment for several years, the HCI drive in Taiwan was quite limited. 
Heavy industry in Korea has been twice as capital intensive as heavy industry in Taiwan 
[71]. In both Korea and Taiwan, the overall objective during the early years of development 
was a desire to increase economic productivity. However, in Korea, the relative importance 
of this objective appears to have decreased vis a vis social development and consideration 
of price and economic stability. In Taiwan, on the other hand, productivity of economic 
sectors remained the leading consideration in infrastructure decision making until very 
recently, when social and budgetary considerations began to play more significant roles. 
Price and economic stability have also been important concerns, but not as important as in 
Korea. Both countries have recognised the need for liberalisation policies and privatisation 
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of infrastructure services. However, they have taken different approaches to these needs and 
have had different experiences of success and failure. In Taiwan, privatisation of 
infrastructure has been slow in evolving because of the lack of private seetor participation 
in infrastructure services. In Korea, privatisation covers a wide range of services. 
In terms of R&D aetivities, whereas excessive conglomerate power appeared to be an 
obstacle to innovation in Korea, in Taiwan the cut throat competition among the many small 
Taiwanese producers made profits so small that little was left over for R&D [72]. While 
Korea did not lead Taiwan in terms of economic maturity (i.e., in terms of per capita 
income, Korea has remained about 30 to 40 percent behind Taiwan), it did make the 
distinction between economic and social development objectives of infrastructure earlier and 
more clearly than Taiwan did. There were also some differences between two countries in 
state structure and political history which led to differences in their respective development 
strategy. The most obvious has been the nominally democratic nature of the Korean 
political system imposed by the Americans, compared to the one party structure in Taiwan. 
Having su.nnnarised the success metors ofS.Korea and Taiwan, it can be seen that while for 
S.Korea, important metors such as foreign capitals (heavy foreign borrowing), the big 
business conglomerates, and state interventions have been the most key players in its 
success, in Taiwan, foreign direet investment, small and medium enterprises and its 
appropriate development policies are the major metors. As it is mentioned earlier in the case 
ofK.orea, Taiwan's model of rapid industrial and economic development can have valuable 
lessons for other developing countries. However, it seems difficult for other less developed 
countries to duplicate Taiwan's development strategies, since every country has its own 
institutional and cu1tural characteristics and a unique set ofmctor endowments. Nevertheless 
while Taiwan's experience is unique, being the result of a number of different factors, its 
development process does exhibit features that may be applied to other LDCs trying to build 
up their economies. Thus, it can be said that many of Taiwan's success factors and 
experiences can be very useful for the other less developed countries. LDCs can learn from 
the development experience of Taiwan that the government of a country must have long-
range and fleXl"le plans which can serve as a blueprint for gradual and evolutionary 
development in order to make a direct effort to the rapid development and modernisation. 
The met that Taiwan and S.Korea adopted and adapted successfully the Japanese model of 
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industrialisation shows that the other developing countries can replicate this model to their 
own countries. Moreover, it should be noted that a number of countries in particular those 
of East Asian countries (ASEAN) have been able to follow successfully the Taiwanese and 
Korean model of technological and industrial development. Some policies such as heavy 
investment on the development of quality and quantities of its human resources, promotion 
of the export industries, the significant role of state in choosing appropriate policies and 
strategies and strengthening its technological capability by transferring technology can be 
among the most important and vital policies which might be relevant to most, if not all, 
developing countries. Taiwan's experience also showed that, in order to strengthen technical 
seIVice, specific task forces, independent of R&D organisations and led by strong leaders 
with solid industrial backgrounds, were desirable. Another lesson which can be learned 
from Taiwan's development experience is that in the absence of an already established 
democratic political system, an authoritarian regime, particularly a "soft" authoritarian 
regime like that of Taiwan, might be useful in ensuring the stable political and social 
environment necessary for economic development and modernisation. Such a regime should 
be prepared to use its authority to encourage economic growth. In other words, authority 
and power should only be the means to economic development and political modernisation, 
not an end in themselves. Taiwan's experience also suggests that, for establishing national 
programs of some strategic technologies aiming at commercial applications, an overall 
development framework to upgrade the infrastructure and general capabilities is needed. In 
short, the development experiences of the Taiwan have sufficiently showed that, with long-
term planning and concerted efforts, a society with limited resources, a dense population, 
and almost continuous external pressure can still achieve significant resuhs in the 
industrialisation process. 
Another lesson which can be learned from Taiwan is that Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
should not rely on policies which only aim at protecting selecting industries, but they should 
also choose a directed market approach which allows for development to take place in all 
sectors and leads to substantial productivity and growth rates, technical diftbsion, increased 
employment, and thus to a balanced share of income and to a political and economic stability 
[73]. Taiwan's experience is thus most directly relevant to countries wiDing to accept the 
social and political consequences of growth and willing to allow an economy that, while 
mixed, is primarily market oriented [74]. The economic miracle of Taiwan as it called by 
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Clark (1994) "growth with equity" can be explained in the following three broad trends [75]: 
• a remarkable ability of flexible and rapid response to changes in the economic 
environment; 
• a virtuous cycle of positive reinforcing impacts between social and economic 
development; and 
• generally balanced and complementary economic roles for the public and private 
sectors. 
Having considered Taiwan's experience of very fast transition to a newly developed country 
and assuming that the very rapid growth rate of East Asian countries such as Taiwan 
continues in the future, as Brick (1992) predicted, there likely will be a shift of economic 
power away from Europe and North America to the western Pacific by the middle of the 
twenty-first century [76]. 
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APPENDIXC: 
MALAYSIA'S EXPERIENCE IN INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOWGICAL 
DEVEWPMENT 
Malaysia is a COlDltry in south-east Asia with abundant natural resources and population of 
approximately 17 million. It has vast forest resources and petroleum and natural gas. In 
addition, Malaysia is a large producer of natural rubber (nearly 40 per cent of world output), 
palm oil (60 per cent of world output), and tin (30 per cent). Malaysia is also one of the 
most open economies of Southeast Asia and can be classified in the second-tier Asian NICs 
along with Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. However, some economic and industrial 
indicators, such as an annual average growth of GNP (9 %), the share of manufacturing in 
GDP (31.5%), the share of export-oriented to total manufacturing (50%), and per capita 
income ($ 2,182) indicate to the fact that Malaysia can be classified in the first-tier NICs [1]. 
1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
GOP ($ billion) 4 24.5 31.2 28 32 34.7 37.9 42.7 47.1 58 6 
GOP growth 4.5 7.4 -1.1 1.2 5.4 8.9 9.2 9.7 8.7 7.8 8.5 
rate (%) 
Total exports 1.7 12.9 15.4 14 18 21.1 25 29.5 34.4 40.7 47.1 
($ billion) 
Manufacturing 13.4 22.4 32.8 44 45 48.6 53.9 58.8 64.9 68.9 74.3 
exports 
Table C.l The Important Economic Indicators of Malaysia during the period between 1970-
1993 
Source: Department of Statistics, External Trade Summary, December 1993, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, Annual Report, various years; Bank Negara Malaysia, Quarterly Bulletin, Dec 
1993; Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various years. 
Malaysia's GDP has grown at an annual average rate of6.5 per cent in the 1960s and 
average rate of 7.9 per cent in the 1970s and average growth rate of 9 per cent during early 
1990s. Nearly 40 per cent of this growth was attn'buted to industrial sector (including 
mining, manufacturing, construction and transportation). The share of manufacturing sector 
of GDP has increased from 12 per cent in the 1970 to 22 per cent in 1980 and over 30 
percent in mid-1980s, most of which included electrical and electronics, textiles and food, 
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beverages and tobacco [2]. According to a survey by Kirnrnura (1986) the highest export-
production ratio in 1983 went to electrical machinery (6l.2%), followed by textiles (37.6%), 
machinery (33.2%), and food, tobacco (32.2%) [3]. 
Malaysia pursued an import-substitution strategy in the post-independence period. Import 
substitution in Malaysia has generally involved assembly, packaging and final processing of 
finished goods previously imported from abroad by domestic labour, using machines and 
material largely imported from abroad. Import substitution has also been invariably 
associated with a package of policies aimed at protecting the infant industries in Malaysia 
such as tobacco, furniture, rubber products, wood products, food and beverages. One can 
generally say that the import-substitution strategy helped Malaysia to diversify the economy, 
reduced the excessive dependence on imported consumer goods, utilised some domestic 
natural resources, created employment opportunities, and contributed to country's economic 
growth. Although the lSI policy contributed to some of the Malaysia's growth, it had led 
to inequalities in income and employment, distortions in domestic product policies, 
inefficient, low value added, local products, saturated domestic markets and serious deficits 
in balances of payments. It is also believed that, under import-substitution programmes local 
industries failed to develop competitively either because of tariff protection or disguised 
subsidies in the form of tax relief [4]. 
Moreover, it is believed that Malaysia's heavy industrialisation which has been a second 
stage of import substitution and began in 1981 to develop a heavy industry sector, involved 
massive government barrowings from abroad to invest in almost unprofitable projects 
requiring heavy protection, imports of capital goods, deepening technological dependence 
[5]. Because of the limited domestic market, which was saturated, and the introduction of 
the investment incentives act in 1968, the emphasis of the industrial policy in Malaysia 
quickly shifted to an export promotion strategy. It should be noted, however, that the 
adoption of export-promotion did not mean the entire abandonment of import substitution 
which continued to exist in a parallel fashion. In the Malaysian context, as in the other 
LDCs, adopting the outward-oriented strategy was accompanied by a dehDerate and 
extensive intention to increase exports. 
It can be said that there is a close relationship between growth rates of GNP and exports 
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particularly in Malaysia. Export expansion seems to be a very significant factor contributing 
to the country's economic growth. For instance, one can refer to the sharp decline in growth 
rates of both exports and GNP occurred during the periods 1973-1975, 1975-82 and 1984-
86, which coincided with the periods of world economic recessions. Moreover, the export-
promotion policy has been an important source of growth for the Malaysian manufacturing 
sector since the early 1970s. Over the period 1973-85, Malaysia's growth in manufacturing 
exports to developed countries has exceeded 15 per cent a year. According to a survey by 
the World Bank, Malaysia ranked seventh out of 43 developing countries in terms of 
achievement in the share of manufacturing exports. [6]. Malaysia has become the world's 
largest producer and exporter of room airconditioners; the third largest exporter of semi-
conductors, including microprocessors; and a leading producer of audio- visual equipment 
[7]. 
Malaysia has emerged as a world major exporter of integrated circuits since the late 1970s. 
In terms of value of electrical products exported in 1983, Malaysia had the highest rank 
among other Southeast Asian Countries. There has also been a close relationship between 
the structure of production and that of exports. The high degree of concentration whether 
in terms of output, export or export market contnouted to the diversification in the 
Malaysia's industrial products. By the early 1970s, various new steps, notably the 
establishment of free trade zones, were taken to facilitate and encourage Malaysian 
manufacturing production for export, mainly using imported equipment and material. 
Following the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) act of 1971, the companies established themselves 
in FTZs and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) of Malaysia to export products assembled or 
produced by the Malaysian low-wage labour. Most of these products were in electrical and 
electronics machinery and to lesser extent textiles and clothing. There were about 88 plants 
operating in FTZs in 1983 which mostly involved in the electronics and electrical 
components and textile manufacturing [8]. 
By introduction of these FTZs, the exports of manufacturing grew very rapidly. For 
instance, the export of manufacturing products aCCOlDlted for almost a quarter of all exports 
from Malaysia by 1980. There were about 80,000 employment opportunities created by the 
FfZs, equaDing a1most one eight of the total manufacturing labour-force during the period 
from 1972 to 1979 [9]. Another example is the electronic zone in Pehang which is the 
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world's largest exporter and the third biggest assembler of computer chips. As Warr (1987) 
stated, ''The importance ofFTZs in Malaysia ... is unique among the developing countries 
establishlng these zones. No where else is their role as significant, either in absolute terms 
or as a proportion of overall manufacturing activity". However, as he pointed out " The 
degree of linkages between FTZs firms and the domestic economy, through the purchase 
of domestically produced raw material and capital equipment, has been disappointing" [10]. 
The composition of manufactured exports, as a percentages of total merchandise exports, 
increased from an average of4 per cent in 1960-64 to 22 per cent in 1980- 81. There was 
a significant increase in export of items virtually non-existent in the 1960s such as textiles, 
clothing, electronics, electronics machinery and appliances [11]. There was a need for 
Malaysia in the second stage of export-promotion policy to shift from labour-intensive 
manufactures to more capital and technology-intensive products such as heavy machinery, 
petrochemicals, and generally other resources-based industries in which the country is 
expected to have comparative advantage. Furthermore, there was also a shift towards 
greater privatisation and closer co-operation of state and private sectors in Malaysia. 
Following violent racial riots in May 1969, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
incorporated within the framework of the second Malaysia plan (1971-1975), aiming at two 
broad objectives of promoting the national unity through the increasing income and 
employment levels for all Malaysians and accelerating the process of restructuring the 
Malaysian economy. The twin objectives of poverty alleviation and restructuring society to 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function directed a series of state 
interventions. Under the New Economic Policy, the desire to improve the position of the 
indigenous COTD1D1mity led to increase in state's direct economic role. The government of 
Malaysia attempted to playa more direct and active role in the country's industrialisation 
process following the adoption the of new economic policy. The shift toward a more 
assertive state role in development process was emphasised by NEP as a mechanism to 
redistribute wealth more broadly within the domestic economy. It also attempted to amend 
the imbalance in ownership of equity capital and control of enterprises between foreigners 
and Malaysians. As a result of this shift, the overall involvement of the government in the 
economy rose from 24% of GNP in the 1966-70 period, to 29% in 1971-75,31 % in the 
1976-80 period and peaked the following year 48% [12]. 
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During the first decade of the NEP, Malaysia enjoyed a period of favourable economic 
growth and development. GDP increased at an average annual rate of7.13 % during the 
first half of decade and 8.6 % between 1975 and 1980 which can be comparable with that 
other successful countries in the Southeast Asia [13]. It is generally argued that the 
achievement of the NEP (New Economic Policy) relied more on two factors: continuing 
public support and the state's ability to efficient utilisation of resources and the fiscal 
capability of the state during the NEP which has mostly been due to its large oil and gas 
income during the sharp increases in the oil prices in the 1970s [14]. 
The Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) encouraged the growth of a modem industrial 
sector in the belief that this sector had relatively favourable rates of labour absorption. There 
has also been a decentralisation industrial policy during this period which was supported by 
the Investment Incentives (Amendment) Act of 1973. Enterprises which were located in a 
"locational incentive area" exempted from tax for a period offive to eight years. Despite 
measures designed to promote the decentralisation of the manufacturing industry, these 
locational incentives were relatively ineffective [IS]. In 1974, Malaysiats government 
achieved the Petroleum Development Act (PDA) with the main purpose of controlling over 
exploitation of petroleum resources in Malaysia. Following (PDA), the PETRONAS, a 100 
percent state-oil company, established in 1974, controlled all management decision-making 
in the oil sector including production, refining, and transportation, which used to be 
controlled previously by the foreign oil companies. The Malaysian government also obtained 
a S9 per cent production share of Malaysian oil and gas through production-sharing 
contracts. 
The Industrial Co-ordination Act of 1975 ( ICA) was established with the main objective 
of assisting in the implementation of government industrialisation policies. The Industrial 
Co-ordination Act (ICA) has also aimed at providing for the co-ordination and orderly 
development of manufacturing activities in Malaysia. The Industrial Co-ordination Act was 
also effective in pushing forward the New Economic Policy in the private manufacturing 
sector [16]. The ICA was also the instrument through which the government hoped to 
achieve the objectives of the New Economic Policy in the industrial sector. Under the ICA, 
an firms were also required to submit any agreement signed with any foreign company for 
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approval. Following the implementation of the Industrial Co-ordination Act of 1975, the 
technology transfer unit was established within the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the 
specific purpose of controlling all types of technology agreements. Technical support of 
technology transfer unit is provided by the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(MIDA) which also controlled the quality and quantity of foreign technology transferred 
from abroad. It can also be added that the act provided various means of controlling 
information about existing industry in Malaysia [17]. 
It is believed that ICA has had some negative effects on the Malaysian economy. One of the 
most important impacts ofICA was a significant decline in private and foreign investment. 
There was a substantial decrease in investment, both real and nominal terms following the 
introduction of the Industrial Co-ordination Act of 1975. Figures published by MIDA 
(Malaysian Industrial Development Authority) showed that in 1976, manufacturing 
investment was well below 40 per cent of the target for the third Malaysia plan [18]. This 
can be due to number of factors including concern over the security situation in the country 
which had caused serious worries among local and foreign investors. The ratio of private 
investment to GDP in 1978 was considerably lower than the 1973-74 level. It is believed 
that one of the most important reasons for Malaysia' s high external debt in the early 1980s 
has been the lack of adequate private investment. However, private investment increased 
during the Fifth Plan (1986-1990) at an annual rate of 13 per cent. Much of private 
investment concentrated in the manufacturing sector which led to an increase in the 
manufacturing sector value added of 13.9 per cent during the period of Malaysia Fifth Plan. 
Overall, Malaysia experienced a period of filvourable economic and industrial growth during 
the 1970s. There was an average annual growth rate of 11 per cent in manufacturing value 
added during the period between 1971 and 1975, and the share of manufacturing in GDP 
rose from 12.2 per cent in 1970 to 14.4 per cent in 1975 [19]. Substantial progress was also 
made in terms of job creation, structural transformation and modernisation, poverty 
eradication and restructuring of society. In the third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 manufacturing 
was again accorded a strategic role for achieving the goals of the NEP. The participation 
of Malays and other indigenous groups was also made an important adjunct to industrial 
development. The 1980s saw a decline in Malaysia's economic performance compared with 
its past performance and the contemporary performance of the NICs. Despite the 
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implementation of the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85) which aimed at the growth in 
Malaysia's GDP and continuing the NEP (New Economic Policy) for poverty eradication, 
the export earnings declined mostly because offill1ing commodity prices for rubber, tin, palm 
oil and petroleum during this period [20]. 
When the new government of Dr Mahatir Mohammed took power in 1982, it became clear 
that the extreme interventionist role of government could no longer be counted on to sustain 
growth. Therefore, a privatisation program became an important component of a new 
strategy, with the main objective of reducing the role of government in direct economic 
activity. It was also aimed at two simultaneous goals of reducing government expenditure 
and promoting competition, efficiency and productivity of Malaysian products. In Malaysia, 
privatisation was first formulated as a national policy in 1983. Since 1983, 22 major projects 
have been privatised, mainly through the sale of shares to the public. As a resuh of an 
extensive privatisation program, there has been a significant reduction in financial and 
administrative burden on the government in terms of personnel and financial administration. 
For example, the sale of shares in government controlled industry has reduced government 
borrowing. In terms of personnel, privatisation managed to reduce the work force in 
government departments by about 54,000 [21]. However, privatisation has been hampered, 
not so much by lack of government resources as by private firms difficuhies in raising the 
necessary capital for purchase of government assets. 
By the mid-1980s, public enterprises were made more autonomous with decentralised 
decision making and many were prepared for privatisation. The government replaced local 
managers with foreign managers in order to increase efficiency [22]. The privatisation 
process has recently been accelerated by privatising fifteen major public firms, including the 
largest automobile producer Proton, the telecommunications utility, Telekom Malaysia, and 
the Malaysian Airlines System during the period between 1989-1992. By 1992, 40 public 
enterprises had been taken over by the private sector, and 14 projects involving 
infrastructure and utility construction had been privatised [23]. The government also 
proposed an integrated industrial strategy which emphasised firstly on the expanding of the 
heavy and chemical industries based on domestic resources and secondly on the further 
diversification of the Malaysian industrial structure in particular small scale industries. As 
an example, one can refer to the bicycle industry which showed how it could expand the 
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domestic market with an intermediate degree of factor-intensity [24]. 
As indicated earlier, following the implementation of a heavy industrialisation drive in early 
1980s, a number of heavy industries, including integrated steel mills, petrochemical 
complexes and other plants such as a multi-billion project for building car (Proton Saga) 
based on Japanese technology were established. The Heavy Industries COIporation 
(mCOM) was established in 1980 and was made responsible for developing more capital-
intensive projects. These projects which required a large amount of money led to heavy loan 
servicing for the country. The Proton plant was supposed to increase annual output 
gradually from 80,000 units in 1985 to 120,000 by 1988. However, despite heavy subsidies 
and protection by the government, total car sales for 1987 had declined to about 50,000. 
It has also been argued that each car sale abroad involved a subsidy of at least $ 5000- 6000, 
almost half the sale price. 
In addition to the Proton car project, other heavy industries projects such as steel plants has 
had simi1ar positions. For example, the state-owned steel industry, Perwira Trengganu, had 
a total debt $ 1.35 billion up to March 1988 [25]. Furthermore, these capital-intensive heavy 
industrial plants provided relatively few jobs in the country. It is also believed that 
premature focus on heavy industry has resulted in inefficient allocation of resources which 
affected other resource-based industries [26]. Malaysia's heavy industrialisation policy has 
been accompanied by changes in the composition of output, as Malaysian industry evolved 
from the simple assembly of imported components, to the manufacture of labour-intensive, 
import-substitutes industries and the processing of new materials such as rubber for export. 
The heavy industries policy was also formulated as a means of achieving two not very 
compatible goals, those of accelerating the pace of industrial growth and at the same time 
improving the economic position of Malays relative to those of the other resident 
communities in Malaysia. 
However, as discussed earlier, it can be said that the heavy industrialisation programme has 
produced some negative impacts on the Malaysian economy. Although originally designed 
to generate local linkages, Malaysia's newly established heavy industries remained heavily 
dependent on participation of foreign capital which led to heavy external borrowing. 
Another problem faced by heavy industries in Malaysia has been the relatively small size of 
the domestic market. With a population ofless than 14 million in 1980 and a relatively small 
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domestic market, it has not been easy for many heavy industries to operate at a minjmum 
efficient scale of operation [27]. Malaysia's relatively unsuccessful experience with heavy 
industries can present at least two useful lessons for other LDCs: Firstly, adequate and 
intensive preparation have to be made, at least with respect to technology and human 
resource development as well as the modernisation of small industry before developing 
heavy industry. Heavy industries require a high degree of technical, managerial and 
marketing experience. Secondly, where government intervention has not proved to be 
efficiently and effectively pro-active, the implementation of heavy industries should rely 
more on market forces and private enterprises, rather than on government. 
Malaysia adopted ''look-east'' policy in the early 1980s with the main objective of promoting 
industrialisation and modernisation of Malaysia through learning, particularly with regard 
to labour ethics, discipline, and managerial skills from S. Korea and Japan. It has therefore 
introduced the Japanese and S. Korean model for Malaysia's industrial and technological 
development. This has been more because Japan and Korea suggested development paths 
less threatening to traditional Malay culture. Despite the negative impacts of Japanese 
occupation in wartime, the Malaysian public has generally been positive to Japanese 
investment, products and culture, because of the demonstrated economic success of post-
war Japan. As Dr Mohatir Mohammed noted, Malaysia wants to follow the good values 
of the Japanese such as their large capacity for hard work and integrity. It is also believed 
that adoption of an industrial culture which increased productivity, hard work and financial 
discipline has been a necessary precondition for successful industrialisation in Malaysia [28]. 
However as Bowie (1994) pointed out, ''Malaysia has never closely resembled the 
development state model often associated with Korea and Taiwan" [29]. 
The recession of 1985-86 which was accompanied with an outflow of capital and negative 
growth rate of 1 per cent, led to a government decision in Malaysia to take some new 
measures to encourage local and foreign investments. As.an example, one can refer to some 
specific measures, such as privatisation of state-owned companies and relaxation of the 
regulations on the ownership of the foreign subsidiaries up to 100 per cent. Furthermore, 
the new Promotion of Investment Act (PIA) replaced the previous Investment Act in 1986, 
which provided tax exemption for companies engaged in manufacturing new products or 
undertaking modernisation, expansion or diversification of products. Therefore, with the 
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implementation of these measures, foreign investment increased very sharply by 137 per 
cent in 1988 and 77 per cent in 1989, and the economy grew from 1.2 per cent in 1986 to 
5.4 per cent in 1987, rising to 8.9 per cent in 1988 and 8.8 per cent in 1989. Other measures 
undertaken after 1985 economic crisis in Malaysia included deregulation, h"beralisation and 
greater provision for development of infrastructure. 
Malaysia's government has adopted the Industrial Master Plan (IMP) in 1986 which 
accompanied with Malaysia's Fifth Plan (1986-1990) with the new long-term objectives, 
such as increasing indigenous technological capability and competitiveness in international 
markets in order to reach the advanced level of industrial and technological development. 
The government under the IMP also emphasised the importance of export-led 
industrialisation and promoting manufactured exports. In line with the IMP and to further 
improve the incentives available for the development of the manufacturing sector, the 
Promotion of Investments Act (PIA) was introduced in 1986. Under the PIA, new export 
incentives, as wen as incentives for development of small-scaled industries were introduced. 
The IMP has pointed out that due to Malaysia's growth and development record, it has been 
a relative latecomer to industrialisation. The IMP attn"butes Malaysia's delayed 
industrialisation to its success in developing primary exports. The IMP also admits that 
Malaysian import-substituting industries have been excessively protected. The effective rate 
of protection for the entire sector rose from 25 % in 1962 to 50 % in 1966 and 70 percent 
in 1972. The IMP also realised that export-oriented manufacturing has been heavily 
dominated by two types of industries, namely, "electronics and electrical products" and 
"textiles and garments", which together accounted for $ 6.4 bn or 65 per cent of the $ 9.8 
bn worth of manufactured exports in 1983, of which semiconductor assembly alone 
accounted for 41 per cent [30]. 
While the IMP acknowledged the impressive growth of electronics, it has been argued that 
this sector has had a heavy dependence on production of components, accounting for 80 to 
85 per cent of industry's total output. As an example one can refer to a survey of thirty two 
electronic and electrical products factories, it has been found that only a quarter obtained 
some simple parts, not requiring any advanced technology from local firms, while the 
remaining three quarters imported all their requirements. The IMP has also concentrated on 
development of resource-based industries in which Malaysia has comparative advantage. 
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Therefore 12 major industrial sectors identified; rubber products, palm oil products, food 
processing, wood-based, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, non-metallic mineral products, 
electronic and electrical, machinery, iron and steel, transport equipment, textiles; as leaders 
in the Malaysia's industrialisation programme in the 1990s. In order to be able to compete 
in the international market, these industries need to improve their production efficiency 
through the generating a strong technological and information base along with a good 
technical supporting services [31]. 
In order to accelerate manufacture exports, the IMP provided a series of export incentives 
such as an exemption from tariffs and customs duties. As a result, the export targets set by 
the IMP have been generally achieved by almost all sectors. Even in some industrial sectors, 
the actual export exceeded the IMP export targets. For example, export of electrical and 
electronics industries exceeded the targets by 44.6 per cent in 1986,62.1 percent in 1987 
and 101.6 percent in 1988 for the electronics sub-sector, and by 77 per cent in 1986, 127.1 
per cent in 1987 and 215.1 per cent in 1988 for the electrical sub-sector [32]. However the 
biggest push in Malaysia's export of manufactured products has been from the iron and steel 
industry. The export of iron and steel products grew rapidly over the three year period of 
1986 to 1988, exceeding the IMPs 1986 export target by more than 500 per cent, over 1000 
per cent in 1988 [33]. The Industrial Master Plan also suggested several other measures to 
cope with the bottlenecks in manufacturing sector: firstly, the overall protection of industry 
has to be reduced to promote industrial efficiency. Secondly, the existing imbalances in the 
provision of incentives which exist between import-substitution and export industries have 
to be adjusted in order to attract more export industries. Thirdly, large and medium scale 
export-oriented industries have to be located together in urban regions, whereas small and 
light industries which mainly serve the domestic market encouraged to locate themselves in 
the less developed regions. 
The Malaysian state has adopted relatively similar industrial policy such as Korea and 
Taiwan in order to implement the IMP. Therefore, industrial policy focused more on 
attempts to promote reinvestment, industrial linkages, exports, and training. It can be seen 
that like Korea and unlike Taiwan, industrial policy in Malaysia has favoured more large 
scale industries than small-scale counterparts. It is argued that the main problems faced by 
small industries has been the poor access to credit institutions, technology, management 
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training, marketing, sub-contracting opportunities, suitable sites and premises as well as 
discriminatory government policies and practices [34]. While the IMP accepted the 
significant contribution of foreign direct investment, it has recognised that the heavy 
dependence on foreign investment in some important industries may lead to lack of strong 
indigenous technological capability [35]. The major problems that have affected Malaysian 
industrialisation stated by IMP can be summarised as following: 
1. Technological dependence and lack of indigenous industrial technology capability; 
2. Shortages of engineers and technicians; 
3. Lack of private sector initiatives; 
4. Constraints imposed by NEP (new economic policy) restructuring efforts; 
5. Inadequate incentives for technological development. 
Following its growth of 5.4 per cent in 1987, the Malaysia' s economy has continued to 
grow at an average rate of 8 per cent in late 1980s. This impressive performance has been 
more because of a further change in the nature of development policy. It can be said that the 
emphasis of development for the second half of the 1980s has been more based on growth 
with stability along with improving efficiency. One can say that the IMP enabled industries 
in Malaysia to realise their strength and weaknesses. Moreover, the formulation of the IMP 
has facilitated the preparation of the Technology Action Plan. However there are some 
criticism against it. Some argued that the IMP has been too much in favour of the foreign 
investor at the expense of the domestic investor. Others believed that IMP emphasised more 
on the state intervention model of S. Korea and Japan and ignored the open market oriented 
model of the west [36]. 
Following the successful implementation of IMP, there has been a significant increase in 
output of some particular manufacturing sub-sectors in Malaysia. For example, there was 
annual growth rate of 30 per cent in transport equipment and electrical equipment in 1990 
and 1991. There was also an increase in exports of transport equipment by 68 per cent and 
electrical machinery by 32.1 per cent [37]. However, Malaysia's economy is said by the IMP 
to be characterised by various imbalances, with the manufacturing sector narrowly based on 
a few labour-intensive and resource based industries. The New Economic Policy (NEP) 
whose targets were unlikely to be achieved by 1990 was replaced by the National 
Development Policy. The NDP main objective emphasised the point that Malaysia should 
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become a completely developed country by the year 2020. This objective is supposed to be 
achieved by implementing a number of strategies including an annual average growth rate 
of 7.5 per cent, continuing the process of privatisation and deregulation, widening the 
manufacturing base, promoting small and medium-scale industries and attracting more 
foreign investment by allowing up to 100 per cent foreign equity in export oriented sector. 
The manufacturing sector is expected to provide the main role for achieving the GDP 
growth rate of 7.5 per cent. Following the implementation of the Sixth Malaysia Plan 
(1991-1995), manufacturing sector's share ofGDP has increased from 27 per cent in 1990 
to 32.4 per cent in 1995. 
As Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahatir Mohammed has noted "Malaysia's future depends 
on improved productivity and the ability to sell more and more goods to the world. He also 
promised to reduce the role of government in industry and stressed that the main source of 
economic design [38]. The National Development Policy and the Sixth Five Year Plan has 
placed more emphasis on accelerating the pace of privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
along with improving infrastructure and worker productivity through new training and 
education programs. This can enable the Malaysian economy to absorb rapid increases in 
private investment. Furthermore, there has been high priority for the expansion of the 
transport and communication systems, the upgrading of human resources and the 
development of science and technology during the Sixth Malaysian Plan. 
There has recently been more emphasis on the expansion of private sector. By late 1990, 
over 30 state-owned enterprises had been privatised, with another 68 firms being either 
approved or under consideration for privatisation [39]. Furthermore, the government has 
stressed the need for a collaboration between the public and private sectors through the 
"Malaysia Incorporated" concept. Under the Sixth Five Year Plan, there has been a strong 
shift towards emphasis on industries in which Malaysia has the comparative advantage, 
including natural resource based industries such as wood-based industries, rubber products, 
automobile tyres and latex products for medical uses and electrical and electronics. There 
is also a shift from labour-intensive industrial sector towards supporting a more capital-
intensive and high-technology based industrial sector. The intense global competition for 
investment which intensified with the entry of new competitors such as Latin American 
countries, Vietnam and China, along with the inevitable rising of domestic labour wages are 
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among major reasons for this shift. Therefore, there has been more priority given to export-
oriented, high value added and high technology industries with R&D forming an integral 
component of industrial sector. 
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Figure C.I Malaysia's Industrial Development plan towards the year 2000. 
One of the most important factor of Malaysia's success is believed to be the overall stability 
of its socio-political environment. Despite the differences in ethnic, cuhural, and religious 
composition of its population, it has proven to be a model for inter-racial co-operation and 
harmony for other developing countries [40]. Another important factor that has played a 
significant role in enabling Malaysia to achieve more rapid economic growth, is the 
international competitiveness of its labour-intensive industries, in particular the electronics 
industry. 
C.I THE ROLE OF FDI IN MALAYSIA'S INDUSTRIALISATION 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has played a major role in the country's industrial 
development, not only because of providing product design and industrial technology but 
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also for its overseas market access. It can be said that foreign investment has been a 
dominant factor for Malaysia's industrial development during the 1960s and 1970s. For 
example, in 1970s, foreign investors controlled more than half of the import-substitutes 
manufacturing sector [41]. Malaysia has been the world's third, fourth and fifth largest 
receiver of the FDI in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s respectively, and it has become the 
world's fourth largest receiver ofFDI in early 1990s after China, Singapore and Mexico. It 
has received the total amount ofS 13.2 bn during the period between 1988-1992 [42]. 
Foreign direct investment has contnouted to an average annual rate 8 per cent ofGDP in 
Malaysia during the 1980s. Since 1989 this figure has increased to 19 per cent in recent 
years as a result of more attractive incentives encouraging foreign investors to invest in 
various industrial sectors of Malaysia. Another estimation provided by the Malaysian 
Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), FDI contnoution to manufacturing investment 
has increased from around 40 per cent in 1985 to 58.6 per cent in 1988, 73.8 per cent in 
1989 and 64.4 per cent in 1990 [43]. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan period (1991-1995), 
a total amount ofMS 80,000 million have been invested in the manufacturing sector, of 
which M S33,000 million was FDI [44]. 
As indicated earlier, most foreign capital and investment have been attracted by the 
manufacturing sector in Malaysia, of which scientific and measuring industry, the beverage 
and tobacco industry, and the electrical and electronics industries have had the highest rate 
in attracting FDI in 1986 [45]. However, it should be noted that FDI inflow, in the long 
term, moves towards the industries where Malaysia has a comparative advantage such as 
the electronics and machinery industries. FDI in to Malaysia has been co-ordinatedby the 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) a governmental organisation that has 
created incentives necessary to attract new capital, technology and managerial skills into the 
country [46]. MIDA also provides two major statistical data series on FDI, including an 
estimation of the expected flow of FDI and the actual stock of FDI. In addition, the 
industries divisions of Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) provide most 
information about FDI in industry in the form of manual administrative files containing all 
correspondents between MITI, the companies and other government agencies [47]. 
It is argued that the industrial restructuring in Japan and East Asia has led to accelerated 
inflows ofFDI into Malaysian industries. Japan has been the largest investor in Malaysian 
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1988, with total ofM$561 million ($ 215million) in approved investments, followed by 
Taiwan ($ 147 million},United States ($ 97 million) and Singapore ($66 million). These 
countries jointly accounted for more than 78.5 per cent of total foreign capital in the 
approved projects in 1988 [48]. Japanese investment during 1973-4, focused more on light 
manufacturing and the integrated circuit industry. During the early 1980s, Japanese 
investment mainly concentrated in the construction of buildings, dams, electric power plants, 
and highways. The more recent investment by Japanese multinationals has focused more on 
the electronics and electrical manufacturing. More than twenty-five Japanese semiconductor 
companies, such as Hitachi, Toshiba, and NEC, have invested directly in Malaysia. The 
recent Japanese investment in electric and electronics industries of Malaysia can also be best 
seen in Matushita's air conditioner factory, Sharp's audio equipment and colour TV sets and 
Hitachi's mainly semiconductor devices [49]. However, the majority of NICs investments 
has concentrated into Malaysia' s traditional export-oriented industries. It can be said that 
while FDI inflow has contnbuted to relatively more rapid growth of the manufacturing 
sector, such inflow has provided substantial opportunities for Japanese industries to increase 
their exports of intermediate and capital goods to Malaysia. 
The Investment Incentives Act of 1968 was basically designed to attract foreign investment 
by providing total or partial tax relief to companies involved in new manufacturing projects 
or expanding into new products. More foreign investments were to be found in food, textiles 
products and electrical and electronic goods, which jointly accounted for 40 per cent of the 
total FDI in 1983 [50]. With the beginning of new phase of hberalised export-led 
industrialisation in 1986, the government relaxed the NEP (NEP imposed a requirement of 
divesting up to 51 per cent of the equity to local Malaysian enterprises) in the interests of 
boosting industrial investment, exports and employment which have led to the attracting 
more foreign investment. Moreover, the depreciation of Malaysian currency, structural 
adjustments, economic hberalisation, and relatively low wage level in Malaysia, have 
recently led to the new wave of East Asian NICs investment into the country. 
As explained earlier, the financial burden of the big projects in heavy industries such as 
PROTON (Malaysian national car) and problems such as recession and decline of market 
prices for primary products including oil, rubber, and tin, in the mid-1980s, created financial 
problems for the Malaysian government, which led to the country's external debt of 21.3 
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billion ringgits (27.7% of GNP) in 1985 [51]. Therefore, the government relaxed policies 
on foreign investment in order to attract more FDI. The government allowed 100% foreign 
ownership to companies that export more than 50 % of their products and employ more 
than 350 of Malaysian labour force. It should be noted that while there were few wholly-
owned and turnkey operations, the majority of the foreign investment in Malaysia has been 
in the form of equity joint ventures. However, there has recently been a tendency towards 
FDI in the form of licensing and franchising agreements and management contracts. 
Malaysia's policy towards foreign investment has been tied to the overall objective of 
diversification and modernisation of the economy. 
Foreign investment in Malaysia has presented a certain pattern, particularly in terms of 
market orientation and ownership structure. It is argued that foreign investment in Malaysia 
has been heavily oriented to exports which improved country's balance ofpayments in the 
late 1980s [52]. It is believed that a heavy reliance on foreign investment in Malaysia has led 
to the heavy imports of capital and intermediate goods. It is also observed that despite 
creating employment opportunities, the types of industries which came into Malaysia did not 
generate high value-added in the overall economy of the Malaysia [53]. 
C.2 THE ROLE OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
The role of human resource development in Malaysia's development should also be noted. 
It is obvious that investment in human resources and education has played a significant role 
in facilitating an upgrading process to achieve higher productivity and remain competitive 
in international markets. For instance, it can generally be seen that Japan's large pool of 
scientists and engineers has been more important to success in numerous Japanese industries 
than the low wages of Japanese production workers [54]. Overall, the strategy of human 
resource development in Malaysia has been a vision of a more efficient and effective labour 
market with better and effective allocation of labour resources to sectors which need labour 
and skiDs, and allowed mobility of labour between regions. Education was a primary concern 
of the early Malaysian plans. In the 1960s, it was the third largest item in the development 
budget, after land development and transport. Nearly 20 per cent of total expenditures has 
been allocated on education program in 1960s. Development expenditure on education rose 
from 9.4 per cent of the total in the second Malaysia Plan to 16.1 percent in the Fifth 
Malaysian Plan, before dropping to 15.1 per cent in the 6th Malaysia development plan [55]. 
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The Fifth Malaysian Plan (1986-1990) also emphasised more on human resource 
development through the training and education of the labour force to increase their 
productivity. Furthermore, rapid growth and the pressure for the adoption of more capital-
intensive technologies has been another incentive for Malaysia for expanding its education 
and training programmes. Education standards also continue to be a major advantage for 
Malaysia in attracting, and keeping, foreign investors like the electronic chip makers in 
recent years. Some electrical and electronics firms began introducing systematic human 
resource development programmes which not only provided some training and retraining 
programmes for their workers but also motivated workers sufficiently to retain them [56]. 
Having compared the educational factors of Malaysia with other less developed countries, 
one can see that the educational attainment in Malaysia has been in a high position. For 
instance, the literacy rate was 60 per cent in 1987, the primary and secondary school 
enrolment has been 60 per cent and 56 per cent respectively [57]. However, despite a 
relatively high rate of expenditure on education, Malaysia has got less out of it. It is 
believed that Malaysian educational system has concentrated more on humanities rather than 
technical and engineering science, and technical education has been neglected [58]. 
Moreover, despite of a relatively good stocks of educated labour in Malaysia, it is believed 
that the amount professionals, particularly engineers, skilled technicians and managers, has 
been inadequate for sustaining rapid industrialisation in Malaysia. Malaysia's existing six 
universities and other institutes of higher education have produced only about 500 engineers 
and 1,500 diploma- level technicians every year. This problem has intensified with increasing 
rate of emigration of its qualified and experienced professionals to more advanced countries 
(brain drain). For instance, as a result of recession over the period between 1984-1986, 
many middle-level managers and professionals emigrated to countries such as Australia, 
New Zealand and Singapore [59]. Hence, the shortage of highly qualified technicians and 
engineers has been a source of complaints from foreign investors, and has remained a barrier 
for more effective technological transfer. Moreover. the weakness of the education system 
as wen as lack of adequate training for Malaysian industrial labour have led to the low level 
in technology absorption capacity of domestic industries. 
Having compared the educational level of Malaysia with that of Korea, Taiwan, China and 
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Thailand, as Lall (1990) indicated, Malaysia's overall educational level has been some way 
below S.Korea, Taiwan and China but slightly greater than Thailand [60]. According to a 
survey by the World Bank (1989) in Malaysia only one in ten applications for vocational 
training has been accepted, compared to one in three applicants for higher education [61]. 
Another survey by World Bank on the impact of recession in the Malaysian economy 
indicates to the existence of a mismatch between the skills available and that needed by 
industries. This dissinn1arity has increased by the reduction in public sector expenditure and 
the freeze in public sector employment. As a resuh, the Malaysian economy has suffered 
from increasing unemployment which led to a certain extent to the weakness of the 
Malaysian educational and training system Furthermore, the poor linkages between various 
academic institutions and local firms has been another problem for Malaysian industrial 
sector. 
C. 3 THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN INDUSTRIALISATION OF 
MALAYSIA 
Technology transfer to Malaysia has been another important factor of Malaysia's industrial 
development. There were a total of 1,579 agreements, approved by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), during the period between 1957-1989. The 
averaged number of these agreements per year has increased from less than 60 a year before 
1980 to a peak of 198 agreements in 1989. Japan has transferred highest proportion of 
technology to Malaysia (35%)foBowed by UK (13.5 %) and US (11.1%) during this period 
(1975-1989) [62]. The Japanese share as a major supplier offoreign technology in Malaysia 
can be attributed to Malaysia's Look East Policy as wen as the increasing international role 
of Japan as industrial technology exporter particularly in 1980s. Malaysian firms have 
obtained Japanese technologies more through imports of capital equipment or machinery. 
For example Japan provided almost 34-40 per cent of Malaysia 's machinery needs between 
a period between 1978 and 1983. However it should be noted that capital equipment or 
machinery alone does not constitute technology, it represents only part of technology 
embodied in hardware, while the remainder included software can only acquired through 
indigenous technological effort. 
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Figure C.2 Approved Technology Agreements by country 1989 
As is shown in the following table, the number of technological agreements has increased 
since 1980. It can also be seen that technical assistance and know-how agreements with 
about 52.6 per cent of all technological agreements approved during the period between 
1980-87, has been the major mechanism for acquiring foreign technology. Management 
setvices and joint ventures with about 22.2 per cent oftotal technological agreements have 
been another main source for importing foreign technology in Malaysia during this period. 
Turnkey engineering agreements, where technology suppliers are responsible for all 
technical decisions, has accounted for a much smaller proportion of the total ( 1.7 %) [63]. 
This indicates that there has been a shift from the packaged to unpackaged type offoreign 
capital investments in relations to technology transfer process in Malaysia. The former refers 
to an arrangement whereby technology is purchased as an important component of an 
investment package to be complemented by management, marketing services and equality 
participation. 
477 
Types of 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total % 
agreements 
Technical 57 64 48 61 71 51 50 53 455 52.7 
assistance 
Manageme 13 6 10 13 10 6 10 5 73 10.1 
nt contracts 
Joint 14 22 14 14 17 9 19 11 120 12.2 
Venture 
Service 6 7 2 7 2 1 1 1 27 5.9 
Trademark 4 8 8 7 1 19 33 30 110 9.9 
8 & patents 
Turnkey 5 5 4 4 6 - 1 - 25 1.7 
Others 15 19 8 25 12 10 9 10 108 7.5 
Total 114 131 94 131 119 96 123 110 949 100.0 
Table C.2 Types Of Technology Transfer Agreement, 1980-87 
However, it should be noted that most technologies have been transferred to Malaysia in the 
past (before the 1980s) through importation of machinery and equipment, complete plants 
or turnkey projects, and transfer of knowledge through the movement of people. In 
Malaysia, the largest proportion of technology transfer payments made by firms involves 
payments for new machinery and equipment. More recently, it appears to be more profitable 
for Malaysian enterprises to obtain their required technologies by entering into a joint 
venture or licensing agreement with foreign partners. Most of these technology agreements 
were in the electronics and electrical industries (17.7 %), fabricated metal industries (10.8 
%), chemical industries (12.3 %), and transport equipment (10.6 %), which accounted for 
more than 50 % of all technology agreements signed, indicating more emphasis on 
Malaysia's technology transfer policies towards these relatively technology-intensive and 
heavy industries. As in most other developing countries, technology transfer regulations in 
Malaysia have not been utilised to search for more appropriate technologies, partly because 
technology transfer is processed by administrators lacking the necessary technology 
background [64]. 
It can be said that lack of indigenous technological capability within domestic industries has 
been a major hindrance in achieving a higher level of industrialisation in Malaysia. Because 
of direct and easy access of Malaysia to foreign technologies through foreign direct 
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investment andjoint ventures, little attention was paid to the creation of the minimum levels 
of indigenous technology which was necessary to absorb foreign technology. It is believed 
that due to some factors such as small domestic market and partly its inability to internalise 
foreign technologies, Malaysia has also lacked legislation and government control on 
technology transfer. Moreover, low productivity in some of the Malaysia's industry sector 
including small industry, transportation, which is believed to be because of the institutional 
and structural constraints, has prevented the application of more efficient or appropriate 
technologies. Furthermore, there have been other reasons including the absence of incentives 
and infra structural support for small industries, and lack of know-how in some of its 
industries. Therefore, Malaysia needs to identify the foreign technologies which can be 
more contributed to the strengthening of its domestic technological capability through better 
adaptation and assimilation of those technologies to its local conditions. 
In the 1970s and the early 1980s, multinational investment was concentrated in capital-
intensive and high levels of direct foreign investment, contn"buting little to domestic 
technological capability. Due to change in MNCs strategy in order to improve productivity 
for the competitive international markets, they started to transfer skills and know-how along 
with the machinery and train local engineers and workers. The government in Malaysia has 
encouraged technology transfer from multinationals in order to accelerate the growth rate 
of economic and industrial development. The technology transfer unit in the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry was set up to ensure the assimilation and absorption of foreign 
technology. It can generally be said that due to some factors particularly, heavy dependence 
on foreign companies, lack of linkages with local producers, and limited R&D activities, 
Malaysian firms did not have adequate opportunities to transfer foreign technologies 
through learning by doing. These factors also led to the lack of adaptation of imported 
technology and heavy dependence on imported technology in Malaysia. One can also add 
that most MNCs (multinationals) in Malaysia have involved in simple assembling of 
imported components rather than actual manufacturing, therefore there has been less real 
transfer of technology in Malaysia. 
However, there is some evidence of successful technology transfer between Malaysian firms 
and their foreign counterparts. As an example, one can refer to a Malaysian- Singapore joint 
venture agreement in transferring textile mills into the country. There has been considerable 
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transfer of textile technology appears to have occurred, such as acquiring various skills in 
different aspects of textile manufacturing and also maintenance and operation of highly 
sophisticated machinery and equipment by Malaysian workers. Another example of 
successful technology transfer was a Malaysian-Taiwanese joint venture in producing copper 
and ahJDDnium power cables, telephone cables, and underground cables. It can be said that 
Malaysian workers not only adopted the know-how of the wire and cable technology and 
operated advanced machinery and equipment but also they could diversify the products by 
undertaking R&D activities [65]. 
These success examples of technology transfer can refer to the point that Malaysia has been 
able to adapt, assimilate and absorb technologies which were transferred by other NICs in 
East Asia rather than multinationals in other developed countries. This is partly because of 
the cost consideration. While MNCs in developed countries invest heavily in R&D to 
innovate technology, NICs generally copy technology from advanced countries and transfer 
older technology to the other LDCs (including Malaysia) which they acquired from 
industrialised countries at much less cost. The most recent shift to strengthening high-
technology manufacturing in Malaysia has led to the establishment of comprehensive 
infrastructure and support services. These include new technology parks and science parks 
which offer investors and companies access to ready-built, specialised research and 
development facilities. These technology parks also provide the infrastructure for R&D 
activities to support the operations of high technology industries, for example, Technology 
Park Malaysia which has been established in Malaysia since 1986 to support the growth of 
high-technology industries and industrial entrepreneurship. It has also provided a critical link 
between industry, the government, research institutions and universities [66]. 
Determined to be a major part of the technology revolution that has taken place in 
manufacturing around the world, Malaysia is building a strong technological competence, 
particularly in areas where it has a natural advantage, such as resourced-based industries. 
The Malaysian government has recently identified six strategic industrial sector in this area, 
to be given priority for R&D support. These include advanced materials, automated 
manufacturing, biotechnology, microelectronics and laser technology, information 
technology and energy-related technology. In Malaysia, the process oftecbnology transfer 
has generally taken the following forms: 
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1. Introduction and purchase of technology from outside, 
2. Maintenance and modification and 
3. International development and production. 
It can be said that among the technological power factors in Malaysia, maintenance is 
evaluated at the highest level of 4.4 and modification at 3.8, followed by manufacturing at 
3.2, and designing at 3.0. The maintenance level of 4.4 can be equalised with that of other 
NICs such as Hong Kong and Singapore [67]. According to a survey of the situation of 
technology transfer in the firms locating in the FTZs in 1980s, it can be seen that while 
there has been less technology transfer in textile firms, it can be said that the greatest 
transfer of technology has been taken place in the co1DlDJmications and semiconductor firms. 
In the case of the semiconductor firms in the Malaysia, however, technology development 
has been limited to the machinery. A survey by MIDA of the effects of technology transfer 
on the Malaysian domestic enterprises in 1989 has pointed out that local engineers have on 
several occasions developed automated machines and exported them all over the world. 
One such a product was a semi-automated die-attach machine, which was previously 
subcontracted to a local firms [68]. Moreover, it can be said that there has generally been 
a high degree of transfer of technology in the electric industry in Malaysia, which contrasts 
with the automobile industry's low rates of transfer for most technology types. 
As indicated earlier, in order to be able to compete more in the international technology 
market, Malaysia needs to upgrade and promote its technological capability. It is argued that 
one of the major obstacles in the development of technological capability in Malaysia, has 
been its relatively weak scientific and technological infrastructure in manufacturing 
industries. Therefore, the recent technology policy in Malaysia has emphasised more 
financial support of R&D activities particularly in areas in which the country has a 
comparative advantage. Priority has also been given to the expanding and strengthening of 
human resource development to increase the availability of the high-level industrial workers 
required to adapt and assimilate imported high-technologies. It is also needed for Malaysia 
to link the science and technology activities between academic institutes and universities by 
establishing an effective co-ordinating ministry or organisation. It is also argued that 
technological capability can be improved by emphasising more the adaptation and 
acquisition of imported technologies rather than generating new technology, although the 
481 
latter skill remains the final objective. 
C. 4 THE ROLE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) ACfWITIES 
It is obvious that R&D activities can enhance the country's capability to absorb and 
assimilate foreign technologies and also improve indigenous technological capability. The 
national R&D expenditure was estimated to be 0.66 % of GNP in 1984. The government 
has allocated M$ 400 million for R&D for public research institutes (59%) and universities 
(32%) [69]. It must be noted that there was a significant increase in university research after 
1987, indicating the government emphasis on developing the research capabilities of 
universities. There were about 20 government institutions for R&D activities in early 1980s, 
such as SIRIM (Standards and Industrial Research Institute Malaysia), IMR ( Institute of 
Medical Research), Tun Ismail Atomic Research centre. As an example of R&D activities 
in Malaysia, one can refer to the R&D activities in rubber products which has been one the 
major items of Malaysia's exports. While Malaysia has owned 36% of the world's natural 
rubber, its share in the world's rubber output was 0.4% in 1983. This is mostly due to the 
fact that only 20% of Malaysian rubber manufactures have involved in R&D activities [70]. 
However, all of Malaysia's major universities have recently established research and 
development centres and operations. For example, University Pertanian Malaysia (UPM) 
had 1,300 research projects during the period 1991-1993 covering production of food 
through biotechnology, environmental conseIVation through the sustained use of natural 
resources and automation and electronics in industry. Meanwhile, University Malaya has 
been very active in research in the some areas such as industrial products, timber 
preservatives and crop protection; lasers and opto-electronics for industrial and medical 
applications; plasma research; and solid and biomass as ahernative sources of energy. As 
indicated earlier, there has been a lack of systematic linkages between scientific and 
technological infrastructure existing in Malaysia. AU the components of that infrastructure 
remain basically unconnected and act almost independently of one another. It seems that 
there has been a gap separating the industrial sector from the educational and research 
sector in Malaysia. Therefore, the Malaysian government has attempted to fill this gap by 
establishing science parks for the exchange of ideas between technologies and academicians. 
Total R&D expenditure in Malaysia has increased to an average of 0.8 per cent of GNP in 
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1989, comparing to 1.4 per cent in Taiwan and 2.1 per cent in Korea. The share of public 
sector investment in R&D activity has accounted for over 80 per cent of the total R&D 
expenditure in Malaysia. In 1989, of the total of 13600 personnel engaged in R&D activities, 
only 13 percent were employed in the private sector. However, there has been an increase 
in private investment in R& D during the Sixth Malaysian Plan. There has recently been a 
tendency for foreign companies to establish R&D centres in Malaysia. For instance, Sharp 
Co-operation of lapan has set up a $ 20 million R&D centre in lohor with facilities for 
research in areas such as electronic and mechanical design, product planning and engineering 
analysis [71]. Furthermore, the government has decided to increase R&D expenditure per 
GNP to 2 per cent by the year 2000, as R&D and the ability to innovate are the key factors 
to promote Malaysia's competitiveness in international market. 
C. 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As indicated earlier in detail, Malaysian rapid economic and industrial development during 
the period between 1970-1990 can be attributed to the achieving of some specific industrial 
policies and plans in this period. These policies and programmes included early import 
substitution industrialisation policy for building industrial infrastructure which was 
accompanied with the New Economic Policy (NEP) announcement of 1971 and was 
intensified by the Industrial Co-ordination Act (ICA) of 1975, followed by a successful shift 
towards export promotion industrialisation policy as well as significant effort to attract 
labour-intensive export activities particularly in electronic components and textiles in 1970s, 
and a state-led heavy industrialisation policy of early 1980s along with a series of reforms 
(managerial improvement and privatisation of public enterprises, new investment incentives 
for attracting more foreign investment) that began in 1983 and intensified in response to the 
recession of 1985-86, the Industrial Master Plan (1986-1995) which aimed at the utilisation 
of the country's abundant natural resources and accelerating the growth of the resource 
based industries, and the recent National Development Policy which replaced the NEP in 
1991. 
Therefore, these programmes and policies have played a critical role in the Malaysia's 
experience of industrialisation. It should also be noted that to succeed to the higher stage 
of industrialisation which has envisioned by Dr Mahatir Mohammed as a new vision for 
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Malaysia to become a fully industrialised country in 2020, Malaysia must acquire much 
greater technological capability. This required the state to provide several forms of support 
for science and technology development. As indicated earlier, Malaysia can promote its 
technological capabilities through number of supportive policies including more financial 
support for R&D activities, support policies for human resource development and 
programmes to promote the diffusion and assimilation of foreign technologies. 
It can generally be argued that the Malaysian industrialisation has been conducted under 
government guidance within the framework of the successive national development plans 
and as part of NEP (New Economic Policy), IMP (Industrial Master Plan) and NDP 
(National Development Policy). Therefore, it can be concluded that despite the open nature 
of the Malaysian economy, the state has played a critical role in creating the required 
infrastructure for industrial development, providing facilities for private firms, and utilising 
the country's vast natural resources. As in other Southeast Asia NICs such as Korea and 
Taiwan, the government has had an important role in the achievement of a strong and 
efficient manufacturing sector in Malaysia. While government in Malaysia has not been 
authoritarian as in some of the Asian NICs, it has also not been weak and uncertain, as in 
some less developed countries. 
In sum, one can generally refer to several reasons for industrial development in Malaysia. 
First, as the experiences of industrialised countries and newly industrialised countries such 
as Korea and Taiwan shows, industrial development can make significant contnDution to 
employment creation particularly from that of labour intensive industries. Therefore, the 
poor labour absotption by the agricultural sector in Malaysia relative to the high population 
growth rate necessitated rapid development of the industrial sector to avoid high 
unemployment. Secondly, rapid growth rate of the industry sector, particularly 
manufacturing, has shown that Malaysia can achieve higher economic growth as a resuh of 
industrial development. Moreover, Malaysia would be able to compete in international 
market by its rapid technological development and adequate provision of physical facilities 
and a well balanced industrial policy [72]. One can also refer to the Malaysia's major natural 
comparative advantage for rapid industrialisation which consists of: 
1. an adequate infrastructure, 
2. extensive natural resources, 
484 
3. a moderate industrial base which concentrate mainly in electronics and textiles, and 
4. the existence of some general engineering capability. 
Moreover, the success factors of the Malaysian economic and industrial development during 
the past three decades can also be included with some other reasons such as its rich 
endowment of natural resources, relative political and social stability, the existence of 
infrastructure and industrial facilities, relatively high amount of foreign investment, and the 
role of government in industrial development. It can also be added that with substantial 
revenue generation capacity from its natural resources, particularly from petroleum and 
natural gas, Malaysia could choose to industrialise through the "leap-frogging" approach by 
adapting the latest industrial technologies 
However, there are some general points which one should note in Malaysia's experience of 
industrialisation. Firstly, there has been an imbalance in the rate of investment across various 
industries which are concentrated only in some particular industries. There has been high 
investment in electrical and textile industries wbile there has been little investment in certain 
other industries. This has led to an imbalanced structure in employment and manufactured 
exports. Secondly, there has been limited use of the country's natural resources in the 
exporting industrial process. Malaysia still exports a large amount of raw materials such as 
palm oil, tin and timber to advanced countries to be processed into higher value added 
products. For example, the Malaysian sawn timber is used in large scale production of 
plywood and fabricated furniture in Korea and Japan while its natural rubber is exported to 
United States, European countries and Japan for the production of tyres and surgical 
protective devices. Therefore, one can say that the past industrial policies have not been very 
satisfactory in promoting a stable and balanced manufacturing structure. 
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APPENDIXD: 
THAILAND EXPERIENCE OF INDUSTRIALISATION 
Thailand is the only country in south east Asia that has never experienced colonial rule. It 
covers almost 200,000 square miles of the Indochinese Peninsula and has four main 
geographical regions, each with somewhat different natural resources and economic 
development. Thailand's highly fertile central plain is one of the richest sources offood in 
Asia. There is a substantial amount of rice are grown throughout the region which has made 
Thailand the world's leading exporter of rice. Thailand has also been the world's second and 
third largest producer of tungsten and tin which accounts for 12 per cent ofGDP and 65 
per cent of its labour force. The Thai people consists of about 85 percent of Thai ethnic 
origin and another 12 percent of Chinese descent. The remaining 3 percent are Malays, 
concentrated in southern Thailand along the Malaysian border, and hill people, who are 
found along the borders of Burma and Laos. 
Thailand has also one of the fastest growth rate within developing countries with an 
averaged real growth rate of7 per cent over the past 30 years. Thailand was an agricultural 
economy with the annual average growth rate of g per cent in the 1960s. The agriculture 
sector was as a provider of resources for industrial investment. The manufacturing sector 
in 1960, was predominantly concentrated in food and beverages, tobacco, textiles, and a few 
consumer non-durables [1]. Furthermore, Thailand had a more open trade system than most 
countries at similar levels of economic development, with relatively low tariffs and few 
quantitative import restrictions. The openness of the Thai economy was reflected in the high 
share of foreign trade in GDP. In the period between 1960-73, export and import share 
averaged 18% and 21%, respectively [2]. 
The industrialisation began in the 1960s with the usual pattern of import substitution 
including tariff and import controls and investment incentives, aimed at creating an industrial 
sector producing for the domestic market. Thailand's protection level of domestic industries 
has been moderate and relatively stable, thus not encouraging huge inefficiencies. The 
protective system has been inclined against the agro-based industries and towards the 
manufacturing sector. The main incentive for industrial growth in the 1960s came from 
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industries producing for the domestic market, but even at this early stage of industrialisation, 
the rich natural resource base of the country provided a competitive advantage for some 
export industrial activity [3]. Thailand's national development plans in the 1960s were 
mostly concentrated on the economic and social development at the national level. 
Thailand's First: National Plan (1961-66) was formulated in 1961 which emphasised import 
substitution industrialisation policy and giving priority to a number of infrastructure projects, 
including transportation and communication. The government in Thailand with the 
assistance of US foreign aid during the Vietnam War period invested extensively in 
infrastructure such as roads, power generation and irrigation projects. Moreover, during the 
first plan (1961-1966), the government also emphasised promoting private industrial 
investment through incentives and protective measures against competing imports. 
The second National Plan (1967-1972) emphasised increasing the income level and living 
standard of the people and also increasing the productivity by utilisation of resources. The 
manufacturing sector grew at an average rate of 11.4 percent during this period [4]. The 
leading industries in the earlier phase of industrialisation were textile and food processing 
industries. During the late 1960s the domestic consumer market, particularly for textiles and 
locally assembled vehicles, was at near saturation point. The manufacturing sector achieved 
an average annual growth rate oflO.S during the period between 1966-1972. According to 
a World Bank swvey, 64% per cent of the expansion in manufacturing was due to an 
expansion of the domestic market, 29 % was to replace import and 7 % for export [5]. As 
a result of import substitution policies pursued by the Thai Government, some industries 
such as motor cycle and agriculture machinery industries have expanded. 
It is generally argued that the import substitution policies of the early 1960s favoured large 
enterprises, which were found to be more capital intensive and import dependent and 
therefore caused an increase in income inequalities. Import substituting industries relied 
heavily on imported materials and capital equipment, causing industries to locate plants near 
the big cities such as the capital Bangkok [6]. Therefore, most manufacturing industries of 
Thailand concentrated near big cities especially in Bangkok and the suburb areas. It is 
believed that the lack of adequate infrastructure outside Bangkok and the central provinces 
excluded a large share of the rural population from participation in modernisation until the 
second half of the 1970s [7]. 
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By the late 1960s, there was a tendency to shift the industrialisation policy in Thailand 
towards export-led growth. It should also be added that by the 1970s, the Thai economy 
reached the stage where component parts and other intermediate capital goods could be 
produced locally .The 1970s also witnessed a gradual, but clear, evolution in Thai industrial 
policies as a partial response to declining commodity prices and the oil price shocks. The 
Thai government's emphasis changed from one of import-substitution, favouring the 
development of domestic manufactures over imported goods, to one of export promotion 
associated with a greater opening of the economy to trade and foreign investment [8]. 
However, despite the shift towards export promotion policies, Thailand continued import 
substitution in the area of consumer durables and intermediate goods mostly due to its large 
domestic market. Several incentives was given to the local producers by government in 
Thailand for encouraging exports and at the same time, a high protection for domestic 
industries was also given. Export promotion measures have been applied in the area of 
labour intensive goods, while in the area of heavy chemicals protective measures have been 
taken in order to promote import substitution, thus resulting in the striking differences in 
trade policies among industries [9]. 
It is believed that the shift of industrial promotion policy towards exports was started with 
the passage of the Investment Promotion Act of 1972 [10]. Moreover, a variety of export 
incentives were introduced by government including the tax exemptions, electricity rebates, 
low interest loans, and establishing the export processing zones. Thailand experienced an 
export commodity boom from 1972 to 1974 which was mainly due to the increase in the 
price of rice. Thailand has been one of the most successful agricultural exporters in the 
world during the 1970s because it has successfully adapted to and diversified into new and 
rapidly changing markets for agricultural products. The volume of sugar exports doubled 
between 1974 and 1976 and the volume of rice export, which was the major agricultural 
export commodity increased by an annual average of 11 per cent during the 1970s [11]. 
Moreover, the export of labour intensive industries including rubber products and non-
ferrous metals and also food, textiles, leather products, plastic products increased very 
rapidly during this period. Exports of the machinery and electronics industries in Thailand 
have also increased since 19708. In the electronic and electrical appliances industry, there 
have been about twenty large companies producing television sets, radios, refrigerators, air 
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conditioners, and integrated circuits. The manufactured exports increased from 10 per cent 
of total exports in 1971 to 66 per cent of total merchandise exports in 1988. The value of 
exports of processed goods increased from 23 billion baht in 1973 to 67 billion baht in 1978 
[12]. 
The export promotion act was formulated in 1972 which provided a full tax exemption on 
imported inputs used in export activities, a refimd of all taxes on the production process, a 
discount facility on short term loan from the Bank of Thailand and an exemption of business 
tax on the product exported. However, the rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 along with the 
reduction of the American economic aid slowed Thai growth from around 9 per cent to 
around 6 per cent and led to a decline in country's industrial outputs in the early 1980s. The 
Third Plan (1972-1976) placed more emphasis on economic restructuring through the 
accelerating of growth of industrial development while maintaining the high economic 
growth rate. It also emphasised the promotion of manufactured exports as an industrial 
development strategy. There were extensive efforts to promote exports. Revising the Export 
Promotion Act and the Investment Promotion Act in 1972, implementing tax refund 
program by the Ministry of Finance, and providing a rediscount facility for exporters were 
the most important measures which taken for the expansion of the exports during the period 
of Third Plan. 
One can point to two broad factors for Thailand's success in rapid expansion of its exports. 
Firstly, the internal factors such as the state economic policy. As explain earlier, the 
government in Thailand adopted export oriented policies in the early stage of 
industrialisation. These export expansion policies accelerated the industrial development of 
Thailand in various ways, in particular through stable financial policies, low levels of 
taxation and the maintenance of strong currency, which have all helped to promote domestic 
savings and foreign investment. The second looks to external factors, such as American aid 
during the Vietnam War, the impact of Japanese economic growth and the growth of the 
NICs in providing not only export markets and a source offoreign capital investment but 
also models of export-led growth, and changes in world currency movements [13]. 
Furthermore, it is believed that one of the main reasons for Thailand's success in exports 
has been the international economic restructuring from the success of the NICs in Asia and 
Japan, and the revaluation of the yen. Thailand Dvourable policies, along with its adequate 
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infrastructure and low cost of labour attracted a huge inflow of foreign investment which 
largely accelerated export-led growth [14]. 
The Fourth Plan (1977-81) intended to stabilise the economy from the world economic 
recession through accelerating the rate of export expansion. A significant elements of 
Thailand's strong industrialisation lay in the export drive, which exports grew from only 
14.3 billion baht in 1970, to 60.4 billion baht in 1976, to 150 billion baht in 1981 and 616 
billion baht in 1990. Moreover, there was more emphasis placed on the role ofgovemment 
in export marketing and on the establishment of export processing zones in the Fourth 
Development Plan as a long term strategy. In 1979, the Industrial Estate Authority of 
Thailand (IEAT) was created to promote industrial development through establishment of 
industrial estates and Zones. There were three export processing zones in operation by 1988 
in Thailand which were designated for export manufacturing industries. Firms located in an 
EPZ were exempt from import duties and business taxes on machinery, and equipment. 
Additional incentives were proposed for project development in theses zones, which include 
reduction of business tax on the sales of products, reduction of corporate income tax, and 
corporate income tax deductions for expenditures [15]. 
A crucial part of the export promotion shift in the 1970s was the increasingly state-
sponsored, preferential treatment given to investors and producers in industrial export 
activities. The Thai Board of Investment (BOI) which was established in 1960 following a 
World Bank mission, was particularly important in attracting the labour-intensive parts of 
the production processes of export-oriented transnational corporations [16]. The Board of 
Investment also attempted to promote certain exports since the early 1970s. The BOI also 
acted as the central council for controlling the implementation of new policies vis-a-vis 
foreign capital. The 1977 Investment Promotion Act authorized the Board to engage in a 
number of export-promoting activities, including the granting of tax privileges and the 
establishment of Investment Promotion Zones and enterprises [17]. The BOI also provided 
investment for exporting firms, but the firms were required to export around 80-100 per 
cent of their total production. The promotions allowed exporting firms to acquire imported 
machinery and intermediate goods at world market prices by providing exemption from 
import tariffs. 
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By the mid 1970s there was increasing pressure for a further shift in emphasis towards 
export oriented industrialisation policy. This was coming from the international agencies, 
particuJarlythe World Bank: the need to increase exports to reduce the balance of payments 
deficit and domestic capital interests. These influences were strongly reflected in the fourth 
plan, 1977-81, under which EOI was given a central role [18]. The deterioration of 
Thailand's balance of payments in the second half of the 1970s can be mostly attn'buted to 
increase in industrial protection. For example between 1974 and 1978, tariffs were raised 
on 53 industrial categories and reduced on only 19 categories. The average levels of nominal 
protection of import substituting activities were also increased during this period from 
34.6% to 50.8% for products with low import competition [19]. 
Towards the end of 1970s, two major policy shifts marked a new phase of industrialisation. 
First, a large scale industrial development plan, the Eastern Seaboard Development Program 
(ESOP) was initiated. Secondly, while export promotion continued, protection was granted 
to heavy industries producing intermediate and capital goods. From 1979 to 1983 the 
current account deficit averaged about 7 percent of GOP, and the public sector deficit rose 
to around 5 percent of GOP for an even longer period. Long term debt rose from $ 2.7 
billion in 1978 to $ 13.2 billion in 1985. Manufacturing growth was only 4.1 per cent, less 
than half the 10 per cent annual real growth experienced in the 1970s. It should be noted 
that unlike some of the NICs, Thailand has never enjoyed a large current account surplus. 
Moreover, because of some factors mainly a decline in the price of the Thai products in 
world markets such as rice, coconut oil, tapioca, tin, sugar, and rubber, and the world 
recession in early 1980s, the growth rate of Thailand slowed to an average of 4.2 percent 
in the first half of 1980s and to 3.2 percent by 1985 [20]. However, since 1983 the 
contnoution of manufacturing to the GOP has exceeded that of agricuhural sector. The 
growth of manufacturing production increased from 7.2 per cent in 1982 to 12.6 per cent 
in 1987 and 15 per cent in 1989. This continuous rate of growth in manufacturing 
production was due to the favourable conditions in domestic and foreign markets, including 
the government's policy of promoting production and exports together with the relatively 
stable prices of oil, interest rates and exchange rates. 
In 1983 the Board of Investment declared a new set of policies that sought to encourage the 
development of labour intensive export industries through the controlling of fiscal policy and 
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encouragement of foreign direct investment. Under the new guidelines, the BOI acted as 
referee and created a competition environment among foreign investors [21]. Thai economic 
growth during the later half of 1980s was remarkable. In comparison with other countries 
in South east Asia (ASEAN) which grew an average of4.2 per cent between 1983-1987, 
Thailand growth rate was an average 5.2 per cent in this period. The 1980s also marked a 
new approach to Thai industrialisation. The role of the private sector was appreciated and 
development policies of this decade called for greater participation of the private sector in 
the development effort, particularly in spreading economic benefits to other parts of the 
countIy. As a resuh of the rapid growth in manufactured exports, the share of manufactured 
exports increased from 36 per cent in 1981 to 66 per cent in 1988. While world trade grew 
at an average annual rate of 13 per cent between 1986-1989, Thai manufactured exports 
grew at an average of 40 per cent per year during this period. Growth of manufactured 
exports has been concentrated in clothing precious stones and integrated circuits. The share 
of clothing and textiles in total exports increased from 4.8 per cent of total merchandise 
exports in 1983 to 14.5 per cent in 1988. It should be noted that despite of increase in Thai 
exports, as a study by World Bank indicated, Thai exports constituted only 1 per cent of 
industrial countries imports from developing countries, compared with 3-4 per cent for 
Malaysia and Singapore, and 14 per cent for Taiwan and Korea in mid-1980s [22]. 
During the Fifth Plan (1982-86), the government continued to promote private investment, 
both domestic and foreign, in the production and sale of industrial products while the main 
objective of industrial development policies was to contn'bute towards stable economic 
growth, and to help solve the basic problems of the country, such as trade deficit, 
unemployment, uneven distribution of income, and poverty. The fifth development plan also 
emphasised industrial adjustment, improving efficiency and strengthening competitiveness 
in both domestic and international markets. The basic industrial development policies were 
achieved for these pwposes, including policies to promote manufactured exports, to 
restructure the existing industries to be more efficient, to promote small-scale industries, to 
promote rural industries, to promote industrial employment and to set up a system to 
promote and monitor foreign investment [23]. 
Thailand's export performance in 1987 ranked the best among IDes. Total export earnings 
increased from 146,472 million baht in 1983 to 298,099 million baht in 1987. In 1988, 
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Thailand exported nearly $2.3 billion worth of textiles and garments, about $ 500 million 
worth of integrated circuits, some $ 400 million worth of footwear, around $ 200 million 
worth of steel pipes, and about $ 200 million worth of wooden furniture, out of $ 16 billion 
in total exports. It can be said that this exceptionally fast growth in manufactured exports 
which accounted for 58 per cent of Thailand's total exports in 1988, was comparable with 
72 percent in the case of Singapore, and Taiwan and S. Korea's 93 per cent in the same 
year. This again indicates that Thailand can join the four NICs of Asia [24]. 
It can be said that Thailand has emerged from the latter half of the 1980s as the most 
promising developing country in the world. The two digit growth rates of 13 per cent and 
11 percent in 1988 and 1989, respectively, were the highest rate of growth in the world for 
these two years, generating a widespread feeling that the economy had finally reached a 
take-off stage and Thailand was about to join the ranks of the Asian NICs. Some important 
mctors such as, export, tourism industry, and foreign investment, are said to be the main 
engines of growth for Thailand. This fast growth pattern is accompanied by rapid structural 
changes in three dimensions. Firstly, there has been a clear internationalisation of the Thai 
economy. The share of exports to GDP rose from 19.2 percent in 1982 to as high as 26.5 
percent in 1988. There was also a remarkable change in the structure of exports which the 
value of industrial exports swpassed that of agricuhural exports in mid 1980s. Secondly, 
massive relocation of export industries from Japan and NICs in Asia, led to the increasing 
integration of Thailand. It is believed that Thailand compuative advantage during this period 
has been its low wages. Moreover, Thai labour can be descn"bed as literate, trainable, 
disciplined and hard working. According to a survey by World Bank, comparing industrial 
earnings and output for selected Asian Countries, the rise in labour productivity in 
manufacturing in Thailand during the first half of the 1980s has been (66%) greater than in 
any other country [25]. 
During the period from 1988-90, the annual growth rate exceeded 10 percent. This solid 
growth rate was due mainly to an increase in exports and a large amount of foreign 
investment in Thailand Although Thailand has traditionally had an agrarian-based economy, 
its manufacturing and service sectors have grown tremendously in both size and significance. 
In 1990, the share of manufacturing exports, which reached 49.5%, exceeded that of 
agricultural exports (37.9 %) and by 1991 exports of manufactured products accounted for 
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more than three-quarters of the country's total exports. Textiles and garments were the most 
important industry, accounting for 29.2 per cent of principle exports between 1986 and 
1988, while canned food accounted for 12.7 per cent in 1988.The nominal value of textile 
and jewellery exports grew an average of25% annually during the last years of the 1980s. 
The Thai export of food processing such as fruits (especially pineapple), various canned and 
frozen vegetables and tuna have also increased very rapidly during this period [26]. 
Thailand has adopted the Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-
1991) which aimed at strengthening the scientific and technological capability through 
human recourse development and promoting of R&D activities, and providing of incentives 
to the private sector and state enterprises for the extensive use of science and technology 
.The plan particularly emphasised the development of technological capability in the areas 
ofbio-technology, material, electronic and information industries. As indicated earlier, the 
Thai economy has experienced a very significant growth rate of an average 10.5 per year 
during the implementation of sixth National Plan, which was twice the plan target. It is 
believed that this high growth has mostly been because of a considerable expansion of Thai 
manufacturing exports as well as foreign investment and tourism during this period. World 
economic conditions, in particular the lower oil prices and lower interest rates, brought 
further benefits during this period. The rapid and unexpected growth during the period 
(1987-1991) changed the structure of the Thai economy. A much more diverse industrial 
structure, with growing technological sophistication, has been accompanied by huge 
investments in infrastructure during this period. 
The value of exports increased from $ 10 billion in 1987 which was the same value attained 
by S. Korea 10 years earlier, and increased to $ 20 billion in 1989 and almost $ 30 billion 
in 1991 [27]. However, because of high dependency on the imports of machinery, capital 
and intermediate goods, Thailand faced deficit in its overall current account during the 
period between 1987-1990. The high import intensity of export led growth reflect the 
missing link in the country's industrial structure, failing to supply adequate intermediate and 
capital goods. Therefore, one of the strategic approaches to industrial development in 1990s 
is aimed at developing basic industries as wen as supporting industries in order to strengthen 
inter-industry linkages and thereby reduce the high degree of import dependence of 
industrial production [28]. 
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It can be said that Thailand had most of criteria which was necessary to join the ranks of the 
NICs in around 1988. Some indicators such as its share of industrial sector per GDP, and 
the share of manufactured output accounted for 32 and 76 per cent respectively. Moreover 
the manufacture exports accounted to about 44 per cent of total exports of goods and 
services. However, there are some major constraints to Thailand's becoming a fully NICs, 
such as high dependency on foreign technology in particular from Japan, the shortage of 
adequate scientists and engineers, inadequate research and development activity, inadequate 
upgrading of skills through training and continuing education, a relatively low level of GDP 
per capita, inadequate domestic savings and capital formation and unbalanced income 
distribution. One can say that while Korea and Taiwan have undergone four significant 
stages in their industrial development, namely the simple assembly, fabrication, design 
improvement and engineering design within the past two decades to become a NIC, 
Thailand, which took off at the same time, has just entered the second stage. Moreover, 
despite the Thai economy having met the basic common features of NICs, however, in order 
to become the fifth tiger, other elements, in particular social indicators such as enrolment 
in education, and infrastructure status need to be developed. Therefore, Thailand still has 
some ground to cover to catch up with the newly industrialising countries. For instance, per 
capita GNP is $ 1400 per year, less than a third of S. Korea's and 13 per cent of 
Singapore's. 
The export component of the manufacturing products continued to be dynamic in 1991. This 
dynamism has been attributed to the recent growth in export-oriented direct investment, the 
price competitiveness of Thai products, and government policies which encourage exports. 
Industries in which production has increased rapidly include computers and electronics, 
garments and footwear, furniture and wood products, canned foods, gems and jewellery, 
toys, and plastic products. Production for the domestic market was also important to 
continued strong output during 1991. High growth industries include construction materials, 
foods and beverages, and electronic appliances. Growth in the automotive industry in 1991 
was affected somewhat by the substantial reduction in import duties on cars and components 
in July 1991. In 1991, the Board of Investment in Thailand issued promotion certificates for 
534 investment projects; 304 of these projects planned to export 80-100 % of their output 
and a further 30 projects planned to export 30-79%. These projects include investment by 
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Thai and foreign firms, but it is observed that particularly the foreign investment projects are 
export oriented. It is estimated that the foreign firms accounted for at least 25% of 
manufactured exports by the end of the 1970s and that share, by 1990 had risen to 30- 40% 
[29]. 
Thailand's Seventh National Plan (1992-1996) has formulated with the main development 
objectives of maintaining economic growth rates at an appropriate levels, redistributing 
income in particular to the rural areas and accelerating the development of human resources. 
The Thai government has decided to achieve these objectives through restructuring the 
economic and industrial policies. These policies include liberalisation of the economic system 
in order to increase efficiency, expanding private sector role, increasing production 
efficiency by enhancing technological capability and diversifying and expanding economic 
base to the regions and new economic zones. The Seventh National Plan has also set an 
average annual growth target of 9.4 per cent for industrial production. The plan has 
identified six strategic industrial sectors in which Thailand could gain a competitive 
advantage. These include agro-industry and food processing, textiles and garments, 
electronics, meta1-based industries, petrochemicals and iron and steel The Thai government 
has taken supportive measures for developing these industries, including removal of barriers 
protecting local car assembly and short term protection for iron and steel industries. 
Thailand is currently not only competing with the other ASEAN countries for foreign 
investment and aid but is also confronting the economic pressures from Eastern Europe and 
China as they become competitive in the jewenery, textiles, and electrical appliances sectors 
[30]. 
In order to be more competitive in international market, the Thai government has attempted 
to diversifY manufactured exports towards products of greater technological sophistication. 
Therefore, it has emphasised more on support for those industries which include all 
industries support the activities of major manufacturing companies by providing essential 
materials, component and services. Thailand adopted the Japanese and Taiwanese system 
of industrial production for improving its competitiveness. Unlike S. Korea which neglected 
the development of an efficient local supply base of parts and components and suffered from 
high dependency on foreign parts and components, The Japanese and Taiwanese model of 
industrial production which has relied more on subcontracting and supporting industries, and 
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they initially established a powerful domestic parts and components industry. Moreover, like 
Taiwan, the size distnlmtion of firms in Thailand has shifted towards small and medium 
sized industries which accounted for 98 per cent of enterprises in mid-1980s [31]. 
D.I THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF TIIAILAND 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Thailand has been growing steadily since the 
industrialisation began in early 19605. Foreign investment accounted for only 12 per cent 
of net capital inflows into Thailand in 1970s which accounted an annual average of 1900 
million baht in this period [32] Until the early 1980s, Thailand, along with the S. Korea, had 
the lowest level of foreign investment among the Southeast Asian countries. Foreign Direct 
Investment began flowing into Thailand mostly after 1987, boosting GDP growth to beyond 
8 per cent a year. Like other countries in Southeast Asia, Thai authorities offered a wide 
range of incentives for foreign investors especially those from Japan and the Asian NICs. 
In order to attract more export-oriented manufacturing investments, Thai government has 
recently allowed even 100 per cent foreign ownership in export oriented projects. Therefore 
the number and value of foreign investment approved by the board of investment reached 
to nearly 600 billion baht in the 1987-89 period [33]. One can also say that some factors 
such as the availability of a vast pool oflow-wage, unskilled, trainable labour, sufficient 
infrastructure for industry, a slwp appreciation of Japanese yen and Taiwanese dollar (yuan) 
against the Thai baht in the latter half of 19805 and the presence of a relatively stable 
government with an favourable policies toward foreign investment, are among major factors 
which made Thailand an attractive base for foreign investors particularly in the last years of 
1980s. For several years Japan has been Thailand's number one foreign investor. In 1985, 
Japan accounted for 26.7 per cent of all foreign investment in Thailand with nearly 90 per 
cent of it investing in the manufacturing sector. In 1987, Japanese firms invested in 200 
approved ventures totalling $ 1 billion; in 1988 nearly 300 investments totalling almost $3 
billion were registered, and the Japanese investment increased to $ 3,537 million in 1989, 
which was about 6 times more than the U.S. investment ($ SSI million). Most Japanese 
investment flew to those Thai industrial sectors which American and European firms did not 
have a strong intention to transfer their manufacturing systems, including the motorcycle, 
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automobile, and electrical appliances. 
Furthermore, most Japanese investment took the form of joint ventures with local equity 
participation. However, as a result of the shift toward export oriented production, recent 
Japanese investors have shown a preference for wholly owned subsidiaries over joint 
ventures. It can be generally said that as the experience of Thailand in transferring 
technology indicated, Thailand could attract more investment and technology through joint 
venture agreements with foreign partners. Despite the large amount of investment from 
Japanese firms in Thailand, they have been criticised as not really willing to transfer 
technology and managerial skills to Thailand. It is pointed out that Japanese firms 
transferred mostly out of date technologies that lacked the potential to generate enough 
productivity to gain competitiveness in international markets. It can also be added that 
Japanese firms did not care to complete handbook manuals for operation and management, 
which has made the understanding of know-how and principles of production and 
management difficuh for Thai people to obtain [34]. The following diagram distinguished 
the Japanese technological catch-up pattern from the conventional patterns that we can see 
in most developing Asia countries such as Thailand. 
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Figure D.I Technology Catch-up Patterns of Japan and Southeast Asian Developing 
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Source: Institute of Developing Economy, Tokyo, 1985, P :22. 
The second most active foreign investor has been Taiwan, at $ 1 billion in 1988. The United 
States, with a hundred approved projects in 1988 valued at about $ 700 million, is in distant 
third place [35]. Thailand has been an attractive location for Taiwanese enterprises mostly 
in labour intensive industries such as footwear, electrical appliances, ceramics, food 
processing, textiles and toys, due to Thailand's cheap labour, as well as similar cultural 
background and the existence of a large Chinese community. In 1988, Taiwan investors 
proposed 400 projects accounted 28.6 per cent of total foreign investment to Thailand 
which exceeded that of Japan with 389 cases in the same year. Among the approved 
Taiwanese projects in 1988,29 % were wholly owned by Taiwanese firms, comparing to 
25% of Japanese projects, while 90 per cent of the investment of both countries were export 
oriented [36]. Thailand has also attracted investments by other Southeast Asian countries, 
including Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and S. Korea. 
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Figure D.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Thailand in 1988. 
Source: UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation), 1992. 
A survey by Lee (1990) indicated that while Taiwan has invested more in Thailand and 
Malaysia, Korea investors has invested more in Indonesia. Taiwanese investment in Thailand 
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has been more concentrated in construction as well as manufacturing, and there has been 
more investment in electronics in Malaysia by Taiwanese investors [37]. There is no doubt 
that foreign investment has played a vital role in industrial development and transferring the 
technology and managerial skills to Thailand. However, some believe that foreign 
investment during early stage of Thailand industrialisation has been concentrated mostly in 
production for a protected domestic market, with heavy dependence on imported machinery 
which led to the negative balance of payment. Furthermore, there has been little transfer of 
know-how and skills through past experiences of Thailand in attracting foreign investment 
in the country. As Satikarn (1982) noted more technology transfer in Thailand occurred 
through the purchase of technology and other channels rather than through foreign direct 
investment [38]. There have also been some cases in which foreign investors have brought 
to the country second-hand machines and semi-obsolete ''labour intensive" technology which 
led to high costs for maintenance and repairing those machines [39]. It can also be added 
that Foreign investment in Thailand in some cases has led to an increase in import demand, 
resulted to current account deficit and increasing external debt. 
It should also be noted that the major foreign investors in Thailand such as Japan, Taiwan 
and Korea have exported intermediate and capital goods to their subsidiaries in Thailand, 
where they are processed for export to U. S.A. and EC countries with cost advantage and 
competitiveness. This pattern has led to the unbalanced industrial structure with heavy 
dependency on imports of industrial components and parts in Thailand. Moreover, there has 
been effective opposition from Thai enterprises against some foreign investment which 
mostly competed domestic firms. As an example, one can refer to the opposition from local 
producers to four projects of the Japanese multinational Toshiba which planned to invest 
over $ 400 million in 14 projects to make Thailand its largest manufacturing based outside 
of Japan. As a result of this opposition by Thai firms, Toshiba reduced its proposed 
investment by half [40]. 
One can also add that the past foreign investment in Thailand did not create adequate 
employment for Thailand's huge labour force. It is believed that most offoreign business 
activities in Thailand did not have sufficient beneficial effects on employment creation. It 
seems that Thailand could gain more benefits from foreign investment if the government 
would take measures to increase market competition and to continue insisting upon more 
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participation of local workers in the investment projects. Thus, Thai's authorities have 
recently attempted to take some effective measures in order to attract more foreign 
investment which bring about transfer of technological know-how and know-why to local 
personnel, through ongoing training programs, using foreign and local experts to involve 
more in R&D activities. 
As pointed out earlier, more technology in the past has been transferred by other channels 
than FDI. Unti11975, 256 technology contracts were submitted to the Bank of Thailand, 
which 115 were technical assistance agreements, 23 engineering agreement, I management 
agreement, and 33 contracts were combinations of the above agreements. However, it 
should be noted that this classification was based more on the actual title of each contract. 
For example, due to lack of patent laws in Thailand, there has been no indication or 
specification of the relevant patents in most of the licensing agreements. Therefore, it was 
impossible to separate patented from unpatented products or processes. Most technology 
agreements with Japanese technology suppliers have been in the form of joint venture 
agreements in relatively simple industries, such as textiles, electrical appliances, and vehicle 
assembly [41]. 
D. 3 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND 
As it pointed out earlier, technical human resource development is seen as a key factor 
underlying the economic success of the newly industrialised economies of East Asia. It is 
widely recognised that the successful industriaHsation of the East Asian newly industrialising 
countries has been largely caused by the early priority given to the development and 
upgrading of human resources. Thailand lagged behind other countries in Southeast Asia in 
science and technology education. The number ofhigh school graduates has been only 30 
per cent of the population in Thailand, compared with 94 per cent in S. Korea, 91 per cent 
in Taiwan, 53 per cent in Malaysia, 71 per cent in Singapore and 68 per cent in the 
Philippines [42]. This was mostly because of structure of economy, with most people 
engaged in traditional agriculture. As it is pointed out, there has been a close link between 
the share of employment in agriculture and the transition rate from primary to secondary 
education [43]. 
According to a report by Thailand Development Research Institute, the number of potential 
506 
scientists and engineers in Thailand is lower than that of Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Korea. The ratio of total science and technology human resources per 
10,000 population in Thailand (4.8) is the lowest among all Asian countries, which is 49.6 
for Japan, 24.4 for Korea, and 7.3 for Indonesia. Another indicator shows that the number 
of scientists and technicians per 10,000 of the population was 524 for Korea, 256 for 
Singapore, 78 for Indonesia, and 14 for Thailand. As estimated, there has been only 15% 
of Thai university students graduate in scientific and technological disciplines, compared 
with Korea's near 40 per cent. By the year 2000, Thailand's shortfall of engineers will range 
between 10,000 and 30,000 [44]. The total number of Thai scientists and engineers engaged 
in R&D in the entire country has been only about 2,700, comparing with that of330,000 for 
Japan, and 30,000 for Korea. Thailand has also allocated an average of 0.1 per cent of its 
GDP for research and development activity, while other Asian countries like Taiwan and 
Korea have spent an average of 1-2 per cent of their GDP for R&D activities [45]. 
According to another statistics, Thailand produces only a total of 2,500 science and 
technology graduates each year. This figures indicates to lack of qualified human resources 
at all levels as the one of the major constraint on development of technological capability 
in Thailand [46]. Another figure shows that the number of scientists and engineers in Korea 
in 1981 was almost double that of Thailand in 1984 and the number of Korean technicians 
was larger by more than 700 per cent [47]. 
In 1990, 83 per cent of Thai workers had completed only primary school or less. The 
secondary enrolment ratio has been the lowest of all ASEAN countries, and well below that 
of S. Korea a decade ago. It was estimated that the enrolment ratios for lower and upper 
secondary in 1986 were 41 per cent of those aged 14-16 and 28 per cent of those aged 17-
18. This indicates that more than half of the Thai children in the age group 14-18 were not 
attending school This can be a major hindrance in the production of a skilled and adaptable 
labour force, not to mention the creation of scientists, engineers and technicians to promote 
Thailand's technological capability. One can generally say that science and technology 
capabilities in Thailand has been in lower level in comparison with that of Asian NICs. 
Thailand has emphasised more on the basic physical infrastructure for industrial 
development. As an example, in 1987, total R&D expenditures accounted for only 0.22 per 
cent of GDP, which is very low in comparison with approximately 2 per cent in S. Korea, 
which only about 3 per cent of total R&D activities has been carried out by private sector, 
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compared to about 80 per cent in S. Korea. It is believed that the low rate of R&D activities 
in Thailand had mostly been due to its heavy reliance on imported technology. 
As pointed out earlier, it seems that Thailand has to shift toward producing more high-tech 
products with a greater degree of sophistication, in order to continue the substantial growth 
rate in the late 1980s and to become more competitive in international market, particularly 
with the emergence of countries such as China and Vietnam as serious competitors in the 
markets for labour intensive manufactured products, due to their lower wage rate in 
comparison with Thailand. This can be achieved through strengthening of its technological 
capability. One has to take account some factors which are necessary for enhancing 
technological capability, such as the development of country's science and technology 
infrastructure base, more R&D expenditure per GNP, development of human resources and 
the country's comparative advantages, which can be helpful to find out the most appropriate 
strategic industries and technologies for the country. 
However, there are some general problems in development of Thailand's technological 
capability. One of the most important problem has been inadequacy of its technical human 
resources. As explained earlier, there has been shortage of S&T personnel in all of 
Thailand's industry. This inadequacy in technical human resources has also affected the 
adaptive, and absorptive capacities to assimilate foreign technologies. Another problem in 
enhancing Thailand's technological capabilities has been the lack of sufficient technical 
information services. It is believed that there has been high dependency of domestic 
enterprises to foreign technical services in order to assimilate those technologies. The limited 
capability in the acquisition and transfer of technology has been another problem in 
upgrading Thailand technological capability. This has mostly been due to inadequate source 
of data and information on technology, as well as lack of bargaining power and appropriate 
financial support for the Thai's small and medium-sized enterprises which have been 
involved in technology transfer. Another important factor which has played a part in 
delaying the application of modem technology to increase industrial productivity has been 
the high level of protection that the government had given to the industrial sectors, such as 
import tariff barriers. 
Furthermore, research and development activities and basic facilities and support services 
for development of science and technology are still not strong enough to readily absorb 
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foreign technology, or to have sufficient degree of self-reliance for indigenous technological 
development. Most of R&D activities are conducted by the public rather than private 
sector, which mostly due to the lack of positive measures and incentives from the 
government to encourage them to invest in research and development. Thai authorities have 
determined to increase R&D expenditure to 0.75 per cent of GDP by 1996. According to 
a recent survey undertaken by Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) which 
have analysed the overall technological capabilities of 119 Thai firms, average capability 
levels were found to be highest in agriculture, bio-technology based industries and lowest 
in the electronic industries. It is also noted that operative capabilities including maintenance, 
professional management, technical training tended to be in favourable level while 
innovative capabilities such as R&D activities, major product and process modifications and 
development of new products were found to be in low level [48]. The Thai government has 
also taken some effective measures through the Seventh National Plan (1992-1996) to 
promote application of appropriate technology, enhance productivity, increase international 
competitiveness, strengthen technological capability, assimilate foreign technologies, and 
particularly develop its human resources. 
D. 4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, like most developing countries, Thailand chose to follow the import-substitution 
industrialisation in 1960s. Subsequently, the first two plans, covering 1960-66 and 1967-71, 
introduced mechanism to induce domestic production to substitute for imports, particularly 
the consumer non-durable goods. Attention was paid to export promotion in Third Plan 
(1972-1976) and the trend toward export promotional drive was intensified again in the next 
two plans. One can refer to two broad reasons for Thailand's successful transition to become 
an exporter of manufacture products. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, because of its rich natural 
resources, Thailand has a natural advantage in the processing of its primary commodities for 
exports such as leather and wood products, and food processing industries. Secondly, 
Thailand's relatively large size of domestic market has encouraged local firms to not only 
become efficient in providing import substituting industries but also to compete in 
international market [49]. 
Having compared some aspects of Thai experience with that of neighbouring Malaysia, it 
can be said that the role of state in the economy has been larger than in Thailand. The ratio 
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of government expenditure to GDP in 1984 was 18 per cent in Thailand, 30 per cent in 
Malaysia. Furthermore, foreign direct investment has played more critical role in industrial 
development and technology transfer to Malaysia than in Thailand. As an example, the stock 
ofFDI in 1974 was $ 1350 million in Malaysia, while FDI inflow accounted only $ 550 
million in Thailand [50]. Moreover, there has been some important structural differences 
in the early phase of industrial experiences of Thailand and Malaysia. For instance, while 
Thailand's major traditional exports were indigenous products, Malaysia concentrated upon 
modern export products such as rubber, palm oil, and tin. In both cases, export production 
was supported by commercial and processing activities supplied by industrial sector [51]. 
Furthermore, unlike the Malaysia which implemented a heavy industrialisation drive in 
1980s, heavy industries has been relatively underdeveloped in Thailand. Thai industrial 
sector in 1980shad a higher proportion of light industries, particularly of food processing, 
beverages, leather and rubber products and of textiles. However, Thailand's heavy industry 
has increased from 18 per cent of manufacturing value added in 1960 to 32 per cent in 1988. 
As in other South east Asian countries, the Thai state has played a vital role in directing the 
economy towards rapid industrial progress. The Thai state traditionally played an active role 
to promote domestic capital through diverse state institutions and sought ways to utilise 
foreign capital. The government's major contribution to economic growth has been to 
provide economic and social seIVices, most notably to build infrastructure such as highways, 
power stations, as weB as to provide various incentives and financial assistance to promote 
private investments. The Thai Government has also controlled a substantial portion of the 
economy, including the postal service, telephone, telegraph, radio, and television 
communications, the railroads, ports, and an airline. Despite the recent privatisation 
program in order to privatise as much as state owned firms, the government is still interested 
in participating in some Manufacturing industries such as glass, rubber, canned fish 
products, automobile batteries, petroleum, and petroleum refining. 
There are also other fields which controlled either by the government through direct 
participation or special arrangement (including concessions to private operators and 
licensing), such as the mining and exploitation of minerals, the production and distn1>ution 
of electricity, the water supply, passenger transport (other than the government-owned 
railroad), banking, and insurance. Therefore, there is no doubt that the state has played a 
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central role in Thai economic progress, and the dynamic relationship between the state and 
private sector is considered to be one of the important factors of success. Having compared 
the state role in industrial development of the South East Asian countries, one can say that 
there has been less direct intervention in Thailand than Korea and Taiwan. The state has 
played a more passive role in industrialisation of Thailand than in Taiwan and Korea. The 
Thai state has legal control over natural resources and it uses its power to determine how 
natural resources are to be exploited. Thai government has also been effective mainly in 
creating favourable conditions for attracting foreign investment. Despite of relatively 
Wlstable politics in Thailand, the relationship between state and private sectors has been very 
stable and institutionalised [52]. 
Having identified the specific factors contributing to Thai success one can refer to three 
broad factors. Firstly, the dynamic growth of its agriculture which along with other natural 
resources, provided a supportive base for the development of processing export oriented 
industries. The second important factor is the political development in Thailand, which led 
to the assimilation of the capitalist class of Chinese origin into an indigenous economic and 
political power elite with similar views on development policies. Moreover, Thailand also 
benefited from long periods of relatively political stability. Despite some coups and changes 
of governments during the past three decades, the changes in government hardly affected 
the basic development philosophy or development strategy of the country. A third factor 
contributing to Thai success is the location in a dynamic region of the world economy and 
the longstanding and close relations with the main industrial force in the region, Japan [53]. 
Furthermore, the gradual shift towards export promotion policies through various incentives 
for exports from the 1970s, and Thailand' s stable macroeconomic conditions which 
enhanced the confidence oflocal and foreign investors, are among other factors which have 
also contributed to the success experience of Thailand. Compared to the negative growth 
rate of some developing countries during the post second oil shock period, it is clear that 
the maintenance of macroeconomic stability was a crucial factor that enabled the 
occurrence of the rapid growth experiences in the late 1980s. A constant and stable Thai 
baht against dollar and yen during the last 30 years as well as a low inflation rate have been 
the most important aspects of Thai macroeconomic stability. As pointed out earlier, 
Thailand's relatively political stability, its social openness and tolerance, its freedom of 
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markets, and its good record in social development may also be considered as other success 
factors. 
Thai authorities and economic planners have recently faced a major decision: whether to 
encourage a NIC's (Newly Industrialised Country) type of strategy based on manufacturing 
exports from the urbanised central region, which will probably require increasing 
dependence on foreign investment and technology, especially from Japan, or follow a 
NAIC's (Newly Agro-Industrialised Country) type of strategy based on agro-industry 
exports, which will mean less overall rapid growth but an improvement in rural conditions 
as well as more independence through internal sources. Choosing either a NIC's or NAIC's 
strategy alone is not probably desirable for Thailand, since both approaches have different 
advantages. It seems that in the long term, Thailand needs to develop more its 
manufacturing industries in addition to agro-industries. One can say that although NAICs 
approach may solve to some extent Thailand's problem of rural poverty and emigration of 
labour force into urban areas, it does not appear to be the final solution for Thailand since 
agricuhure productivity has not reached a sufficient level yet. On the other hand, adopting 
only the NICs approach will require an extensive infrastructure investment and can not 
provide employment for the majority of Thailand's population who are mainly in rural areas. 
Although Thailand may not have enough financial and technological resources to pursue 
both strategies, a mixture of both strategies therefore seems to be an appropriate choice for 
the Thai authorities. 
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APPENDIX E 
INDUSTRY AND TECHNOWGY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA 
Indonesia is another ASEAN member located in Southeast Asia with more than 13,000 
islands and a total population of about 190 million along with 2000 ethno-cu1tural groups. 
Indonesia was a Dutch colony for a period of three and a half centuries which influenced 
the building of its institutional indicators particularly the educational system. Therefore, one 
can say that the Indonesian school system has been more oriented to the general pattern of 
the ''Nederlandsch Indie" educational system [1]. Indonesia is also rich in natural resources 
of every type, of which oil is certainly the most important, with a capacity to produce 1. 7 
million barrels a day. The reserves are equal to 2 per cent of the world oil reserves [2]. 
After the second world war and its independence on 17 August 1945, Indonesia has given 
top priority to the agricuhural sector to exploit and develop its abundant natural resources. 
The Indonesian government tried to develop indigenous small scale industries located in 
rural and semi rural areas during the first five year plan (1956-61). Indonesia also pursued 
an import-substitution industrialisation policy which was carried out by public enterprises 
under a highly centralised administrative system. The infimt industries were heavily protected 
and promoted by high tariffs, import quotas, local content requirement and various subsidies 
[3]. 
Due to the existence of many micro economic distortions and huge macroeconomic 
imbalances prior to 1966, the new order government of president Soeharto adopted 
stabilisation policies which aimed at economy recovery through devaluation of national 
currency and encouraging private and foreign investment. As a resuh of the stabilisation 
policies, the annual average growth rate reached 8.2 per cent compared to the average rate 
of 1.2 per cent in the preceding five years [4]. One can say that Indonesia's rapid growth rate 
during this period was partly due to the increase in its productive capacity, both through 
higher investment and faster technological progress. The manufacturing sector grew very 
quickly at an annual rate of 12.5 per cent during the period between 1965-1991.This 
indicates a doubling of real output about every six years, or a ninefold increase over the 25 
years. 
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According to another figure, the rate of growth in manufacture during the period between 
1967-81 increased 14 fold, which was mainly concentrated in construction, transport and 
commmications industries [5]. The manufacture value added (at a constant prices of 1973) 
increased at an average annual rate of 15 per cent during the period between 1971 and 1980. 
The contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP also increased from 8.4 per cent in 
1971 to 11.6 per cent in 1980 [6]. One can refer to some overall factors contnouting to the 
rapid growth of manufacturing sector in Indonesia, such as increasing rate of foreign 
investment, in particular in capital intensive industries, and high tariff systems which created 
an extremely high effective level of protection. It can be generally said that the relatively 
successful experience of import substitution in Indonesia during the 1970s has mostly been 
because of the massive inflow of oil revenues and foreign investment. Consequently, the 
emerging modern manufacturing sector was highly capital intensive, and the labour 
intensive, traditional manufacturing sector dominated by indigenous private capital suffered 
a rapid decline [7]. The process of import substituting industrialisation was closely 
controlled by the state through direct participation in manufacturing. 
WIth the ending of the easy phase of import substitution industrialisation, there was a shift 
from production of consumer goods towards intermediate and capital goods and this along 
with state protection, subsidy and public and private investment, provided more for further 
development. Consumer goods dropped from 80.8 per cent of total value of manufacturing 
in 1971 to 47.6 per cent in 1980, whilst intermediate goods grew from 13.1 to 33.5 per cent 
and capital goods from 6.1 to 16.9 per cent in the same period. However, due to low tariffs 
on intermediate and capital goods, intermediate-goods industries were limited to state 
enterprises producing cement, steel, paper, fertiliser and petrochemical [8]. 
The Indonesian economy grew at an average rate of 7.9 per cent per annum during the 
period between 1973-81.The high growth rate during 1970s was accompanied with m 
import substituting path and rapidly expanding investments in infrastructure and directly 
productive capacity reflecting the dominant role of the government sector in the growth 
process. The strong performance of the Indonesian economy during 1970s was also 
associated with rapid increases in private and public consumption, overall investment, 
domestic savings and foreign exchange earnings. In particular, the oil sector contnlmted to 
substantial increases in government revenues and foreign exchange earnings. The share of 
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oil and gas in total exports increased from 39 per cent in 1971 to 75 per cent in 1980. 
Therefore, rapid industrial growth tended to be oriented to the domestic market and was 
relatively capital intensive during 1970s [9]. Moreover, trade and industrial policies during 
the 1970s were directed at influencing the pattern of industrialisation through protection of 
domestic industries. The protectionist regime that developed was characterised by import 
controls through tariff and non-tariff barriers, high and variable levels of effective protection 
which are inctined against exports, proliferation of administrative procedures and allocation 
processes, and excessive government intelVention in the direction of industrialisation [10]. 
According to Pangestu and Boediono (1986) the average effective rate of protection in 
import competing industries was 108.6 per cent in 1975 with a range from 35 to 4315 per 
cent across all industries [11]. 
The development of manufactured exports during the 1970s went through two distinct 
phases. The decline of manufactured exports in the first half of the decade was attn'buted 
mainly to the increased importance of oil exports in this period. Furthermore, the strong 
emphasis on the development of import substitution industries has been another reason for 
the decrease in manufacture exports during the early 1970s. The other reason, as Paauw 
(1981) indicated, has been the overvaluation of the Indonesian rupiah which associated with 
a high rate of domestic inflation [12]. The second half of the 1970s, however, saw an 
increase in both the share of manufactures in total exports as well as the share of 
manufactured exports in output of the manufacturing sector. During the period between 
1975 to 1980 the value of manufactured exports in constant prices increased by an average 
annual rate of 28 per cent. The major incentive to the growth of manufactured exports is 
considered to be the 33 per cent devaluation of rupiah in 1978 [13]. 
Because ofa serious depression in oil market and the general world recession of the early 
1980s, the average annual growth rate ofGDP declined to 4.2 per cent during the period 
between 1980 to 1984. Faced with lower oil prices in the early 1980's and the need to 
create more than two million jobs annually, the government of Indonesia in 1983 launched 
"deregulation and de-bureaucratization" programs. The main goals were to give more 
emphasis to the private sector and reduce dependence on petroleum as a source of export 
earnings and tax revenues. The deregulation program indicated both a reduced role of 
government intervention and wider and more creative participation by the public. Moreover, 
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the deregulation policy has been considered as a necessary component of the broader task 
of structural adjustment directed at a more efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, 
another aim of deregulation program during the late 1980s has been improved economic 
performance through a more efficient allocation of resources, and the most immediate 
measure of its success was the growth in non-oil exports. The strong drive for non-oil 
exports seem to have encouraged a tendency toward new regulation or re-regulation either 
by restricting or totally banning the export of a range of products, primarily unprocessed or 
semi-processed goods [14]. 
The program began with a loosening of controls on the financial sector. In the initial phase 
of the deregulation and adjustment period (1983-1985), there has been a sharp reduction in 
imports in order to adjust the balance of payments. Several factors contn'buted to this 
reduction. Firstly, public sector imports of capital goods were reduced sharply by a 
reconsidering of large projects in March 1983 and by reduction of real capital spending in 
subsequent years. Secondly, by redefining priorities, the government diverted its 
expenditures from sectors with a relatively high import-intensiveness (mining and industry) 
to those that were less import-intensive (agriculture, education, and transport). Thirdly, the 
large depreciation of the real exchange rate raised the price of imports relative to domestic 
goods, causing the private sector demand to shift from imports to domestic substitutes. 
Fourthly, a strong public investment effort during the oil boom increased import-substitution 
activities in some important commodities such as rice, sugar, processed food, cement, and 
fertiliser. Fifthly, the proliferation of non-tariff barriers in the form of import licenses after 
the early 1980s also led to the reduction of imports [15]. In 1986, it was estimated that the 
approved importers system re&tricted 28 per cent of the total number of items imported, 26 
percent of the total import value, and 31 percent of the value added [16]. 
The Indonesian government also decided to take further effective measures for economic 
recovery from the negative effects of recession in early 1980s. The major measures included 
reducing public expenditure and subsidies, devaluation of the rupiah by 28 per cent against 
the US dollar in March 1983 and September 1986, a number of tax reforms to raise 
government revenues, h'beralized conditions for foreign and domestic investment, reduced 
tariffs and import-licensing restrictions, and eased export requirements. As a resuh of these 
measures, the balance of payments improved considerably and non-oil exports increased 
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very rapidly. Moreover, the widespread deregulation of the economy had favourable effects 
on economic efficiency. According to a World Bank study in 1989, the rate of return on 
investment rose from 13 per cent in 1982-85 to almost 22 per cent in 1986-88 and that of 
total factor productivity a more comprehensive measure of efficiency gains also improved 
during this period [17]. 
It is generally argued that most of the deregulation policies in the mid-1980s concentrated 
in the simplifYing procedures, allowing the exporters special facilities, and removing the anti-
export bias. However, the current deregulations go beyond simplifying procedures, making 
regulations more obvious, and removing distortions for exports and re-examining the 
objectives behind the regulations [18]. The continuing of deregulation policies has also 
strengthened the private market for technology development through the trade and 
investment incentives which allowed greater flows of foreign investment and technical 
expertise into Indonesia. Moreover, the Indonesian government intended to encourage 
exports in the non-oil sector from 1982. Therefore, the government formulated some 
policies such as reconsideration of disincentives to exporters under import substitution, 
provision of services to the export sector in the fields of finance, sale, quality control, and 
inspection, and reduction of transportation costs such as those of shipping. As a resuh of 
these policies the non-oil exports rose from 18 per cent of total exports in 1982 to 27 per 
cent in 1984 and to 41 percent in 1989. Moreover, the value of manufactured exports 
increased from $ 2.5 billion to $ 19.6 billion and in relative terms from 11 % of total exports 
to 57.7% of total exports between 1982 and 1992. This growth has been particularly evident 
since 1986, when the sector's export revenues still amounted to only $ 4.5 billion or about 
30 per cent of total export earnings. (the real annual average growth of exports increased 
to 30 per cent during the 1980s). Moreover, the economic growth increased from an 
average rate of 4 per cent in mid-1980s to about 7 per cent during 1988-91. It should also 
be noted that the major force driving economic recovery was the private sector which played 
an important role in the success of deregulation policies. The private sector contn'buted over 
70 per cent of total GDP growth during 1983-1991 [19]. 
One can generally say that from mid-1980s onwards, the previous import substitution 
policies replaced with an export oriented policy aimed at promoting non-oil exports and 
private sector. Despite significant growth of manufacturing exports in Indonesia during the 
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late 1980s, there have been some problems in promoting manufactured exports. Due to the 
low level of labour productivity and the increasing pressure of its competitors in the 
international market, Indonesia does not offer a particularly favourable environment for 
export-oriented manufacturing investment [20]. Manufacturing contn'buted only 15 per cent 
of Indonesia's GOP in 1983, in comparison with 21 per cent of Thailand and 18 per cent of 
Malaysia [21]. Moreover there have been some overall problems such as the cultural 
influences of the colonial period along with political instability and sometimes inconsistent 
industrialisation policies particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. Another major obstacle in 
promoting manufactured exports has been Indonesia's high cost of industrial products. While 
the reduction in tariff protection has encouraged the export of manufacture products, the 
use of non-tariff protection such as import licensing arrangements has created high prices 
for industrial inputs, leading in tum to uncompetitive exports. The other important problem 
in enhancing the manufactured exports is the fact that most foreign investment in Indonesia 
has been import-substitution oriented which emphasised more producing for the domestic 
market. As an example, a survey ofll3 Japanese enterprises in Indonesia indicated that 105 
of Japanese fums were import substitution oriented, while only 3 were export oriented, and 
the other 5 were both import substitution and export oriented [22]. 
The Indonesian fourth national development plan (1984-1989) formulated during the mid-
1980s aimed at raising the standards of living, intellectual abilities and general welfare of 
the people, and laying strong foundations for subsequent stages of the nation development. 
The priorities of this plan were given to self-sufficiency in food and machinery industries 
[23]. One can generally refer to several points regarding Indonesian's very rapid growth rate 
of the manufacturing sector. Firstly, while some of the manufactured products in the 1960s 
were almost regarded as non-tradable and mostly included traditional and small-scaled 
industries, there has been a dramatic increase in both quantity and quality of manufacture 
products through the massive public and private investment in the manufacturing sector. It 
should also be noted that a very rapid increase in oil prices in 1973 provided a substantial 
amount of foreign exchange for the Indonesian government in order to develop the 
manufacturing sector. Secondly, Indonesia has imported an enormous amount of new 
technologies from foreign countries since mid the 1960s. It can be said that despite highly 
regulated and self reliant industrial policies, Indonesia has relied heavily on imported 
technology. The import-substitution industrialisation strategy of the 1960s and 1970s has 
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led to a flood of new technologies into Indonesia, many of which replaced older 
technologies and some of which made new goods available. Generally, with the increase 
in oil income revenue in 1970s, Indonesia was able to improve both general education and 
infrastructure, which facilitated the acquisition of new technologies. In addition to rapid 
modernisation of its labour- intensive technologies, the Indonesian government also 
developed the large-scale capital intensive industries during the 1970s and 1980s. 
This indicates the importance of modem technologies for the Indonesian authorities. As 
one of the Indonesian Ministers (Research and Technology Minister) has stated, 
development should not only be regarded as increasing the national income but the physical 
appearance of the economy which can result from the heavy use and diffusion of high 
technologies may also have a significant impact to development of the economy and 
national income. He concluded that the capacity to develop and produce technology is 
essential for successful industrialisation [24]. His four part dream for Indonesia include 
acquiring advanced technology by assembling foreign designed aircraft under license, 
integrating this knowledge into high-tech joint ventures, developing indigenous technical 
skills through technical institutes, and finally providing competence in basic science and 
technology at the same level with the advanced industrial nation [25]. 
He has established two major technology ventures in shipbuilding (PAL) and aircraft 
manufacturing (Nartanio). While Nurtanio has produced aircraft (the CN 235) under license 
to the Spanish company (CASA), PAL has manufactured various types of ships, from 
tankers to patrol boats and hydrofoils. [26]. Moreover in aircraft manufacturing, since the 
establishment of Indonesia Nusantra Aircraft Industry (IPTN) in 1976, Indonesia has 
designed and manufactured five seater helicopters (NBO- 105) under licence from MBB-
Germany, 19 to 28 seater fixed-wing aircraft (NC-212) under licence from CAS-Spain, 
PUMA NAS-300 and super PUMA NAS-332, 19 to 24 seater helicopters under licence 
from Aerospatiale France, and the recent collaborative programme with US companies with 
the purpose of assisting IPTN to be one of the subcontractors for Boeing products [27]. 
Both the ship and air~aft industries are examples of the government's continuing 
involvement to intervene in the marketplace through regulation and direct investment, in 
order to create a domestic induStrial network in the face of market forces. The Indonesian 
government established the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology 
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(BPPT) in 1978 in order to strengthen its industrial technology capability through the 
selection, assessment and application of appropriate science and technologies. The agency 
was also responsible to formulate general policies for the assessment and application of 
technology requisite for national development. In order to achieve these objectives, BPPT 
employed 2,305 scientists and researchers involved in a wide range of research and 
development activities. Eight industries, namely, aeronautics and aerospace, maritime and 
shipbuilding, land transportation, telecommunications, energy, engineering, agricuhural 
equipment, and defence industries have been selected for intensive research and 
development. 
The flow of industrial technology from foreign sources including MNCs to Indonesia has 
mainly taken place been by the private firms rather than through state-owned enterprises. 
Most of industrial technology has been transferred into Indonesia through foreign direct 
investment (which in Indonesia can also take place through joint ventures) or through 
technical licensing agreements. In a survey of technology transfer through MNCs in twelve 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia, the primary concern was to examine to what extent 
this technology transfer has contn"buted to the development of indigenous (local) 
technological capability through the application of technological effort. The studies indicated 
that the degree oflocal technological effort for achieving indigenous technological capability 
in Indonesia has been greater in the case of national companies which have purchased 
technology through licensing agreements than in the case of joint ventures between MNCs 
and Indonesian private or state-owned companies [28]. 
There are five general stages in the process of technology transfer to LDCs such as 
Indonesia, including, learning how to operate machines, establishing maintenance skills, 
acquisition of repairing skills, establishing basic technology to make independent design 
possible, and establishing independent development in full-scale technology. As an example, 
the aeronautics and aerospace industry in Indonesia has reached the stage of design and 
manufacture of the CN-235/2 engine 38 passenger short take-off and landing aircraft [29]. 
Despite this significant development in some technology-intensive industries, it should be 
noted that Indonesia still lacks a strong scientific, engineering and managerial base along 
with skilled workers on wbich to build high value added industries. Moreover, it is believed 
that the development of these targeted high-technology industries supported by direct 
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public investment or subsidies and high levels of protection are costly and ineffective and 
inconsistent with Indonesia's strategy of broad-based growth and creating enough 
employment for its growing labour force. 
Broadly, the government in Indonesia have used two strategies to accelerate the 
development of technological capability. The first is to promote private market mechanisms 
for technology development through functional interventions, for example maintaining 
competitive and open product markets, allowing unrestricted imports of machinery, 
technology and services; providing incentives for private investment in technology research 
and development, developing human resources, helping establish industrial standards and 
technology services and providing extension and information services. The second strategy 
has been to invest in technological development through selective strategic interventions, 
such as selective targeting of technology-intensive industries through import protection, 
direct public investment or subsidies to encourage private investment in such industries and 
the targeted development of highly trained manpower for such industrles.[30]. It appears 
that Indonesia has currently used both functional and selective interventions in pursuing 
technology development with being more successful in the first (functional) than the second 
(selective strategic interventions). 
Having compared the experiences of most East Asian countries including Indonesia in 
development of their technological capability, one can refer to some of the main common 
policies in which these countries have adopted in order to develop their technological 
capability such as a huge investment in development of their infrastructure in particular the 
manufacture sector, developing of their human resources through massive investment in 
education sector, the acquiring of foreign technologies through selective appropriate 
channels and through limited, well-designed government intervention and encouraging 
private sector through various incentives in order to help private companies to be able to 
compete in international technology markets. It should also be noted that as the experience 
of several East Asian countries has indicated, import substituting industrialisation strategies 
are not conductive to the absotption and diffusion of industrial technologies that are 
appropriate to labour-intensive economies [31]. 
The third feature of Indonesia's manufacture growth has been the rapid transition from 
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production of consumer goods and resource processing industries towards more 
intermediate and capital goods and heavy industries. For example, the manufacture value 
added in some consumer goods such as beverages and tobacco and rubber industries 
decreased from 60 per cent in 1963 to 12 per cent in 1986. The share of intermediate and 
capital goods in manufacturing value added increased from 13.1 and 6.1 per cent in 1971, 
to 35.5 and 16.9 per cent in 1980 respectively [32]. The increase in the capital goods 
industries were mainly due to the expansion of production in the engineering sector (such 
as electrical machinery, transport equipment and metal products), which was one of the 
fastest growing sectors during the 1970s. There was an annual growth rate of about 9 per 
cent in labour productivity among large and medium firms during the period between 1975 
and 1986 [33]. 
Another important issue in the assessment of industrial development is the considerable 
growth in the manufacturing employment which grew at an annual rate of about 5.6 per 
cent for large and medium firms from 1975 to 1986. According to another figure, 
employment in manufilcturing grew from 3.1 million in 1971 to 4.7 million in 1980, and the 
rate of growth in manufacturing employment increased substantially from about 4.5 per cent 
per annum in 1980-85 to 7 per cent per annum in 1985-90 [34]. Related to growth rates 
of manufilcturing employment to value added gives the employment value added elasticity 
of about 0.30 in the period between 1971 and 1980. However, in comparison with the other 
South east Asian countries especiaJly Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, the manufacture 
sector made a much more important contribution to employment creation in these countries 
than in Indonesia with the employment elasticities of 0.56, 0.66 and 0.78, respectively 
during the 1970s [35]. 
The next important characteristic is an increase in the manufactured exports after 1985. 
Indonesia's manufactured exports during 1970s never surpassed $ 500 million which 
constituted less than 3 per cent of total exports. This weak performance of manufactured 
exports in 1970s can be mostly attributed to the Indonesia's import substitution and 
protectionist policies and reliance on export ofits mineral resources, in particular oil and gas 
sector. Due to the shift towards an export promotion industrialisation policy, a sharp decline 
in on export prices in mid 19808, and a major devaluation of national currency in 1978 and 
1984, manufacturing exports rose fomfold in the period between 1980-85, and nearly 
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doubled again in 1985-89, and increased a further 50 per cent in 1989-91. During the whole 
period (1980-91), real exports grew at an annual rate of30 per cent [36]. By 1987 the 
value of the manufactured exports exceeded that of the agricuhure commodities, and by 
1991 manufactures constituted over half of all merchandise exports. Non-oil exports 
increased more than doubled from $ 6.7 billion in 1986-87 to an estimated $ 14.3 billion in 
1989-90, an average annual increase of about 29 per cent. Much of this growth was believed 
to have come from a diversifying base of manufacturing goods [37]. 
It should be noted that due to weak domestic economic conditions related to the oil price 
decline that began in 1986, there was excess production capacity. Thus manufactured export 
output could be increased in response to a more favourable policy environment without 
increasing investment. As the decline in the role of oil revenue in GDP is continuing in the 
1990s, it seems crucial for Indonesia to keep a non-oil manufacturing growth rate of around 
10 per cent per year for the 1990s. At this rate, the share of non-oil manufacturing in GDP 
could increase from about current rate of 16 per cent to 23 per cent by the year 2000. 
Therefore, the importance of promoting efficiency and productivity of manufacture products 
becomes more vital for Indonesia in order to be able to compete in international export 
market. Most of early growth in manufacturing export has been in some natural resource 
based processed products such as plywood, clothing and textiles which accounted for about 
40-50 per cent of total exports. Indonesia has been the largest supplier of plywood in the 
world since 1984. A range of other resource-based products including cement, fertiliser, 
paper, footwear, garments, furniture, jewellery and glass products also became significant 
in the late 1980s [38]. The share of heavy (engineering and assembly) industry which 
consisted of more capital intensive processing activities such as iron, steel, chemicals, and 
engineering and assembly activities rose substantially to over 40 per cent by mid 1980s [39]. 
The transition to resource-based manufacture exports has been based on Indonesia's 
comparative advantage, which would allow maximal foreign, productivity and employment 
benefits. 
Moreover, a major dimension of Indonesia's industrial transformation lies in its rapid 
diversification. For example, the share of food, beverages, tobacco and rubber products fell 
extremely sharply, from 70 % in 1963, to 53% andjust 33% in 1975 and 1986 respectively. 
On the other hand, the share of other newly emerging engineering and metal goods 
527 
industries, rising from 6 per cent in 1963 to 13 per cent in 1985, and heavy processing 
industries rose from 9 per cent to 25 per cent over the same period [40]. However, in 
comparison with most of its neighbours in South east Asia, the share of industrial products 
in Indonesia has been lower than those of neighbouring countries except for the wood and 
chemical products. Another feature of the industrial sector in Indonesia is its pattern of 
industrial ownership. Three main ownership categories dominate Indonesian non-oil 
manufacturing: (domestic) private firms, private foreign joint ventures, and joint ventures 
involving government, private and foreign interests. The large state enterprise sector reflects 
the government's strategically important role to guide the pattern of industrialisation. The 
state particularly controlled some strategic and capital intensive industries such as oil 
refining, sugar refining, cement, fertiliser, aircraft, spinning and weaving. In 1983, state 
owned firms contn"buted 55 per cent of total manufacturing output, and a further 21 per 
cent in joint ventures with foreign firms. In 1985, there were about 589 large and medium 
sized state enterprises. Data on 215 firms owned and operated by Indonesian government 
at the end of March 1986 provided further information. By sector, the total included 38 in 
manufacturing, 19 in public works, 17 in transportation, and 8 in mining and energy [41]. 
Some Indonesian authorities believed expanding large state enterprises is essential for 
Indonesia to catch up with modern technology and compete internationally. However, as 
the examples of gannents and footwear industries indicated, one can say that the success of 
the non-oil exports drive has mostly depended on smal1 enterprises rather than large firms 
[42]. 
However, despite relatively large state involvement in the manufacturing sector, private 
firms have been the major factor in Indonesian non-oil manufacturing. They provided over 
two-thirds of the jobs compared with 12 per cent government groups and just 6 per cent for 
foreign firms. Private firms dominate much of manufacturing mostly in consumer goods and 
labour intensive industries, including food products, plywood, textiles, garments, rubber 
products, and most non-metallic minerals industries [43]. The share of private fum's output 
has been increasing over time and they contn"buted over half of value- added in sixteen of 
the 28 main industrial groups. Another important point in the growth of manufacturing 
exports during the 1980s has been the direct role of government intervention in stimulating 
non-oil exports. As an example, one can refer to the ban on log exports which facilitated the 
very substantial growth of plywood, controls on the export ofa range of timber products, 
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and the export of relatively capital intensive products supported by heavy public sector 
investment. Export developments in 1991 suggest a return to the earlier trends of rapid 
growth and diversification. Thus the experience of 1989 and 1990 can be viewed as unusual, 
and brought about by strong growth in domestic demand and a crowding out of certain 
export activities, particularly machine goods and metals. Rapid export growth in 1991 has 
been attnDuted partly to the jump in domestic and foreign investment directed towards 
exports in the previous two years, especially in textiles, footwear and wood products [44]. 
The Indonesian economy continued to shift from reliance on the oil and gas income to the 
broader base in particular manufacturing exports. In 1992, manufacturing has continued to 
be one of the most rapidly growing of Indonesia's major economic sectors and accounted 
for 21.7% of GDP. The increased importance of the manufacturing sector has resulted in 
manufacturing products becoming Indonesia's major export item in 1992, overtaking the 
value of exports of oil and gas for the first time. Manufactured goods produced export 
revenues of$14. 0 billion and accounted for 41.1 % of total exports in 1992. Exports of oil 
and gas, historically Indonesia's largest export item, moved into second place with export 
revenues of $10.7 billion which accounted for 31.4% of total exports. Non-oil 
manufacturing accounted for 17.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), oil and gas 
production and refining for 13.0 percent, agriculture for 16.7 percent, and trading, hotels 
and restaurants for 16.6 percent in 1992. Real growth in GDP averaged 6.7 percent from 
1987-92, and slowed down to around 6.5 per cent in 1993. The principal manufactured 
goods produced in Indonesia included textiles, processed foods, motor vehicles and 
electronic equipment in the consumer goods sector and plywood, cement, fertilizers, metals 
and glass products in the intermediate goods sector. 
Indonesia's prescription for its economy in 1993 places a high importance on mobilising 
financial resources to help the country develop its infrastructure and professional training. 
In order to make industry and trade more internationally competitive, Indonesia sharply 
reduced non-tariff barriers in July 1992, and deregulated key industries to allow free 
importation of essential manufacturing inputs. There have been 227 new manufacturing 
projects, at a combined value of over $ 2.5 billion in February 1993 including 18 chemical 
plants and 28 metal plants which are capable of generating approximate foreign exchange 
earnings of $ 1.1 billion and saving an estimated $ 1.4 billion annually in imports [45]. In 
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1993 manufactured exports reached US$22, 944 million or an increase of 17.0% compared 
to that of 1992 which amounted to US$19, 613 million and 247.7% compared to that of 
1988 \Wich amounted to US$9, 262 million. The increase in exports value has in fact lifted 
the role of manufactured exports on the whole of the national export from 50.4% in 1988 
to 62.3% in 1993. While the role of manufactured exports on the whole of non-oil and 
non-gas exports increased from 82.1 % to 84.7%. 
E. 1 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVEWPMENT POLICIES IN INDONESIA 
Human recourse development has received strong emphasis in the government's 
development strategy, both as a means of raising living standards and increasing the 
capacities for growth. It can be said that one of the most significant achievements of the 
New Order government has been a dramatic expansion in educational enrolments at all 
levels. The share of education in GDP increased from about 2 per cent in 1969 to 3.5 per 
cent in 1976-77 and again to 4.5 per cent in 1985-86. Moreover, in the early 1980s the 
literacy level grew very rapidly and reached to 80.9 per cent in 1985 and 86.4 per cent in 
1990, compared with 71.1 per cent in 1980. It should be noted that the development of 
education have been remarkable at all levels, particularly at the primary and secondary 
levels. In terms of growth rates, upper secondary school graduates grew fastest at over 11 
per cent per year over the period between 1971-1985 [46]. 
Moreover, in 1993/94, the number of new students in the senior high schools and vocational 
and technical schools (not including the Islamic senior high schools where the education is 
non-technical) reached 1.34 million. This amount shows a slight increase compared to the 
1.33 million of the previous academic year \Wich was in accordance with the increase of the 
junior high school graduates from 1.61 million to 1.63 million. Thus, the ratio of the number 
of newly admitted students in the senior high school against that of the junior high school 
graduates has increased from 82.1% to 82.3%. This amount shows a sharp increase 
comparing to that in 1968 \Wich was only 35.3%. It is estimated that the real rates of return 
to improved basic education in rural areas have been about 27 per cent and in secondary 
education about 11-16 percent [47]. The few available studies on rates of return to 
education in Indonesia have indicated the highest returns at primary level and lowest for 
higher education. As Byron and Takashi (1989) estimated, general returns to education in 
Indonesia has been 15-17 per cent for each additional year of schooling [48]. 
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In 1990, there were 49 public institutions for higher education in Indonesia, 10 of which are 
authorised to grant master's and doctoral degrees. Furthermore, there were 872 private 
institutions of higher learning [49]. In 1993, the government's plans for expansion of 
educational facilities at the university level included the introduction of new areas of study 
such as marine science, bio-chemistry, bio-techno10gy, computer technology and micro-
electronics. According to another figure, the student enrolments in tertiary education, both 
public and private, has increased from 8.5 per cent of the population aged 19-24 years ( 1.65 
million) in 1989 to 11 per cent (2.5 million) [50]. Furthermore, there were 88,700 higher 
education academics in 1994 with a ratio of one academic for every 23 university students 
in academic year 1993/94. These numbers are higher than those of the previous academic 
year which are 59,500 academics and a ratio of 1 :28. Research activities have also increased 
and there were 1,500 research titles funded by the Government during 1993-94 [51]. 
However, one can say that despite the quantitative growth in the Indonesian educational 
system, the quality of the educational system has not developed to the same level. The 
Indonesian authorities have recently tried to find a selective development strategy in which 
the highest returns for good quality in higher education are achievable. This human resource 
development strategy aimed at a re-evaluation and promoting of study programs to give 
significant stress on the development of the basic sciences, technology, economics, business 
and conunerce. This should include new policies to enable professional colleges to increase 
their capabilities in training for industry. The strategy also encourages the academic staff to 
become more involved in research and development activities in order to improve self-
confidence and academic standing. Moreover, Indonesian officials required foreign suppliers 
of technology to provide facilities for the training of Indonesian workers. This training 
generally aimed at promoting the capability of Indonesian workers to assimilate and develop 
imported technologies and also the replacement of foreign staffby Indonesians. Therefore, 
it appears that in order to meet the demands of continued industrialisation, the Indonesian 
authorities continue to make worker training and vocational education a top priority in the 
current development strategy. 
Having compared the educational development in the Southeast Asia, between the period 
1970-1985 adult literacy rose from 54 to 74 per cent in Indonesia, 60 to 74 per cent in 
Malaysia, and 69 to 86 per cent in Singapore. In the Philippines and Thailand literacy rate 
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were, respectively, 86 per cent and 91 per cent in 1985. Gross enrolment ratios at the 
secondary level in 1985 ranged from 30 per cent in Thailand to 71 per cent in Singapore, 
with Indonesia having made the most dramatic progress from 16 per cent in 1970 to 42 per 
cent in 1985. In terms of the share of educational expenditure per GDP, while Indonesia 
allocated about 4.5 per cent of its GDP in education, this figure have been 6 per cent and 
1.8 per cent for Malaysia and the Philippines respectively in mid 1980s [52]. 
E.l THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER TO INDONESIA 
The inflow of foreign direct investment has been an important factor in Indonesian industrial 
development since 1967, when the Foreign Investment Law was passed. During the first 
year of its enactment, more than twenty large MNCs applied to invest in Indonesia. Between 
1967 and 1992, more than 1,590 manufacturing projects involving $ 37.7 billion in foreign 
investment were approved by Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), which 
represented 60 per cent of the value of total foreign investment commitment approved 
outside of the petroleum and financial service sectors [53]. Following the anti-Japanese riot 
of 1974, the New Order state undertook an Indonesianisation policy by amending the 
foreign investment law. The maxinmm limit of foreign share of ownership in all existing and 
new investments was fixed at 49 per cent. Furthermore, the main requirements of any joint 
ventures constituted the capital value including the local contn'bution of not less than $ 
500,000, the local share-holding of not less than 20 per cent which should be increased to 
51 per cent within 10 years [54]. Moreover, foreign investors were required to train local 
personnel to replace foreign personnel within 3 to 5 years [55]. 
This restrictive policy towards foreign investment, however, turned out to be in line with a 
general thrust toward more government intervention and government regulation of the 
economy which became increasingly evident after the tnid-1970s. Since implementation of 
restrictive policies towards foreign investment in 1973, the amount of foreign investment 
declined sharply, causing increased concern by the Indonesian government. In order to 
attract more foreign investor, the government issued new regulations in mid 1980s, 
liberalising the restriction of the 51 per cent Indonesian ownership for joint venture 
agreements [56]. 
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Moreover, the Indonesian government also authorised foreign investors to enter the service 
sectors and other activities previously reserved for Indonesian nationals if there was a lack 
oflocal entrepreneurs in that business area. Japan has invested more than any other country 
in Indonesia's manufacturing industries. Following the Foreign Investment Law of 1967, the 
flow of Japanese investment into Indonesia increased rapidly, which was mostly in the form 
of joint ventures with majority ownership in the early 1970s [57]. 
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Figure E.l Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Indonesia during the period between (1967-
1988) 
However, more than 50 per cent of foreign investment in Indonesian manufacturing was 
implemented through imports of goods [58]. According to a figure published by the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, the cumulative total of Japanese investment in Indonesia 
registered to the end of March 1984 amounted to $ 7, 641 million, which made Indonesia 
the second largest recipient of Japanese investment after the United States, during the period 
between 1951-83 [59]. Another figure indicated that the total approved Japanese investment 
in Indonesia was estimated to be $ 5.9 billion in 244 projects, which accounted for around 
26 per cent of the total investment in Indonesian manufacturing industries, for the period 
1967-1988. It can be said that almost all Japanese manufacturing affiliates in Indonesia have 
been import substitution oriented, having been set up to produce goods for the domestic 
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market. According to a study of technology transfer by Japanese companies in Indonesia 
showed that almost half of the inputs of Indonesian subsidiaries of Japanese companies were 
imported from the parent company in 1974, a substantially higher figure than for either the 
Philippines or Thailand. This indicated to high import intensity of foreign investment in 
particular Japanese investors [60]. 
In addition to be an attractive place for foreign investors, mainly because of rich natural 
resources, cheap labour and large market size, the government in Indonesia also introduced 
some other incentives such as tax exemptions and establishing export-processing zones in 
order to attract more foreign investment. More recently, the Government of Indonesia eased 
restrictions transferring majority ownership to nationals. Under these rules, foreign 
investors are limited to 80 percent equity in a limited liability company, which must be 
reduced to 49 percent within 20 years of commencement of commercial production. As a 
result of these policies and due to emergence of fivourable international conditions, the flow 
ofFDI reached $ 1.5 billion in 1987, $ 4.5 billion in 1988, $ 4.8 billion in 1989, $ 8.8 billion 
both in 1990 and 1991, and $ 10.3 billion in 1992 before decreasing in 1993 to $ 8.0 billion, 
which mostly concentrated in export-oriented manufacturing industries [61]. 
Year No. of Projects (New Amount ($ U.S. million) 
1980 20 1,074.4 
1981 24 706.5 
1982 31 2,416.9 
1983 46 2,470.8 
1984 23 1,096.9 
1985 45 853.2 
1986 93 847.6 
1987 130 1,520.3 
1988 145 4,481.6 
1989 294 4.718.8 
1990 432 8,751.0 
1991 376 8.778.2 
1992 305 10,313.2 
1993 lJan- 99 3.973.2 
Table E. 1: Approved FDI in Indonesia during the period between 1980- May 1993. 
Source: Capital Investment Coordinating Board: Statistics on Investment, Monthly 
Investment Report, Jakarta, May 1993. 
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The slight decline in the amount of FDI in 1993 can be partly attn'buted to a massive 
slowdown in Japanese investment. It should be noted that, FDI approved on condition that 
65 per cent or more of its production should be allocated for export, which increased to 70-
80 per cent during late 1980s. Much ofFDI to Indonesia was attracted by manufacturing 
industries in particular, chemicals and rubber industries, the processed metals and metal 
products, paper and paper products, and textile and leather industry. Therefore, the bulk of 
foreign investment since the late 1980s, apart from the oil related industries, have been 
directed towards export activities, particularly in labour intensive and resource based 
manufacturing industries, where Indonesia has a comparative advantage. 
Having compared the foreign investment in Indonesia with other ASEAN countries, as a 
survey conducted by Japanese Committee for Economic Development in early 1987 
indicated, Indonesia's investment climate was perceived by many Japanese enterprises to be 
less favourable than those of the other Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of the 
Philippines [62]. However, one can say that in comparison with some ASEAN countries 
such as Thailand and the Philippines which suffered from relatively inadequate infrastructure 
and shortage of skilled managerial and technical workers, Indonesia appeared to be more 
appropriate as a base for attracting foreign investment. Although Indonesia has not 
established Export Processing Zones (EPZ) as much as its neighbours, there was a small 
EPZ operating for many years in Jakarta and more recently the government has established 
the "Golden Triangle" in Batam-Singapore-Johor in co-operation with the governments of 
Singapore and Malaysia in order to attract more foreign investment [63]. Batam is a small 
island which belongs to Indonesia's Riau province and in about 20 Km. away from 
Singapore. The Indonesian government planned Batam to be a free trade zone to compete 
with Singapore. In order to attract more investment, the lOOper cent foreign ownership was 
allowed in the Batam Economic Zone. The first official statement of the concept of Golden 
Triangle comprising the state of Johor in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Riau province 
(Batam and Riau islands of Indonesia) was announced in December 1989.The main 
objectives of the establishing Golden Triangle included simpHfication of product distn"bution, 
payment and delivery product, joint tourism promotion and development, co-operation in 
water supply and transportation in Singapore, co-operation in development and maintenance 
of infrastructure for joint development projects and co-operation in industrial and 
technological development in the Riau province of Indonesia. By the end of 1990, Batam 
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attracted a total amount of$ U.S. 2.8 billion, with 79 per cent of private investment and 21 
per cent of public investment [64]. 
In addition to taking advantage of Singapore's financial and commercial status with its 
efficient facilities for communication, transportation and other services, Batam can also be 
used as a link between the Indonesian domestic economy and the world economy. Batam 
can process Indonesian raw materials for export to Asia, America and Australia. It can also 
manufacture goods from components from foreign countries (or the domestic components) 
for the Indonesian market. There has been foreign investment from other countries into 
Indonesia in particular from NICs in Southeast Asia, which of the 432 foreign investment 
projects in the non-oll and gas sectors approved during 1990, about 58 per cent of the total 
were initiated by investors from these four countries [65]. It is believed that increasing 
labour costs, higher land prices, heightened concern about the environment and appreciation 
of their CWTencies have led these countries to relocate labour intensive and resource-based 
industries oft:shore and to concentrate on high-tech and knowledge-based activities which 
produce high value added products [66]. While Taiwanese and Korean investment is more 
concentrated in the Indonesian manufacturing sector due to their greater degree of a 
technological capability, whereas Hong Kong and Singaporean investment have been more 
diversified in other sectors. Korean investment in the manufacturing sector was heavily 
concentrated in the chemicals industry, which accounts for 58 per cent of Korean investment 
in Indonesian manufacturing, and the wood and wood products industry (34 percent). 
Taiwanese investment on the other hand, was concentrated more on the paper and paper 
products industry which included 86 per cent of its total investment in Indonesia. Hong 
Kong investment in Indonesia ranked second after Japan with an invested amount of $ 
2,308.2 million which represented 10.3 per cent of all foreign investment in Indonesia 
during the period between 1967-1988. Most of Hong Kong investment in Indonesia 
concentrated in the textiles and garments, iron and steel, chemicals and pharmaceutical, and 
paper products. 
Most of the NICs investment in Indonesia has been export oriented in nature and in fields 
in which Indonesia has a strong comparative advantage, such as labour and resource-
intensive activities. Furthermore, many NICs tended to invest in smaIl-scale manufacturing 
in Indonesia. However, with the growing of technological capability and comparative 
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advantage of the NICs, there has recently been a shift towards investing in more capital and 
technology intensive industries by Korea and Taiwan, such as electrical and machinery 
industries. A case in point is the electronics industry, where Japanese and Korean 
manufacturing firms, such as Sony, Matsushita, and Samsung electronics, set up new plants 
in 1992 which are equipped with the most modem capital equipment to produce consumer 
electronics products, such as audio and video equipment, almost all of which is being 
exported. Apart from Korea the presence of a large Chinese business community in 
Indonesia facilitated the establishment of trade and investment links between the Chinese 
NICs and Indonesia. 
It is believed that FDI has two main types of benefit for Indonesian manufacturing sector. 
The first benefit has been increases in real income reflected in increased wages, reduced 
prices to consumer, or higher government revenues. The second and indirect benefits such 
as introduction of new techniques and managerial expertise into Indonesia. It appears that 
Indonesia has gained in both ways during the past decades [67]. One can generally say that 
the recent flow of foreign investment into Indonesia has been effective in promoting 
Indonesia's technological and industrial capacities. The majority of this investment has taken 
place in industries in which Indonesia has a strong comparative advantage, in particular 
those producing labour-intensive, and utilising relatively simple product and process 
technologies. It should also be noted that despite an important contribution of foreign 
investment in transferring technology and managerial expertise in the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector, however as the experience of Korea in achieving technological 
capability through other channel of technology transfer such as licensing agreement 
indicated; foreign investment has not been considered the only way of gaining access to 
more advanced products and processed technologies and marketing expertise for Indonesia. 
E.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Indonesia's industrialisation started nruch later than other Southeast Asian countries, because 
it took a long time for the country to achieve a political stability as well as economic 
reformation and stabilisation after the end of second world war. Between 1965 and 1975 
Indonesia followed a strategy of Import Substitution Industrialisation financed largely by 
foreign aid and loans and in which private investment, both foreign and domestic, was to 
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play an important role. Serious efforts to establish import substituting industries in 
manufacture offinal consumer goods were initiated only after 1967. From 1973 to 1981, 
the oil boom overshadowed industrial development. However the main industrial strategy 
during the 1970s and early 1980s was still import substituting, which expanded further to 
include intermediate and capital goods. The rapid decline of oil prices in the mid-1980s 
eventually forced Indonesia to change to a policy of promoting non-oil exports, particularly 
manufactured products, with an effective currency devaluation. 
This shift in strategy bas been the incentive for the economic and trade reform packages that 
have been introduced on an almost annual basis since the late 1980s. The Indonesian 
government bas introduced a series of policy measures including, devaluation, privatization, 
and deregulation and Export Promotion policies to promote non-oil exports especially 
manufactured exports. Due to these new government policy initiatives substantial progress 
bas been made in many sectors of the economy in particular non-oil exports. Indeed, since 
1987, non-oil exports have become major source of income for Indonesia. However as a 
latecomer to production of manufactured exports, Indonesia still produces largely resource-
base and labour-intensive light industrial goods. The Government also has encouraged 
domestic and foreign private investment and continues to seek an important contnoution 
from the private sector towards the estab1ishment of a broader and more balanced base for 
economic development. The Indonesian government also views foreign investment as a way 
of attracting high technology and managerial expertise to Indonesia. Various measures have 
been introduced to encourage both domestic and foreign private investment. More recently, 
in an important development of this policy, during late 1993 and early 1994, the government 
announced a privatization programme in which several state-owned companies' shares are 
being sold on the domestic and foreign capital markets. 
Having compared the Indonesian manufacturing sector with some other countries, it appears 
that despite rapid growth in the manufacturing sector during the last two decades, the 
Indonesian manufacturing sector is relatively smaller than that of South Korea and India 
(and Mexico), and little larger than that of Thailand. However, Indonesian's pattern of 
industria1isation has had common features with its East Asian neighbours in the its recent 
export promotion policies, with Mexico and Nigeria and other oil exporter countries as a 
"petroleum economy", and with India in its large domestic market. The Indonesian 
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government's strategy for the future development of the manufacturing sector is essentially 
twofold: to continue promoting the development of labour intensive industries to create 
more jobs and raise the nation's living standards; and to promote value-added industries in 
order to strengthen Indonesia's trade position and global competitiveness. 
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APPENDIX F 
MEXICO'S EXPERIENCE OF INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVEWPMENT 
Mexico is a middle-income economy, characterized by a low- productivity primary sector 
and, at the same time, by relatively well-developed manufacturing and service sectors. 
Manufacturing and the construction sector generate 23% and 5%, respectively, of total 
output, but absorb just 18% of the labour force. The main manufacturing products are 
vehicles, machinery, chemicals and textiles. Oil extraction and processing constitute another 
important part of the secondary sector. Services contnoute about 60% to GDP and provide 
employment for more than half of the population. Commerce, restaurants and hotels 
comprise the most important part of the service sector, contnouting 26% to GDP, followed 
by financial services, insurance and real estate, which together accounted for 11 % of GDP 
[1]. Prior to the 1980s, Mexico stood out as one of the Third World miracle economies: a 
successful, though occasionally troubled, example of import substitution induStrialisation. 
It had achieved annual average growth rates of 6 per cent a year from 1950 to 1970. 
Manufacturing grew by an annual average of7.6 per cent from 1960 to 1980, with heavy 
industries growing more than 10 percent [2]. 
Import substitution policies and restrictions on foreign investment were a major part of the 
postwar development strategy in Mexico. During the 1950s, import substitution was still in 
the first stage in Mexico and the country lagged Brazil by almost one decade. As its name 
suggests, the goal of lSI was to develop a strong industrial base by encouraging the 
domestic production of previously imported goods. Moreover, the import substitution policy 
promoted and protected an industrial sector that was generally inefficient and therefore 
unable to compete in international markets. In the first stage of Import Substitution during 
the 19608 most non-durable consumer goods produced in Mexico substituted to the imports 
of intermediate goods. The government has directly participated in the industrialisation 
process by coordinating manufacturing corporations, either by itself or in conjunction with 
private investors. The manufacturing growth rate accelerated at 9 per cent through 1960s 
compared with 6.1 per cent in the 1950s. Non-durable consumer goods continued to grow 
by 6.3 per cent annually, but intermediates accelerated at 8.4 per cent while capital and 
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durable consumer goods grew faster than the manufacturing average (by 12 and 12.8 per 
cent, respectively) [3]. 
In Mexico, lSI was also associated with agricultural development programs that assured 
increasing in basic food supplies for most of the population. Import substituting 
industrialisation also succeeded in its initial goals of reducing imports and promoting 
domestic manufacturing. As a result of adopting the lSI strategy, imports fell rapidly as a 
proportion of total Mexican demand. The growth model based upon import substitution has 
enabled Mexico to move ahead in the development process. Mexico was also a model for 
other countries that employed the lSI strategy [4]. King (1970) summarises the major 
reasons for adopting an import substitution policy in Mexico in early stage of its 
industrialisation to the following four points [5]: 
1. Mexico has frequently been dependent on a single country or even on one firm for 
her imports. Import substitution reduced this economic dependence. 
2. Import substituting industries gave employment to a growing labour force. 
3. Such industries helped the transfer of people employed in agriculture into non-
agricuhural sectors, thus reducing pressure on agricultural resources and so raising 
agricultural incomes. 
4. Import substitution strengthened Mexico's balance ofpayments in face of her slow 
growth of commodity exports. 
It can be said that even though there is a general agreement about import substitution as a 
necessary prerequisite for industrial development, particularly in a large country like Mexico, 
this strategy resulted in a deficit of trade in manufactured goods. The IS strategy increased 
the demand for the import of non-competitive raw materials and investment goods and 
reduced the export of manufactures [6]. However, import substitution policies are 
considered to be not efficient enough for leading the country in economic and industrial 
development. This can be summarised in the following points: 
1. The lSI was not able to resolve the shortage of foreign currency. Import substitution 
was itself import promoting. The second stage of import substitution required more 
importation of materials and capital goods. 
2. Due to neglecting the efficiency and quality of the import substituting industries, 
they were not competitive in international market. 
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3. The import substituting industries were created less employment opportunities than 
expected. 
4. The income distribution was not improved by the lSI policies. 
While IS and protection policies did help to expand industrialisation in Mexico, and 
industrialisation has been a key element in raising incomes, diversifying and increasing 
exports, and modernising Mexican society. One can say that there could be more 
manufacturing outputs by pursuing less protection policy in Mexico. Indiscriminate 
protection has also been a major obstacle to manufactured exports. Such protection not 
only increased the costs of intermediate inputs but in many case resuhed in lowering their 
quality. The import substitution policy promoted and protected an industrial sector that was 
generally inefficient and therefore unable to compete in international markets. Labour 
productivity in the Mexican manufacturing sector grew by only 3 per cent annually, 
comparing with 9.8 per cent for Korea between 1963 and 1973 [7]. 
As discussed earlier, since early in the 1970s it has become evident that the import-
substitution pattern of industrialisation in Mexico, which relied heavily on the use of 
imported technology has led to a worsening of the trade balance. This was mainly because 
of a rapid increase in imports of the intermediate and capital goods. The lags in 
manufacturing goods exports and the stagnation of traditional primary exports were also 
responsible for the size of deficit. Hence, lSI policies only altered the nature and 
composition of the dependency and failed to reduce the country's general dependence on 
imports from the industrialised countries. In 1972, the Mexican government adopted a 
strategy of state intervention greater than ever before. As a resuh of this policy GDP grew 
in 1972 and 1973 causing a recovery process which extended to the rest of the economy. 
However, this recovery was short lived. The'shortages in the production of basic industrial 
inputs and the stagnation of agricuhure production caused the Mexican economy to 
encounter another recession in the mid-1970s. Import-substitution as a development strategy 
began to stagnate and the import share of manufactured goods rapidly rose during this 
period. Protectionism allowed an industrial sector to develop, but after three decades of 
doing business with government subsidies and protective tariffs, Mexican industries grew 
inefficient and uncompetitive. 
The national development plan (1976-82) which emphasised more the expansion of 
petroleum sector, along with rise in oil prices in 1979, resuhed in an extraordinary boom in 
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the Mexican economy and led to the accelerated GDP growth of over eight per cent during 
this period. Ahhough exports increased from 3.6 to 9.4 per cent ofGDP between 1975 and 
1980, due to growth in oil exports which expanded to $16 billion by 1982. Non- oil 
manufactured exports increased only slightly as a percentage of GDP from l.1 per cent to 
1.4 per cent between 1975 and 1980 [8]. According to a government report, from 1975 to 
1981 the production of crude oil increased 3.2 times; natural and refined oil products by 2 
times; basic petrochemicals by 2.5 times; fertilizers by 2.3 times; steel and cement by l.5 
times; automobiles by 2 times; and electricity by 1.7 times [9]. In spite of some important 
results such as high GDP growth rates (of averaged 8.4 per cent) and expansion in the 
manufacturing, construction and oil and electric power sectors, some serious problems such 
as low labour productivity and lack of competitiveness distressed the Mexican economy 
during the short lived petroleum-led economic boom of the late 1970s. 
F.1 TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND PRW ATIZATION 
Following the debt crisis in 1982, Mexico changed its previous inward-looking strategy of 
protection and state regulation to the outward-oriented, private sector-led development 
strategy. Import substitution policies and reliance on oil exports for foreign exchange 
earnings were replaced with policies aimed at attracting foreign investment, lowering trade 
barriers, and generally making the country more competitive in non-oil exports. Mexico 
began to rely more on market forces in order to allocate resources more efficiently. One of 
the main objectives of adopting the new strategy was to encourage domestic industry to 
greater efficiency and international competitiveness. It is also argued that trade liberalisation, 
by expanding output of labour-intensive industries in Mexico, led to increased employment 
of wage earners, and therefore, to a more even distnbution of income. Whiting ( 1991) has 
pointed out five overall reasons for a transition toward more open and hberalised economy 
after the Mexico's 1982 crisis [10]. Firstly, the economy had become excessively dependent 
upon oil. Secondly, the growth of the state-owned sector was accompanied by increasing 
indebtness. Thirdly, import substitution industrialisation, even when accomplished through 
foreign direct investment, was highly inefficient. (Mexico's import substitution industries 
were high cost and low quality). Fourth, Mexico had failed to develop an autonomous 
technological capacity, one of the stated goals of industrial policy. Fifth, Mexico's 
manufacturing productions were not able to compete in the international markets. 
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Mexico's trade Iiberalisation program can be divided into three stages running between 1983 
and 1989. The first stage was from 1983 to June 1985, the second stage from July 1985 to 
December 1988; and the third since 1989 under the Salinas administration. During the first 
stage of the trade liberalisation (1983-1985) some of the import tariff schedule were 
reduced and import-licensing requirements for intermediate and capital goods were 
eliminated. For example, the proportion ofimports exempted from tariffs increased from 21 
percent in 1982 to 42 percent in 1983 [11]. Some of the previous restrictions on the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were also simplified. The second phase of trade 
liberalisation consisted of removing licenses and import permits and replacing them with 
tariffs. One of the most important results of the trade h"beralisation policies was the 
government decision to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in late 
1985. It is believed that this decision has been a shift in balance of power from small and 
medium sized firms towards the large private industrial concerns, which have had extensive 
and profitable links with multinational corporations for many years [12]. 
In addition to obtaining the advantages of GAIT membership, the agreement was viewed 
by the Mexican administration as a means of strengthening private sector's confidence in the 
government's long term commitment to trade h"beralization. The stabilization caused the 
Mexican economy to contract by almost 5 per cent between 1982 and 1983, and cut the 
average rate of Mexican GDP growth to the only 0.8 per cent between 1982 and 1988. 
According to Ramirez (1994), the most important components of the economic stabilization 
and adjustment program were [13]: 
1. a systematic policy of devaluing the real exchange rate by devaluing the peso along 
with stabilisation of inflation rate via a reduction in public sector deficit. 
2. The reduction by more than 40 percent of the number of public enterprises as part 
of the government's so-called strategy of disincorporation. 
The growth rate of total non-oil exports particularly manufactured exports have been 
significantly increased since 1983 as a result of trade h"beralisation policies. For example, 
manufactured exports rose at an average annual rate of about 22.4 percent between 1983 
and 1988. In 1988, for example, total merchandise exports reached 20.7 billion dollars, with 
manufactured exports accounting for most of the expansion. Manufactured exports, on the 
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other hand, accounted for 82.4 percent of non-oil exports in 1988, and their share of total 
merchandise exports rose to 56.5 percent that year (compared to only 20.6 percent in 1983) 
[14]. The Mexican government turned to export promotion when it found problems in the 
balance of payments. As a means to promote an export-oriented industrial sector, Mexico's 
state employed various forms of subsidies to exporters, preventing the use of imported 
inputs in export production only when domestic substitutes were available. 
It is generally believed that there are two general reasons for adopting export-led 
industrialisation policies in Mexico. The first reason is that, adopting an export-oriented 
strategy through relaxing the foreign investment rules, may attract Multinational Companies 
(MNCs) into the country, which would be more likely to bring modem technology and 
techniques with them Mexico's need to create as many as jobs as possible can be seen as 
another reason for the change of its policy to an export oriented industrialisation [15]. Since 
1985, a number of initiatives have been taken to promote non-petroleum exports, including 
the greater access of credit for exporters, easing the requirements for admission of imported 
intermediate inputs and further devaluation of exchange rate. Consequently, non-oil exports 
grew from $7 billion in 1985 to $14 billion in 1988 and $ 16 billion in 1990 [16]. It should 
be noted that Mexico's significant performance of non-oil exports has mainly been due to 
manufactwing exports and in particular those of the maquiladoras. (Maquiladora is the term 
applied to companies that assemble or process foreign-made components in Mexico and 
then export the resulting products. The term "maquiladora" originally refe"ed to millers 
who collected tolls in kind as a service charge called "maquila"for processing wheat into 
flour). 
For example, Mexico changed from being a net importer of motor vehicles to being a net 
exporter, in the 1980s. In 1988 Mexico produced 512,776 vehicles and, the following year, 
generated $ 1,600 millions from overseas sales and a further $ 2,200, from overseas sales 
of parts. One can say that a competitive exchange rate and trade hl>eralization can be 
contributed to this improvement in export performance [17]. Moreover, the main reason 
that Mexican exports gained additional world market shares was its exports of machines and 
transport equipment [18]. It is noteworthy that much of Mexico's success in exporting 
manufactured products has been the result of the government's promotion of labour-
intensive firms known as maquiladoras along the country's 2000 mile border with the United 
States. Maquiladoras can be concluded a Mexican version of a Free Trade Zone (FTZ). It 
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is believed that some of the leading U.S. multinational enterprises which had faced the price 
competition in their home market from European and Asian producers, established 
maquiladoras to perform labour intensive assembly operation in order to take advantage of 
the cheap labour costs in Mexico [ 19]. 
Following some incentives introduced by the Mexican government, such as allowing sale of 
up to 40 percent of their products locally, the number of these firms increased in some other 
regions of the country and away of American border. One of the prime objectives of the 
maquiladora operations has been the earning of foreign currency through exporting their 
products. The maquiladora exports was the second largest foreign-currency eamer after 
petroleum exports in the 1980s [20]. However, in spite of some advantages such as 
providing more than 160,000 jobs in 1985, these firms had some disadvantages such as 
dependency on the U.S. market for both their imports and exports, lack of linkages with 
domestic suppliers and markets and inadequate physical infrastructure of the maquiladora 
industry which led to the pollution of environment and prevented for their further expansion. 
It is believed that the maquiladoras had very weak linkages with the rest of the Mexican 
economy, with much of their contnoution decreased, for all intents and purposes, to the 
payment of salaries and the expenditures related to the installation and operation of the 
plants [21]. Moreover most of maquiladora activity involved assembly and was not truly 
high technology. Most of the parts and materials were shipped to the Mexican border mainly 
for the labour-intensive phases of the productive process and then merely shipped back. 
Over 75 per cent of the production workers in maquiladoras were women. It can also be 
said that maquiladoras operated as self:.contained units and they contn'buted little to the 
development of indigenous industrial activity. In 1975-80, Mexico's share of total materials 
and supplies utilised by maquiladoras varied around 1.5 per cent [22]. 
Some of the other reasons criticizing the maquiladoras are as follows: 
1. It is believed that they paid low wages, transferred few skills, and generate few 
backward linkages or local content. 
2. In addition, it was argued they seem to be lDlStable since plants involved little capital 
investment and could be easily shut down. 
3. It was also argued that they did not provide the basis for viable long-term 
industrialisation of Mexico. 
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4. Some have criticised the maquila program for putting upward pressure on skilled 
labour wages, which could cause inflation. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the maquildora production was an important part of growth 
of manufactured exports. There were about 2000 maquilas in Mexico by 1992, employing 
almost haIfa million workers. Annual maquila export earnings are in the region of US $ 2-3 
billion. Two-thirds of the plants are owned by United States citizens, nearly 25% by 
Mexican, and 3% by Japanese. As Sklair (1989) pointed out, the maquila industry has 
certainly been responsible for the upgrading and encouragement of profession skill all along 
the border. Sklair (1989) also argues that maquiladoras have largely failed to establish links 
to local business via transferring technology or improving the conditions of labour. Although 
he accepts the maquiladoras' ability to generate foreign exchange, he points out the gap in 
the cross-border spending of maquiladoras workers and contradictory effects of devaluation 
on domestic value added in the maquila industry [23]. As an effect of the maquiladora, one 
can refer to the increased effort to train and educate employees to fill the growing d~mand 
for skilled labour. A comparison of labour intensive border maquiladoras with maquilas in 
the interior shows that high-tech U.S. firms have started combining some of the most 
automated manufacturing technologies and the latest management techniques with some of 
the world's lowest-paid workers [24]. 
In recent years, the maquiladora program has attracted more sophisticated forms of 
production in automobile-related manufacturing and advanced electronics assembly. This 
"second wave" of maquiladora plants has made substantial investment in complex 
technology. In the most part of these maquiladors industries, high and sophisticated 
technology is contained in the components which are assembled in a highly standardised and 
simplified technique by low-paid maqila workers doing the same things hundreds of 
thousands of time every day. This forms of technology transfer to Mexico which can be 
called production sharing means that in some major industries, particularly those that are 
based on electronic control systems, the high technology processes transfer in the form of 
components to low wage areas for further processing. Thus, the technology has been 
relocated, not kept in production processes within low wage areas where the further 
processing is taking place. High quality exports can be produced in Mexican plants using 
advanced production technologies [25]. 
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The 1985-87 was extremely a difficuh period for the Mexican economy, beginning with the 
sharp fall in oil prices in the second half of 1985, and followed by the devastating 
earthquakes that hit Mexico City in late September of that year, and the Mexican stock 
market crash of 1987, sent the economy into a downturn as severe as the one experienced 
in 1982-3. While the early stages of Mexico's stabilization and h"beralization policies 
accelerated the process of intemationalisation, the later stages have speeded up Mexico's 
integration into international economy. This indicates a reshaping of production processes, 
including the assimilation of new technologies and new organization of the labour process, 
which involves more automation and fewer worker in production [26]. Since 1988, the 
additional h1>eralization measures, combined with an appreciating real peso, have had a 
stronger impact on increasing imports. Merchandise imports during 1988 estimated almost 
$ 19 billion, up from $ 12 billion in 1987. The growth in imports has been dominated by 
capital goods and has resulted in a sharp reduction of the trade surplus to a mere $ 1.8 
billion in 1988 [27]. By 1989 the Mexican economy had turned around according to most 
economic indicators. After a long period of negative economic growth (1983-1988), the 
Mexican economy enjoyed three years of positive per capita growth. For labour 
productivity, in manufacturing in the aggregate, growth after 1~85 was no more than 
modest. For 1985-1989, it averages 1.9% annually compared with around 1% in 1981-85, 
and around 3% in 1975-80 [28]. 
As explained earlier, one can say that trade h1>eralization policies facilitated transforming of 
an inward-looking economy characterised by high tariffs and heavy reliance on import 
controls into an outward-looking economy which identified by greater reliance on market 
forces and less government interventions. Mexican firms have also improved their 
productivity under the liberalization policies and more generally the h1>eralization measures 
have contributed to the estabHshment of a predictable and logical incentive structure for the 
private sector in Mexico. Moreover, the elimination of subsidies, quotas, as well as 
deregulation and privatization of state enterprises along with fiscal and financial incentives 
for export promotion, have played a critical role in the restructuring of Mexican industry. 
For instance, private firms were allowed to import petrochemical materials since 1986 which 
previously had been permitted only for state enterprises [29]. 
After the election of president Salinas de Gortari as a Mexico's president in December 1988, 
the National Council of Concert and the National Plan of Development (1989-1994) were 
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established in 1989. Additionally, the deregulation and privatisation of state enteIprises was 
accelerated, and the number of state enterprises declined from 1,155 in 1982 to 386 in 1991. 
Following the accomplishment of a solidarity pact (Pacto de Solidaridad Economico) in 
1987 by de la Madrid administration and renaming to the pact for stability and growth 
(PECE) by the Salinas government in 1989, the inflation rate was brought down from 159.2 
per cent in 1987 to 18.8 percent in 1991, and estimated 11.9 percent in 1992 [30]. The 
economy grew strongly, expanding 3.3 per cent (real GDP) in 1989, and 4.4 per cent in 
1990. Concerning privatisation, by February 1990, 891 entetprises had been privatised or 
closed, from a total of 1,155 in 1982 [31]. 
Following the foundation of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the 
United States and Canada in 1992, Mexico has decided to modernise its industrial 
infrastructure, especially in the area of international competitiveness. As a result, four 
modernization programs were launched: the national program of science and technology 
modernization, 1990-94; the national program for industrial modernization and foreign 
trade, 1990-94; the national program for modernization of education, 1989-94; and the 
program for modernization and development of micro, small, and medium industries, 1991-
94. In Mexico, the integration of a free trade area Mexico-US- Canada, is seen by many as 
the logical outcome of the neo-liberal model and the ongoing trends between the Mexican 
and the U.S, economy, also called the "silent integration". However, there is some argument 
about the probable disadvantages ofNAFTA for small and medium firms as well as for small 
farmers. It is believed that a treaty based on the exploitation of cheap Mexican labour, cheap 
energy and raw material, technological dependency and a weak protection of the 
environment are the wrong assumption for economic integration. 
Some of the most important effects of the NAFTA in the Mexico's economy can be 
summarised to the following points: 
1. It is believed that NAFTA may affect Mexican agriculture products (particularly 
grain production) because of the high production costs and low productivity level 
of Mexican agriculture compared to those of United States. 
2. NAFTA has accelerated the industrial restructuring of Mexico due to transition of 
the American and Canadian factories to Mexico to utilize low cost of labour in 
Mexico. 
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3. It is believed that small-scale enterprises in Mexico have been harmed by low-price 
import products resulted from NAFTA, since they have limited managerial, 
technological, financial, and marketing resources. 
4. It seems that after the NAFTA, the future growth of Mexico will depend more on 
foreign investment than on export performance. The future performance of the 
economy is thus rather fragile, since most of capital inflow has gone to the stock 
exchange rather than direct investment. 
However, in short term, the most important benefits ofNAFTA for Mexico is the capital 
inflow. Moreover, the prospect of a Free Trade Agreement with Canada and U.S. has 
provided an excellent chance to advertise to the world the business opportunities available 
in Mexico. In the medium term, there would be an increase in Mexico's efficiency and 
productivity levels due to removal of trade baniers resulting from anticipation of the benefits 
of NAFTA [32]. Furthermore, a free trade agreement with the United States, by 
encouraging Mexico's reforms, would increase investors' confidence in Mexico [33]. 
NAFTA can be characterised as an expanded free trade area. Some swveys of the effects 
ofNAFfA on the Mexico's economy shows that ifNAFTA allowed Mexico to increase its 
level of specia1ization in manufacturing and permitted the import of specialised inputs, then 
output per worker in manufacturing could rise by some 1.6 percent a year. This is beyond 
the growth that would exist without NAFT A. 
It is also believed that a trade agreement with the U. S. enhances the flexibility of the strategy 
to future Mexican political changes. Furthermore, the pursuit of a Free Trade Agreement 
(FfA) with a partner so much more powerful also has been shown to include some risks. 
Firstly, the United States' capacity to put pressure on Mexico is far greater than the 
converse. Mexico accounts only for about 6 per cent of U.S. total trade, but depends on the 
U.S. market for almost 75 per cent of its exports and imports. In addition, about 63 per cent 
of total foreign direct investment in Mexico comes from the United States. Secondly, 
Mexico's intema1 matters have been and will continue to be under close investigation [34]. 
The Mexican authorities in particular expect that Mexico's widespread access to the North 
American market will open new opportunities for Mexican companies help generate 
employment in Mexico, and increase wages. Also, the NAFTA is expected to improve 
Mexico's position in the current international competition for capital. Furthermore, greater 
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access to goods from Canada and United States would give Mexicans a wide choice of 
products at lower prices. On the other hand, NAFTA can be seen as a first step toward a 
wider trading region encompassing other Latin American countries [35]. High quality and 
productivity combined with low wages present a vital attraction for new investment, 
Moreover, NAFfA minimizes or eliminates one of the major barriers to investment today, 
the perception of political risk. 
It is believed that NAFfA means the beginning of the end of the maquiladora program. With 
the advent of free trade in north America maquiladoras are no longer able to receive duty 
drawbacks on third- country components included in exports to the United States and 
Canada. Maquiladoras should be free to sell their products within Mexico, upon payment 
of appropriate duties [36]. It is generally accepted that a NAFTA accompanied by continued 
policy liberalization will cause Mexican exports of goods and non-factor services to grow 
at a faster rate than would otherwise have occurred. However, some of the industrial unions 
in the U. S. opposed to the agreement because of fear of runaway industries that would take 
advantage oflow Mexican wages. 
F.2 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO 
Foreign Direct Investment has long been a part of Mexico's industrialisation. The changes 
in Mexico's policies toward foreign direct investment and intellectual property are among 
the most notable aspects of that country's liberalisation of foreign economic policy. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, foreign investment grew primarily in import-substituting 
industries such as automobile electronics, chemicals, and processed foods. During the 1970s, 
about 75 per cent offoreign investment was concentrated in the manufacturing sector. In 
contrast to three of the four Asian NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) FDI played an 
important role in early phases of development in Mexico. Mexico has been among the 
developing countries that have received the most foreign investment. Net FDI, including the 
reinvestment of profits, reached almost $ 13.5 billion from 1955 to 1982, the period when 
Mexico's manufacturing industry grew the fastest. From 1971 through 1981, the year before 
the crisis, the flow ofFDI was growing at an average rate of 18 per cent [37]. In 1981, of 
the $ 9.9 billion ofIDI in manufacturing, 64.3 per cent came from U.S.A, compared to 9.9 
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per cent from Germany, 5.4 per cent from U.K, 5 per cent from Switzerland, 2.8 per cent 
from Canada and 2.7 per cent from Japan. U.S investment was dominant in all sector of 
production in 1981, except for wood products and non-metallic mineral products, Swiss 
investments in foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (16.7 per cent) and in non-metallic mineral 
products (23.4 per cent), Japanese investments in basic metallic industries (17.9 per cent) 
and those ofU.K in non-metalic mineral products (36.4 per cent) [38]. 
Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico 
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Figure F. 1. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Mexico 
Source: Banamex, Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, July 1991 
Since the 1970s there were a number oflaws and regulations aiming at promoting foreign 
investment and technology, particularly in the manufacturing sector. The" Law to Promote 
Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investments" in 1973 was passed to combine all 
previous related laws and regulations and to establish the sectors in the conditions under 
which foreign capital could be invested in the country. The 1973 law also introduced' a 
maximum of 49% for foreign participation. However, the National Commission of Foreign 
Investment established by this law was responSlble for implementing the law and on occasion 
authorised increase or decrease of foreign capital participation. In the period since 
implementation of the law until Apri11976, there were about 345 enterprises which foreign 
participation of338 of these did not exceed 49 percent [39]. Between 1973 and 1980, 1,724 
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proposals for foreign direct investments were approved by the National Commission on 
Foreign Investment. Of these 171 wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries were allowed, since 
their production was entirely for exports. Apart from these, majority foreign holdings were 
permitted in only forty-four cases. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, foreign 
investments have continued to concentrate on a relatively few, mostly technologically 
advanced industry accounted for about half of the total foreign investments. These included 
the manufacture of chemicals (18.5 percent), transport equipment ( 14.5 percent), electrical 
and electronics products (9 percent), and non-electrical machinery (7.4 percent) [40]. 
The introduction of regulatory measures on foreign investments appears to have had little 
impact on the inflow of foreign capital. From the enactment of regulatory legislation in 
1973 to the end of 1982, foreign investments had increased from $ 4 billion to $ 10.7 billion. 
It can be said that Mexico's foreign laws and procedures have been a mixture of nationalism 
and dehberate industrial policy. In 1984, Mexico adopted new guidelines for the promotion 
offoreign investment in specific sectors of the economy which was able to generate positive 
foreign exchange balance and create employment. Comparing the amounts of FDI 
authorised or directly registered for 1982 and 1987 ($10.8 billion and $ 20.9 billion 
respectively), it appears that FDI stock nearly doubled in just five years. Automobile and 
electronic industries have received a large share of FDI in the major industrial projects 
undertaken by foreign enterprises from 1985 to 1987. Moreover, foreign firms played an 
important role in the growth of non-oil exports increasing their share from 22 percent in 
1983 to 53 per cent in 1987. In the same period, their share in total exports from the private 
sector rose from 34 per cent to 65 percent. The wholly foreign-owned firms and those with 
less than 49 per cent foreign equity were in automobiles, synthetic fibers, glass, cement and 
paper products, while the state-owned enterprises were in iron and steel, petrochemicals and 
sugar. The wholly nationally-owned private firms were to be found in the production of 
beer, iron and steel, petrochemicals and artificial fibers, metal products and car parts. 
In may 1989, the "Regulations of the Law to promote Mexican Investment and Regulate 
Foreign Investment" were designed to increase the inflow of investment capital by providing 
legal certainty and by clarifying investment rules. According to these regulations, foreign 
investors were allowed to own 100 per cent of enterprises valued up to $ 100 million 
without need of approval from the National Foreign Investment commission, provided that 
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certain conditions were met. Since the introduction of the economic stabilization and trade 
liberalization programs in 1985, the stock offoreign direct investment in Mexico has more 
than doubled, to a level of$ 33 billion at the end of 1991, with about 63 per cent of US and 
6 percent for both UK and Germany. Mexico's strong growth performance in 1989-1990 
and its perspective membership in a NAFTA seem to have encouraged new investors [41]. 
Mexico has also attracted much indirect or speculative foreign investment. An increasing 
share of Mexico's foreign investment has been channelled into stock market. However, it 
should be noted that since portfolio investment is highly unstable, it could leave Mexico just 
as quickly as it entered. Therefore, although it helped Mexico's balance of payments, it has 
been less valuable as a base for economic development. It is estimated that the most 
European and Japanese investments have concentrated in manufacturing within the 
automobile, electronics and petrochemical industries. Volkswagen and Nissan have been key 
participants in the automobile industry; Thompson, Phillips and every single major Japanese 
electronics producer have manufacturing plants in Mexico as well; and European firms such 
as leI, Hoescht and BASF have involved in the petrochemical industry. Within the service 
sector, telecommunications became quite important in the early 1990s following the 
privatisation of the government telephone monopoly. TELEMEX, with extensive 
participation of France Telecom in a joint venture with Mexican and US capital [42]. 
Generally speaking, Mexico seem. to have taken advantage of the potential that derived from 
the restructuring of industry worldwide, ahhough it is not posSlole to determine whether or 
not more radical changes in FDI policy would have had a more favourable impact on the 
trade balance and investment flows. With the beginning of the debt crisis, foreign investment 
was greatly reduced. The value offoreign investment flowing into Mexico dropped from an 
annual average of$ 2.5 billion in 1980-81 to $ 0.4 billion during 1983-8S. Flows rose again 
to $ 2.9 billion per year on average during 1987-90, before rise to historic high of over $ 4 
billion in 1991. Most foreign investment has been in manufacturing, tourism and computer 
services [43]. 
It bas been argued that after 1982 foreign investment had become a necessary precondition 
for growth rather than simply its by-product, as it had been in the past. As a method of 
strengthening the balance of payments, foreign investment bas been something of a two-
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edged weapon, particularly where there were no exchange controls. In the past, foreign 
direct investment has been desirable not merely for its effects on reserves of foreign 
exchange but for its contribution to the total capital stock. During the period of import 
substitution, foreign investment flew to Mexico to control the most dynamic and profitable 
sectors of domestic market. More recently, foreign investment in manufacturing has flowed 
predominantly into Mexico's export oriented production. It can be said that one of the most 
important factors for high FDI in Mexico has been the increased access that products from 
Mexico had in the markets for the U. S and Canada. As foreign investment rules were 
relaxed, foreign companies started investing in Mexico as part of their global strategy and 
with a view to exporting to the United States in particular. Basically, Mexico has been a 
more attractive host for FDI not because of changes in its domestic economy, but mainly 
because ofits position as a springboard for supplying the U.S. [44]. 
However there is another belief that the level of new U. S. foreign direct investment in 
Mexico has relied less on Mexican regulations than on the growth prospects of the Mexican 
economy, since the main objective of most foreign companies has been to expand their 
internal market in Maxic. Mexico has also experienced a strong increase in foreign direct 
and portfolio investment during the past few years, which accounts for its strongly positive 
capital account. These favourable developments are mainly the resuh ofhigh real interest 
rates, but also prove the increasing confidence offoreign and domestic investors in Mexico's 
economic future. In 1993, foreign direct investment rose by 11 % to $ 4.9 billion, mostly due 
to the prospects ofNAFfA, while portfolio investment more than doubled to $ 10.7 billion. 
The huge capital inflows since 1990 have allowed a significant increase in Mexico's foreign 
exchange reserves - amounting to$ 25.3 billion at the end of 1993, which is equivalent to 
6 months of imports- and have reduced Mexico's reliance on external borrowing by public 
authorities. 
F.3 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN MEXICO 
Technology transfer has been identified as a key factor in the industrialisation through 
foreign direct investment which Mexico had been pursuing. Mexico's total expenditures 
on technology including the payment of royalties on technology transfer as well as 
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independent consultants fees for short term technical services, increased from $ 80.3 million 
to $ 208.9 million between 1970 and 1978 [46]. Until the introduction of legislation on 
foreign technology in 1972, technology transfer agreements between foreign technology 
suppliers and recipient Mexican enterprises has been formalised generally by contracts and 
there was little governmental control over technology fees and payments to parent 
companies and other technology licensors. The major objectives of the legislation were to 
promote national technological development and therefore to provide greater technological 
support to Mexico's industrialisation program. In Mexico, international technology transfer 
has taken place by various methods: contractual agreements, payments for the use of 
patents, licenses and technical assistance, as well as those originating in foreign direct 
investment. Each of these major mechanisms was used according to its importance to a 
particular sector and the nature of ownership of the enterprises involved (domestic or 
foreign). 
In a swvey of technological elements in the technology transfer contracts of four industrial 
groups in Mexico in 1979, it has been discovered that the elements of most frequently 
transferred were non-patented know-how and technical aid. It was also found that while 
trademarks appeared in about half of the contracts, patent licences appeared in only 20 
percent and engineering services 10 percent of the contracts. According to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industrial Development, from 1983 to 1987, the United States continued to be 
the principal supplier of technology (based on the number of contracts signed with 
foreigners involving some form of payment: 1989 contracts out of2,652). Of the total of 
transfer contracts registered from 1983 to 1987, more than 53 per cent went to the 
manufacturing industry, mainly in the sectors of chemical substances, oil by-products and 
rubber, and metal products, machinery and equipment. Foreign firms accounted for 20 per 
cent of transfer contracts during this period. The import of technology to Mexico has played 
an important role in development of Mexico's domestic industrial infrastructure, since R&D 
activities did not have much to offer for local technological capability. 
The Law on the Transfer of Technology and the use and exploitation of patents and 
trademarks was passed by the Mexican congress on December 28, 1972. This law identified 
as an first major attempt in Mexico to regulate technology, patents, and trademarks 
imported from outside Mexico. The law on technology transfer was designed primarily to 
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provide a mechanism for monitoring the flow of technology and to reduce its cost. A 
national registry for the transfer of technology was established following the 1972 
technology transfer law, to review and approve, after negotiation if necessary, all contracts 
with foreign companies. The law also provided a means whereby the state could not only 
collect information on the technology transfer process as reflected in contracts with foreign 
firms but also could propose itself as a third bargaining agent between the supplier of 
technology and the acquiring firm [47]. 
A new law on technology transfer was passed at the end of December 1981, replacing the 
law passed in 1972. The purpose of the 1982 law moved from mere registration and 
negotiation of terms of technology transfer to the development of existing technologies. The 
1982 law also represented an important step towards the formulation of a policy of 
technology development in Mexico, the idea of which is to combine a selective transfer of 
foreign technology with local efforts of assimilation and innovation. As an effect for the law 
of 1982, foreign supplier of technology could transfer technology easier if they could argue 
that their practices benefited the nation. The National Council of Science and Technology 
(CONACYT) founded in December 1970 was the central Mexican government agency 
responsible for coordinating and supervising the National Plan for Science and Technology. 
There were several other activities assigned to CONACYT such as a consultancy service 
for the government concerning all aspects of research and development as well as financial 
support of scientific programs, commercialising innovation in collaboration with the 
Mexican Foreign Trade institution and providing information to companies on ahemative 
sources of technology. 
There were other institutions, such as the National Registry of Technology Transfer (RNTT) 
which was established under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, to evaluate and 
approve technology contracts, INFOTEC (Information Tecnica Para la Industria) or 
(Technical Information Trust Fund) created by CONACYT in 1972 as a technical 
information service, IMEC (Instiuto Mexicano de Investigaciones en Manufacturas 
Metalmecanica) or (The Mexican Institute of Research for Engineering Industries) which 
was created in 1976 to offer technological assistance to the engineering industries, and 
AIMED (Institute Mexicano de Investigacine Technologica) or (The Mexican Institute of 
Technological Research) which was founded by Banco de Mexico to offer technical 
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assistance to private industry. Under recently announced foreign investment laws, Mexico 
required prior authorization for investments involving construction and installations. In most 
cases, It is emphasised by the Mexican officials that Mexican technician personnel who 
operate the facilities should be involved in setting up the plants. 
It is believed that the capital goods sector can make a very important contn'bution to 
creating domestic technological capability [48]. In comparison to the other NICs, Mexico 
appears to have had a revealed comparative advantage in capital goods. However it can be 
said that Mexico has had the least developed capital goods sector among NICs. Mexico's 
relatively poor performance in project exports can be attributable to its underdeveloped 
capital goods industry, which has been one of the constraints indicated by Mexican firms as 
limiting their technology exports. The Mexican capital goods sector has been more inward 
looking oriented in comparison with the more outward looking capital sector in other NICs. 
Therefore, the Mexican capital goods production has relatively been well-integrated into 
local economy and it possessed less international strength than that of other more export-
oriented NICs. The expansion of capital goods production has been based widely on local 
technological capacity. Foreign technology was employed but only to the extent of its being 
a point of exploitation for local technological activities [49]. 
Ofimportance for the capital good industries have been the activities of the state as a major 
suppliers of cheap energy and basic metals and in facilitating imports for these industries. 
In spite of the various public and foreign involvement in capital goods, it can be said that 
capital goods production in Mexico has emerged and developed mainly as a result of private 
Mexican investment. It is also believed that the weak performance of Mexico's capital goods 
sector seems to result from a combination of imitating conditions rather than to any single 
factor [50]. Firstly, protection of capital goods has historically been fairly low relative to 
Mexico's duties on manufilctured goods in general. The second factor is Mexico's proximity 
to the United States, which led to closed competition of its producers of capital inputs from 
both new and secondhand American goods. The third factor was the structure of the 
industry. Excessive diversifications of types, models, and the brands of machinery and 
intermediate inputs has led to the fragmentation of supply. Furthermore, prior to the early 
1980s, Mexico's capital goods sector suffered from liberal import policies, insufficient 
institutional and financial support, the proximity to the United States, extensive periods of 
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an oVeIValued peso and other structural problems [51]. However the industrialisation model 
adopted in Mexico has not been responsible for the lag in the capital goods industry. 
F.4 THE ROLE OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO'S 
DEVELOPMENT 
The lack of human technological resources and skills is often considered the major obstacle 
to technological development in LDCs. Since 1960, the Mexican government has made 
considerable efforts to expand the nation' s educational system Total expenditure for public 
education increased significantly from 1, 959 million pesos in 1960 and 7,817 in 1970 to 
over 800,000 million (in current pesos) in 1984. The per capita expenditure on education 
also doubled with the result that the number of schools at all levels doubled. during the 
1970s. These efforts resulted in an improved adult literacy rate (from 65% in 1960 to 81% 
in 1977) [52]. Having compared the educational level of Mexico with Brazil, it seems that 
the level of education in Mexico was higher than that of Brazil during a period of 20 years 
between 1960 and 1980. In fact considerable investment in education has been an important 
part of an industrial policy in Mexico aiming at greater self-reliance. 
There has also been further emphasis on improving technical education in Mexico. The 
number of technicians and workers engaged in the on-the job training increased from about 
140,000 in 1970 to 458,000 in 1985. There was also an increase in the number of students 
enrolled in institutions of higher education from 271,275 in 1970 to 1,200,000 students in 
1985. The government in Mexico launched a project called "Programme Mexico", to devote 
funds to academic institutions in order to train human resources and to carry out research 
in technical areas. There were 56 enterprises participated in this programme in early 1988 
which were to contn"bute some $ 40 million, more than 80 per cent of which was for 
electronics and information services [53]. Thus, it is obvious for Mexico that increasing 
investment in human resources can be the key to developing the infrastructure needed for 
becoming a technologically advanced country. The total expenditure on science and 
technology increased from 772 million pesos in 1970 to 4,729 million pesos in 1985 in 
constant prices. The government has almost made about 95 percent of all spending in the 
scientific and technological areas until 1985. 
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Having measured technological output and productivity in Mexico, it should be noted that 
in 1984 there were only seven scientific magazines published in Mexico and their total 
circulation did not exceed 20,000 copies. Moreover, Mexico in comparison with other Latin 
American countries has had an intermediate position with regard to the ratio between 
projects, researchers and R&D expenditures. For example, while Chile is needed 2 projects, 
4.9 researchers and 90,000 to produce one scientific author, in Mexico, 14.6 projects, 11.2 
researchers and $ 400,000 are required to produce one author. Furthermore, there were only 
704 the total of 5,419 patent registration. As James (1985) has pointed out, Mexico lagged 
behind other major newly industrialising countries (NICs) such as Argentina, Brazil, South 
Korea in terms of two indicators of technological capability, technology exports and 
production of capital goods [54]. One can say that in most case the imported technology has 
been inadequate to Mexico's resource endowments or even obsolete. Furthermore, the 
imported of technology has been very poor substitute for indigenous technological capacity 
in Mexico. It should be noted that neither the law, nor the operation of the office for the 
registry of technology transfer, have been regarded as significant obstacles to the flows of 
technology into Mexico. 
F.S MEXICO TECHNOWGICAL DEVEWPMENT POLICIES 
It can be said that one of the reaSOn for Mexico's technological gap with developed 
countries has been adopting science & technology policies aimed at accelerating growth 
without structural change. As Wionczek discussed, Mexico did not have a coherent 
technology policy. There were weak links between basic and applied research. There was 
also a scarcity of good scientific journals. Moreover there was little general awareness of 
the crucial role of science and technology in the development process. However, since 
shifting toward more outward-looking strategies, Mexico has increasingly paid most 
attention to adopting an appropriate policy for technology transfer. Mexico also considered 
its technology transfer policy to promote technical progress, adequately using the country's 
more abundant resources (labour and natural resources) as well as its scarcer resources 
(capital and foreign exchange). 
As it pointed out earlier, Mexico's industrial policies in the past, did not include 
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technological development of productivity growth as objectives. As a result, most Mexican 
firms remained highly dependent on foreign technology and capital goods. However, 
Mexico's state realised the need to transform industrial development policies in order to 
decrease its dependency on foreign technologies and to strengthen indigenous technological 
capability. Therefore, Mexico's technological development policy has changed toward 
developing the indigenous technological capability and technological self-reliance. In order 
to achieve to this objective, Mexican officials placed their emphasis on the following set of 
activities [55]: 
1 Development of institutional capabilities to search internationally, evaluate, select, 
negotiate for, assimilate, adapt and generate new technology. 
2. Regulation offoreign investment and technology transfer to limit foreign ownership 
and managerial control and to protect Mexican industry from powering foreign 
presence. 
3. Expanding training of scientists, engineers, and technicians to move from supervised 
operational roles to management research, design, and engineering functions. 
While the past Mexico's policy on technology transfer had placed more emphasis on the 
selection and negotiation of technology transfer, the recent technology transfer policy has 
paid more attention on adaptation, absorption and diffusion of the imported technologies. 
Bueno (1986) explains this change in objectives for technology transfer policy, because of 
the following general reasons [56]: 
1. the critical foreign exchange situation of Mexico 
2. the change in the overall strategy for economic development in Mexico attaching 
greater significance to exports of non-petroleum products and 
3. the larger potential of the technology transferred from abroad. 
One useful principle for evaluating technology policy in IDes generally and Mexico in 
particular, is the "Sabato triangle". Sabato's industry-government-research institute model 
describes a national or sectoral technological system. For some sectors or industries, or even 
for entire countries, the triangle may not exist, or the sides of triangle may be weak or non-
existent. 
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Mexico has not succeeded in producing an indigenous technological capacity. As figure F.2 
shows, foreign technology creates a series of externallin.kages to the Mexican triangle that 
are strongest between the foreign supplier of technology and the national recipient firm. 
Sabato's industry-government-research institute model also explains a national or sectoral 
technological system Foreign technology can create a series of external linkage to the 
national triangle that are strongest between the foreign supplier of technology and the 
recipient. Sabato claimed that it is the availability offoreign technology which keeps the 
national triangle weak. As shown in its diagram, Sabato describes a vicious circle, which 
accelerates progressively. National firms accept available foreign technology, government 
avoids defining or implementing a policy of technological development, and the national 
research institute, dedicates itself to complementary activities rather than developing an 
independent research capacity. Sabato deplores the fact that institutions and individual 
officials often are actually unaware of the problem of technological dependence and its 
associated costs [57]. 
One of the weaknesses of Science & Technology in Mexico has been the lack of 
coordination between research centres and industry. Having looked at the linkages described 
by the Sabato triangle it can be found a rather strong link between government and industry 
and a fairly well-formed connection between research and government, but the links between 
research and industry are quite weak. Mexico began this process of awaking to the necessity 
of developing independent technology systems at the national and industry level, if only to 
make possible the bright selection and incorporation of foreign technology. Therefore, 
foreign suppliers of technology are required to strengthen their ties to all three vertices of 
technology triangle; industry, government, and research. The focus of policy on technology 
transfer is thus likely to shift from reducing its costs toward increasing benefits, from 
regulation of technology transfer to promotion of technological development. Therefore, 
one can see that the Sabato triangle may also help LDCs whose firms import most of their 
technology from transnationals. 
Technology transfer to Mexico has also been directed with flexibility and openness in order 
to serve Mexican overall policy objectives, such as creating employment, generating exports, 
substituting for imports and promoting a favoured industry. It can also be said that the 
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country could reach a higher competitive position internationally through technology 
transfer, since imported technology increased quality and lowered prices, local firms which 
had benefitted from technology transfer had greater success in the export market [58]. The 
national plan for science and technology in Mexico has generally relied on three main 
objectives: science & technology development, cultural autonomy, and technological self-
determination. In order to attain these objectives, there were some lines of actions such as 
incorporating science and technology policy into Mexico's overall development policy. The 
plan also proposed institutional changes in the management of science and technology 
activities. It was also proposed that the state design financial and other incentives to increase 
domestic R&D capability and develop self-reliant in science and technology development. 
However, the content of the national science and technology development programme for 
1984-88, showed the inflexibility of some problems in Mexico, which arose from the lack 
oflong term approach to science and technology policy. 
It can be said that technological change had several effects on the industrial sector in 
Mexico. The spread of technology and its rapid diffusion contnouted to increased 
competition in industry, working through the market to make technology rapidly available. 
However, the very rapid technological change of technological leaders particularly in some 
technology-intensive industries such as pharmaceutical and computers. could threaten to 
withhold advanced technology and prevent Mexico access to the most advanced 
technological development [59]. Moreover, Mexico's R&D expenditure as a percentage of 
its GNP has been very low in comparison with many other NICs. Total R&D per GNP 
decreased from 0.6 in 1985 to 0.2 in 1989. Moreover, most of the R&D activities in Mexico 
was performed by the government [60]. 
F. 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In sum, as discussed in detail earlier, Mexico adopted an import-substitution industrialisation 
strategy shortly after the second world war which was followed by a long period of high 
economic growth and significant industrial development. When, in the mid-1970s, import 
substitution had reached its limits, it was replaced by a growth model based upon the 
development of the petroleum sector. After the severe economic crisis in early 1980s caused 
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by the oil price declining and heavy debt, policy makers in Mexico abandoned the previous 
growth model and adopt an outward-looking export-oriented strategy. As a result of this 
change in Mexico's strategy, many state-owned firms were privatised and competition was 
given a much more important role in the development process than it had ever had since the 
second war. 
As discussed earlier, maquiladoras in Mexico can be seen as another factor in Mexico's 
industrial and technological progress. The maquiladora sector was established in 1965 as a 
part of Mexico's border industrialisation program which was designed to attract foreign 
manufacturing facilities to the border area in order to create new employment opportunities. 
The maquiladora sector has expanded rapidly in the 1980s as Mexico became an increasingly 
attractive location for labour intensive assembly operations. It can generally be said that 
even if there are some criticisms of maquiladoras, its products have been an important part 
of growth in manufactured exports of Mexico. Mexico's entry to join the North American 
Free Trade Agreement in early 1990s along with trade liberalisation policies which were 
implemented since mid-1980s has brought significant achievements for its economic and 
industrial development. 
Having compared the overall industrial and technological policies of the newly industrialised 
countries in Latin America such as Brazil and Mexico with those of Southeast Asia, one can 
refer to some main differences such as their market size and development strategy. The Latin 
American NICs, particularly Brazil and Mexico, have considerably larger domestic markets 
than the more advanced southeast Asian NICs such as S. Korea and Taiwan. The Latin 
American experience with import-substitution strategies has significantly been longer than 
those of NICs in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the government role in the industrialisation and 
technological development of NICs in Southeast Asia (such as Korea and Taiwan) has been 
different in comparison with that of Latin American NICs (such as Brazil and Mexico). As 
discussed earlier in the case of Korea and Taiwan, the government in these countries has 
played a key role in the economic and industrial development of these countries. 
Government intervention in these countries did not &her the market mechanism, but rather 
supplemented it. It should also be noted that state regulation of trade and investment in new 
technologies has been less focused than in Asian NICs. It can also be said that state 
intervention has been far less effective in the Latin American NICs in strengthening 
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industrial competitiveness than it has been in the Asian NICs. 
The state in Latin American NICs (such as Brazil and Mexico) has also been highly 
interventionist in industrial and technology policy making. However, it is believed that 
Brazil's state intervention has been widest in scope, reflected in the relatively large weight 
of state enterprises in the economy. Government in Mexico has also played a major role in 
allocating resources for growth in encouraging foreign investment and in fostering technical 
change. State-owned enterprises in Mexico have been of major importance in the economy, 
especially in energy, transportation, communications, and fertilizers. However, the 
government's privatization program moved rapidly to transfer state enterprises to the private 
sector. In technology, the shift to h"beral policies reflects the weakness of Mexico's 
technological base and of state as innovator. As a World Bank report noted in a study of 
five countries, Mexico's technological exports such as capital goods have mostly been by 
multinational firms though state regulatory bargaining may serve as a stimulus [61]. 
Not only has government in Mexico financed construction of numerous industrial parks, but 
it has also supported the maquilas by providing land, roads, and public utilities. In 1988, 44 
percent of the maquilas and 75 percent of the jobs were found in specialised industrial parks 
for the maquila sector. Mexican capitalists and professionals have also played an important 
role in the maquila sector mainly by setting up industrial parks, providing services, and 
acting as subcontractors. The role of the state as innovator has also become one of the 
stimulating the absorption of foreign technology. The state as financier has become a state 
struggling to balance its budget and stimulate exports. Although Mexico has reduced the 
number of its state enterprises from more than 1000 to about 500, this is still five times the 
number of enterprises that existed in the state sector in 1970. There is little evidence of 
state retreat from its role as primary producer of raw materials and basic services [62]. 
Having compared the educational system in NICs of Southeast Asia with that of Latin 
American countries, the Asian NICs have very highly educated populations. For example, 
the percentage of tertiary students in engineering in S.Korea has been at least double the 
figure for the Latin American NICs [63]. One can add that secondary educational levels in 
Latin American NICs have been on average one-third lower than with that of Southeastern 
NICs. However the filct that the Latin American NICs have send a lower proportion of their 
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post-secondary students for training abroad than Southeastern Asian NICs partially reflects 
their higher level of development of educational structures. For instance, the number of 
scientists and engineers density for Brazil has been higher than in countries like S.Korea. 
Comparing in method of technological acquisition, the Latin American NICs (such sa Brazil 
and Mexico) have relied to a larger degree on foreign direct investment than Southeast 
NICS. The Asian NICS, on the other hand, have generally adopted fairly liberal policies 
regarding FDI. S. Korea has probably had the most restrictive FDI policy and has used other 
methods such as technology licensing and joint ventures as the major source of the foreign 
technology acquisition. However, some Latin American NICs, have faced tremendous 
problems in the transferring of technology through foreign direct investment because of the 
depressed state of their internal markets. A country like Mexico has been in somewhat better 
position given vast flow of investment from U.S. market. It can be said that good 
management of this investment from the perspective of technological learning could 
contribute significantly to an increase in Mexico's technological absorptive capacity [64]. 
Because of the limited international experience and weak components and parts sectors in 
most Latin American NICs (with the exception of Mexico's maquiladoras), they have had 
limited experience in assembly subcontracting in comparison with the Asian NICs. While the 
Southeast Asian NICs and Mexico have relied more heavily on assembly subcontracting in 
the past, S.Korea and Taiwan in particular focused more on supplying finished products to 
original equipment manufactures. In conclusion, there is certainly something that can be 
learned from a comparative assessment of the Asian and Latin American NICs experience, 
but generally it would not be easy for the other LDCs to replicate their model given the 
vastly different historical experiences, as well as contemporary political, social , economic, 
and cultural factors. 
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APPENDIXG 
THE INDUSTRIALISATION EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY 
Turkey is located in one of the most strategic geographical areas of the world, with the area 
of 779,452 km square, and has been as a republic since 29 October 1923. Unlike some of 
the developing countries in East Asia such as Indonesia and Malaysia, Turkey is not a 
resource-rich country, with only about 246,000 km square of land used in agriculture and 
some minerals such as coal, chromites and copper. Since the establishment of a republic and 
in particular after the second World War, Turkish economy has improved very rapidly with 
an average GDP growth rate of about 6 percent during the period 1923 to 1953. After the 
second World War, GDP increased at a rate of8.7 per cent, industry growing 9.7 per cent 
and agriculture 9.4 per cent [1]. After 1951-53 and despite the recession during the late 
1950s, industry continued growing rapidly at a rate of8.5 per cent unti11961-63; agriculture 
growth slowed to 2.7 per cent and agriculture lost its role as a leading growth sector. The 
industry sector has been the most rapidly developing sector of Turkish economy since 1962, 
with an average annual growth rate of close to 10 per cent during 1962-1967. As a result, 
the importance of industry sector in the economy has increased steadily and the share of 
industry in GNP rose from 13.5 per cent in 1948 to about 18 per cent in 1968 [2]. 
The manufacturing industry became the leading sector in terms of contnbution to total 
growth by 22.5 per cent, but the increase was small, from 20.1 per cent in 1951-53 to 1961-
63, and did not compensate for the decline in the contnbution of agriculture. Turkey 
experienced a rapid succession of stop-go policies during the period between 1953-63. 
Multiple exchange rate and quantitative restrictions were the main instruments used to 
control the demand for foreign exchange, though some export incentives were added. 
Export incentives were not maintained because of a continuously overvalued exchange rate 
[3]. However, during the period between (1968 - 73) the contnbution of exports rose to 
10.4 per cent, although the increase was small, it did reflect a shift in incentives and perhaps 
provided an indication of what Turkey could accomplish, as confirmed by the effect of its 
shift toward an open development strategy in the 1980s. Although the Turkish export 
incentives from 1970-73 tended to be unsuccessful, largely because the government allowed 
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incentives to move against exports, this was a preliminary base for Turkey to enter to a new 
period of rapid and successful export promotion. The observed phasing suggests the 
hypothesis that a period of protected import substitution is essential to build a base from 
which a successful export drive can be started. 
The First: Five-Year Plan for 1963-1967 formed the first stage of a fifteen year development 
program, aimed at an annual increase in GNP of 7 per cent to be accomplished mainly by 
increasing the share of investment in the GNP to an average of 18.3 per cent over this period 
[4]. During the period between 1962-72, manufacturing industry accounted for 93 per cent 
of total industrial products. The second Five-Year Development Plan (1968- 72) proposed 
an annual growth rate of 12 per cent in industry, as a result of which the industry sector 
accounted for 20.5 per cent of GNP in 1972, as compared with 17 per cent in 1967 [5]. 
One can see that the industry sector played a key role in Turkish development strategies and 
was a driving force in the development of economy. It is also believed that the strong 
growth performance of the Turkish economy during the 1960s is explained largely by 
movements of labour from agriculture to industry and the high level of industrial activity [6]. 
The Second Plan (1968-72), also considered a balanced distnl>ution of resources among 
various industries to accelerate industrial growth. The expansion in industrial production 
was expected to be achieved through the generation of new capacities rather than 
technological improvement of existing industries. The actual growth rates accomplished 
during the First and Second plan were 6.7 and 6.9 per cent respectively, which were very 
close to the targeted annual growth rate of 7 per cent. However, the annual growth rate in 
industry during the second plan (1968-72) lagged behind the planned target of 12%, 
achieving only 7.6 %. The share of industry sector in GNP rose from 16.8 percent in 1963 
to 20.6 in 1971 [7]. Despite the very rapid growth rate of Turkish manufacturing, it is 
argued that the growth of productivity in the Turkish manufacturing sector lagged behirid 
some of the fast growing developed and developing eountries. According to a study by 
Nishinrinl and Robinson (1984), which compared the growth rates of total productivity in 
manufacturing for the period 1963-76 in Japan, Korea, Turkey and Yugoslavia, growth 
rates were lower in Turkey than in Korea and Japan, but higher than in Yugoslavia [8]. 
Turkey like many other developing countries has adopted import substitution in its early 
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stage of industrialisation, which aimed at creating of strong industry sector through 
extensive protective policies and also developing domestic production of previously 
imported manufactured goods. The import substitution provided considerable protection to 
domestic industry through a system of import licensing, import quotas, and restricted access 
to foreign exchange, and restrictions on imports of consumer goods. The import-licensing 
system was employed to prevent imports of goods competing with domestic production. 
The import substitution policies also formed the basic framework of the Five-Year 
development plans until the end of the 1970s. It was also essential for the rapid industrial 
growth as the imports of nondurable consumer goods were replaced by domestic 
production. Therefore, one can say that Turkey had been quite successful in its early stage 
of import substitution strategy in 1960s. By the end of the decade the share of consumer 
goods in the total imports was only 5 per cent [9]. 
However the replacement of the imports of intermediate and capital intensive goods in the 
second stage of import substitution which required relatively sophisticated technology and 
large-scale production, for efficient operation caused high cost for the Turkish limited 
domestic market. Therefore, after initial successes, the application of an inward-oriented 
development policy in Turkey encountered increasing difficuhies as high-cost import 
substitution, worsened by inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises, led to a decline in the 
productivity of investment and the slowdown in employment creation. Nevertheless, as the 
OEeD survey of first Five-Year plan indicated, the inevitability of an import substitution 
policy was clearly recognised because of formidable difficulties in the way of export 
development [10]. It is also believed that the period from 1965 to 1976, during which 
Turkey made a general effort to industrialise through the implementation of import 
substitution strategy, was the most successful period in terms of both the level and stability 
of growth. However, as Krueger (1974) pointed out, alternative or modified import 
substitution policies would have allowed Turkey to realise much bigger gains in 
employment, exports and industrial production. Under policy options she called " moderate 
import substitution" and "balanced export promotion and import substitution", the Second 
Five Year Development Plan, for instance, would have yield significantly better results [11]. 
Turkey's poor export performance in the 1970s is considered to be mostly because of 
internal factors such as an overvalued exchange rate and political instability in that period, 
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and external factors such as world recession and the rise of protectionism in the developed 
countries in mid-1970s. As Dervis and Robinson (1978) pointed out, Turkish policy 
strongly favoured import substitution both through direct protection and through import 
rationing and exchange rate policy. The resuh has been severe discrimination against exports 
They also refer to the overvalued exchange rate after 1970 which significantly restricted 
exports. They estimated that by 1977, the lira was overvalued by 55 %, which had negative 
impacts on Turkey's export performance [12]. The value of exports fell at a rate of 4.3 
percent per annum for the period between 1973-77 and the volume of imports rose at a 
compound rate of 10.4 per cent per annum. The average annual growth rate of Turkish 
exports dropped from 1.6 per cent during 1960-70 to 0.8 per cent during 1970-77 [13]. 
The Third (1973-77) and the Fourth (1979-83) Five Year Plans formulated in the early 
1970s aimed at increasing the level of income, speeding up industrialisation, reducing the 
dependence of foreign resources, improving the balance of payments and making the 
economy self-sufficient [14]. During the Third Plan period ( 1973-77), the annual growth 
rate of GNP was increased to 7.9 per cent. The manufacturing sector was the main 
contributor to this significant growth rate. Whereas manufacturing had accounted for almost 
a third of private capital formation during 1973-77, this decreased to just below 29 per cent 
in 1979. Nevertheless, by the mid and late 1970s the private sector had come to playa 
substantial role in Turkish industry. In 1975, its shares of production, employment and 
investment among the large manufacturing firms were 62.5 per cent, 64.6 per cent and 67 
per cent respectively. With all manufacturing firms included, the share of the private sector 
in value added approached 70 per cent in 1978 [15]. 
Although the continuing import substitution policy during this period (1973-77), the overall 
dependence of Turkish economy on imports in particular imports of capital goods did not 
decrease. The import substitution strategy had created an industry which was highly 
protected and was heavily dependent on imports of raw materials, intermediate goods and 
equipment. For example, one can refer to the Turkish automobile manufacturing sector, 
which alone needed $ 700 million in direct imports (or about 20 per cent oftotal Turkey's 
non-oil imports) for its assembly production in 1979, while total automotive exports did not 
exceed $ 7 million [16]. On the other hand, the share of exports per GNP remained at a 
weak rate of 4 percent in 1974. Even though the overemphasis on import substitution had 
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initially brought about impressive results, by the 1970s most opportunities for successful 
import substitution were exhausted. Furthermore, as a result of the import substitution 
policy, manufacturing industry failed to expand into new markets and the average annual 
growth rate of manufacturing production slowed from 10.2 % in 1960-73 to 5.2 % in 1973-
79 [17]. 
While in the early stage of import substitution in 1960s the Turkish economy was engaged 
in replacing the imports of non-durable consumer goods such as food processing, and 
textiles. In the later stage, Turkey replaced the imports of intermediate and capital goods 
such as steel and petrochemicals, and consumer durable such as vehicles, by domestic 
production. It should be noted that Turkeys industrialisation process in the 1970s became 
increasingly import intensive, creating a rigid structural dependence on imported inputs. The 
rigidity in the substitution of manufactured imports for domestic output was a major source 
of difficulty in adjusting to reduced capital inflows during the 1978-80 crisis, and therefore 
set the stage for the export drive in the 1980s [18]. Following the balance of payments crisis 
in 1977, there was a revision in import-substitution policy. This was mostly because of the 
high cost of domestically produced intermediate and capital products (such as iron, steel and 
petrochemicals), along with oil shocks of the 1970's which caused a large imbalance of 
payments and a 107 per cent rate of inflation in 1980. Moreover, the growth rate of GNP 
declined from 3.0 per cent in 1977 to - 0.7 per cent in 1979, and country's external debt 
reached to an explosive figure of$ 11.4 billion. There was also a sharp decline in the share 
of imports in GDP between 1977 and 1979, imports of goods fell by 21 percent in 1978 and 
rose by only 10 per cent in 1979. The current account deficit increased sharply with a $ 3.2 
billion oil import bill larger than total commodity exports of$ 2.9 billion [19]. There was 
also an increase in the rate of unemployment in the late 1970s, which had reached 3.5 million 
or 20 per cent of the labour force by 1978 [20]. It is argued that the fall in the GNP growth 
rate during the late 1970s can be mostly attnouted to a sharp fall in the productivity of 
capital, caused by exogenous factors which the Turkish policy makers had failed to predict 
[21]. 
On January 24, 1980, the Turkish government announced comprehensive economic reforms, 
stabilisation and liberalisation programs aimed not only at correcting the deteriorating 
economic situation, but also at changing the entire orientation of TurkeYs development 
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strategy from its position of an inward-oriented to that of more open and outward-looking 
strategy. Moreover, the other important objectives of these new policies included improving 
the balance of payments and increasing Turkey's international competitiveness, raising the 
efficiency of Turkish state owned enterprises through their privatisation, and opening the 
economy as nmch as possible in order to give greater freedom to the market in determining 
resource allocation. Most of the previous policies changed such as change in exchange rate 
including a 33 per cent devaluation of the Turkish Lira, hoeralisation of imports involving 
the elimination of quotas and the reduction of the tariffs, and a transition from previous 
import substitution to export-expansion policy including a large numbers of export 
incentives such as introduction of direct tax rebates for export of manufacturing goods. 
These programs were extensively supported by international organisations such as 
International Monetary Funds (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (DECD). The OECD granted $ 4.2 billion during the period 
between 1980-1985 and IMP provided 1.2 billion in Special Drawing Rights (approximately 
$ 1.6 billion) in.June 1980 and a further 225 million in April 1984 for helping Turkey's debt 
repayment, and the World Bank contributed $ 1.6 billion through five structural adjustment 
loans to support the stabilisation and h'beralisation programmes [22]. The implementation 
of these appropriate policies, in particular the successful trade hberalisation policy which 
made Turkey a model of trade h'beralisation for other developing countries, had a 
remarkable impact on the overall Turkish economy. The immediate impressive impact of the 
adjustment policy of 1980 included an immediate fall of the inflation rate to 37 per cent in 
1981 from over 107 per cent in previous year, an over 4 per cent growth in GNP in 1981 
fonowingthe negative figures in 1979 and 1980, and a recovery in balance of payments (a 
sharp decrease in the current account deficit from 106.4 % in 1980 to 14.5 % in 1982). The 
significant growth rate of export performance was one of the most noticeable results of the 
stabilisation and the shift toward more outward-looking policies in the early 1980s. The 
overall exports grew by an annual average rate of22.3 % during the period between 1980-
87, and the share of exports in GNP rose from 5% in 1980 to 14.9% in 1985, and 21.3% 
in 1987. The value of merchandise exports rose from $ 2.9 billion in 1980 to $ 10.3 billion 
in 1987 [23]. 
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It is noteworthy to indicate the rapid increase in the share of industrial goods in overall 
exports was mostly due to increasing competitiveness of Turkish industry. The share of 
manufacturing products in total exports increased from 36.8 % in 1980 to 79 % in 1987, 
with an average annual growth rate of 38.2 per cent during the same period [24]. In 
particular, one should also refer to the magnificent growth rate of industrial products from 
$ 1.047 billion in 1980 to about $ 8.065 billion in 1987. Of the total increase in value of 
exports by about $ 5,697 million from the period between 1980-1985, about $ 5,210 million 
was in processed and manufactured products, more than 45% of which was in labour 
intensive industries such as textiles and clothing, processed agricultural products, and hides 
and leather (light industries), and about 23.4 % was in scale intensive industries such as iron 
and steel, transport equipment, glass and paper products [25]. One can therefore argue that 
the export boom of the 1980s was, by and large, due to an increase in share of manufactured 
exports from 26.9 per cent to 66 per cent during the period between 1980-1987. It is also 
generally believed that Turkey's satisfactory export performance in comparison with other 
developing countries, led to an increase in Turkey's share in overall exports of developing 
countries from 0.86 per cent in 1980 to 2.27 per cent in 1987 [26]. 
It is believed that the success story of Turkish export performance during the period of 
1980s can be mostly attributed to the implementation of the trade hl>eralisation and a shift 
from import substitution policy toward export promotion policy. The real depreciation of 
Turkish Lira, along with additional export subsidies and tax exemptions to the exporters 
were among the most important measures taken by Turkish authorities to accelerate the 
export growth. Moreover, an improved political and economic climate along with the 
availability of unused capacity can be considered as other important factors for the 
significant growth rate of exports in early 1980s. The strategic geographical location of 
Turkey has been among the external factors of its significant export performance [27]. 
Another factor which can be attributed to the Turkish export performance during the early 
1980s was the government's strong commitment to exports. A number of incentives were 
introduced or enhanced for exporters by Turkish authorities. Exporters were permitted to 
retain 5 per cent or $ 10,000 (whichever was larger) of their receipts. There were also a 
reduction in the cost of importing the inputs necessary for the production of exports. It is 
believed that tax rebates were the crucial element of these export incentives of the 1980s, 
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with an increase of the average amount from 8.91 per cent in 1980 to 22.31 per cent in 
1984. The considerable reduction in domestic demand and the shift of production from 
domestic to foreign markets has also been another factor explaining the significant Turkish 
export performance in 1980s [28]. 
The other factor contn'buting to export performance, which was not linked with specific 
policy tools, was the ability to sustain a high level of intermediate goods imports. It should 
be noted that despite the implementation of substantial export incentives such as reductions 
of tariff rates and production taxes, these tariff reductions mainly applied to capital and 
intermediate goods while consumer goods faced tax increases. Therefore, one can say that 
import substitution policy was not entirely abolished. Moreover, it is believed that the 
potential of Turkey's manufacturing industry, a heritage of the import substituting pattern 
of industrialisation of the last decades, was the basis of the export performance of the 1980 
[29]. The other factor that led to Turkey's successful export performance in the early 1980s, 
was the creation of a huge excess capacity as a resuh of the crisis of 1977-1979 which had 
depressed industrial outputs. This capacity utilisation particularly in private industry stood 
at 51 per cent in 1980 [30]. 
It is argued that Turkish export performance during the 1980s has had both structural 
weaknesses and encouraging aspects. On the one hand, due to some export incentive 
measures in particular a policy of gradual real depreciation of the exchange rate, Turkey's 
international competitiveness has improved considerably, and on the other hand, the product 
structure of Turkish merchandise exports needed to be improved through greater 
diversification of production and a shift from unprocessed goods to the higher value added 
products. Moreover, despite its contn'butions to growth and more significantly to the 
balance of payments, there is, however, no evidence to suggest that the export drive and the 
major changes in trade and industrialisation policies associated with it have led to increased 
efficiency and competitiveness in the public and private sector enterprises [31]. It can also 
be argued that it was the major devaluation and exchange rate policy of early 1980s along 
with Turkey's advantage in the geographical proximity and access to the European 
Community markets, rather than cheap labour and tax-burden that made Turkish 
merchandise exports more competitive in international markets. Turkish firms could also 
use high - tech methods of production such as Just In Time (JIT) production methods and 
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Computer Aided Design (CAD) and manufacturing systems which included for a growing 
part of its exports [32]. 
The Middle Eastern countries, in particular Iran and Iraq, took an increasing share in 
Turkey's exports markets; about 45% of total Turkish exports in 1982, mainly due to easy 
access of Turkish exporters to their markets. Turkish exports to other countries, mostly the 
major OECD countries, also grew at an annual average rate of 17.5 per cent and reached 
to 52% in 1985 [33]. The composition of Turkish exports changed in 1991, which exports 
to the EC and OECD countries increased to 65.1 % of total exports, while the share of 
Middle East countries decreased to 20.1 % [34]. The second stage of trade liberalisation and 
stabilisation began with an announcement by the Turkish authorities in December 1983, 
intended to provide incentives through a unified exchange rate for all transactions, and more 
simplification of import procedures. Accordingly, the real exchange rate was further 
depreciated by about 3.6 per cent in 1985. Moreover, additional measures were taken to 
increase Turkey's attractiveness for foreign investors, including easing of conditions 
controlling the transfer of profits and flow of capital, as well as the general relaxation of 
capital and exchange market controls [35]. 
However, due to sharp fall in exports of manufactured products, the total export volume 
decreased in 1986 for the first time in six years. The strong decline of Turkish industrial 
exports in 1986 was mostly due to new policy of removal of government subsidies on 
industrial exports. Another reason for a decline in Turkish exports is believed to be the 
sharp fall of oil prices in 1986 which reduced the foreign currencies of the Middle Eastern 
oil exporters and made them curtail to a large extent their imports from Turkey. It is also 
believed that one of the principal causes of Turkey's inability to sustain the pace of rapid 
export expansion was inadequate private investment in manufacturing, which in turn has 
been closely associated with the growing macro-economic imbalances in the economy [36]. 
In order to recover the strong decline of industrial exports, Turkish authorities reintroduced 
tax rebates for export sales in 1986. 
It should be noted that despite the substantial achievements ofh1>eralisation and stabilisation 
program, they have been insufficient and lacked the necessary strength to move the economy 
toward the frontier [37]. It is also believed that the hoeralisation attempts did not lead to a 
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significant reductions in the effective rates of protection. The imports of a large number of 
agricuhural and light manufacture were mostly prohibited [38]. Some of the macroeconomic 
stabilisation objectives announced in January 1980 were only partially and temporarily 
achieved, and some overall problems such as inflation remained as an economic and political 
problem. Despite the sharp decrease from about 107 % in 1980 to about 30 % in 1983, the 
inflation rate rose thereafter and stood at rates between 65 and 75 % in the late 1980s [39]. 
In addition to inflation, there were other unsolved problems, such as the worsening income 
distribution, fiscal deficits and unemployment, which affected the significant achievements 
of the trade liberalisation and structural adjustment policies of early 1980s. In terms of the 
effect of the stabilisation and hberalisation programs on the income distn'bution, one can say 
that not only did these policies not succeed in bringing about improvement in distribution 
of income, they made it even worse by reducing the share of wages particularly in the 
agriculture sector by almost 50 per cent during the period between 1980-88 [40]. 
Moreover, during the adjustment and stabilisation programs, the recorded rate of 
unemployment increased from 14.8 per cent in 1980 to 16.3 per cent in 1985. This increase 
in rate of unemployment can be mainly attn'buted to a decline in agricultural employment. 
However, some non-agricultural sectors had an average annual growth rate of 2. 8 per cent 
in the employment during the implementation adjustment program period [41]. 
It should also be added that despite of an increase in the merchandise exports as a result of 
trade h'beralisation of 1980s, the Turkish economic structure remained unchanged. There 
are three reasons which can attn'buted to the general failure to &her the economic structure 
of the country. Firstly, from 1980 onward, although both total exports and the share of 
manufactured goods in total export increased over this period, the growth rate of 
manufacturing industry remained more or less unchanged. It is argued that there was no 
correlation between the growth rates of the manufacturing sector and manufactured exports. 
It is also believed that increased exports resulted mostly from a decrease in domestic 
demand, so that there was no great modification in both the structure and the export 
capacity of Turkish industry. Secondly, one can argue that a decrease in the price of Turkish 
exports in comparison with international prices was mainly due to the introduction of some 
export incentives such as export subsidies and real devaluation of Turkish lira rather than 
a reduction in cost of domestic production. It is also argued that export prices were just 
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artificially reduced through the introduction of these export incentives and therefore carried 
no considerable impact in favour of changing the structure of the Turkish economy. Finally, 
it is believed that the improvement of export / import ratio was mostly due to slowing down 
of importing capital goods rather than increasing exports. This resulted from a lack of new 
investments, which could have contributed to a modification of the structure of economy 
[42]. 
The Turkish authorities continued to emphasise their determination to follow trade 
hberalisation policies after 1986, through further tariff cuts for imports of raw materials and 
some export incentives such as tax rebates and preferential credits for industrial 
enterprueners and exporters. The GNP grew by 7.9 % in 1986, which exceeded the 
proposed target of 5.0. On the other hand, industrial output grew by 10.9 % in 1986, 
exceeding the projected target of 5.5 % and the previous rate of 6.6%. Another important 
feature of 1986 was the increase in the share of manufacturing in GOP, measured at 
constant prices, from 27.5 % to 28% [43]. Non-metallic mineral products, glass and 
ceramics, food processing industries, textiles and clothing, metal products such as iron and 
steeL manufacturing of machinery and transport equipment industries were among the most 
important Turkish industrial products. 
The continuous trade hberalisation brought about some considerable economic achievement 
such as an increase in real GNP by 7.4% in 1987 [44]. GNP grew approximately by 50% 
per year from 1983 to 1987 and 70% from 1987 to 1990. The Turkish lira depreciated by 
more than 100 per cent relative to its level in 1979. This enhanced the international 
competitiveness of Turkish exports. Despite removal of some export incentives in the late 
1980s, the overall exports reached $12,960 million in 1990. In particular, there was an 
increase in export of some manufacturing such as metal products and machinery, electrical 
appliances, leather products, cement and chemicals in late 1980s. The share of industrial 
products in overall exports rose to 78.2 per cent in 1989. Following the tariff reductions 
and exchange rate appreciation in 1989, the import increased and resuhed in a current 
account deficit in 1990. It is also argued that the exchange rate appreciation in 1989-90 
weakened export propensities in intermediate and capital goods with an unfavourable impact 
on export diversification [45]. 
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The export of manufactured products increased by 6.2 per cent in volume and by $ 1,626 
billion, in 1992, due to the effect of real depreciation of the Turkish Lira in the first half of 
the year. Exports of manufactured products were heavily concentrated in a few sectors; 
textiles and clothing, and iron and steel, together included over half of manufactured exports 
in early 1990s. There was also a strong increase in the exports of ready-wear and other 
textile products, as well as electrical appliances, cement and non-electrical machinery in 
1992. It is argued that even though the successful export performance of Turkey in the early 
stages of trade liberalisation policies can be partly attributed to large export subsidies, it is 
however believed that the decrease of export subsidies in the late 1980s provided some 
overall welfare benefits for some industrial sectors in Turkey. One can refer to some 
problems which were caused by export subsidies such as budgetary problems for the 
government and various types of rent-seeking behaviour among exporters, such as distorting 
export documents which may lead to conuption. It is also argued that when a country such 
as Turkey has hberalised imports, while at a same time maintaining significant export 
subsidies, further import hberalisation must be balanced with further reductions in export 
subsidies [46]. 
Turkey's sixth Five-Year plan, which covered 1990-94 supported the continued outward 
orientation of the economy, with an enhanced role for the private sector, backed by a more 
efficient public sector. The principal objectives of the sixth plan (1990-1994) were further 
liberalisation of the economy through increased reliance on market forces and to shift 
resources from the public to the private sector and from consumption to saving and 
investment. The Sixth development plan has also aimed at an average annual growth rate 
of 7 per cent. Private sector investments are targeted to grow at an annual rate of 11 per 
cent, with growth reaching 15 per cent by the end of plan. Exports have been projected to 
grow at an average of 15 per cent a year and to exceed $ 22, 000 million by 1994, and 
inflation has also been projected to fall to 10 per cent a year by the end of 1994 [47]. 
The trade and development strategies of Turkey in early 19905 have been the continuous 
import liberalisation and export expansion of late 1980s with more emphasis on lowering 
protection on imported goods fBvoured in the domestic market and diverting investment into 
exportable goods [48]. The strategy of the seventh plan (1995-1999) published in April 
1993, emphasised Turkey's increasing share in world trade, and further integration of the 
590 
Turkish economy with the global economy, increasing reliance on free market forces, raising 
productivity and increasing share of industry and services in total employment and 
industrialisation taking into account the environment effects. The Turkish economy 
continues its rapid growth in the 1990s with a much more open economy in comparison with 
the past, and a significantly improved infrastructure in transport, energy and 
comrmmications. To many observers, Turkey in 1990s is indicative of Spain a decade or two 
decades ago, and may be experienced a similar take off [49]. 
One of the other points which has played an important role in the Turkish economy has been 
the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). The State Economic Enterprises where founded 
during the 1930s, and constituted the primary engine of economic growth associated with 
the preliminary phase of import substitution. Their share in GDP and industrial output were 
9 % and 49 % respectively in the period between 1978-1983 and they also employed about 
750,000 people or about 4 per cent of total and 30 per cent of industrial labour force [50]. 
SEEs were subject to lower rates of interest on their borrowing than were their private 
counterparts. They were also able to obtain some of their domestically-produced purchased 
inputs at lower prices than were their private competitors. Despite these incentives given by 
the Turkish government in order to make their products competitive in the marketplace with 
those of the private sectors, the rate of profits was so low in some SEEs that they incurred 
fairly substantial losses [51]. 
Since the implementation of trade liberalisation and stabilisation programs, the Turkish 
government decided to enhance the efficiency and productivity of state economic enterprises 
through reducing their dependency on government credits. Certain State Economic 
Enterprises (SEEs) were permitted greater freedom in setting prices in an effort to improve 
their profitability and reduce deficits. Furthermore, the privatisation program launched by 
the Turkish authorities in 1986 aimed at improving the efficiency of SEEs through sales of 
most SEEs shares on the newly created Istanbul Stock Exchange. The relatively 
comprehensive privatisation program has been mostly focused on the State Economic 
Enterprises which were active in areas such as switchboard equipment, cement, airport 
service, petrochemicals, steel-iron, petroleum refinery, hotel chains and airlines. Some 
overall objectives of the privatisation program included reducing the financial burden of the 
SEEs on the general budget, transferring the decision-making process from public to private 
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sector, promoting competition, improve efficiency and increasing productivity of the public 
enterprises, and raising revenue through sales of public assets to private and foreign 
investors who could transfer modem technology and the foreign exchange needed by the 
government to service its extemal debt [52]. 
However, despite the government efforts to make SEEs behave like private firms, there was 
little progress in privatising these firms. The narrow size and instability of Turkish capital 
markets has been a factor in delaying planned sales of shares of SEEs. As an example, one 
can refer to major difficulties encountered in the sale of TELETAS shares (a 
telecommunications equipment firm in which the state had a 40 per cent share) due to the 
fall of stock prices in the autumn of 1987 and the continual weakness of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange in the following year [53]. Moreover, the limited success of the Istanbul exchange 
market has been attributed as another failure factor in the privatisation of SEEs [54]. Some 
of the other overall barriers of successful implementation of the privatisation program can 
also be added such as political and macroeconomic instability and uncertainty and a 
relatively weak and underdeveloped capital market in Turkey [55]. It can generally be said 
that the State Economic Enterprises have played a dual role in Turkish economy. On the 
one hand, they represent one of the most important bases for Turkey's industrial 
development, and on the other hand, due to their heavy investment requirements and 
inefficient operations have been considered as a one of the main obstacles to Turkish 
dynamic growth [56]. Despite some successful examples in the first stage of SEEs's 
privatisation, the majority suffer from low investment, low productivity, poor standards of 
quality and weak management. Following the change of government in October 1991, the 
new government has reviewed its previous privatisation strategy. There has been an attempt 
to restructure the SEEs before putting their shares in the stock exchange market and the 
privatisation process is mostly guided by the ability of the market to absorb assets and sales 
of shares [57]. 
In 1993, when the government budget deficit was estimated at Turkish lira (TL) 170 trillion 
($ 15.5 billion), the losses of state economic enterprises amounted to TL 48 trillion ($ 4.4 
billion). The burden of loss-making SEEs falls not only on the government, but also on 
private companies using expensive intermediate goods (such as iron, steel, and paper) and 
services (energy and telecommunications) provided by the public sector [58]. It is believed 
S92 
that despite several attempts by the Turkish authorities to remove the obstacles, the 
inefficiency and weaknesses of the SEEs is likely to continue in the 1990s unless a 
comprehensive reform focusing on privatisation is carried out to restructure this sector and 
to bring about a fundamental change in the ways in which they have been operated. 
Ahhough there is a perceived agreement on the success of Turkish experience. the driving 
force behind it remained a matter of debate. Most observers of the Turkish economy would 
agree that export performance has been the principal success story. notably during the first 
half of the 1980s. Some stressed Turkey's liberal provision of export incentives. Other have 
concentrated on the macroeconomic and import liberalisation policies in Turkey that 
resuhed in sustained real depreciation of exchange rates [59]. Whether the significant export 
performance in particular the manufacturing exports or any other important factors such as 
trade h'beralisation and structural adjustment policies of early 1980s have been the cause of 
Turkish success, one can generally say that Turkey's relatively successful transition to an 
open market and export oriented economy can support other developing countries which 
want to follow the same path of late industrialisation policies. 
G.l THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND TECHNOWGY 
TRANSFER 
Foreign investment played a negligible role in the Turkish development strategy in the post 
second world war period. In spite of a fairly h'beral foreign capital law which was enacted 
in 1954, only $ 228 million of foreign capital came to Turkey over the period between 1954-
1980. In 1980, Turkey received the only $ 65 million of foreign investment which could 
hardly be regarded as a significant contribution to closing Turkey's domestic savings and 
foreign exchange gaps [60]. A number of factors have been indicated as reasons for the 
low share offoreign investment in the Turkish economy. One can refer to some of the most 
important factors, such as political instability, administrative delays and bottlenecks in 
responding to foreign investment applications, continued high inflation, and periodic 
currency crises. Furthermore, much of the FDI before 1980 was domestic market oriented, 
in other words, concentrated in the import substitution industries and did not contnbute 
significantly to the development and growth of Turkish exports [61]. 
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The Turkish authorities adopted various policies to attract foreign investment and 
technology to participate in the country's development. In order to promote more private 
foreign investment, apart from simplifYing the regulations concerning application for foreign 
investors, the government introduced new incentives through the stabilisation and structural 
adjustment of the 1980s. The establishment of customs-free industrial trade zones at some 
industrial areas such as Antalya and Mersin in 1986 which benefited from exemptions and 
relaxed currency controls, were among the most important measures to boost foreign 
investment. These zones were successful in increasing export oriented investment and 
production in Turkey, accelerating the entry of foreign capital and technology. Other 
measures included a 100 % custom exemption for a period of up to five years for the 
investment project and production, complete or partial tax rebates on the capital goods and 
raw materials imported for industrial investments, and investment tax credits. The 
government also attempted to attract foreign investment into infrastructural projects, such 
as harbours, airports and power plants. However, foreign investors tended to concentrate 
more in manuJilcturing and services, while in infrastructural investments, they were involved 
mostly in the construction of dams [62]. Furthermore, the establishment of a Foreign 
Investment Department under the supervision of the state planning organisation has been 
one of the first steps undertaken under the adjustment and stabilisation programs of the 
1980s, in order to attract more foreign capital. The Department was authorised to approve 
foreign investment projects of up to US $ SO million, with foreign equity participation 
limited to less than 50 per cent. However, in the later stage of trade h'beralisation policy, 
there was a major relaxation of foreign investment regulations, and the limit on foreign 
ownership was abolished [63]. 
According to the foreign investment law (No:6224), foreign capital is permitted in sectors 
open to Turkish private enterprises which tend to promote the economic development of the 
country and do not involve a monopoly or special p~ege. The Turkish government has 
also given more priority to joint venture projects between Turkish enterprises and their 
foreign trade partners, to strengthen the development of country's industry, technology and 
managerial skills. The Turkish government also tended to use foreign investment in those 
branches of industry where Turkish firms have not been active for lack of sufficient technical 
knowledge, experience, and capital [64]. Some other incentives were given to the investors, 
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including exemption from custom duties and taxes on imported machinery and equipment, 
investment allowances of up to 100% for approved projects, low interest rate loans and tax 
exemptions [65]. 
Following the implementation of these measures, the amount of foreign capital reached $ 
1,429 million during the period between 1980-1985, which was almost five times the whole 
amount during the 25 years 1954-1980. The total authorised foreign investment increased 
from $ 325.1 million in 1980, to $ 662.6 million in 1981, $ 829 million in 1982 and $ 932.3 
million in 1983 [66]. The number of investors increased from 100 in 1980 to 610 in 1986. 
Of the total foreign firms operating in Turkey, 54% were from European countries, with 
Switzerland (63 firms) on the top list offoreign investors in Turkey in 1985, followed by 
U.S and German firms with 60 and 59 firms respectively. Among the total of Middle Eastern 
countries involved in setting up capital and investment projects in Turkey, Iran was the 
front-runner with 17 companies followed by Saudi Arabia and Syria with 10 firms [67]. 
Turkish authorities gave further incentives and highly hoeralised the foreign investment in 
the second half of the 1980s, raising the net foreign capital inflows to increase from $ 354.0 
million in 1988 to $ 663.0 million in 1989, and to $1,784 million, recording an 87.3 per cent 
increase over 1988 [68]. Most foreign investments were concentrated in the manufacturing 
and service sectors. Within the services, banking was the most important sector with about 
20 per cent of total value ofFDI in 1986 [69]. Within the manufacturing sector, food 
processing industries, chemicals and transportation vehicles were the relatively more 
important sectors in attracting more foreign investment [70]. Moreover, foreign investors 
have also become involved in Turkish textiles and electronic industries. As a result of the 
massive investment in textile industries which were more export-oriented, Turkey has 
recently replaced Hong Kong as the biggest textile supplier to the European community. 
The foreign investment in electronic industries however has been more oriented to the 
domestic market than to exports, mainly because the market is protected by high tariffs and 
has shown strong growth. There have been successful joint venture and licensing agreements 
in the electronic industry such as the Bestal plant at Manisa to make T.V sets, home 
computers and microwave ovens in a joint venture with Goldstar of Korea. In terms of 
vehicles manufacturing, there have been thirty-eight local companies (including many with 
foreign share holdings) and thirty-two foreign licensees involved in vehicle production in 
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Turkey. In addition to producing a national car, "Anatol" many years ago, in 1987 Turkish 
vehicle manufacturing firms have produced 88,000 cars which although considerable has 
not been adequate enough to meet increasing domestic demands [71]. 
In order to increase the level of private and foreign investment, the Turkish government 
introduced further investment incentives in 1990. These new incentives were introduced for 
projects concerning car production. For example, projects involving automotive side 
industries benefitted from a 35 % premium. There were also some new incentives in order 
to attract more foreign investment in tourism, ship building and electronic industry projects 
particularly in Turkish free trade zones [72]. However, as a result of Persian Gulf conflict 
(Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) in 1990, the total portfolio of investments, which had amounted 
to $ 1,586 million in 1989, decreased to $ 547 million in 1990 but rose to $ 648 million in 
1991. The manufacturing and services respectively accounted for 55 per cent and 42 per cent 
of total foreign investment in 1991. The food and tobacco, chemical industry, electrical 
machinery, iron and steel, and cement were the major sectors within manufacturing sector 
in 1991. The banking, tourism and commercial sub-sectors attracted more foreign investment 
within the service sector in the same year [73]. By 1992, there were 2,271 firms with foreign 
capital participation with an average share of 51 per cent of foreign capital. Inflows of direct 
investment amounted to around $ 1.1 billion in 1992. However, the flow of foreign 
investment to Turkey decreased in the following years and reached a total value of only $ 
432 million in 1994, which shows the inadequacy offlowing foreign capital and investment 
in Turkey [74]. 
As discussed earlier, macroeconomic and political instability is the major factor influencing 
the low amount of FDI flowing to Turkey. The increasing inflation, inconstant exchange 
rate, political crisis and more recently stronger labour union pressures for real wage 
increases, are among the most important indicators explaining the macroeconomic 
instability [75]. It is also argued that due to the sensitivity of FDI to macroeconomic 
factors, Turkey's success in attracting more FDI will largely depend on the future economic 
and political stability of Turkish economy. There were a number of problems regarding the 
past experiences ofFDI in Turkey. One of the problems with foreign direct investment, as 
opposed to foreign loans, is that it required a higher rate of return. In addition, foreign 
investment did not necessarily bring in fresh new capital. It is also argued that the Turkish 
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Free Trade Zones (FJ'Zs), which were established in order to accelerate the flow offoreign 
investment were not as successful as the free trade areas in other developing countries. This 
was mainly because of the dependency of these zones on importing considerable quantities 
of raw materials. Moreover, it is believed that these zones could not solve Turkey's 
problems of unemployment and foreign exchange shortage. In addition, export oriented 
facilities in free trade zones required infrastlUctural investments which require external loans 
in order to be serviced [76]. 
It is clear that foreign investment has also been one of the most important ways of 
transferring foreign technologies and managerial skills for Less Developed Countries 
(LOCs) such as Turkey. It is argued that foreign direct investment in Turkish manufacturing 
has obtained significant and even absolute net benefits in the transfer and diffusion of foreign 
technologies and the training of domestic labour. Since the bulk ofFDI went into sectors 
in which Turkey had no comparative advantage, for example, the automotive industry, the 
technological net benefits although directly, i.e., in and by themselves quite substantial, did 
not in the final analysis contribute to the generation of total real income benefits. Perhaps 
in the long-run, these technological benefits can be channelled into the development of those 
sectors, such as non-electrical machinery and metal products, in which Turkey might have 
comparative advantage [77]. 
Ahhough the relatively importance role ofFDI as a source of attracting foreign technologies 
which were essential to increasing the productivity and international competitiveness of 
Turkish manufacturing products, foreign technologies were also transferred through other 
channels, in particular licensing and know-how agreements. Turkish policy-makers have 
emphasised more the importing of technology than its adaptation and diffusion in the past. 
However, there has recently been more tendency towards strengthening the domestic 
technological capability through the acquisition and assimilation of foreign technologies. The 
Turkish government supported the establishment of a sector specific technology institution 
in order to develop the diffusion of new technologies by an efficient institutional network 
[78]. 
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Following the trade h1>eralisation and stabilisation policies of the 1980s, a diverse range of 
foreign capital and intermediate products and technologies were imported into Turkish 
market, which forced local firms to compete by upgrading the quality of their products. As 
imported goods mostly cost more than the domestic alternatives, local firms competed on 
the basis of quality rather than price [79]. In addition to the import of foreign technologies, 
Turkey has also exported some small-scale labour intensive technologies to other developing 
countries, in particular those of its neighbouring and other Middle Eastern countries. Most 
of these technologies were transferred licensing, consulting and technical services and 
project exports respectively. Direct foreign investment (which were all joint venture 
investments with firms in other developing countries) seems to be a relatively unimportant 
technology export method for Turkish firms [80]. 
The Research and Development (R&D) expenditure accounted for a small proportion of the 
Gross National Products (GNP) in comparison with other developing countries. The R&D 
expenditure has decreased from between 0.3 per cent and 0.4 per cent of GNP during 1960s 
to 0.2 - 0.3 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s. The industrial research and development is 
carried out mainly by a number of Turkish R&D institutes such as the Turkish Scientific and 
Technical Research Council (TUBITAK) which was established in 1963 and has been 
largely oriented towards the public sector and also lacked the specialisation to adapt foreign 
technology to local conditions. Another major Turkish R&D institutes, the Marmara 
Scientific and Industrial Research Institute, set up in 1966 under the sponsorship of 
TUBITAK, and has mainly concentrated on metallurgical and material problems [81]. 
Having realised the fact that cheap labour can no longer be expected to remain the 
comparative advantage for Turkey due to gradual wage rises of its labour, Turkish 
authorities are fully concerned to strengthen technological capability through combining 
relatively cheap labour with new technologies, such as individual automation technologies 
in operations strategic for quality improvement. As an example one can refer to the Turkish 
automobile industry, which has employed a strategy of selective automation and labour 
intensive technologies in order to increase its competitiveness [82]. It is argued that the 
government can play a considerable strategic role in setting general conditions which 
encourage the development ofTmkey's technological capability. This is largely relied on the 
government's ability to clear away adverse externalities such as macroeconomic instability 
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and infrastructural ( physical, human and technological) problems limiting the diffusion and 
adaptation of technology. Moreover, in the case of low domestic demand for new 
technologies, in order to promote local technology production, the government has 
restricted the imports of new technologies. In the long term, encouraging investments and 
the resulting demand on new technologies can motivate their local production. Furthermore, 
increasing public and private expenditure for more research and development activities and 
more coordination of the R&D activities with universities and industries, along with the 
designing of industry-relevant technology research programs and developing an effective 
system of industrial standards and of quality control are among major government programs 
to enhance local technological capability [83]. 
G.2 THE ROLE OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
The development of human resources was emphasised in the Turkish development plans 
starting from first Five-Year Plan (1963-67) which presented the details of projected 
programs for developing high-quality human labour. The base of Turkey's educational 
system has been a free, five year primary school, attendance at which was legally 
compulsory for those between seven and twelve years. Turkey has pursued an education 
policy with emphasis on elementary education and with strict controls on admission to 
higher education. Almost all children received primary education, and 58 per cent of school-
age children attended secondary school in 1991. In addition to a variety of adult education 
programs, the military bases have also played an important role in the development of high 
level technical and managerial human labour in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s [84]. 
The improving and expanding of education and training has also been one of the other 
important objectives of the structural adjustment and stabilisation policies of the 1980s. The 
key role of development of human resources was emphasised in the Turkish national plan 
during the period 1985-1989, which indicated the maximum exploitation of the Turkey's 
potential of human resources through appropriate education and training. In 1985, the total 
enrolment in elementary education amounted to approximately 6.6 million. However, the 
budgetary allocations to the Education Ministry fell from 2.5 per cent of GNP in 1983 to 
2.1 percent in 1986. Between the academic years 1983-84 and 1985-86 the schooling ratio 
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has increased in primary education from 98.3 to 98.9 per cent, in middle school from 43.7 
to 54.4 per cent, and in secondary education from 26.4 to 31.4 per cent. The number of 
primary schools and students increased from 47,355 and 6,500,539 respectively in 1983-84 
to 51,370 and 233,441 in 1990-91. The rapid process of industrial development in 1980s 
necessitated the need for skilled human labour with professional and technical knowledge. 
Hence, the government increased the number of vocational and technical schools from 1,356 
in 1983- 84 to 1,963 schools in 1990-91. There were also an increase in the number of 
students and teachers of these schools from 370,176 students and 36,684 teachers in 1983-
84 to 620,244 students and 48,369 teachers in 1990-91 [85]. 
There is no simple or comprehensive measure for human resource development. However, 
there is a useful and simple summary measure by United Nations Human Development 
Index (HOI) based on literacy (mean years of schooling), life expectancy and real per- capita 
GDP. On the HDI measure, Turkey was among the top ten countries in terms of 
improvement over the period 1960-92, leaving the ranks of the low and entering the ranks 
of the medium level countries. By 1992, Turkey ranked 68th (71st in 1990) among 173 
countries. This improvement in ranking was due to above-average economic performance, 
as Turkey lagged in education outcomes [86]. Despite substantial quantitative achievements, 
the Turkish educational system has been often criticised for its excessively academic nature 
and lack of practical orientation [87]. The rapid growth in enrolments, coupled with 
increasing funding problems, has brought signs of declining quality in school provision. It 
is also argued that for those who have been. at upper-secondary educational level, there were 
about 30 per cent of the 15-17 year-olds remained in the formal system Another figure 
shows that in 1984-85, only 41 per cent of 12 to 17 year-olds stayed on in formal schooling. 
Lacking an adequate foundation of general knowledge as well as basic vocational skills, 
most of early school-leavers have been ill equipped to adapt to the future economic and 
social changes and therefore added to the unemployed group. Thus, the quantitative 
expansion and qualitative improvement offurther education opportunities at the middle and 
upper secondary levels remained as a major challenge to Turkish educational policy [88]. 
Moreover, there were some serious imbalances between the number of engineers and 
technicians (about 3:5 ratio) and between doctors and nurses ( about 6:1 ratio). The 
engineer and doctor therefore do the work of technician and nurse. Such imbalances 
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prevented proper utilisation of more highly trained personnel and forced them to spend 
much time in some activities which could be performed by lesser trained persons [89]. 
Although five-year primary education has been covered all children aged between 7-12, only 
26 per cent of the relevant age group have received full-time secondary education in 1988. 
For tertiary (university) education, the figure was 12 per cent in the same year and the share 
of educational expenditure as a percentage of GDP was only 1.9 per cent. These figures 
which have been the lowest levels in OECD, put Turkey at the bottom of the OECD 
countries [90]. Despite a recent rapid increase in the both public and private expenditure 
on education, the rate of youth unemployment has remained high with about one-third of 
urban unemployed youths between the age of 15 and 24 and one-fifth between the ages of 
25 and 30 [91]. 
In order to solve these problems and generally improve the national education system, the 
Turkish government has adopted some specific programs through the national development 
plans, including necessary measures to raise the quality of national education, further 
increasing of the schooling rate in all educational level, developing technological education 
at the primary and secondary level, emphasising an overall technical and vocational 
education and improving the quality of science and engineering in higher education. It is 
believed that because of certain factors and budgetary limitation, the implementation of these 
measures may not be completed until 2005. 
G.l SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
One can draw several important lessons from the Turkish experience of industrialisation. A 
fundamental lesson to emerge from the Turkish experience concerns the powerlessness and 
vulnerability of a highly centralised state. In the Turkish context, the centralised state 
appeared to be particularly wInerable in terms of its ability to generate tax revenues on an 
adequate scale, and to impose fiscal discipline [92]. Moreover, during the period of 
implementing import substitution in the 1960s and 1970s, the state in Turkey played a 
significantly larger role than that observed in many other developing countries pursuing the 
same pattern of industrialisation. The share of the state sector, predominately located in 
strategic branches, in manufacturing industry and in total investments were around 40 % and 
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50 % respectively during the 1960s and 1970s [93]. 
Having compared the role of state in industrialisation of Turkey with that of East Asian 
counterparts, one can say that the Turkish state has been weaker in terms of monitoring 
private sector activity and its ability to decipline private firms in return for the resources 
provided. It is also believed that the state in Turkey has been an "overextended" or 
"overloaded" in comparison with the East Asian countries. It has not only involved direct 
production through extensive state economic enterprises, but it has also sought to guide 
private production through a complex system of subsidies and investment incentives [94]. 
Moreover, in terms of the successful experience of East Asian countries in implementation 
of import substitution strategy in the early stage of their industrialisation, it is believed that 
the Turkish import substitution strategy has also been moderately successful, at least in the 
early stages. However, one of the most important factors which distinguished the Turkish 
and East Asian experience of lSI in the early stages of their industrialisation has been the 
lower degree of state autonomy and the insufficient degree of co-operation or collaboration 
between the state and business in Turkey which led to frustrating the development process 
and to the crisis of the late 1970s [95]. 
The Turkish case demonstrates the overall feasibility of switching from Import Substitution 
Strategy to Outward-orientation in the latter stages of the h"beralisation process, but the 
transitional costs involved appear to be substantial. Moreover, Turkey's recent experience 
in trade h"beralisation and stabilisation programs brings about the strong connections 
between macroeconomic policy and trade reforms. It shows that the interactions of 
adjustment policies can cause the macroeconomic instability such as high rate of inflation 
and lDlemployment and unbalanced income distn"bution, and this in tum has worsened the 
climate for new capital formation in manufacturing, which is central to sustained 
industrialisation in the long term. The Turkish case also illustrates the difficulties of 
sustaining a single minded export drive, in a COlDltry endowed with a large domestic market. 
The experience of Turkish industrial development also shows that the early import-
substitution strategy was highly conducive in giving an initial impetus to the Turkish industry 
during the 1960s. However, despite some momentous impacts on the Turkish economy, it 
is believed that this strategy failed to achieve all of its planned objectives. The 1980s 
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strategy of manufactured export-led growth, on the other hand, has been essential in 
increasing merchandise exports and also changing the country's economy structure in favour 
of the manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, this strategy could not provide adequate 
stimulate to the domestic economy when the export potential of the export promotion 
scheme has reached its limits. As suggested by Yeldan (1989), it seems that an appropriate 
development strategy for Turkey's future is the continuing of the current export promotion 
policy along with a primarily domestic demand-oriented industrialisation strategy. This 
strategy is based on the expansion of the domestic market through emphasising more on 
agriculture sector, and also production of basic intermediate and capital goods together with 
domestic production of associated technologies, and aimed at improvement of income 
distribution, employment and social welfare, particularly in rural areas [96]. 
The Turkish experience of structural adjustment and stabilisation programs suggests that the 
effectiveness of these policies can benefit gready from prompt and sizable external financial 
assistance especially during the initial period of the adjustment. It is only at a later stage, 
however, that an increasing portion of capital inflows can be expected to take place in the 
form of foreign direct investment which need to be improved in Turkey. One can say that 
the Turgut Ozal was the major architect of structural adjustment and trade hoeralisation of 
the 1980s and appeared to have a Japanese model behind its thinking, and transition to an 
export oriented economy that Turkey underwent under his guidance identifies the 1980s 
quite clearly as the Ozal decade [97]. 
It is clear that the Turkish experience of structural adjustment and trade liberalisation 
policies and its transition to an open market export oriented economy since 1980 has had 
many similar criteria with the experience of some other late industrialising countries such 
as those of South East Asian countries and some Latin American countries. Most or all of 
these late industrialising countries have adopted these policies earlier or at the same time 
with Turkey, which usually accompanied with conditional assistance from international 
organisations such as IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank. One can also 
refer to some particular convergence in their policy orientation, such as redefining the role 
of state and assigning a greater importance to the competitive discipline of market through 
a transition from inward looking to outward looking industrialisation policies. As an 
example, one can see an interesting parallel between the Turkish experience of post 1980s 
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and South Korea in the post 1964 period in terms of the significance of export subsidies as 
wen as the sequencing of export promotion and import h'beralisation. The empirical reality 
in late industrialising countries generally indicates, however, significant divergences in the 
forms of implementation as well as the degree of socioeconomic success of the fairly 
standard guidelines of the IMF type programs [98]. A comparison with the Latin American 
cases of the post 1982 era indicates that while stabilisation and reform in Latin America, in 
its early stages, was accompanied by drastic import compression. In Turkey the reverse was 
true, with significant import expansion accompanying the h'beralisation programme. Since 
Turkey was heavily dependent on imports of intermediate and capital goods, an expansion 
of imports contnbuted to the recovery of domestic production as wen as to the process of 
export expansion. 
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